Trinity Term
[2016] UKSC 31
On appeal from: [2014] EWCA Civ 279
| JUDGMENT |
Taiwo (Appellant) v Olaigbe and another (Respondents) Onu (Appellant) v Akwiwu and another (Respondents)
before
Lady Hale, Deputy President
Lord Wilson
Lord Reed
Lord Hughes
Lord Toulson
JUDGMENT GIVEN ON
22 June 2016
Heard on 20 and 21 April 2016
Appellant (Taiwo) Respondent (Olaigbe) Robin Allen QC Thomas Linden QC Christopher Milsom Sarah Hannett (Instructed by Anti (Instructed by Lewis
| Trafficking and Labour | Silkin LLP (Oxford)) |
Exploitation)
Appellant (Onu) Respondent (Akwiwu) Robin Allen QC Sami Rahman James Robottom David Mold (Instructed by Anti (Instructed by BH
| Trafficking and Labour | Solicitors) |
Exploitation)
LADY HALE: (with whom Lord Wilson, Lord Reed, Lord Hughes and Lord
Toulson agree)
1. The mistreatment of migrant domestic workers by employers who exploit
their employees’ vulnerable situation is clearly wrong. The law recognises this in
several ways. Depending on the form which the mistreatment takes, it may well
amount to a breach of the worker’s contract of employment or other employment
rights. It may also amount to a tort. It may even amount to the offence of slavery or servitude or forced or compulsory labour under section 1 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 or of human trafficking under section 2 of that Act. If a person is convicted of such an offence and a confiscation order made against him, the court may also make a slavery and trafficking reparation order under section 8 of the Act, requiring him to pay compensation to the victim for any harm resulting from the offence. But such orders can only be made after a conviction and confiscation order; and remedies under the law of contract or tort do not provide compensation for the humiliation, fear and severe distress which such mistreatment can cause.
2. Such a remedy could be found if the employer’s conduct amounts to race
discrimination under the Equality Act 2010 or its predecessor the Race Relations Act 1976. This would have the added advantage that proceedings for the statutory tort of race discrimination can be brought in an employment tribunal, at the same time as proceedings for unpaid wages and other breaches of the contract of employment and for unfair dismissal. The issue in this case, therefore, is whether the conduct complained of amounts to discrimination on grounds of race. In both the 1976 and 2010 Acts, at the relevant time, the definition of race also covered nationality and ethnic or national origins. In the two cases before us, the employment
tribunals both found that the reason for the employers’ mistreatment of their
employees was their victims’ vulnerability owing to their precarious immigration
status. The principal question for this court, therefore, is whether discrimination because of, or on grounds of, immigration status amounts to discrimination because
of, or on grounds of, nationality. The subsidiary question is whether the employers’
conduct amounted to indirect discrimination against persons who shared that
nationality.
Ms Taiwo’s case
3. Ms Taiwo is a Nigerian national of Yoruba and Nigerian…
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- Case
- [2016] UKSC 31
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine the validity of the customary marriage and its legal implications for property rights in Australia. The primary focus was on whether the marriage was recognised under Australian law and whether it could confer any proprietary rights in the property in question. The court examined the nature of customary marriages and their recognition in Australia, considering the relevant common law principles and statutory provisions. The respondents argued that the customary marriage was not valid and thus did not confer any property rights. The appellant contended that the marriage was valid and that it entitled him to a share in the property.
The High Court found that the customary marriage was not valid under Australian law, and therefore it did not confer any property rights to the appellant. The court held that customary marriages, unless recognised by statute, do not have legal effect in Australia. Consequently, the appellant's claim to a share in the property was dismissed. The reasoning was grounded in the principles of Australian family law and the specific statutory provisions governing property rights. The court concluded that the property belonged to the respondents, as established by the New South Wales Court of Appeal.
It follows that these appeals must fail. The High Court upheld the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, affirming that the respondents are the rightful owners of the property in dispute.
Orders
Orders of the court
It follows that these appeals must fail.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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