Williams v Auckland Council - [2016] NZSC 20

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

SC 124/2015
[2016] NZSC 20

BETWEEN	CHARLES WILLIAM WILLIAMS, JEAN ELIZABETH MORLEY, INEZ BEVERLY FLAVELL, LESLEY ANNE HENSLEIGH, THE ROYAL NEW ZEALAND FOUNDATION OF THE BLIND, DONALD ALEXANDER MACKINTOSH, LYNDA ANNE RYAN, JANICE AILEEN ROBERTSON, GILLIAN MADGE CLARK, ROSALIE HILDA MAILAND, DONALD MICHAEL STEWART, PATRICIA DORA MARY SPENCER-WOOD, SOPHIE MARIA HUNT AND DAVID JOHN MCCORMICK First to Seventh Applicants
AND	AUCKLAND COUNCIL Respondent

Court:	Elias CJ, William Young and O'Regan JJ
Counsel:	C R Carruthers QC for Applicants M E Casey QC and G W Hall for Respondent
Judgment:	11 March 2016

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
B The applicants must pay costs of $2,500 to the respondent.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

The applicants seek leave to appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal.[1] In that decision, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from a decision of Fogarty J in relation to a case involving the offer back provisions in the Public Works Act 1981.[2] The Court of Appeal’s decision led to the same outcome as that of Fogarty J, but its reasoning was quite different.
[1]Williams v Auckland Council [2015] NZCA 479 (Harrison, French and Mallon JJ) (CA judgment).
[2]J A Robertson & Ors v Auckland Council [2014] NZHC 765 (Fogarty J) (HC judgment).
The points that the applicants seek to raise on appeal are:
(a)the question of the proper interpretation of the term “successor” in s 40(5) of the Public Works Act; and
(b)the basis on which the Court should exercise the discretion as to whether declaratory relief should be granted.
We will deal with these in reverse order.

Discretion

This proposed ground of leave deals with the Court of Appeal’s decision to exercise its discretion not to make a declaration in favour of those claimants who were found to come within the s 40(5) definition of successor. The applicants argued that there was either an error in principle or that the exercise of the discretion was plainly wrong.
The Court of Appeal declined to give a declaration for two main reasons. The first was delay. The second was that the applicants had only an economic interest in the land, rather than a personal familial interest.

Delay

The applicants’ case was that their right to have the land offered back to them arose in 1982, when the Public Works Act came into effect, or alternatively in 1995. The present litigation was commenced in 2005, so the delay was either more than 20 years or about 10 years. There was a dispute about the time at which the applicants became aware that the land was no longer held for a public work, but even if the most favourable view is taken they still delayed for 10 years in commencing their litigation.
The applicants submit that they should not be penalised for delay because the respondent should have come forward and offered the land back to them as soon as it became…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2016] NZSC 20
Decision Date: 11 March 2016

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of New Zealand, the case of Williams v Auckland Council involved multiple applicants seeking to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeal that had dismissed an appeal from a decision of Fogarty J regarding the offer back provisions in the Public Works Act 1981. The applicants were contesting the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the term “successor” in s 40(5) of the Act and the basis on which the Court should exercise its discretion regarding the granting of declaratory relief. The primary concern of the applicants was the Court of Appeal's narrower interpretation of the term “successor,” which they believed should be more liberally construed to align with the remedial intent of the Act.

The Supreme Court assessed the applicants' arguments and found that the Court of Appeal's decision not to grant declaratory relief was grounded in the significant delay in initiating the litigation and the applicants' lack of personal or familial interest in the land. Despite the applicants' contention that the respondent should have offered the land back to them, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s reasoning that the purpose of the Act was to restore land to individuals with a personal or familial connection to it. Given these findings, the Supreme Court concluded that even if the interpretation of "successor" were to be reconsidered, it would not alter the outcome of the case.

Consequently, the Supreme Court declined to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the application. The applicants were ordered to pay costs of $2,500 to the respondent. The respondent, having indicated an intention to cross-appeal if leave were granted, was not required to proceed with the cross-appeal as the application was dismissed.

Orders