Zabiyaka v The Queen
[2017] NZHC 124
•8 February 2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY
CRI-2016-419-000061 [2017] NZHC 124
BETWEEN ANTON ZABIYAKA
Appellant
AND
THE QUEEN Respondent
Hearing: 8 February 2017 Appearances:
G Walsh for the Appellant
M Dillon for the RespondentJudgment:
8 February 2017
ORAL JUDGMENT OF MUIR J
Counsel/Solicitors:
G Walsh, Barrister, Hamilton
M Dillon, Almao Douch, Hamilton
ZABIYAKA v THE QUEEN [2017] NZHC 124 [8 February 2017]
Introduction
[1] The appellant, Mr Zabiyaka, pleaded guilty to eleven charges in the District Court, all of which resulted from a single methamphetamine-fuelled spree of offending. The pre-sentence report describes him having generally “wrought chaos from Hamilton to Te Kuiti”. That is not an overstatement.
[2] On 27 September 2016 Judge Treston sentenced him to four years imprisonment. Mr Zaibyaka now appeals his sentence on the basis that it was manifestly excessive. Specifically he argues that the starting point adopted was too high and the discount for mitigating factors was insufficient and did not recognise discounts for remorse and rehabilitation.
Offences
[3] In the District Court Mr Zabiyaka pleaded guilty to the following charges:
Offence
Statutory provision
Maximum penalty
Demanding with intent to steal (x 4 counts)1
Crimes Act 1961, s 239(2).
7 years’ imprisonment
Intentional damage
Crimes Act 1961, s
269(2)(a).
7 years’ imprisonment
Wilful damage
Summary Offences Act
1981, s 11(1)(a).
3 months’ imprisonment
Aggravated robbery
Crimes Act 1961, s 235(c).
14 years’ imprisonment
Possession of an offensive weapon
Crimes Act 1961, s
202A(4)(b).
3 years’ imprisonment
Aggravated assault
Crimes Act 1961, s
192(1)(c).
3 years’ imprisonment
Possession of Class A controlled drug (methamphetamine)
Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, ss 7(1)(a) and 7(2).
6 months’ imprisonment
1 The appellant’s submissions refer to only three counts of demanding with intent to steal, but the
charge sheet and the District Court judgment both refer to four counts.
Offence Statutory provision
Maximum penalty
Driving while impaired
Land Transport Act 1998, s
57A.2
3 months’ imprisonment plus disqualification from driving
Factual background
The offending
[4] The offending occurred on the morning of 27 April 2016. At that time Mr Zabiyaka was subject to release conditions in respect of previous offending. He was the guest of a hotel in Hamilton. At around 6.15 am that morning he injected himself with methamphetamine. It appears that he had done so on numerous previous occasions having explained to the writer of the pre-sentence report that on the morning in question he injected “larger than his normal quantity of the drug”. Upon doing so he became highly agitated, breaking items and furniture in his hotel room and forcibly removing a fire sprinkler. This resulted in extensive water damage to the interior of his room and also some damage to neighbouring rooms. These actions resulted in the intentional damage charge.
[5] He then exited the hotel and drove off in his motor vehicle which was parked nearby. He had a hammer in the car which he retained throughout the offending. That gave rise to the possession of offensive weapon charge.
[6] By about 7.00 am Mr Zabiyaka had driven to Thornton Place in Hamilton. He parked his car in the middle of the road. A Ms Wilson was driving her car along Thornton Place at the time. As she approached Mr Zabiyaka’s vehicle he began to reverse towards her, stopping just short of a collision. Ms Wilson sounded her horn at the defendant.
[7] At that point Mr Zabiyaka armed himself with the hammer, exited his vehicle and approached Ms Wilson. He opened the driver’s door saying “get out, get out
now before the police come”. As he did so he was holding the hammer with his right
2 There are differing references to this charge throughout the file, and no statutory provision is cited. The Judge in the District Court, for example, refers to “one police charge of driving and failing to complete a compulsory impairment test”.
hand above his head. He grabbed Ms Wilson by the clothing and pulled her out of the vehicle. He then got into the victim’s vehicle and drove away leaving his car in the middle of the road. His evident motivation in doing this was to confuse any police pursuit.
[8] He then drove towards Pirongia stopping at a service station at approximately
7.30 am. He demanded a can of soft drink from the service station attendant who refused to comply, at which point Mr Zabiyaka threw a bag of cables at the attendant and drove away.
[9] Shortly after he drove Ms Wilson’s car into the opposing lane on Highway 39 flashing his lights at a second victim, Mr Dunn, who was travelling in a northerly direction. Mr Dunn was forced to stop his vehicle. Mr Zabiyaka then exited his vehicle and approached the driver’s door of Mr Dunn’s vehicle. Armed with the hammer he demanded Mr Dunn hand over his vehicle, evidently again with the intention of confusing the police in their pursuit. Mr Dunn drove quickly off. As he did so, Mr Zabiyaka used the hammer to strike at Mr Dunn’s vehicle, smashing the rear side window. These actions gave rise to the wilful damage charge.
[10] Mr Zabiyaka then continued to drive further south along State Highway 39. At about 8.00 am he arrived at an address in Otorohanga. This was a rural property occupied by the third defendant Mr Edwards along with his wife and two children. Mr Zabiyaka approached Mr Edwards armed with the hammer and said “I want your fucken ute, the pigs are after me”. Mr Edwards told him to take it and went inside his house. Mr Zabiyaka attempted to steal the utility but was unsuccessful. He left the address shortly after. Those actions resulted in the charge of demanding with intent to steal.
[11] He then travelled to a second address in Otorohanga. There, he approached the fourth victim, Mr Veteinuba, and demanded his vehicle. He told Mr Veteinuba he “could do this the easy way or the hard way”. Mr Veteinuba became frightened and went inside his house locking his doors. Mr Zabiyaka remained at the address for a short time and tried to get into two vehicles parked there. However, he was
unsuccessful. He subsequently left the address in Ms Wilson’s vehicle. These actions gave rise to a second charge of demanding with intent to steal.
[12] Shortly after that Mr Zabiyaka travelled to another address. He approached the occupant, the fifth victim, Mr Prasad. He demanded his vehicle, telling him, “I need to take your vehicle for a long drive, if you don’t give it to me I’m going to rob it”. However, with the approaching sound of police sirens he decided immediately to leave the address. These actions gave rise to the third charge of demanding with intent to steal.
[13] As police cars approached, Mr Zabiyaka attempted a U-turn blocking both lanes in the process. Police cars parked behind and in front of him in an attempt to contain him. Constable Strongman approached Mr Zabiyaka’s side door and tried to get him to exit the vehicle. At that point Mr Zabiyaka reversed into the police car parked behind him, pushing it out of the way. He attempted to drive off but appeared to have difficulty in doing so. Constable Strongman ran alongside the vehicle. Mr Zabiyaka swerved his vehicle towards the constable, who took evasive action and threw his police-issue baton through the side window at Mr Zabiyaka. Mr Zabiyaka swerved and drove away. These actions gave rise to the aggravated assault charge.
[14] Mr Zabiyaka drove to another address and approached the sixth victim, Mr Scott. Armed with a hammer and the police baton that had been thrown into his vehicle, he told Mr Scott “I want your ute”. Mr Scott felt that Mr Zabiyaka was going to take it by force. These actions gave rise to the fourth charge of demanding with intent to steal.
[15] Police then arrived and arrested Mr Zabiyaka. When searched, 12 small plastic bags were found in his possession containing a crystaline substance. This gave rise to the charge of possession of a Class A controlled drug, methamphetamine.
[16] After his arrest, Mr Zabiyaka displayed characteristics consistent with being under the influence of intoxicating substances. He admitted that he had recently
consumed methamphetamine, and a subsequent blood sample was found to contain that drug. This gave rise to the police charge of driving while impaired.
Impact on the victims
[17] None of Mr Zabiyaka’s victims received any physical injuries. Nevertheless, the victim impact statements describe the significant emotional trauma associated with his offending. For example, Ms Wilson, who is 63, describes these actions as having had a “traumatic emotional effect on her”. Although previously a confident person, she now finds herself suffering from anxiety attacks and is unable to collect her grandchildren from school or indeed to walk down a public street unless someone is with her. She She and her husband were without a motor vehicle for the six weeks required to repair their car and Ms Wilson was required to take two weeks leave from her employment and her husband three days.
[18] The police reparation schedule estimates that the total financial costs of all of the offending that occurred that day amounted to $15,967.
Prior convictions
[19] Mr Zabiyaka has 53 criminal convictions dating back to late 2000. The offending is relatively consistent, apart from a gap between 2008 and 2013 during which Mr Zabiyaka says, in a statement provided to the District Court, he managed to remain alcohol and drug free.
[20] However, by 2013 he had started drinking again resulting in a drink driving charge that year. The drinking became heavier and then spiralled into drug taking. At the time of the events in question it is clear Mr Zabikaya had a serious methamphetamine addiction.
[21] He was convicted of offending in the period 2000 to 20008, including assault with a blunt instrument, several common assaults, male assaults female, robbery and aggravated robbery and motor vehicle theft. He has also been convicted of car thefts in the past. All of this offending seems ultimately to have had its genesis in addiction.
Personal circumstances
[22] Mr Zabiyaka is 32. He resides with his partner of 10 years and her 13 year old daughter whom he regards as his step-daughter. Prior to the index offending he was self-employed as a builder, a trade which he learned during his period of abstinence in 2008 to 2013. He was sufficiently successful that his business grew to include other staff.
[23] He acknowledges that he requires extensive treatment for his addiction issues. He has a particularly supportive and competent mother who is a dual diagnosis clinician at the Community Alcohol and Drug Service. With her help, he took steps after the offending to be considered for In-Patient treatment at Odyssey House. Such treatment was not possible in light of the sentence of imprisonment he received for the offending. I am nevertheless advised that he is actively pursuing all alcohol and drug rehabilitation opportunities available to him whilst in prison. His mother’s advice to the District Court was that he was showing greater motivation than any earlier time to address his underlying problems.
[24] The pre-sentence report indicates that Mr Zabiyaka has some insight into his offending but says that he tends to “limit his responsibility”. That comment appears to be based on the fact that Mr Zabiyaka has stated that the offending would not have occurred had he not injected a larger than normal quantity of the drug. I do not see that statement as necessarily detracting from his insight into his offending.
[25] Mr Zabiyaka was willing to participate in a restorative justice conference. The District Court records that a sum of $3,000 was offered by way of reparation. However, no reparation order was made. Mrs Zabiyaka today advises me in a sworn statement that she and her husband are prepared to advance the sum of $5,000 for financial reparation on the strict basis that this is a loan to Mr Zabiyaka to be repaid by him as soon as he is released from prison and returns to employment.
The District Court’s decision
[26] Judge Treston took the aggravated robbery charge as the lead offence, an approach with which I agree. He then referred to the tariff decision of R v Mako and
applied a starting point of five years imprisonment having regard to all aggravating feature.3
[27] The Judge noted by way of aggravation the following:
(a) an actual and threatened use of violence and weapons;
(b)Mr Zabiyaka was on release conditions at the time of offending and there was a bail bond;
(c) the loss, damage and harm caused to the victims;
(d) some elements of premeditation (although fuelled by his drug use);
and
(e) Mr Zabiyaka’s previous convictions.
[28] The Judge said that cumulatively these features persuaded him to adopt the Crown’s suggested five year starting point. In fact, there is an inconsistency in the District Court judgment which recites at [10] that the Crown sought a starting point of five years and two months, two months being an appropriate uplift to recognise previous offending. By comparison at [18] of the judgment, the District Court Judge says that:
… it is my view that the appropriate starting point is that as suggested by the Crown when one looks at the various uplifts and the starting point according to the authority which I have referred and it is my view that the overall, because of this offending, the starting point ought to be five years’ imprisonment.
[29] Mr Dillon submits that the Judge can be taken as having adopted a starting point of five years and two months, uplifting for the previous offences as contended for by the Crown but then recognising some element of remorse so as to adopt a revised starting point of five years. If that was the Judge’s approach, it is not
apparent on the face of the judgment.
3 R v Mako [2000] 2 NZLR 170 (CA).
[30] Having adopted that starting point the Judge then noted Mr Zabiyaka’s guilty pleas and expressions of remorse as mitigating factors. He allowed a 20 per cent discount for the guilty plea but, although identifying remorse as a discrete item, he did not allow a discount for it. He then imposed a sentence of four years imprisonment for the aggravated robbery charge and sentences of between one month and two and a half years imprisonment for the remaining charges, with all such sentences to be served concurrently.
Appellant’s submissions.
Starting point
[31] With respect to the lead offence involving aggravated robbery of Ms Wilson, the appellant refers to the tariff case of R v Mako4 and submits that this offending falls within the category of a street robbery (justifying a starting point of between 18 months and three years).5 He says further that the extent of the violence used justifies a starting point of two years’ imprisonment. The robbery essentially involved threatened violence only. The appellant only briefly grabbed the victim (Ms Wilson), and did not use the hammer against her. The victim did not suffer any physical injuries.
[32] Counsel referred to three principal authorities in support of this submission being R v McGhee,6 Golding v New Zealand Police,7 O’Donnell v R.8 I will return to these cases later in this decision.
[33] From this starting point of two years the appellant accepts an uplift of a further two years was appropriate to represent the additional offending which occurred on the day and a further uplift of two months should be added on account of prior convictions. The appellant therefore contended for a sentence of four years
and two months’ imprisonment, prior to relevant deductions.
4 R v Mako, above n 3.
5 See Mako at [59].
6 R v McGhee HC Gisborne CRI-2005-016-2532, 2 March 2006.
7 Golding v New Zealand Police HC Whangarei CRI-2008-488-3, 14 February 2008.
8 O’Donnell v R [2011] NZCA 50.
[34] In oral submissions today Mr Walsh conceded, appropriately in my view, that a two year starting point was probably excessively lenient and that a starting point in the order of two years and six months was likely to be more appropriate with consequent adjustment to the four years and two month figure.
Mitigating factors
[35] The appellant does not take issue with the 20 per cent discount given for the appellant’s guilty pleas. However, Mr Walsh submits that discounts should have been given for other mitigating factors, specifically the appellant’s remorse, his willingness to engage in restorative justice, his commitment to rehabilitation and his offer of reparation.
[36] Taken together, the appellant submits that these factors demonstrate his insight into his offending and his motivation to change. He emphasises that the appellant has strong family support and is capable of making such change. The appellant submits that a discount of 10 per cent for these combined factors is appropriate.
[37] Taking into account these discounts the appellant’s written submissions suggested that an end sentence in the vicinity of three years imprisonment would be appropriate. That would likewise require adjustment in light of the concession referred to at [34] of this decision.
Respondent’s submissions
[38] The respondent’s written submissions were necessarily brief as it had not received submissions from the appellant in time. It submits, however, that the sentence was appropriate. It notes that there were 10 Crown charges and 9 complainants and that there was damage to property in the vicinity of $16,000. Counsel also emphasised the appellant’s significant criminal history.
[39] In oral submissions Mr Dillon drew particular attention to the observation in
Mako that where there is actual physical enforcement against a victim the starting
point may be higher than the 18 month to three year range otherwise identified for street robbery.9
Approach to the appeal against sentence
[40] An appeal against sentence is an appeal against discretion. Section 250(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 states that the Court must allow the appeal if satisfied that:
(a) for any reason, there is an error in the sentence imposed on conviction; and
(b) a different sentence should be imposed.
[41] In any other case, the Court must dismiss the appeal.10
[42] The Court of Appeal in Tutakangahau v R has recently confirmed that s 250(2) is not intended to change the previous approach taken by the courts under the Summary Proceedings Act 1957.11 Further, despite s 250 making no express reference to “manifestly excessive”, this principle is “well-engrained” in the Court’s approach to sentence appeals.12
[43] The approach taken under the former Summary Proceedings Act was set out in R v Shipton, namely:13
(a) There must be an error vitiating the lower Court’s original sentencing discretion: the appeal must proceed on an “error principle”.
(b)To establish an error in sentencing it must be shown that the Judge in the lower Court made an error, whether intrinsically or as a result of
additional material submitted to the appeal Court.
9 R v Mako, above n 3.
10 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(3).
11 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [26]-[27].
12 At [33], [35].
13 R v Shipton [2007] 2 NZLR 218 (CA) at [138]-[140].
(c) It is only if an error of that character is involved that the appeal Court should re-exercise the sentencing discretion.
[44] Significantly the High Court will not intervene where the sentence is within the range that can be properly justified by accepted sentencing principles. Whether a sentence is manifestly excessive is to be examined in terms of the sentence given, rather than the process by which the sentence is reached.14
Discussion
[45] I must accordingly determine whether there was an error in the Judge’s sentencing process, and if there was such an error, whether a different end result should have been imposed because the sentence given was outside the permissible range, that is “manifestly excessive”.
Starting point
[46] As I have indicated, the Judge was, in my view, correct in taking the aggravated robbery as the lead offence and in identifying R v Mako as the tariff case.15 Rather than providing strict sentencing bands, the Court of Appeal in Mako set out the proper approach to sentencing for aggravated robbery as follows:16
The range of conduct that can constitute aggravated robbery is very wide. In addition to the essential elements of the offence, in each case there will be features, themselves widely variable, that will contribute to or detract from the seriousness of the conduct and the criminality involved. It is the particular combination of these variable features which requires assessment for sentencing in each case. Once the seriousness of the particular combination of features is assessed and a starting point reached, it will be necessary to consider whether overall the crime is aggravated or mitigated by the offender's particular personal circumstances such that the sentence to be imposed should be higher or lower than the starting point. We emphasise, to dispel any doubt, that in this context a starting point is the sentence considered appropriate for the particular offending (the combination of features) for an adult offender after a defended trial.
[47] Despite citing Mako, Judge Treston did not separate out consideration of the aggravating and mitigating factors relevant to the offending and those relevant to the
14 Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].
15 R v Mako above n 3.
16 At [34].
offender. Rather, the Judge appears to have considered all aggravating factors together in adopting his starting point of five years,17 He then applied the discount for guilty plea. This could be considered an error in the Judge’s sentencing process.18 It necessitates that I “unpick” the identified five year starting point taking into account all aggravating and mitigating factors of the offending and establish whether an appropriate initial starting point was adopted and appropriate uplifts and discounts then made.
[48] The net result is that I consider myself required effectively to undertake a resentencing of Mr Zabiyaka and then, having arrived at my final sentence, to identify whether the sentence imposed by the District Court is manifestly excessive by comparison.
[49] The Court of Appeal in Mako lists various aggravating factors to be considered in the context of the charge.19 In my view the following were undoubtedly relevant to Mr Zabiyaka’s offending:
(a) Threatened use of a weapon: a hammer can be used to inflict relatively serious injury. Mr Zabiyaka held the hammer threateningly above his head, adding an extra element of intimidation. However, he did not otherwise use the weapon.
(b)Property stolen: Mr Zabiyaka took valuable property from Ms Wilson, namely her vehicle. It was subsequently recovered, but required extensive repairs.
(c) Actual violence: Mr Zabiyaka pulled Ms Wilson from her vehicle by her clothing. On a scale of violence, this may be towards the lower
end. Nevertheless, it cannot be minimised (to the extent counsel for
17 Including those relevant to Mr Zabiyaka personally, such as his previous convictions. See [17]–
[18] of this judgment.
18 In particular, where aggravating factors relating to the offending and aggravating factors personal to the offender are mixed, it is difficult to compare the resulting starting point to similar sentencing cases which is desirable in the interests of consistency and in the context of potential appeal rights.
19 At [35]-[51].
the appellant seeks to do so). It was in effect a forcible removal of Ms
Wilson from her vehicle. She was aged 63, and relatively vulnerable.
(d)Victim impact: Ms Wilson suffers ongoing anxiety and trauma as a result of the robbery. The impact on her was significant. Other victims were also significantly affected.
(e) Associated offending: the aggravated robbery was one event in a drug- fuelled spree of offending. Mr Zabiyaka caused significant damage to property (with a considerable financial impact on his victims as a result) and involved the police in a dangerous apprehension exercise. The consequences of his offending could readily have been very much more serious.
[50] Taken as an isolated incident, I consider that the robbery in this case would fall towards the higher end of the 18 month to three year street robbery scale identified in Mako. In respect of the cases that were referred to me, I make the following comments:
(a) R v McGhee:20 the offender approached the young victim from behind and yelled out to him. He pointed a knife at the victim’s throat, demanding the keys to his vehicle. The offender threatened to stab the victim if he told anyone. The High Court adopted a starting point of
18 months’ imprisonment. However, the case involved a much younger offender and did not involve the application of physical force. The presence of physical force in this case elevates the aggravated robbery into a more serious category.
(b)Golding v New Zealand Police: 21 the appellant and his two associates punched the 12-year-old victim once in the face and took his bike. The High Court held that the starting point of three years and four
months’ imprisonment was too high, and should not have exceeded
20 R v McGhee, aboven n 6.
21 Golding v New Zealand Police, above n 7.
two and a half years. I tend to agree with Mr Dillon that, given that a blow was inflicted to the victim’s head, this case may be considered something of an “outlier” in terms of leniency.
(c) Raroa v R:22 Multiple offenders approached the victim in the street and questioned him about the bag he was carrying. One offender showed the victim the handle of a knife hidden up his sleeve and threatened to ‘drop’ the victim if he did not hand over the bag. No violence was applied. A starting point of two and a half years was applied. The present case is broadly comparable albeit that Ms Wilson was also physically removed from the car. However, the existence of multiple offenders in Raroa clearly added to the menacing nature of the demand.
(d)O’Donnell v R:23 the appellant and two co-offenders (members of the Mongrel Mob) drove to a private residence where the female victim was home alone. They threatened and menaced the victim. The Court of Appeal considered that a starting point of two years’ imprisonment, before any uplift, was appropriate.
(e) Cropp v R:24 the victim declined to buy drugs from two co-offenders and the co-offenders subsequently brandished a knife at him demanding money. A starting point of two years was considered appropriate. Again that was not a case where actual violence was used to enforce the demand.
[51] Having regard to these cases and the nature of the physical enforcement,25 I consider a starting point of two years and six months imprisonment was appropriate. To this a significant uplift was necessarily applied in respect of the remaining
charges.
22 Raroa v R [2014] NZCA 57.
23 O’Donnell v R [2011] NZCA 50.
24 Cropp v R [2015] NZHC 2077.
25 Which did not involve application of the weapon or carry with it any obvious risk of injury.
[52] The Crown submitted to the District Court that such uplift be two years with an additional two months on account of previous convictions. Mr Walsh does not advance any contrary submission today. That would make for a starting point before mitigating features of four years and eight months’ imprisonment.
Mitigating factors
[53] The appellant submits the District Court erred in not allowing a discrete discount for remorse, rehabilative efforts and the offer of reparation. To some extent these are inter-related issues. Mr Walsh accepts that remorse itself would not justify a discount of greater than five per cent but contends for an overall discount of 10 per cent because of the other factors identified.
[54] The District Court Judge appears to have accepted that the defendant was remorseful. He had before him the defendant’s detailed letter in which, among other things, he said that he did understand that his actions were totally unacceptable. He attributes such actions to his drug addiction. As I have indicated, I do not regard that as, of itself, an attempt to minimise his responsibility. It was simply a recognition of the catalyst of his offending.
[55] That letter has the hallmarks of a genuine demonstration of remorse, the bona fides of which seem to me to be substantiated by the offer on the part of the defendant to participate in a restorative justice programme. Ultimately that was not possible on account of the victims’ decision not to do so. However, the offer itself may be an indicator of genuineness, as I find it to be in this case.
[56] There was also an offer of reparation of $3,000 made to the District Court which offer has now been revised to $5,000. The defendant has also, I accept, indicated a strong desire to rehabilitate himself and I accept the advice of his mother that his commitment to do so has significantly increased due to the circumstances he now finds himself in.
[57] Cumulatively, I consider a further discount should have been recognised by the District Court Judge on account of these factors which I assess in the order of five per cent.
[58] Approaching the sentencing in this way the end sentence which I arrive at is three years and six months’ imprisonment.26 The District Court Judge’s sentence was approximately 14 per cent higher. Such a disparity in my view warrants the conclusion that the appeal is appropriately granted.
Result
[59] I allow the appeal. I substitute for the sentence of four years imprisonment imposed in relation to the aggravated robbery charge a sentence of three years six months’ imprisonment.
[60] I make a reparation order in the amount of $5,000. Such sum is to be paid to the following parties in the following amounts (I have prorated this based on the Reparation Schedule totalling $15,967.55 provided by the Crown to the District Court).
(a) Maria Wilson $ 125.25 (b) Peter Dunn $ 46.97 (c) Distinction Hotel $1,707.50 (d) NZ Police $ 89.12
(e) IAG NZ Limited as insurer of
Ms Wilson’s motor vehicle $3,031.16
[61] This sum of $5,000 is to be paid no later than close of business on Friday 10
February 2017. It is to be paid to the Registrar of the District Court at Henderson who is to be provided with a copy of this decision. Mr Walsh is to provide the
Registrar with contact details for each of the recipients of the reparation.
26 Reflecting an actual deduction of 6.25% for remorse and rehabilitation.
[62] I confirm all other concurrent sentences imposed by the District Court, such
that the final sentence imposed on Mr Zabiyaka is that of three years and six months’
imprisonment.
Muir J
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