| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND |
| SC93/2013 [2013] NZSC 136 |
| BETWEEN | VINCENT ROSS SIEMER |
| AND | JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSIONER HELEN DIANA WINKELMANN |
| Court: | McGrath, William Young and Glazebrook JJ |
Counsel: | Applicant in person |
Judgment: | 4 December 2013 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The application for recall is dismissed
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
Mr Siemer applies to recall the judgment in Siemer v Judicial Conduct Commissioner SC 93/2013 [2013] NZSC 113.
The application raises no new matters that would justify recall.
The application for recall is dismissed.
Solicitors:
Crown Law Office for the First Respondent
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- Case
- [2013] NZSC 136
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the application for recall presented any new matters that could justify revisiting the earlier judgment. This involved an examination of the grounds on which the recall was sought and a determination of whether these grounds were indeed new and significant enough to warrant a reconsideration of the case.
In its judgment, the Supreme Court held that the application for recall did not introduce any new matters that would warrant a recall of the previous judgment. The court carefully considered the arguments presented by Siemer and concluded that the application did not meet the necessary threshold for recall. Consequently, the application for recall was dismissed, affirming the earlier judgment and maintaining the status quo.
The final orders of the court were that the application for recall by Vincent Ross Siemer was dismissed, and no further action was to be taken on the matter as per the previous judgment.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the Supreme Court of New Zealand as an application for recall of a prior judgment. The initial case, Siemer v Judicial Conduct Commissioner SC 93/2013 [2013] NZSC 113, involved disciplinary proceedings against Mr Siemer. Following the Supreme Court's judgment in that case, Mr Siemer lodged an application seeking to recall the judgment. The application was heard by McGrath, William Young, and Glazebrook JJ. Mr Siemer appeared in person, while P J Gunn represented the first respondent, the Judicial Conduct Commissioner. The court evaluated the application for recall based on whether new matters had been presented that would justify reconsidering the earlier judgment.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the application for recall raises new matters that would justify reconsideration of the earlier judgment.
2. If the application for recall is successful, what effect, if any, it would have on the prior judgment.
Held
1. The court concluded that the application for recall does not raise new matters that would justify reconsideration of the earlier judgment.
2. As the application for recall does not succeed, the court did not consider the effect it would have on the prior judgment.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Siemer v Judicial Conduct Commissioner, the Supreme Court of New Zealand addressed the appellant's application for the recall of a previous judgment. The appellant, Vincent Ross Siemer, sought to recall the judgment rendered in Siemer v Judicial Conduct Commissioner SC 93/2013 [2013] NZSC 113. The court examined the grounds upon which the appellant sought recall and determined that they did not present any new matters that would warrant reconsideration of the earlier judgment. The Court considered the legal principles surrounding the recall of judgments, which require that the application must raise new matters not previously considered. The appellant's application did not meet this threshold, as it did not introduce any new facts or legal arguments that were not already addressed in the previous judgment. The Court also noted that recall applications are not intended to allow parties to reargue matters that were or could have been raised in the original proceedings. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application for recall. The binding legal principle established in this decision is that recall applications will only be granted if they raise genuinely new matters not previously considered by the Court. The Court did not depart from any prior authority in reaching its decision.