Nottingham v District Court at Auckland
[2018] NZSC 110
•20 November 2018
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI |
| SC 76/2018 [2018] NZSC 110 |
| BETWEEN | DERMOT GREGORY NOTTINGHAM |
| AND | DISTRICT COURT AT AUCKLAND |
| Court: | William Young, O’Regan and Ellen France JJ |
Counsel: | Applicant in person |
Judgment: | 20 November 2018 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
AThe application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal is dismissed.
BThe applicant is to pay costs of $2,500 to the second respondents.
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REASONS
Mr Nottingham wanted to appeal to the Court of Appeal against a decision of the High Court. He did not file his notice of appeal within time so applied for an extension of time. The Court of Appeal declined to grant an extension of time.[1] Mr Nottingham seeks leave to appeal out of time to this Court against that decision.
[1]Nottingham v District Court at Auckland [2018] NZCA 75 (Kós P, Brown and Williams JJ) [Nottingham (CA)].
The High Court judgment which Mr Nottingham wished to appeal to the Court of Appeal was a decision of Gilbert J.[2] Gilbert J struck out Mr Nottingham’s statement of claim in a judicial review proceeding brought against the District Court at Auckland and the second respondents alleging a criminal conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. Gilbert J found the claim was “replete with scandalous and outrageous allegations” and that no attempt was made to provide factual particulars of the various allegations of dishonesty.[3] In addition, the Judge considered much of the relief sought could not be granted on a judicial review.[4]
[2]Nottingham v District Court at Auckland [2017] NZHC 777.
[3]At [16].
[4]The claim arose in the context of an unsuccessful private prosecution brought by Mr Nottingham in the District Court against the second respondents. All of the charges were dismissed and acquittals entered. The statement of claim in the High Court sought, amongst other things, that the acquittals be set aside and convictions entered.
The Court of Appeal, in declining to grant an extension of time, concluded the delay in filing the notice of appeal was substantial and unexplained. Further, the Court considered the proceeding in the High Court was an abuse of process as a collateral attack on issues finally determined in other proceedings.[5] In the circumstances, the Court concluded it was not in the interests of justice to extend time for the filing of the notice of appeal.
[5]The Court referred to Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 (HL): Nottingham (CA), above n 1, at [10]. Mr Nottingham unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal from the entry of acquittals: Nottingham v District Court at Auckland [2017] NZHC 1715 (Paul Davison J). The Court of Appeal subsequently found it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from that decision: Nottingham v District Court at Auckland [2018] NZCA 345 (Asher, Brown and Clifford JJ). Leave to appeal declined: Nottingham v Taka [2018] NZSC 102.
The principles applicable to the Court of Appeal’s decision whether or not to grant an extension of time were set out recently by the Court in Almond v Read.[6] Mr Nottingham does not challenge those principles; rather, he seeks to challenge their application by the Court of Appeal to the particular facts of this case. No point of general or public importance accordingly arises. Nor does anything raised by Mr Nottingham give rise to the appearance of a miscarriage of justice.[7] We add that his delay in filing in this Court is unexplained.
[6]Almond v Read [2017] NZSC 80, [2017] 1 NZLR 801.
[7]Junior Farms Ltd v Hampton Securities Ltd (in liq) [2006] NZSC 60, (2006) 18 PRNZ 369 atFor these reasons the application for an extension of time to appeal is dismissed. The applicant is to pay costs of $2,500 to the second respondents.[8]
[8]The first respondent abides the decision of the Court on the application for leave.
Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for First Respondent
Foy & Halse, Auckland for Second Respondents
[4]–[5].
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