Williams v Auckland Council

Link copied
Case Copied 65 min read

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
CA251/2014
[2015] NZCA 479
BETWEEN

CHARLES WILLIAM WILLIAMS, JEAN ELIZABETH MORLEY, INEZ BEVERLEY FLAVELL, LESLEY ANNE HENSLEIGH, THE ROYAL NEW ZEALAND FOUNDATION OF THE BLIND, DONALD ALEXANDER MACKINTOSH, LYNDA ANNE RYAN, JANICE AILEEN ROBERTSON, GILLIAN MADGE CLARK, ROSALIE HILDA MAILAND, DONALD MICHAEL STEWART, PATRICIA DORA MARY SPENCER-WOOD, SOPHIA MARIA HUNT AND DAVID JOHN MCCORMICK
Appellants 

AND

AUCKLAND COUNCIL
Respondent
Hearing:

12 and 13 August 2015

Court:

Harrison, French and Mallon JJ

Counsel:

C R Carruthers QC, W L Aldred and P M Cassin for Appellants
M E Casey QC and G W Hall for Respondent

Judgment:

9 October 2015 at 10 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe appeal is dismissed.

BThe cross-appeal is dismissed.

C    There is no order as to costs. 

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Harrison J)

Table of Contents

Para No

Introduction
The PWA 1981
Issues
Factual background
First issue: was the Board under a duty to offer the land back?

(a)   Did the Board acquire or hold the land for a public work?

(i)         Council’s defence

(ii)       Decision

(b)   Was the land still held or required for a public work on 1 February 1982?

(i)         Council’s defence

(ii)       Decision

(c)   Were the owners required to prove that the Board compulsorily acquired the land?

(i)         Council’s defence: law

(ii)       Decision: law

(iii)      Council’s defence: facts

(iv)       Decision: facts

(d)   Did the Council as the Board’s successor lawfully exercise a discretionary power when resolving in 1996 not to offer some of the land back to owners?

(i)         Council’s defence

(ii)       Decision

(e)    Did all the owners fall within the statutory definition of a “successor”?

(i)         Council’s defence

(ii)       Section 40(5) approach

(iii)      Owners:

RNZFB, Mackintosh and Ryan
McCormick
Spencer-Wood
Stewart  “successor”?

Second issue:  did the Empowering Act 1983 extinguish the Board’s existing duty under the PWA 1981?

(a)     Council’s defence

(b)     Empowering Act 1983

(c)   Decision

Third issue:  are the owners entitled to declaratory relief?

(a)    Declaratory relief

(b)     Principles

(c)   Delay

(d)     Competing equities

(e)   Conclusion

Result

[1]
[7]
[8]
[12]
[21]

[21]
[21]
[23]

[32]
[32]
[35]

[38]
[38]
[42]
[47]
[49]

[54]
[54]
[57]
[62]

[62]
[65]
[67]
[67]
[71]
[76]
[82]

[86]
[86]
[88]
[90]
[96]
[96]
[99]
[102]
[115]
[126]
[128]

Introduction

  1. In 1949 the then Auckland Harbour Board acting under statutory authority notified the owners of seven separate properties at Te Atatu that their rural land was within an area designated for the construction and development of port facilities in the upper Waitemata Harbour (the Te Atatu land).  Over the next few years the Board acquired over 75 hectares of land from those owners.  By the late 1970s, however, it became apparent that the port proposal would not proceed at the designated site.  The Te Atatu land was progressively rezoned and used for other purposes.  Some of the land is now a residential subdivision.  However, most is within a public park and its potential value for housing is very substantial.

  2. On 1…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Williams v Auckland Council and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] NZCA 479
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Williams v Auckland Council involved the interpretation of statutory provisions concerning the retention of land by a local authority. The case revolved around whether the land in question was held for a public work on 1 February 1982, a date crucial under the Public Works Act 1952. The primary legal issue was whether the Auckland Council was entitled to retain the Te Atatu land for purposes other than a public work, despite the statutory requirement that land held for public works could only be retained for public purposes. The Court had to determine if the Board’s change of purpose for the land without following the formal process of gazetting and proclamation could alter its existing legal status.

The Court held that the Board’s decision to use the Te Atatu land for purposes other than a public work did not change its status as land held for a public work. The Court emphasised that Section 40 of the Act recognises a local authority’s right to retain land for public works but does not empower it to avoid statutory duties by holding land for non-public works. The Court rejected the argument that the land was not held for a public work on the specified date, aligning with the earlier finding of Fogarty J. The Court further clarified that the formal process of changing the purpose of land held for public works is required under the Act, and the Board’s failure to follow this process meant that the land retained its status as being held for a public work.

The Court’s reasoning was based on the statutory language and the established legal principles that the retention of land for public works is a limited right, which cannot be circumvented by merely deciding to use the land for other purposes. The Court also rejected the alternative arguments presented regarding the compulsory acquisition of the land, confirming that the owners were not required to prove the land was compulsorily acquired to benefit from Section 40(2) of the Act. The Court concluded that the land was indeed held for a public work on 1 February 1982, affirming the lower court’s findings.

The final orders of the Court upheld the lower court’s decision, affirming that the Auckland Council’s retention of the Te Atatu land was not justified under the statutory provisions, as the land was still held for a public work on the specified date. The Court’s decision underscored the importance of adhering to statutory requirements when changing the use of land held for public works, reinforcing the principle that local authorities cannot unilaterally alter the purpose of such land without following the prescribed legal process.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In support Mr Casey submitted that as all the Te Atatu land was not purchased for a public work it was not held for that purpose on 1 February 1982. He referred to a range of Board documents showing that from about 1976 onwards the Te Atatu land was being held for development and leasing as an industrial estate. By 1979 the Board had decided at least part of the land would no longer be reserved for future port development. Some reports proposed the creation and development of industrial lots. In Mr Casey’s submission, the Board had decided by 1982 that all the Te Atatu land would only be used for purposes complementary to a port which may be constructed elsewhere in the upper Waitemata Harbour. It was, he said, no longer held for a public work. (ii) Decision In rejecting this submission we add our agreement with Fogarty J that, while the Te Atatu land was not required for a public work,[19] it was still held for that purpose on 1 February 1982. These are two separate elements with distinctly separate consequences.[20] Section 40 recognises a local authority’s continual right to retain land held for a public work only for that or another public work: it does not empower a local authority to avoid its statutory duty by asserting a right to continue to hold and use that land instead for a non-public work. As this Court pointed out in Bennett,[21] s 20 of the Public Works Amendment Act 1952 allowed a local authority to change the purpose for which land was required to another authorised purpose but only by following a formal process of gazetting and proclamation. The Board’s decision to use the Te Atatu land for another purpose without taking these formal steps did not change its existing legal status. [19]At [70]–[77].[20]See Bennett, above n 2, at [45].[21]At [24]. Mr Casey submitted alternatively that either (a) if the industrial and commercial purpose for which the land was acquired were a public work, then as a matter of fact the land was still held and required for that purpose on 1 February 1982; or (b) if the land was purchased for a port or other harbour works that is a public work, then as a matter of fact it was no longer held nor required for that purpose on 1 February 1982. These alternatives appear to contradict what Fogarty J recorded was common ground in the High Court. In any event, they are factually irreconcilable as they would require us to make contrary findings based on the same subject matter; and neither alternative can be sustained in light of our conclusion that by 1 February 1982 the land was still held though not required for a public work. The Council’s third substantive defence is that the owners were required to prove as a pre-requisite to the application of s 40(2) that the Board acquired the Te Atatu land compulsorily. On appeal it challenged Fogarty J’s findings that, first, the owners were not required to prove the land was compulsorily acquired;[22] and second, if proof of compulsion was required, it was satisfied in every case.[23] [22]At [86]–[102].[23]At [103]–[148].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.