Keshvara v Blanchett

Case [2012] NZCA 553


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
CA665/2011
[2012] NZCA 553

BETWEEN  RANJIT KESHVARA
Appellant

AND  DAVID MURRAY BLANCHETT AND GRANT EDWARD BURNS AS LIQUIDATORS OF APG HOLDINGS LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)
Respondents

Hearing:         15 November 2012

Court:             Ellen France, Stevens and Asher JJ

Counsel:         L Herzog for Appellant
M D Branch and S J Rawcliffe for Respondent

Judgment:      30 November 2012 at 3.00 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe appeal is dismissed.

BThe appellant must pay the respondents costs for a standard appeal on a Band A basis and usual disbursements.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Stevens J)

Table of Contents

Para No

Introduction  [1]
Background  [5]
High Court judgment  [8]

Evidentiary issues  [8]

Breaches of duty  [12]

Liability under s 194 of the Companies Act  [18]

Relief[19]

First question – admissibility of business records  [20]

Statutory provisions  [26]

Our evaluation – admissibility  [31]

The second question – liability  [38]

Liability issues – High Court judgment  [41]

Submissions on liability  [55]

Our evaluation – liability  [57]

Result  [62]

Introduction

  1. This appeal concerns findings in the High Court that the appellant had breached his duties as a director under ss 131, 133 and 137 of the Companies Act 1993.[1]  In relation to those breaches the appellant was ordered to pay the sum of $1,439,084.00 by way of remedy under s 301 of the Companies Act.[2]  The High Court also found that at the relevant times the board of directors of which the appellant was a member was in breach of s 194 of the Companies Act.  In relation to that breach the appellant was ordered to pay $39,876.00 pursuant to s 300.

    [1]Blanchett v Keshvara [2011] NZCCLR 34 (HC).

    [2]Applying the approach of this Court in Mason v Lewis [2006] 3 NZLR 225 (CA) at [109]–[110] and [118].

  2. The appellant is a former director of APG Holdings Ltd (APG).  The respondents, Messrs Blanchett and Burns, are the liquidators of that company. 

  3. The central question is whether Venning J was correct to admit into evidence certain documents relating to the transactions in question pursuant to the provisions of s 19 of the Evidence Act 2006 dealing with admissibility of hearsay statements contained in business records.  That was the first issue raised in the agreed list of issues.  The second was whether, if all or some of the evidence is not admitted, the findings of the High Court on liability were affected.

  4. At the hearing, Mr Herzog, counsel for the appellant, also sought to challenge the Judge’s findings on liability even if all of the challenged documents were ruled to be admissible.  We address this question later in the judgment.

Background

  1. The appellant was a director of APG from 11 March 2004 until 23 July 2004.  APG was placed into liquidation on 9 February 2007.  APG was one of the companies in a group known as “Capital Events”.  The Capital Events companies were primarily controlled by Terry Wilson and David Andrew Tauber.  The companies mainly provided hospitality services…

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Details
AGLC
Keshvara v Blanchett [2012] NZCA 553
Case
[2012] NZCA 553
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Keshvara v Blanchett is a case before the court that concerns the admissibility of business records as evidence. The primary issue in this case is whether the trial judge correctly admitted financial records into evidence under the business records exception in the Evidence Act. The appellant, Keshvara, argues that the trial judge failed to properly consider the requirements for admitting such evidence, specifically the identity of the person who supplied the information for the composition of the business records. The respondent, Blanchett, contends that the trial judge properly applied the statutory provisions and that the records were admissible under the exception.

The legal issues before the court revolve around the interpretation and application of the business records exception in the Evidence Act. Specifically, the court must determine whether the trial judge correctly identified the person who supplied the information for the composition of the business records and whether the person who supplied the information could reasonably be expected to recollect the matters dealt with in the information recorded in the documents. The court also considers whether the admission of the business records caused undue expense or delay.

The court finds that the trial judge properly considered the identity of the person who supplied the information for the composition of the business records. The court further finds that the person who supplied the information could not reasonably be expected to recollect the matters dealt with in the information recorded in the documents. The court holds that the business records exception in the Evidence Act applies, and that the trial judge correctly admitted the records into evidence. The court further finds that the admission of the business records did not cause undue expense or delay.

The court orders that the appeal be dismissed, and that the decision of the trial judge be affirmed. The court finds that the trial judge correctly admitted the business records into evidence, and that the appellant’s arguments on appeal are without merit. The court holds that the business records exception in the Evidence Act applies, and that the records were properly admitted under the exception.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Prior to the enactment of the 2006 Act, the “business records” exception was contained in s 3 of the Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980. That section provided:3 Admissibility of documentary hearsay evidence(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, and to sections 4 and 5 of this Act, in any proceeding where direct oral evidence of a fact or an opinion would be admissible, any statement made by a person in a document and tending to establish that fact or opinion shall be admissible as evidence of that fact or opinion if—...(b) The document is a business record, and the person who supplied the information for the composition of the record—(i) Cannot with reasonable diligence be identified; or(ii) Is unavailable to give evidence; or(iii) Cannot reasonably be expected (having regard to the time that has elapsed since he supplied the information and to all the other circumstances of the case) to recollect the matters dealt with in the information he supplied ... The draft Evidence Code prepared by the Law Commission in 1999 did not include a specific section dealing with business records.[18] As a result, the original version of the Evidence Bill 2005[19] did not contain any section equivalent to s 3 of the Evidence Amendment Act (No 2). This was altered at the select committee stage, when the business records exception was re‑introduced. The Select Committee report records that the Committee considered that both time and cost would be saved by retaining the business records exception.[20] We do not consider that there is any merit in the appellant’s submissions relying on s 19 of the Evidence Act. First, we do not accept that the Judge failed to consider who had supplied the information used for the composition of the business records in question. Venning J specifically considered this question and concluded that the most likely candidate was Mr Antoo, who was employed in the accounts section of APG. The Judge said this:[18] The principal documents to which Mr Herzog took issue were trial balances prepared for the company during the currency of the defendant’s directorship. The trial balances and other financial records were prepared by employees of APG using accounting software known as QuickBooks.[19] The person most likely to have prepared the documentation was a Mr Antoo. He was employed in the accounts section of APG. But it is by no means certain that he was the only person who may have been involved in inputting the data. …[20] In the circumstances I was satisfied that no useful purpose would have been served by adjourning the proceeding to enable the liquidators to locate Mr Antoo and to require him to attend merely to produce records of APG which he may or may not have authored in 2004. Given that seven years has elapsed since the relevant time, even if Mr Antoo had created the documents he could not reasonably be expected to recollect the matters dealt with in the information recorded in the documents. He would inevitably have had to rely on the documents themselves. Section 19(1)(b) applies.[21] In addition, given that the matter was only raised at this very late stage the trial would have to have been adjourned to enable Mr Antoo to be located. Undue expense and delay would have been caused if I was to adjourn for that reason. Section 19(1)(c) applies.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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