Lord Hope of Craighead Lord Hutton
(APPELLANT)
(APPELLANT)
LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY
My Lords,
I have had an opportunity of reading in draft the
speeches prepared by my noble and learned friends, Lord Steyn and Lord Hope of
Craighead. I agree with them, and for the reasons they give I would dismiss both
appeals.
LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY
My Lords,
I have had the advantage of reading the draft of the
speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Steyn. For the reasons he
gives I too would dismiss both appeals. I would, however, reiterate that in
Ireland the question as to whether there was a fear of immediate violence
for the purposes of section 47 of the Act and the question as to how the concept
of immediacy is to be applied, in a case where words or silence by someone using
the telephone are relied on as constituting the assault, did not arise for
decision.
LORD STEYN
My Lords,
It is easy to understand the terrifying effect of a
campaign of telephone calls at night by a silent caller to a woman living on her
own. It would be natural for the victim to regard the calls as menacing. What
may heighten her fear is that she will not know what the caller may do next. The
spectre of the caller arriving at her doorstep bent on inflicting personal
violence on her may come to dominate her thinking. After all, as a matter of
common sense, what else would she be terrified about? The victim may suffer
psychiatric illness such as anxiety neurosis or acute depression. Harassment of
women by repeated silent telephone calls, accompanied on occasions by heavy
breathing, is apparently a significant social problem. That the criminal law
should be able to deal with this problem, and so far as is practicable, afford
effective protection to victims is self evident.
From the point of view, however, of the general
policy of our law towards the imposition of criminal responsibility, three
specific features of the problem must be faced squarely. First, the medium used
by the caller is the telephone: arguably it differs qualitatively from a
face-to-face offer of violence to a sufficient extent to make a difference.
Secondly, ex hypothesi the caller remains silent: arguably a caller may avoid
the reach of the criminal law by remaining silent however menacing the context
may be. Thirdly, it is arguable that the criminal law does not take into account
"mere" psychiatric illnesses.
At first glance it may seem that the legislature has satisfactorily dealt with such objections by section 43(1) of the Telecommunications Act 1984 which makes it an offence persistently to make use of a public telecommunications system for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety to another. The maximum…
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- Case
- [1997] UKHL 34
- Decision Date
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