Williams v The Queen
[2019] NZHC 754
•9 April 2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NELSON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHAKATŪ ROHE
CIV-2018-442-000045
[2019] NZHC 754
UNDER Section 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 BETWEEN
PETER ANTHONY WILLIAMS
Plaintiff
AND
THE CROWN NEW ZEALAND ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Defendant
Hearing: 25 March 2019 Appearances:
Mr Williams (Plaintiff) In Person
J M Webber and A R Goodison for Defendant
Judgment:
9 April 2019
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE MATTHEWS
Introduction
[1] Mr Williams sues the Attorney-General in relation to a hearing of a civil proceeding in the Nelson District Court on 3 and 4 October 2012. He was the unsuccessful plaintiff.1 His cause of action in this case is based on s 27 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990.
[2] Mr Williams says that at the hearing counsel for the defendants acted in conflict with and in breach of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Code of Client Care r 13.5, that counsel for the defendants intimidated his counsel, that there was no discovery of or cross-examination in relation to certain emails, and that the defendants’
1 Williams v Cameron DC Nelson CIV-2009-042-000544, CIV-2009-042-000071, 26 October 2012.
WILLIAMS v THE CROWN NEW ZEALAND ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2019] NZHC 754 [9 April 2019]
counsel appeared to act in collusion with “officers of the Court” to ignore the Court’s duty of care and deny the plaintiff a fair hearing in breach of the principles of natural justice. Mr Williams says that “these actions continue to deny us the right of representation by effective counsel”. In argument, it became reasonably clear that the ‘officers of the Court’ referred to include the District Court Judge presiding on 3 and 4 October 2012, but given that Mr Williams is also aggrieved at a decision to hear an interlocutory application in relation to discovery the day after it was filed, it may encompass a broader range of persons, depending on who was involved in the decision to do so.
[3] As I understand Mr Williams’ case, he says that the combined effect of all these matters is that the principles of natural justice were not observed, in breach of s 27:
27 Right to justice
(1)Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of natural justice by any tribunal or other public authority which has the power to make a determination in respect of that person’s rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law.
(2)Every person whose rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law have been affected by a determination of any tribunal or other public authority has the right to apply, in accordance with law, for judicial review of that determination.
(3)Every person has the right to bring civil proceedings against, and to defend civil proceedings brought by, the Crown, and to have those proceedings heard, according to law, in the same way as civil proceedings between individuals.
[4]Mr Williams seeks:
A public, High Court hearing, to review the Nelson District Court decision 26 October 2012, and consider if Justice may have been misled by evidence, that conflicts with evidence, accepted by the High Court in 2010.
[5] In addition Mr Williams seeks damages for loss of income which he quantifies at $1,170,000, and he also seeks exemplary damages, costs and interest.
[6] The statement of claim pleads a number of facts on which Mr Williams relies. His concerns arise from his sale of a business in 2004. He says that he commissioned a firm of accountants, Richards Woodhouse, to obtain an independent valuation of the
business. Over ensuing years there was a good deal of controversy over whether just one, or a second valuation was prepared, and in relation to the genuineness or otherwise of certain emails. Mr Williams commenced proceedings in the District Court. The issues which are the subject of the present proceeding arose during and at the time of the trial of that case.
[7] The Attorney-General applies to strike out this proceeding. The Attorney- General says:
(a)The statement of claim is vexatious and otherwise an abuse of process in that it is a collateral attack on two decisions of the High Court and subsequent decisions in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.
(b)The claim for damages arising out of the District Court decision in question is barred by Attorney-General v Chapman.2
(c)The claim does not disclose a reasonably arguable cause of action against any Government department or officer or employee of the Crown.
(d)To the extent that the claim seeks a review of a decision of the District Court in one of the cases, Mr Williams is proceeding against the wrong party. The correct respondent to such a review would be the District Court at Nelson and the three defendants in the proceedings which were then before the District Court.3
(e)To the extent that Mr Williams alleges that the decision of the District Court reviewed evidence previously heard by the High Court, and overturned a previous High Court judgment which allowed an appeal against an application to strike out the District Court proceeding, the claim is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of a strike out application, the principles applying to such an application and the High Court rule in relation to that application.
2 Attorney-General v Chapman [2011] NZSC 110, [2012] 1 NZLR 462.
3 Williams v Cameron, above n 1.
(f)The claim is likely to cause prejudice or delay because it is diffuse and difficult to understand.
(g)The claim is vexatious and otherwise an abuse of process in that it suggests the District Court may have withheld a conflict of interest with the intention of misleading justice, intimidated counsel and acted to prevent discovery or cross-examination of evidence that contradicted previous evidence.
[8]Mr Williams opposes the application.
Background
[9] Mr Williams’ concerns have been before the courts on numerous occasions. The background of the case is well-summarised in a judgment of the High Court issued by Mallon J on 24 February 2016 and for ease of reference I quote the following paragraphs from that judgment:4
[3] In 2004 the respondents acted for Mr Williams and his company (the vendors) and for another client (the purchaser) on the sale of the company’s marine business for $800,000. Mr Williams takes the view that the respondents failed to disclose a valuation which valued the business at
$957,000. He learned of this valuation in 2006.
[4] In February 2007 the respondents issued an invoice to Mr Williams’ company for $8597.06 in relation to the preparation of its accounts. In mid- 2007 Mr Williams sent the respondents a backdated invoice for $226,534.83 said to be for losses in the sale of the business arising from the undisclosed valuation. Mr Williams also complained to the NZ Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA). In October 2007 the complaint was dismissed on the basis of evidence from the respondents.
[5] In December 2007 a meeting took place between Mr Williams, his new accountant (Mr French) and representatives of the respondents. At the meeting it was proposed that the respondents write off their invoice and Mr Williams would drop his claim. Mr Williams did not agree to the proposal at this stage. Subsequently a discussion between Mr Williams and Mr French took place, and Mr French then made a telephone call to Mr Cameron on 19 December 2007. The respondents contended that a settlement was reached in that telephone conversation.
[6] In 2009 Mr Williams succeeded in having his complaint to the NZICA re-opened for investigation on the ground that he had not been heard. In
4 Williams v Cameron [2016] NZHC 264 (application for leave to appeal the judgment of the District Court dated 26 October 2012).
November 2009 Mr Cameron (one of the respondents involved in the sale) pleaded guilty to charges concerning breaches of the Code of Ethics. No charge was brought against Mr Whalley (another of the respondents involved in the sale) because he had resigned as an accountant and a partner of the respondents’ firm.
[7] On 2 December 2009 Mr Williams commenced his District Court proceedings against the respondents. He claimed breaches of fiduciary duties, breach of contract, negligence and negligent misstatement/mistake of fact. He sought compensation for the sale of the business at a price lower than the valuation which he considered had not been disclosed and reimbursement of costs for the NZICA disciplinary proceedings he pursued. The respondents applied to strike out the proceeding on the ground that the claims had been settled. This application was granted in the District Court (Williams v Cameron DC Nelson CIV-2009-042-544, 26 May 2010 [District Court Judge Zohrab) but overturned on appeal (Williams v Cameron HC Nelson CIV-2010- 422-222, 22 September 2010 [High Court Mallon J]). An order was subsequently made that the issue of whether these claims had been settled was to be determined as a separate question.
[8] On 26 October 2012 the District Court (Judge Tuohy) gave its decision on that question. It held that a contractually binding settlement was reached in the telephone call between Mr French and Mr Cameron on 19 December 2007. This settlement was of the claim for compensation for the sale of the business for a price lower than the value in the undisclosed valuation. The settlement covered all the causes of action with the exception of some of the particulars of the fiduciary duty and breach of contract claims (Williams v Cameron DC Nelson CIV-2009-042-544, 26 October 2012 [District Court Judge Tuohy]). Costs were ordered against Mr Williams.
[10] Mr Williams applied to set aside the District Court judgment. This was declined.5 He appealed to this court unsuccessfully.6 Mr Williams did not file an appeal against the judgment of the District Court within time. He later applied for leave to appeal. That, and related applications, were dismissed by the High Court.7 The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against that judgment and the Supreme Court declined leave to appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal.8
[11] In all, leaving aside three pre-trial decisions,9 the courts have adjudicated on Mr Williams’ claims six times. This judgment is the seventh. All avenues for redress against the original parties have been exhausted. Mr Williams says that the Crown
5 Williams v Cameron DC Nelson CIV-2009-042-000544, 15 April 2013.
6 Williams v Cameron [2013] NZHC 1794.
7 Williams v Cameron, above n 4.
8 Williams v Cameron [2016] NZCA 317.
9 Williams v Cameron [2016] NZSC 119. This was an: (a) application to strike out; (b) appeal against striking out CIV-2014-442-222, 22 September 2010; and (c) application re discovery.
bears responsibility for the events which he says lead to his not receiving justice. Hence he brings this claim against the Attorney-General.
Principles to be applied on an application to strike out
[12] The legal principles to be applied when considering an application to strike out all or part of a proceeding are well settled and are not in dispute in this case. Rule
15.1 of the High Court Rules 2016 provides that the court may strike out all or part of a pleading if it does not disclose a reasonably arguable cause of action or defence, as the case may be, or it is frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
[13]The principles to be applied on an application under this rule are these:10
(a)Pleaded facts, whether or not admitted, are assumed to be true. This does not extend to pleaded allegations which are entirely speculative and without foundation.
(b)The cause of action or defence must be clearly untenable.
(c)The jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and only in clear cases. This reflects the Court’s reluctance to terminate a claim or defence short of trial.
(d)The jurisdiction is not excluded by the need to decide difficult questions of law, requiring extensive argument.
(e)The Court should be particularly slow to strike out a claim in any developing area of the law, perhaps particularly where a duty of care is alleged in a new situation.
[14] In Couch v Attorney-General, Elias CJ and Anderson J observed “it is inappropriate to strike out a claim summarily unless the court can be certain that it
10 Attorney-General v Prince [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA); Couch v Attorney-General [2008] NZSC 45, [2008] 3 NZLR 725.
cannot succeed”.11 They said that particular care is required in areas where the law is confused or developing.
Issues
[15] The issues in this case are encompassed within the seven grounds on which the Attorney-General says the application should be struck out. I will deal with these in turn.
Discussion
First issue: Is the claim a collateral attack on earlier decisions of the High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court?
[16] The Attorney-General says that all of the issues raised by Mr Williams in relation to his case in the District Court in October 2012 have been aired subsequently before the District Court, the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. The only difference between this case, and each of those cases, is that now Mr Williams frames his complaint as a breach of s 27 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990. Further, Mr Williams accepts that this is the position.
[17] In addition to the cases in which these issues have been raised, Mr Williams could also have raised them by appealing from the judgment of the District Court within time, and also by bringing a proceeding alleging fraud in the conduct of the original District Court case. Neither of those steps was taken, and the latter was expressly referred to by this Court on the appeal by Mr Williams against the decision of the District Court declining to recall the judgment in question. In the judgment of this Court dated 16 July 2013, Kós J (as he then was) recorded:12
Thirdly, where, as here, the allegations are gross and require both affidavit evidence and extensive cross-examination, the only appropriate course is to issue new uninfected proceedings to set aside the original decision. That point was made clear by the Court of Appeal half a century ago in Sulco v E S Redit Ltd. It has been reinforced, recently, by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Redcliffe Forestry Ventures Ltd.
(footnotes omitted)
11 Couch v Attorney-General, above n 10, at [33].
12 Williams v Cameron, above n 6, at [29].
[18]His Honour then cited a passage from the Redcliffe judgment, and continued:13
The reason for this approach is the proper protection of the Court’s processes. That is not confined simply to correction of error where there has been (as the plaintiffs allege) fraud. It also exists for the protection of the successful party to the original judgment, against whom such allegations can readily be made with glib disregard for reality. Whether the reality in the present case is as the plaintiffs assert it to be is beside the point. But given the seriousness of the allegations made in Mr Williams’ submissions I do record that there was no admissible evidence before me which reached the standard of proof beyond conjecture and surmise referred to by the Supreme Court in Redcliffe.
[19] Prior to issue of this proceeding, therefore, Mr Williams had failed numerous times to establish his assertions and failed twice to take steps available to him. I do not overlook the fact that he was adjudicated bankrupt for not paying an adverse award of costs, and the Official Assignee disclaimed the rights he asserted he had. But this proceeding by Mr Williams squarely raises the issues he has already raised unsuccessfully but in a different guise. The Attorney-General says this is an unacceptable attempt to raise the same issues again by the collateral means of a cause of action under the Bill of Rights Act.
[20] In Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police,14 the House of Lords examined this principle in the context of facts surrounding the arrest and trial of Mr Hunter, one of six persons convicted of murder by bombing in Birmingham. In a voir dire during his trial Mr Hunter had sought to have his confession to the police declared inadmissible on the ground that it had been obtained by the police forcefully assaulting him. After hearing evidence the trial judge ruled the statement admissible, and during the trial evidence of the alleged assaults was led before the jury to support an argument that little weight should be accorded to the confession. Mr Hunter was convicted. Admissibility of the confession was not raised on appeal.
[21] Years later Mr Hunter brought a case against the Chief Constable in which he sought damages for the assaults to which he alleged he had been subjected. The Chief
13 At [30].
14 Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 (HL).
Hunter has been applied in a number of New Zealand decisions. A recent example is Nottingham v District Court at Auckland [2018] NZCA 75, where the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal because the application was a “collateral attack on issues finally determined in other proceedings” (at [10]). The Supreme Court upheld this reasoning (Nottingham v District Court at Auckland [2018] NZSC 110).
Constable applied to strike out the claim. The House of Lords found that the claim was an abuse of process. In his judgment Lord Diplock, with whom all other law lords agreed, said:15
The abuse of process which the instant case exemplifies is the initiation of proceedings in a court of justice for the purpose of mounting a collateral attack upon a final decision against the intending plaintiff which has been made by another court of competent jurisdiction in previous proceedings in which the intending plaintiff had a full opportunity of contesting the decision in the court by which it was made.
[22]His Lordship then observed:
It would call for a degree of credulity too extreme to be expected even from judicial members of your Lordships’ House to fail to recognise that the dominant purpose of this action, and the parallel actions brought by the other Birmingham Bombers so far as they are brought against the police, has not been to recover damages but is brought in an endeavour to establish, long after the event when memories have faded and witnesses other than the Birmingham Bombers themselves may be difficult to trace, that the confessions on the evidence on which they were convicted were induced by police violence, with a view to putting pressure on the Home Secretary to release them from the life sentences that they are otherwise likely to continue to serve for many years to come.
[23] In the instant case the avowed intention of Mr Williams is to achieve justice, maintaining that this has not occurred to date. The actions of the judge, defence counsel, and possibly others involved in the ways I have outlined have never, in his view, been called to account. Rather, the courts have failed to do so, in Williams’ view, by application of rules which have prevented the Court from considering the conduct in question during and at the time of the hearing before the District Court in October 2012.
[24] That is not an accurate statement of the position. Reference need only be made to the judgments of Kós J and Mallon J in this Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. The present case is unquestionably an endeavour to raise exactly the same issues that have been raised numerous times before in the cases to which I have referred, in the guise of an action for breach of s 27 of the Bill of Rights Act. In Hunter, Lord Diplock went on to say:16
15 At 541.
16 At 541 – 542.
My Lords, collateral attack upon a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction may take a variety of forms. It is not surprising that no reported case is to be found in which the facts present a precise parallel with those of the instant case. But the principle applicable is, in my view, simply and clearly stated in those passages from the judgment of A L Smith LJ in Stephenson v Garnett [1898] 1 QB 677, 680-681 and the speech of Lord Halsbury LC in Reichel v Magrath (1889) 14 App Cas 665, 668 which are cited by Goff LJ in his judgment in the instant case. I need only repeat an extract from the passage which he cites from the judgment of A L Smith LJ:
“… the court ought to be slow to strike out a statement of claim or defence, and to dismiss an action as frivolous and vexatious, yet it ought to do so when, as here, it has been shewn [sic] that the identical question sought to be raised has been already decided by a competent court.”
The passage from Lord Halsbury’s speech deserves repetition here in full:
“… I think it would be a scandal to the administration of justice if, the same question having been disposed of by one case, the litigant were to be permitted by changing the form of the proceedings to set up the same case again.”
In the instant case the relevant final decision by a competent court in which the identical question sought to be raised has already been decided is the ruling of Bridge J, on the voir dire in the murder trial, that Hunter’s confession was admissible. Initially his ruling may have been provisional in the limited sense that up to the time that the jury brought in their verdict he had power to reconsider it in the light of any further evidence that might emerge when the whole question of the circumstances in which the confession was obtained was gone into again before the jury on the question of the weight to be attached to it: Reg v Watson (Campbell) [1980] 1 WLR 991. But his ruling became final when the trial ended with the return of the jury’s verdict of guilty and the pronouncement by the judge of the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. Bridge J thereupon became functus officio. His ruling that the confession was not obtained by the use of violence by the police, as Hunter had alleged, could thereafter only be upset upon appeal to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division).
[25] Importantly, the question is whether the issues have been raised and decided, not whether that occurred in proceedings directed at the outcome sought in the later case. So in Hunter, the issues were first raised in relation to admissibility of evidence in a criminal trial, and later in a civil action for damages. Mr Williams’ issues have been raised in litigation seeking redress from parties involved in his original transaction, but are now raised as a foundation for a claim that the Attorney-General should act in some unspecified and obscure way to orchestrate a review of what Mr Williams says occurred. The purpose differs, but the issues remain the same.
[26] It is clear from the judgments I have listed that in numerous cases Mr Williams has raised the issues he once more wishes to raise. It is equally apparent that he had opportunity to raise them by way of an appeal lodged within time, or by way of a separate proceeding years ago in the form noted by Kós J and referred to above. And the courts have repeatedly assessed the issues raised and cast doubt on their merits.
[27]I find that the present case cannot proceed, and must be struck out.
Second issue: Is Mr Williams’ claim for damages barred by Attorney-General v Chapman?
[28] Mr Williams claims damages in respect of the events which occurred during and at the time of the October 2012 fixture. He made it very clear in presentation of his submissions that he expressly calls into question the conduct of the District Court Judge, in particular alleging that the Judge should not have adjudicated on the case because of earlier involvement in issues relevant to it, and that certain conduct on his part over the course of the trial led to the unfavourable outcome which ensued, from Mr Williams’ perspective. The conduct of the Judge which Mr Williams calls into question is set out in paragraphs 14 – 27 of the statement of claim inclusive.
[29] In Attorney-General v Chapman the Supreme Court decided that compensation cannot be awarded under the Bill of Rights Act in respect of the actions of judges.17
[30] A comprehensive discussion of this issue is contained in the judgment of McGrath and William Young JJ,18 with which Gault J agreed.19 This includes a discussion of the prospect that failing to recognise immunity from suit on the part of judicial officers would leave them open to collateral attack, which is exactly what Mr Williams intends in this case. I need cite only para [204] from the judgment of McGrath and William Young JJ:
Judicial immunity is now conferred by a combination of the common law and statute law. For the reasons we have outlined, we hold that the public policy reasons which support personal judicial immunity also justify confining the scope of Crown liability for governmental breaches of the Bill of Rights Act to actions of the executive branch. Such liability should not be extended to
17 Attorney-General v Chapman, above n 2.
18 At [160] – [206].
19 At [211] – [215].
cover breaches resulting from the actions of the judicial branch. This does not, of course, mean that judicial immunity itself is being extended. Rather it is a recognition that the public law cause of action against the Crown, held in Baigent to be implicit in the Bill of Rights Act, would not appropriately be extended to cover the breaches of the judicial branch. As discussed, the desirability of finality in litigation and the importance of judicial independence and public confidence in that independence are here of particular importance. Relevant also is the extensive protection against judicial breach afforded by the justice system and in particular the current appellate process.
[31] So far as the claim in the present case relates to the actions of the District Court Judge who presided over trial of this case in 2012 is concerned, the action cannot proceed.
Remaining issues
[32] Given the decision reached in relation to the first two issues it is unnecessary to canvass the remaining arguments presented on behalf of the Attorney-General, and remaining submissions made by Mr Williams. On one point he made, however, it may be of value to clarify the position. Mr Williams says that the judgment of the District Court overturned a previous High Court judgment, namely that which reversed the decision of the District Court to strike out the proceeding, thereby allowing it to continue.
[33] That argument is a fallacy. The judgment of the High Court was directed solely to the issue of whether the claim should be struck out, and confined in its ambit to the evidence presented in relation to that application and to the principles which apply to applications to strike out. It was not a judgment following a trial. Any factual findings were made for the purpose of the application only and on the basis of the material then before the Court. Mr Williams raised the same argument before this Court on his application for leave to appeal and the position was explained to him then.20
[34] Finally, counsel for the Attorney-General submits that the claim would be likely to cause prejudice or delay because it is diffuse and difficult to understand. I agree with that observation. The statement of claim in its present form does not follow an accepted format for pleadings; indeed, it falls well wide of the mark. Possibly this
20 Williams v Cameron, above n 4, at [21].
could be corrected, at least to an extent, by an opportunity to replead but no such opportunity should be made available to Mr Williams given the compelling reasons for striking out the proceeding discussed above.
Outcome
[35]This proceeding is struck out.
[36] The Attorney-General is entitled to costs. Mr Webber seeks an award of costs above scale. He submits that the case entirely lacks merit. He notes a failure by Mr Williams to refer to previous litigation in the statement of claim which, given that the Attorney-General was not a party to any of the earlier cases, and the defendants in those cases are not parties to this one, put the Attorney-General to considerable extra work in ascertaining the history of this case. Mr Webber also notes clear indications given by the Court on earlier occasions that Mr Williams’ complaints lack merit.
[37] In response Mr Williams says that in bringing this application the Attorney- General’s office is failing in its duty to the public because, as he sees it, the Crown knows there has been a failure in the system and is responsible for the injustice which has occurred. As he puts it, the Crown has failed in its role to see that justice is done. An ancillary failure identified by Mr Williams is in not having a register of financial interests of judges, a reference to his view that the District Court Judge at the initial trial was in some unspecified way involved with one of the parties to the original transaction. Mr Williams says the Crown knows that the handling of his case was seriously flawed.
[38] Mr Williams’ views on this issue are founded on supposition in relation to the District Court Judge, and he remains committed to the view that despite the results of objective appraisal at all levels of the court system to the contrary, his view of what occurred is right. In my view the points made for the Attorney-General in support of an increase in scale costs lay a proper foundation for the Court to so order and are not counterbalanced by any point of merit put forward by Mr Williams.
[39] I direct that Mr Williams will pay costs to the Attorney-General on a 2B basis with an uplift of 30 per cent. Mr Williams will also pay disbursements, fixed if necessary by the Registrar.
Section 166, Senior Courts Act 2016
[40] Counsel for the Attorney-General seeks an order under s 166 of the Senior Courts Act 2016. This provides that a Judge of the High Court may make an order restricting a person from commencing or continuing a civil proceeding.
[41] I asked Mr Webber if he had considered whether an Associate Judge has jurisdiction to make an order under s 166. He was unable to assist the Court with argument. I prefer to leave this question to another proceeding where it is raised, for the following reasons. First, s 166 specifically refers to a Judge of the High Court, not an Associate Judge. Judges and Associate Judges are referred to by those titles in the Senior Courts Act. This suggests that jurisdiction under s 166 is not given to Associate Judges.
[42] Secondly, ss 20 – 22 of the Act, inclusive, specify the jurisdiction of Associate Judges. There is no provision within these sections which specifically confers on an Associate Judge jurisdiction under s 166. Section 20(4) provides that an Associate Judge has the jurisdiction and powers of the Court to deal with costs and other matters incidental to the matters over which the Associate Judge has jurisdiction under this section. However, I am not satisfied at present that the making of an order under s 166 would come within this provision.
[43] I am presently inclined to the view that an Associate Judge does not have jurisdiction under s 166 and I decline to make the order sought.
J G Matthews Associate Judge
Solicitors:
Plaintiff – in person
Crown Law Office, Wellington
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