“One day my son, all this will be yours”. Spoken by a farmer to his son when in his teens, and repeated for many years thereafter. Relying on that promise of inheritance from his father, the son spends the best part of his working life on the farm, working at very low wages, accommodated in a farm cottage, in the expectation that he will succeed his father as owner of the farm, to be able to continue farming there, and in due course to pass on the farm to his own children.

Many years later, father and son fall out. It does not matter who is to blame for the falling out, but they can no longer work together or even live in close proximity. The son has no alternative but to leave, to find alternative work and rented accommodation for himself and his family elsewhere. Meanwhile the father cuts him out of his will. The facts of this case differ from the above common example only because the father David Guest has two sons, Andrew and Ross as well as a daughter Jan. Andrew was not promised the whole of the farm (“Tump Farm”) as an inheritance, but only a sufficient (but undefined) part of it to enable him to operate a viable farming business on it after the death of his parents.

What if anything can the law do for Andrew? There is no contract between them which Andrew can enforce. The farm was not put into trust for the parents for life with remainder to be shared between Andrew, Ross and Jan. The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 is unlikely to assist Andrew because he can still earn a living. Anyway his parents may have many years to live. And the farmhouse is their home. Most people would think that Andrew has been very unfairly treated by his father, but many would also think it strange if the court were to require David to give Andrew a viable share of the farm now, when he had promised to do so only upon his and his wife’s death. Why should Andrew receive a share of the farm earlier than he had been promised it, because of a family dispute for which he may have been no less to blame (if blame is the right word at all) than his father?

Providing a remedy for Andrew is a task for which the courts have recourse to equitable principles. One of the principal…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Guest v Guest

Details

AGLC: Guest v Guest [2022] UKSC 27
Case: [2022] UKSC 27
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Guest and another (Appellants) v Guest (Respondent), the Supreme Court considered the appropriate remedy for a proprietary estoppel claim. The Appellants, David George Guest and Josephine Guest, appealed against the decision of the Court of Appeal, which had awarded the Respondent, Andrew Charles Guest, compensation for the disappointment of his expectation of inheriting part of the family farm. The Appellants argued that the Court of Appeal had erred in law by focusing on compensating for the detriment suffered by Andrew, rather than satisfying his expectation.

The Supreme Court held that the primary purpose of the remedy in proprietary estoppel cases is to address the unconscionability arising from the promisor going back on their promise. While the length of detrimental reliance and the proportionality between the expectation and the detriment are relevant considerations, they do not determine the appropriate remedy. In this case, the Court of Appeal had not erred in law by awarding compensation to Andrew, as it was a just and proportionate remedy in the circumstances.

The Supreme Court also considered the appropriate amount of compensation to be awarded to Andrew. The Court calculated the financial loss attributable to Andrew being kept out of the money he would have earned in another job and added it to the principal sum to arrive at an estimated total financial loss of £610,000. The Court did not consider it appropriate to add any further amount to reflect non-pecuniary harm, as the financial compensation should go a long way towards alleviating any feelings of dislocation and distress.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal and affirmed the award of compensation to Andrew. The Court emphasized that the primary aim of the remedy in proprietary estoppel cases is to address the unconscionability caused by the promisor going back on their promise, and the appropriate remedy must be proportionate to the circumstances of each case.

Orders