Wilson v APG Holdings Ltd (in liq)

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
CA521/2010
[2011] NZCA 647

BETWEEN  RITA WILSON
Appellant

AND  APG HOLDINGS LTD (IN LIQUIDATION)
First Respondent

AND  DAVID MURRAY BLANCHETT & GRANT EDWARD BURNS
Second Respondents

Hearing:         11 October 2011

Court:             Chambers, Ronald Young and Andrews JJ

Counsel:         G M Illingworth QC for Appellant
M D Branch and S J Rawcliffe for Respondents

Judgment:      15 December 2011 at 3 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe appeal against summary judgment in favour of the first respondent is allowed and that judgment is set aside. 

B        The appeal against summary judgment in favour of the second respondents is dismissed, except to the extent that the amount the appellant must pay to them under s 298(2) of the Companies Act 1993 is reduced to $249,660. 

C        The sum payable under order B, namely $249,660, is to carry interest from the date of judgment in the High Court, namely 15 July 2010, down to the date of payment, in accordance with r 11.27 of the High Court Rules. 

DThe proceeding is remitted to the High Court for determination at trial of:

(a)whether the appellant owes more to the second respondents under the second (now, sole remaining) cause of action;

(b)what interest is payable (if any) in addition to that payable under order C; and

(c)     costs in that Court.

EThe appellant must pay the second respondents costs for a standard appeal on a Band A basis and usual disbursements.  The allowance for item 12 in Schedule 2 of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 is increased from 3.0 days to 3.5 days.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Ronald Young J)

Introduction

  1. The first respondent, APG Holdings Ltd, is in liquidation.  The liquidators and APG brought summary judgment proceedings in the High Court against the appellant, Rita Wilson, seeking repayment of $1,081,097.53 which they said had been paid by APG to her between March 2004 and July 2006.

  2. APG claimed that its money was advanced to Mrs Wilson repayable on demand (demand having been made).  In the alternative, the liquidators claimed the payments were caught by s 298(2) of the Companies Act 1993.

  3. Mr Terry Wilson, Mrs Wilson’s husband, was a director of APG from July 2004.  The sole shareholder of APG was Capital Events Holdings Ltd. 

  4. Mrs Wilson’s response to the claims was that she understood the payments made to her were her husband’s drawings or his salary from APG.  She said she had not borrowed any money from APG and the circumstances were not covered by s 298 of the Companies Act..

  5. In his decision granting summary judgment Associate Judge Bell said that the payments made by APG were not Mr Wilson’s salary.[1]  He considered that the requirements of s 298 had been established and therefore the payments by APG to Mrs Wilson should be repaid to the liquidators.  However, he concluded that Mrs Wilson might be able to establish at trial that payments made by Mr Wilson to APG should be…

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Details
Case
[2011] NZCA 647
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Wilson v APG Holdings Ltd (in liq), the liquidator sought to recover payments made to Mrs Wilson by the company within the specified period under Section 298(2) of the Companies Act 1993. The dispute centred on whether these payments, which were in excess of the value of any consideration received by the company, were recoverable. The court had to determine the validity of the liquidator's claim and whether the payments could be treated as loans by APG to Mr Wilson, with the promise to repay on each advance and the work done by Mr Wilson considered as valuable consideration.

The primary legal issue was whether the liquidator could recover the full amount of the payments to Mrs Wilson or if the value of the consideration received by the company was equal to the value of the advances, as argued by the liquidator. This hinged on whether Mr Wilson's promise to repay the loans and the services he performed could be considered valid consideration. The liquidator contended that the payments exceeded the value of any consideration, while Mr Illingworth argued that the value of the consideration was equal to the value of the advances.

The Associate Judge identified that the liquidator must establish three facts to apply Section 298(2). These were: the disposition of property within the specified period, the disposition to a person within the specified categories, and the value of the disposition exceeding the value of any consideration received by the company. The first and second facts were not disputed, but the third was contested. The liquidator argued that the value of the consideration was not equal to the value of the advances, while Mr Illingworth argued that the promise to repay and the services performed constituted valid consideration. Ultimately, the court ruled that the liquidator could only recover the amount by which the money paid to Mrs Wilson exceeded the value of any consideration received by the company.

The court's decision was that the liquidator could recover only the excess amount of the payments to Mrs Wilson that exceeded the value of any consideration received by the company. The court found that the value of the consideration provided by Mr Wilson, which included the promise to repay the loans and the services performed, did not equal the value of the advances. As a result, the liquidator's claim was partially upheld, and the liquidator was entitled to recover the excess amount.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 298(2) provides as follows:298 Transactions for inadequate or excessive consideration with directors and certain other persons ... (2)Where, within the specified period, a company has disposed of a business or property, or provided services, or issued shares, to— (a)A person who was, at the time of the disposition, provision, or issue, a director of the company, or a nominee or relative of or a trustee for, or a trustee for a relative of, a director of the company; or (b)A person, or a relative of a person, who, at the time of the disposition, provision, or issue, had control of the company; or (c)Another company that was, at the time of the disposition, provision, or issue, controlled by a director of the company, or a nominee or relative of or a trustee for, or a trustee for a relative of, a director of the company; or (d)Another company that, at the time of the disposition, provision, or issue, was a related company,— the liquidator may recover from the person, relative, company, or related company, as the case may be, any amount by which the value of the business, property, or services, or the value of the shares, at the time of the disposition, provision, or issue exceeded the value of any consideration received by the company. The Associate Judge identified three facts which the liquidator must establish before s 298(2) applied.[3] Firstly, that the company had made a disposition of property within the specified period. All the payments to Mrs Wilson’s account were made within the specified period. This was not disputed. Secondly, the disposition was to a person within subs (2)(a) to subs 2(d). It was not disputed that Mrs Wilson was a relative of Mr Wilson who was either a director of the company or had control of the company. Thirdly, the value of the disposition exceeded the value of any consideration received by the company. This was in issue.[3] At [12]. The liquidators could recover from Mrs Wilson only the amount by which the money paid to her “exceeded the value of any consideration received by the company”.[4][4] Companies Act 1993, s 298(2). Mr Illingworth conceded that it could not be claimed that the payments were Mr Wilson’s salary. He submitted, however, that in the circumstances, the advances had to be treated as loans by APG to Mr Wilson and repayable by him on demand. Mr Illingworth argued that the promise to repay the loans on each advance and the work done by Mr Wilson for APG was valuable consideration in terms of s 298(2). This consideration he maintained was equal to the value of the advance for the purpose of s 298(2). Mr Illingworth accepted, however, that there was no evidence that Mr Wilson had in fact performed any services for APG. Mr Illingworth said there was nothing to suggest at the time of each payment to Mrs Wilson that Mr Wilson was impecunious and nothing to suggest that he could not meet the repayments. And so the value of the consideration equalled the value of the advance. Indeed, the fact that Mr Wilson is said to have paid more than $700,000 to APG during this time illustrated his capacity to pay.