Queensland Trotting Board v McLean

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J, Owen and Walsh JJ.

QUEENSLAND TROTTING BOARD v. McLEAN

(1972) 125 CLR 488

25 February 1972

Inferior Tribunals

Inferior Tribunals—Trotting Board—Disqualification by stewards—Appeal to Board—Denial of natural justice on appeal—Prohibition—Certiorari—Whether Board can delegate function of hearing appeals—Whether appeal committee may include members who are not members of Board—Racing and Betting Acts Amendment Act, 1967 (Q.).

Decisions


February 25.
BARWICK C.J. The respondents, the owner and driver of a horse in a race conducted on 15th September 1971 by the Albion Park Trotting Club, Queensland, were disqualified for a period of twelve months by the stewards of that club. (at p489)

2. They appealed to the Queensland Trotting Board pursuant to the Rules of Trotting. The committee of that Board, which I will refer to in what I am going to say as "the committee", all of the members of the committee participating, dismissed the respondents' appeal. (at p489)

3. The respondents sought of the Supreme Court prohibition to restrain the Board from further proceeding upon its decision to dismiss the respondents' appeal, and upon the disqualification of the respondents by the stewards. (at p490)

4. The Supreme Court was satisfied that the committee in hearing the appeal had denied the respondents natural justice. This opinion was founded upon evidence that the members of the committee in viewing films, one of the race in question and another of a race held on the prior week, allowed the chief steward of the Trotting Club to point out features of the film and perhaps otherwise to speak to them in the absence of the respondents. (at p490)

5. The Board now seeks the Court's special leave to appeal against the grant by the Supreme Court of a writ of prohibition against the Trotting Board, both in respect of its own decision and in respect of the stewards' disqualification, on two grounds: first, that the Supreme Court was in error in concluding that there had been a denial of natural justice and, second, that it had no authority to grant prohibition to restrain the committee or the Board from enforcing the disqualification by the stewards. (at p490)

6. I would not grant special leave to appeal on the first of these grounds as in my opinion there are no special grounds for doing so. But I would grant special leave to appeal on the second ground which in my opinion involves an important question of law. (at p490)

7. The Supreme Court granted prohibition in respect of the stewards' decision because their Honours who constituted the Full Court thought that there were no persons other than the members of the committee who could hear the respondents' appeal in conformity with the Rules of Trotting. (at p490)

8. Hart J., with whom the other members of the Court agreed, said this:

"If the rules provided for an alternate appeal committee we could order a rehearing before that committee. But this not being so, there is no tribunal which can…
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Details
Case
[1972] HCA 13
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Queensland Trotting Board (the Board) sought to recover from Mr. McLean the sum of £10,000, which it alleged was due to it under a deed of covenant. The deed was entered into between the Board and Mr. McLean in 1964, and it concerned the sale of a trotting stud property. The dispute arose because the Board claimed Mr. McLean had breached the covenant by failing to pay the sum of £10,000, which was payable upon the happening of a certain event. The matter was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the event upon which the sum of £10,000 was payable had in fact occurred. This required the Court to interpret the terms of the deed of covenant, specifically the clause that stipulated the conditions for payment. The Court had to determine if the circumstances that transpired after the execution of the deed satisfied the criteria for the payment obligation to arise.

The Court examined the language of the deed and the surrounding circumstances at the time of its execution. It was held that the event triggering the payment of £10,000 had not occurred. The Court reasoned that the wording of the covenant was clear and unambiguous, and that the subsequent events did not fulfil the specific conditions precedent to payment. Therefore, Mr. McLean was not liable to pay the sum of £10,000 to the Board under the deed. The appeal was dismissed.

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