Yan v Commissioner of Police

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NOTE: PURSUANT TO CONSENT ORDERS MADE IN THE HIGH COURT BY VENNING J ON 24 NOVEMBER 2014, PUBLICATION OF DETAILS OF RESTRAINING AND ANCILLARY ORDERS CONTAINED IN [114]–[121] OF THIS JUDGMENT PROHIBITED.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA683/2014 [2015] NZCA 576

BETWEEN

WILLIAM YAN

First Appellant

WEI YOU
Second Appellant

AND

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE Respondent

CA684/2014

BETWEEN  ZHIHONG XU First Appellant

LIJING ZENG Second Appellant

ANDCOMMISSIONER OF POLICE Respondent

Hearing: 19 August 2015

Court:

French, Simon France and Asher JJ

Counsel:

D P H Jones QC and J K Goodall for Appellants in CA683/2014
P F Wicks QC and S J Lance for Appellants in CA684/2014
M R Harborow and K Eastwood for Respondent

Judgment:

1 December 2015 at 10.00 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

YAN v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2015] NZCA 576 [1 December 2015]

A        The  appellants’  application  in  CA683/2014  for  leave  to  adduce  two

affidavits in reply dated 21 July 2015 is granted.

B        The appeals in CA683/2014 and CA684/2014 are dismissed.

CThe appellants in both appeals must pay the respondent costs for one standard appeal on a band A basis with usual disbursements.

REASONS

Para No

French and Simon France JJ  [1]

Asher J (dissenting in relation to CA684/2014)  [140]

FRENCH AND SIMON FRANCE JJ

(Given by French J)

Table of Contents

Para No

Introduction  [1] Legislative Framework  [4] Factual background  [10] Application for leave to adduce new evidence on appeal  [17] What is the correct approach to be taken in deciding

applications for an undertaking under s 29?  [22]

Arguments on appeal  [24] Our view  [27] The correct approach to s 29  [39]

The delay in this case  [49] The strength of the Commissioner’s case  [62] Shares in Mega Limited

The facts before the High Court  [67]

The decision in the High Court  [68] Developments since the High Court decision  [69] Arguments on appeal  [70] Our view  [71]

Shares in FM International (FMI)

The facts before the High Court  [74]

The decision of the High Court  [77]

Arguments on appeal  [78]

Our view  [79]

Interest in McClymonts Road property

The evidence before the High Court  [81]

The decision of the High Court  [87] Developments since the High Court decision  [90] Arguments on appeal  [97] Our view  [99]

Right to share in profits generated by Gallinas Ltd

The evidence before the High Court  [106]

The decision of the High Court  [110] Arguments on appeal  [112] Our view  [113]

GEP loan funds  [114]

The bank accounts in the name of Mr Xu and Ms Zeng

The evidence before the High Court  [122]

The High Court decision  [129] Arguments on appeal  [131] Our view  [132]

Outcome  [136]

Introduction

[1]      Under s 29(1) of the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 (the Act), a court may require the applicant for a restraining order to give an undertaking to pay damages or costs in respect of the restrained property.

[2]      The appellants asked the High Court to…

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Details
Case
[2015] NZCA 576
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeals arose from a decision of Justice Lang refusing to require the Commissioner of Police to provide undertakings that he would meet any damages or loss the appellants might suffer as a result of the continued operation of the restraining orders in relation to some of the restrained property. The appeals were dismissed. The key issues raised by the appeal were: what general principles should be applied in determining an application under s 29; and, on the facts of this case, was Lang J wrong to refuse to require an undertaking? In their view, the argument that there should be a presumption in favour of requiring an undertaking based on a distinction between fixed and dynamic assets put an unwarranted gloss on the wording of s 29. The discretion conferred by s 29 was broad and untrammeled. Parliament must be taken to have done that deliberately and it would, in their view, be wrong in principle to fetter or qualify the discretion by adding words that were simply not there. The relevant factors to be taken into account included the personal circumstances of the respondent; delay; the nature of the asset; the likelihood of loss being suffered as a result of the restraint; the extent of any likely loss; the conduct of the Commissioner; the strength of the Commissioner’s case; and the existence of a meaningful alternative avenue of redress. They did not accept there were any presumptions to be applied. The likelihood of loss and the extent of that loss were relevant factors and the more likely the loss was to occur, the stronger the argument for an undertaking. They were not persuaded Lang J’s decision was wrong or that the Judge erred in principle. The decision was one with which they agreed. The application in CA683/2014 for leave to adduce two affidavits in reply dated 21 July 2015 was granted. The appeals in CA683/2014 and CA684/2014 were dismissed. As regards costs, counsel were agreed these should follow the event. They therefore ordered that the appellants in both appeals must pay the respondent costs for one standard appeal on a band A basis with usual disbursements.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established