IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2018-404-001164
[2018] NZHC 2654
UNDER The Companies Act 1993 BETWEEN
WALLACE HOMES LIMITED
Applicant
AND
PEARLFISHER TRUSTEE LIMITED
Respondent
Hearing: 5 October 2018 Appearances:
O Collette-Moxon and E Boshier for the Applicant T Fitzgerald and S Cooper for the Respondent
Judgment:
12 October 2018
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE P J ANDREW
This judgment was delivered by me on 12 October 2018 at 3:30pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:………………………….
Solicitors:
Duncan Cotterill, Auckland Bell Gully, Auckland
Counsel:
O Collette-Moxon, Princes Chambers, Auckland
WALLACE HOMES LIMITED v PEARLFISHER TRUSTEE LIMITED [2018] NZHC 2654 [12 October 2018]
Introduction
[1] The applicant, Wallace Homes Ltd (Wallace Homes) is a property developer. The respondent, Pearlfisher Trustee Ltd (Pearlfisher), is a non-bank lender which specialises in property development funding.
[2] Wallace Homes applies to set aside a statutory demand for $353,260.37 issued against it by Pearlfisher. The disputed sum includes two fees that Pearlfisher says that Wallace Homes agreed to pay as part of Pearlfisher arranging finance for Wallace Homes (the loan facility). Wallace Homes was looking to refinance existing debt for
$9.5 million. The two fees consist of an arrangement fee of $100,000 and an establishment fee of $245,000.
[3] The loan facility did not proceed. Wallace Homes says that there was no legally binding contract requiring it to pay either fee or alternatively, if there is a binding contract, the requirement to pay the fees was not triggered.
[4] The critical issue I must determine, pursuant to s 290(4) of the Companies Act 1993, is whether there is arguably a genuine and substantial dispute as to the existence of the debt. This turns on the question of whether the prerequisites to the formation of a contract were met.
Relevant legal principles
[5] The Court’s jurisdiction to set aside a statutory demand is contained in s 290 Companies Act 1993. That section reads:
290 Court may set aside statutory demand
…
(4)The court may grant an application to set aside a statutory demand if it is satisfied that—
(a)there is a substantial dispute whether or not the debt is owing or is due; or
(b)the company appears to have a counterclaim, set-off, or cross- demand and the amount specified in the demand less the
amount of the counterclaim, set-off, or cross-demand is less than the prescribed amount; or
(c)the demand ought to be set aside on other grounds.
[6] For the purposes of this hearing, I adopt as a general approach to the exercise of this jurisdiction these principles –
(a)The applicant must show that there is arguably a genuine and substantial dispute as to the existence of the debt. Put another way, the applicant must show that there is a real and not a fanciful or insubstantial dispute.1
(b)The mere assertion that the dispute exists is not sufficient. Material short of proof is required to support the claim that…
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- Case
- [2018] NZHC 2654
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the second proposal, which was a formal letter of offer, constituted a binding contract. The proposal was signed by Wallace Homes, indicating acceptance of the offer and an obligation. The proposal's terms, which included conditions precedent to drawdown, demonstrated an intention to contract. The court concluded that there was an intention to be immediately bound and an agreement on every term legally essential to the formation of the contract. The second proposal was intended to be a binding agreement, and its acceptance by Wallace Homes triggered the obligation to pay both fees. The court rejected Wallace Homes' contention that there was no binding legal obligation on Pearlfisher to provide the loan facility and that the second proposal did not constitute a contract. The court found that Wallace Homes had not shown there was arguably a genuine and substantial dispute as to the existence of the debt.
The application by Wallace Homes to set aside the statutory demand was dismissed. The court held that Wallace Homes was contractually required to pay the sum to Pearlfisher. Pearlfisher would ordinarily be entitled to costs on a 2B basis, with memoranda to be filed within 14 days if the parties could not agree on costs.