Williams v Craig - [2016] NZHC 1876

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2015-404-1845 [2016] NZHC 1876

UNDER the Defamation Act 1992

BETWEEN

JORDAN HENRY WILLIAMS Plaintiff

AND

COLIN GRAEME CRAIG First Defendant

AND

NATHANIEL JOHN HESLOP, KEVIN STITT, ANGELA MARIA STORR Second Defendants

On the papers

Appearances:

PA McKnight and A Romanos for plaintiff
First-named second defendant in person

Judgment:

12 August 2016

JUDGMENT OF TOOGOOD J

[Plaintiff's application for costs against first-named second defendant]

This judgment was delivered by me on 12 August 2016 at 3:30 pm
Pursuant to Rule 11.5 High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Williams v Craig [2016] NZHC 1876 [12 August 2016]

[1] The plaintiff, Jordan Williams is suing Nathaniel Heslop and others in defamation. On 4 December 2016, Mr Heslop filed an interlocutory application for summary judgment and for the determination of a separate question. On 27 April
2016, however, a few days before the interlocutory applications were to be heard, Mr Heslop discontinued them.

[2] Mr Williams now applies for increased costs against Mr Heslop in respect of the discontinued interlocutory applications. Mr Heslop argues that costs should be reserved until the substantive proceeding is determined but he says that, if costs are awarded, they should be on a category 2B basis without an uplift.

Background

[3] The relevant chronology of facts is as follows:

(a) On 29 July 2015, an allegedly defamatory brochure was said to have been published on the website of the Conservative Party of New Zealand. Mr Heslop was the party’s secretary at that time.

(b) On 18 August 2015, Mr Heslop was served with Mr Williams’s

statement of claim for the substantive defamation proceeding.

(c) On 18 September 2015, Mr Heslop filed his statement of defence.

(d) On 13 November 2015, Mr Williams amended his statement of claim. (e) On 4 December 2015, Mr Heslop filed an interlocutory summary
judgment application and an application for the determination of a separate question. The application for a determination of a separate question related to whether he was a “publisher” of the allegedly defamatory material.

(f) On 21 December 2015, Mr Williams’ counsel made a telephone call to Mr Heslop, offering to discontinue proceedings against Mr Heslop Mr Heslop agreed not to seek costs.

(g) On 22 December 2015, Mr Heslop rejected Mr Williams’s offer on the

basis that costs would be necessary.

(h) On 21 March 2016, this Court set down the hearing of Mr Heslop’s

applications for the week of 2 May 2016.

(i)On 31 March 2016, Mr Williams filed a second amended statement of claim, which further particularised the allegations of Mr Heslop’s involvement in publishing the allegedly defamatory material.

(j)On 27 April 2016, Mr Heslop withdrew and discontinued his application for summary judgment and for determination of a separate question.

[4] The substantive hearing is set down for trial beginning on 5 September 2016.

Costs claims

[5] Mr Williams seeks a total of $19,342.00 in costs and disbursements for

Mr Heslop’s discontinued application. This is claimed on a category 2B basis,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Williams v Craig

Details

AGLC: Williams v Craig [2016] NZHC 1876
Case: [2016] NZHC 1876
Decision Date: 12 August 2016

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Williams v Craig involves a defamation claim brought by Jordan Henry Williams against Nathaniel John Heslop and others. Williams is suing Heslop and others for defamation arising from a brochure allegedly published on the website of the Conservative Party of New Zealand, with Heslop acting as the party’s secretary at the time. The primary dispute involves whether Heslop should be held liable as a "publisher" of the allegedly defamatory material. Heslop filed interlocutory applications for summary judgment and for the determination of a separate question, which he later discontinued. Williams now seeks increased costs against Heslop in relation to these discontinued applications.

The court was required to determine whether costs should be awarded to Williams for the discontinued interlocutory applications and, if so, the appropriate amount and basis. The legal issues included the applicability of Rule 15.23 of the High Court Rules, which generally requires a plaintiff who discontinues a proceeding to pay costs to the defendant, and the court's discretion to depart from this rule if it is just and equitable to do so. Additionally, the court had to consider whether costs should be reserved until the outcome of the substantive proceeding or awarded immediately, and the appropriate scale and uplift for the costs if awarded.

The court found that while Rule 15.23 applies by analogy to discontinued interlocutory applications, it was not appropriate to fix costs for Heslop's discontinued applications at that stage of the proceeding. The discontinuance of the applications was not entirely self-contained, as it directly related to Williams's pleadings against Heslop at the time. The court also considered the overall context of the substantive proceeding, including Williams's allegations about Heslop's failure to accept offers of settlement and the reasonableness of Heslop's applications. The question of costs on Heslop's application for summary judgment and his application for the determination of a separate question was therefore reserved for determination as part of the final determination of costs at the conclusion of the proceeding.

The court's decision was that it would not fix costs for the discontinued applications at that stage but would reserve the issue for determination at the end of the substantive proceeding. This decision balanced the principle that a discontinuing plaintiff generally pays costs with the need to consider the overall context of the litigation and the specific circumstances of the discontinued applications.

Orders