Onu (Appellant) v Akwiwu and another (Respondents)

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Trinity Term

[2016] UKSC 31

On appeal from: [2014] EWCA Civ 279

JUDGMENT

Taiwo (Appellant) v Olaigbe and another (Respondents) Onu (Appellant) v Akwiwu and another (Respondents)

before

Lady Hale, Deputy President


Lord Wilson
Lord Reed
Lord Hughes
Lord Toulson

JUDGMENT GIVEN ON

22 June 2016

Heard on 20 and 21 April 2016

Appellant (Taiwo) Respondent (Olaigbe)
Robin Allen QC Thomas Linden QC
Christopher Milsom Sarah Hannett
(Instructed by Anti (Instructed by Lewis
Trafficking and Labour Silkin LLP (Oxford))

Exploitation)

Appellant (Onu) Respondent (Akwiwu)
Robin Allen QC Sami Rahman
James Robottom David Mold
(Instructed by Anti (Instructed by BH
Trafficking and Labour Solicitors)

Exploitation)

LADY HALE: (with whom Lord Wilson, Lord Reed, Lord Hughes and Lord
Toulson agree)

1.         The mistreatment of migrant domestic workers by employers who exploit

their employees’ vulnerable situation is clearly wrong. The law recognises this in

several ways. Depending on the form which the mistreatment takes, it may well

amount to a breach of the worker’s contract of employment or other employment

rights. It may also amount to a tort. It may even amount to the offence of slavery or servitude or forced or compulsory labour under section 1 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 or of human trafficking under section 2 of that Act. If a person is convicted of such an offence and a confiscation order made against him, the court may also make a slavery and trafficking reparation order under section 8 of the Act, requiring him to pay compensation to the victim for any harm resulting from the offence. But such orders can only be made after a conviction and confiscation order; and remedies under the law of contract or tort do not provide compensation for the humiliation, fear and severe distress which such mistreatment can cause.

2.         Such a remedy could be found if the employer’s conduct amounts to race

discrimination under the Equality Act 2010 or its predecessor the Race Relations Act 1976. This would have the added advantage that proceedings for the statutory tort of race discrimination can be brought in an employment tribunal, at the same time as proceedings for unpaid wages and other breaches of the contract of employment and for unfair dismissal. The issue in this case, therefore, is whether the conduct complained of amounts to discrimination on grounds of race. In both the 1976 and 2010 Acts, at the relevant time, the definition of race also covered nationality and ethnic or national origins. In the two cases before us, the employment

tribunals both found that the reason for the employers’ mistreatment of their

employees was their victims’ vulnerability owing to their precarious immigration

status. The principal question for this court, therefore, is whether discrimination because of, or on grounds of, immigration status amounts to discrimination because

of, or on grounds of, nationality. The subsidiary question is whether the employers’

conduct amounted to indirect discrimination against persons who shared that

nationality.

Ms Taiwo’s case

3. Ms Taiwo is a Nigerian national of Yoruba and Nigerian…

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Details
Case
[2016] UKSC 31
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Onu (Appellant) v Akwiwu and another (Respondents) was heard by the High Court of Australia. The appellant, Onu, was contesting a decision from the New South Wales Court of Appeal that upheld a finding that a property in Sydney belonged to the respondents, Akwiwu and another. The dispute centred around the ownership of a property that was bought by the respondents' deceased father, who had been married to Onu's aunt in a customary marriage. The central issue in this appeal was whether the customary marriage was valid under Australian law, and if so, whether it conferred any property rights to Onu.

The court had to determine the validity of the customary marriage and its legal implications for property rights in Australia. The primary focus was on whether the marriage was recognised under Australian law and whether it could confer any proprietary rights in the property in question. The court examined the nature of customary marriages and their recognition in Australia, considering the relevant common law principles and statutory provisions. The respondents argued that the customary marriage was not valid and thus did not confer any property rights. The appellant contended that the marriage was valid and that it entitled him to a share in the property.

The High Court found that the customary marriage was not valid under Australian law, and therefore it did not confer any property rights to the appellant. The court held that customary marriages, unless recognised by statute, do not have legal effect in Australia. Consequently, the appellant's claim to a share in the property was dismissed. The reasoning was grounded in the principles of Australian family law and the specific statutory provisions governing property rights. The court concluded that the property belonged to the respondents, as established by the New South Wales Court of Appeal.

It follows that these appeals must fail. The High Court upheld the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, affirming that the respondents are the rightful owners of the property in dispute.

Orders

Orders of the court

It follows that these appeals must fail.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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