FACTUAL CONTEXT [2] THE WILL OF 10 APRIL 2001 [9] SCOPE OF THE APPEAL [17] THE LAW OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY [19] APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS THE INTERVIEWS: DR WAKEFIELD AND MS HARE [23] DR MOSSMAN’S EVIDENCE [24] JON SMITH’S APPOINTMENT AS SOLE EXECUTOR [25] DISCUSSION [26] THE APPOINTMENT OF JON AS SOLE EXECUTOR AND AS SOLE TRUSTEE [28] MR SMITH’S CAPACITY [32] DR GOMMANS’ EVIDENCE AND THE HOSPITAL NOTES [44] ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE OF DR GOMMANS [53]
Result [72]
[1] Until a stroke on 3 May 1998 when he was aged 73, the late Arthur Percy Lionel John Smith was a man of formidable presence and clarity of mind. Following the stroke his mental capacity was reduced. The issue on this appeal is whether the High Court (Woodward v Smith HC NAP CIV-2004-441-706 8 February 2008) was right to find proved that when, nearly three years after his stroke, he executed a will dated 10 April 2001 altering a prior will in two material respects, the reduced capacity of his mind met the standard required by law for that purpose.
Factual context
[2] Mr Smith was born in 1925 and died on 14 November 2001. He and his late wife (“Mrs Smith”), who died in December 2002, married in England in 1944 when he was 19. Their daughter Elaine Coral Woodward (“Elaine”, the appellant) was born in 1946 and their son Jon Philip Smith (“Jon”, the respondent) in 1952. There are two children of Elaine’s first marriage who, like their father, live in the United States and one, Ashley Woodward, of her second marriage. Jon has three children, Jon BD Smith (“Jon Jr”), Philip and Elizabeth.
[3] After Jon’s birth the family moved to New Zealand where, in what became a partnership with Jon (50% Mr and Mrs Smith, 50% Jon) for more than 30 years, they developed the Smith family business. Simon France J found that until the stroke in 1998 Jon and Mr Smith worked together daily as a team. That included physical labour in the family vineyards and cleaning the family motels each day. They managed and maintained the family commercial premises. While to the world Mr Smith was head of the family, he and Jon took their business decisions together.
[4] For most of Ashley’s childhood Elaine was working. Mr and Mrs Smith played a big role in Ashley’s upbringing, looking after him during the day in his pre-school years and during…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Woodward v Smith [2009] NZCA 215
Case
[2009] NZCA 215
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, the case of Woodward v Smith involved a dispute over the validity of a will executed by Arthur Percy Lionel John Smith. The central issue was whether Mr Smith, who had suffered a stroke in 1998 that impaired his cognitive functions, possessed the testamentary capacity to execute a will dated 10 April 2001, which made significant changes from a previous will. The will excluded Elaine Coral Woodward, the appellant and Mr Smith's daughter, from her position as joint executor and made a substantial gift to Jon Philip Smith, the respondent and Mr Smith's son. The High Court had previously ruled in favour of the respondent, finding that Mr Smith had the requisite testamentary capacity when he executed the will.
The Court of Appeal reviewed the evidence presented, focusing on the testimonies of various medical professionals and the assessments of Mr Smith's cognitive abilities. Dr Gommans, a highly qualified geriatrician, argued that Mr Smith lacked testamentary capacity due to the deterioration of his cognitive functions following the stroke. In contrast, other medical professionals and Dr Wakefield, Mr Smith's GP, testified that he had sufficient understanding to execute the will. The Court found that, despite the failure to adhere to best practices in assessing testamentary capacity, the cumulative evidence supported the conclusion that Mr Smith had the capacity to make the will. The Court of Appeal, therefore, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the High Court's decision, but noted that the lack of adherence to best practices warranted a contribution from the estate to the appellant's costs on appeal.