v v Refugee Protection Officer
[2025] NZHC 853
•9 April 2025
NOTE: THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE NAME OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF THE APPELLANT AND OF THEIR CLAIM OR STATUS MUST BE MAINTAINED PURSUANT TO S 151 OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT 2009.
SEE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2024-404-002287
[2025] NZHC 853
UNDER the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 BETWEEN
V
Applicant
AND
REFUGEE PROTECTION OFFICER
Respondent
Hearing: 31 March 2025 Appearances:
Applicant in person
S P Jerebine and E J J McCarthy for Respondent
Judgment:
9 April 2025
JUDGMENT OF PRESTON J
This judgment was delivered by me on 9 April 2025 at 3.30 pm, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date……………
V v REFUGEE PROTECTION OFFICER [2025] NZHC 853 [9 April 2025]
Introduction
[1] The applicant V seeks judicial review of the decision (the June 2024 decision) of a refugee and protection officer (the RPO) to refuse to consider her fourth claim for refugee and protection status under s 140(3) of the Immigration Act 2009 (the Act).
[2] V, who is self-represented, asks the Court to annul the decision—that is to declare it invalid—on grounds that, among other matters, the RPO did not consider all the information submitted in support of her fourth claim.
[3] V further requests that this Court itself determine her refugee status rather than remit the decision back to the RPO. Alternatively, she seeks an order directing the RPO to reconsider her fourth claim with certain ancillary “specific and detailed instructions” as to the RPO’s conduct of that reconsideration.
[4] The RPO, through counsel Ms Jerebine, agrees that relief is appropriate on the basis it is not clear from the June 2024 decision that all information submitted to the RPO was considered. The respondent accepts the Court should direct the RPO to reconsider the fourth claim, on the entirety of the material V submitted in support (and any other relevant material V wishes to promptly submit). This concession was only available to counsel for the respondent following review of V’s late-filed bundle of evidence on the judicial review application. An offer was responsibly then advanced to V during the week prior to the hearing, on an open basis by exchange of correspondence.
[5] V declined the offer. She maintained her request that the Court instead determine her most recent application for refugee status and protection. She filed a memorandum entitled “Application for RSU disqualification and Judicial Review” seeking a further alternative: that the decision be referred to “an independent evaluator” to determine her refugee status. V contends these remedies are available in the Court’s inherent jurisdiction and are justified in the particular circumstances of her case. V emphasised that she has “lost confidence” in the ability of the decision maker to fairly and competently consider her claim.
[6]So the matter came before me for hearing.
V’s circumstances
[7] V is 66 years old. She is a Chilean citizen, born in [a city] in the Republic of Chile. She and her husband separated in 2015, and have three adult sons. It is a matter of record that V has had a lengthy career as a lecturer in [redacted], holding part-time teaching positions at several universities and tertiary institutions in [a city]. She has also operated several small businesses with family members.
[8] In February 2017 V came to New Zealand to study English, holding a student visa until July 2018.
[9] Between February 2018 and December 2022, V lodged four successive claims for refugee and protection status with the Refugee Status Unit (the RSU).1
Other visa applications August 2019 to December 2023
[10] Within and following the time period of her refugee claims, the respondent records V has applied seven times to Immigration New Zealand (INZ) for a work visa under s 61 of the Act. These requests were declined by INZ on 30 August 2019, 5 October 2019, 6 December 2019, 14 July 2022, 7 November 2022, 15 February 2023 and 13 December 2023.
[11] On 10 December 2019, V requested ministerial intervention regarding the decline of her requests for a work visa. On 25 August 2020, the Resolutions Ministerial Departmental Decision Maker determined it was not prepared to intervene.
Procedural history—claims for refugee and protection status
[12] I adopt the chronology of the progress of V’s first three claims to the RSU as set out in the submissions of the respondent.
1 Formerly known as the Refugee Status Branch.
First claim
[13] On 15 February 2018, before expiry of her student visa, V lodged her first claim for refugee and protection status. In her claim, V stated she feared returning to Chile due to:
(a)her father’s murder;
(b)her dismissal from her university teaching post, in 1999, after [critical comments V made];
(c)a wrongful dismissal from a position at the police academy in 2012;
(d)a bank closing her [redacted] business over a disputed debt in 2013;
(e)her pursuit of legal claims to recover a house, owned by her father, which she says a neighbour fraudulently possessed from the 1970s;
(f)her separation from her verbally abusive husband in 2015; and
(g)unjust treatment by corrupt police.
[14] With the exception of the claim her father was murdered, the RSU found that her claims were credible. However, the RSU declined her request for refugee and protection status on the basis the claims did not give rise to a real chance of serious harm if she returned to Chile.
[15] On 21 December 2018, V appealed the decision to the Immigration and Protection Tribunal (the Tribunal) and lodged a humanitarian appeal.
[16] On 7 March 2019, the Tribunal declined the appeal.2 The Tribunal did not accept V’s account that her father had been murdered, and did not accept that the closure of business was anything other than a commercial dispute. But it accepted
2 Re AH (Chile) [2019] NZIPT 801536 at [65].
V’s claims as to the occurrence of the other matters. However, the Tribunal did not accept V had a well-founded fear of persecution.
[17] On 8 April 2019, the Tribunal declined the humanitarian appeal.3 It determined there to be no objective evidence of corruption regarding V’s father estate but noted that, even if there was, this would not be considered exceptional in the context of Chile.4 The Tribunal concluded that V did not have exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian nature in terms of the statutory test.5
Second claim
[18] On 28 June 2019, V lodged her second claim for refugee and protection status with the RSU. V maintained the facts set out in her first claim and noted additional fears in returning to Chile, in relation to:
(a)her family members;
(b)the increased powers of police following civil unrest in Chile;
(c)the uncertain housing situation of her son [redacted] which was indirectly harmful to her;
(d)a police lieutenant-colonel, after a Facebook exchange over one of her posts;
(e)the disappearance of her lawyer who had supported her claim against corruption in the justice system of Chile;
(f)her application for a ruling that the [redacted] bank had abandoned its legal proceedings relating to her debt to it;
(g)her family’s neighbours, who were said to be responsible for making her national identity card invalid; and
3 Re AI (Chile) [2019] NZIPT 504406 at [36].
4 Re AI (Chile) [2019] NZIPT 504406 at [28].
5 Re AI (Chile) [2019] NZIPT 504406 at [34].
(h)the Covid-19 situation in Chile.
[19]The RSU did not accept:
(a)V’s father was murdered;
(b)her family intended to harm her physically;
(c)that the 1999 (university) dismissal and 2012 (Police academy) dismissal were because she had spoken out against corruption; and
(d)her family’s neighbours were behind the invalidity of her national identity card.
[20] The RSU considered the remaining claims were credible, but found V nonetheless did not face a real chance of serious harm in Chile.
[21] On 17 July 2020, V appealed the decision of the RSU dated 30 June 2020 to the Tribunal. The appeal repeated her previous claims, and was additionally based on claims of:
(a)irregularities in relation to her Chilean identity card;
(b)a biased court decision made about her son’s accommodation;
(c)the Court wrongfully archiving her abandonment of procedure application in relation to the bank that previously acted against her for money owed;
(d)disappearance of her lawyer;
(e)a company where she worked being investigated for corruption;
(f)she having ceased all contact with family members;
(g)civil unrest in Chile; and
(h)worsening of the Covid-19 pandemic.
[22] On 30 April 2021, the Tribunal declined the appeal.6 The Tribunal upheld its credibility findings from the earlier appeal, for matters that were repeated in this appeal. As to the new claims, the Tribunal accepted:
(a)V experienced difficulties when attempting to use her Chilean identification document;
(b)her son had found accommodation in the same apartment building, following a tenancy dispute;
(c)her application relating to the bank’s legal proceeding against her has been archived by the court;
(d)she has been unable to contact her lawyer since mid-2019;
(e)she had an exchange on Facebook with a former colleague about corruption in the Police, but the conversation was cordial.
(f)the company where V had worked until 1992 had recently been found guilty of bribery.
[23] However, while the Tribunal found V held subjective fears of serious harm from various factors, objectively she did not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted.
Third claim
[24] On 28 May 2021, V lodged her third claim for refugee and protection status with the RSU. V noted her fear of creditors, the banks, the courts, and the Government. Specifically, V noted:
6 Re AK (Chile) [2021] NZIPT 801809 at [131].
(a)her past disagreements with creditors and the banks, including a dispute from 2006 with [redacted] bank;
(b)her negative views of the courts and government in Chile;
(c)problems with her identification card and passport applications;
(d)a letter to a minister dated 25 May 2021, relating to the 2019 abandonment of proceeding;
(e)a continued dispute regarding her father’s assets;
(f)the disappearance of her lawyer;
(g)the housing and employment situation of her sons in Chile; and
(h)the general situation in Chile.
[25] On 1 July 2022, the RSU refused to consider V’s third claim under section 140(3) of the Act, on the basis that it repeated a previous claim.
Fourth claim
[26] On 8 December 2022, V lodged a fourth claim for refugee and protection status with the RSU. V stated she feared family, neighbours, the Courts, and the Government of Chile. V specified that she:
(a)maintained her father was murdered;
(b)maintained there was continued dispute regarding his assets;
(c)did not want to surrender her inheritance to her family’s neighbours;
(d)had a list of people who were her enemies and wanted to harm or kill her; and
(e)had no protection from Chilean authorities.
[27] The chronology of events following lodgement of the fourth claim is succinctly set out in counsel for the respondent’s submissions, which I adopt:
By letter dated 10 October 2023, the RPO notified V there may be grounds to refuse her fourth claim for refugee and protection status under section 140(3) of the Act, and requested she provide any submissions within 10 working days.
By email dated 25 October 2023, V requested an extension to the due date for her submissions. The RPO confirmed, by email, that V may have until 27 October 2023 to provide her response.
On the evening of Friday 27 October 2023 and on Saturday 28 October 2023 V sent three emails to the RPO (the 27 and 28 October submissions). The first email with 10 documents attached, the second email with 3 documents attached, and the third email with 7 documents attached.
On Monday 30 October 2023, the RPO confirmed receipt of V’s response and the documents in support of her claim.
By email dated Saturday 18 May 2024, V informed the RPO of her eviction from her accommodation and attached 8 documents (the 18 May 2024 email). This was received by the RPO on Monday 20 May 2024.
On 21 May 2024, the RPO informed V that RSU was unable to assist with the eviction matter and that V’s fourth claim would be finalised before 30 June 2024.
The June 2024 decision
[28] On 27 June 2024 the RPO issued its decision, with detailed reasons. The RPO noted its summary of the claim should be read together with that set out in its previous decision of 1 July 2022, and reviewed the procedural history and bases of V’s prior successive claims made in February 2018, June 2019 and May 2021 against the fourth claim. The RPO determined to refuse the claim under s 140(3) of the Act, as manifestly unfounded, clearly abusive and repetitive of V’s previous claims.7
[29] The RPO considered the claim manifestly unfounded as, it concluded, it was self-evident from the particulars on which it relies that it was unfounded or untenable. The claim reasserted matters which have already been found not to pose a well- founded fear of persecution, in two previous decisions of the Tribunal. Further, the
7 Immigration Act 2009, s 140(3)(a) and (b).
claim was found to be clearly abusive, as it is one of many claims which V has made for refugee status, work visas and ministerial intervention and is an attempt to circumvent normal immigration procedures. The claim was also considered a repetition of a previous claim as the RPO considered it “essentially the same” as V’s previous claims.
[30] The June 2024 decision referred to a “bundle of evidence” the RPO had received on 30 October 2023 from V in support of her claim, which it noted included seven identified documents.8 The seven documents cited are those attached with the last of the three emails on 27/28 October set out at [27], above.
[31] Relevantly, although the decision refers to those seven documents being “included” within the evidence received, the RPO later in the decision noted that V provided these seven documents without an explanation of their relevance to her basis of claim. As counsel for the RPO accepts, V provided a 20-page letter, one of the attachments in her first email of 27 October 2023 which addressed the seven documents and their asserted relevance to her fourth claim.
[32] Further, in its analysis of the repetitive nature of the fourth claim, the RPO’s decision noted that in support of her claim V provided seven documents—on its face this reference would appear to be to the seven documents specified in the decision— commenting that “[w]ithout further information it is considered unclear how these documents impact [V’s] current claim”. It is not contested that the date range within those documents excludes the dates of documents included in attachments with the first two of the 27/28 October emails, including a ruling by Judge [redacted] from [a date], which V identifies as one of the documents which indicate significant changes that refute the finding that her fourth claim is repetitive and unmeritorious.
8 The 27 and 28 October emails were sent at: 11.45pm on 27 October 2023 (10 attachments), 11.58pm on 27 October 2023 (three attachments) and at six minutes past midnight on the following day, 28 October 2023 (seven documents). Whereas V submitted she emailed 17 documents to the RPO, the attached documents totalled 20, although nothing turns on this discrepancy.
Statement of Claim
[33] V’s statement of claim sets out in detail the experience she has had in advancing her several successive applications for refugee and protection status, including her view on the (asserted) insufficient or defective determination(s) of her previous three claims. V also recounts from her perspective the history of her multiple unsuccessful applications for work visas after the expiry of her initial visa period in New Zealand.
[34] As noted, V has also previously made requests for ministerial intervention. The request noted at [11] above was unsuccessful and at the time of filing her application for judicial review a further such request was pending, seeking ministerial intervention by the grant of a visa on humanitarian grounds. The week before the hearing V was notified that the Minister declined to intervene and that she was accordingly subject to immediate deportation. I return to this aspect later.
[35] V contends the June 2024 decision was illegal, unreasonable, and procedurally flawed.
[36] The principal basis of her complaint is that the RPO failed to consider all the information V submitted in support of her fourth application for refugee status, as the decision references only seven of the documents she submitted in October 2023. In particular, V complains that the failure to consider the explanatory letter accompanying the (October 2023) documents resulted in a lack of understanding of the chronology of acts of persecution since 1999 and the complexity of her case.
[37] V says the alleged failure of the RPO to consider all the information submitted in support of her fourth claim is contrary to the principle of non-refoulement. Further, V claims the RPO ignored significant changes in her circumstances that directly affected her risk of persecution, arguing the entirety of the evidence tendered to the RPO demonstrates systematic and prolonged persecution in Chile from 1999 to the present time. Additionally, V claims she was denied her right of appeal.
[38]V seeks relief, including:
(a)annulment of the decision; and
(b)a comprehensive review of her claim and a new decision by this Court; or
(c)in the alternative, that the Court order the RSU to reconsider her case, with “specific and detailed instructions” to:
(i)thoroughly evaluate all 27 pieces of evidence submitted;
(ii)consider the entire chronology from 1999 to the present;
(iii)correctly apply the UNHCR guidelines on persecution by non- state actors and the lack of state protection;
(iv)evaluate the real and current risks she faces in Chile, considering the evidence of systematic persecution over the years; and
(v)take into account her vulnerability as an elderly person and a whistleblower of corruption.
Respondent’s position
[39] The respondent concedes the relief in terms as noted, by directing the decision be set aside and an order made for reconsideration. This is on the basis that, although a decision maker is not required to refer to, or list, every piece of evidence submitted and considered for a decision to be lawful, the respondent accepts it is not clear that the explanatory letter submitted by V was considered and it is accepted it was a key document. As the respondent accepts, the decision refers instead to the absence of any explanation of the relevance of a bundle of evidence provided in support of the fourth claim.
[40] Ms Jerebine submits no further directions for relief are appropriate in the circumstances, and notes that V’s claim of wrongful denial of a right of appeal is based
on a misinterpretation of the terms of s 195(1) of the Act, which governs rights of appeal in relation to subsequent claims for refugee or protection status.
Discussion
Principles
[41] Section 140(3) of the Act is the gateway through which successive claims may be advanced for refugee and protection status. It provides:
140 Limitation on subsequent claims
(1)A refugee and protection officer must not consider a subsequent claim for recognition as a refugee or a protected person unless the officer is satisfied—
(a)that there has been a significant change in circumstances material to the claim since the previous claim was determined; and
(b)the change in 1 or more of the circumstances was not brought about by the claimant—
(i)acting otherwise than in good faith; and
(ii)for a purpose of creating grounds for recognition under any of sections 129 to 131.
(2)For the purposes of determining the matter in subsection (1), the refugee and protection officer must not treat the actions of any other person in relation to the claim or the claimant as a mitigating factor.
(3)A refugee and protection officer may refuse to consider a subsequent claim for recognition as a refugee or a protected person if the officer is satisfied that the claim—
(a)is manifestly unfounded or clearly abusive; or
(b)repeats any claim previously made (including a subsequent claim).
[42] As the Court of Appeal observed in WK v Refugee and Protection Officer, an RPO has no jurisdiction to consider a subsequent claim unless there has been a significant change in circumstances material to the claim since the previous claim was determined. 9
9 WK v Refugee and Protection Officer [2018] NZCA 258 at [9].
[43] Subsection (3) (upon which the RPO in the instant case relied) provides an RPO with discretion to refuse to consider a subsequent claim if satisfied it is manifestly unfounded, clearly abusive, or repeats previous claims. Whereas there is a right of appeal to the Tribunal against an RPO’s finding that he or she is without jurisdiction under s 140(1), there is no general right of appeal against a refusal to consider a subsequent claim under s 140(3).10 An appeal is available in the latter case only if the applicant’s most recent previous claim was declined under part 6A of the former Act (the Immigration Act 1987).11 That provision does not apply in V’s case.
[44] As the Court in WK confirmed, Part 5 of the Act provides the statutory means by which this country gives effect to its international obligations as set out in a number of instruments, including the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention).12
[45] The Court observed that s 140 was drafted for the very purpose of ensuring New Zealand meets its obligations under the Refugee Convention.13 Whether there has been compliance with the convention turns on whether s 140(3) has been correctly applied by the RPO.14 As the Court held, New Zealand’s international obligations, in particular under art 33 of the Refugee Convention including the principle of non- refoulement are incorporated within the words of s 140 and no further gloss is required.15
10 WK v Refugee and Protection Officer, above n 12 at [9].
11 Immigration Act 2009, s 195(1). Part 5 (Refugee and protection status determinations) and Part 7 (Appeals, reviews, and other proceedings) of the Act set out the statutory framework by which claims for refugee and protection status are to be determined, including the comprehensive system of appeal and review in respect of decision making under the Act and establishment of the Immigration and Protection Tribunal, the specialist Tribunal which determines appeals and other matters under the Act, including provision for appeals from decisions of the Tribunal and for dealing with judicial reviews of decisions made under the Act.
12 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 189 UNTS 137 (opened for signature 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954). Other instruments given effect to; Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1465 UNTS 85 (opened for signature 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987); and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976).
13 At [44].
14 At [45].
15 At [45].
[46] For completeness, I note that this Court has held that s 140 of the Act does not require an RPO to first consider s 140(1) before considering the exercise of discretion to refuse to consider a claim under s 140(3).16
Analysis
[47] I am satisfied there has been a procedural error in the exercise of the RPO’s duty to determine V’s fourth claim under s 140(3) of the Act. As the respondent accepts, it is unclear on the face of the decision itself whether the statutory decision maker had regard to all of the information which had been submitted in support of V’s fourth application.
[48] Relief is appropriate on the basis accepted by the respondent: by setting aside the June 2024 decision and remitting V’s fourth claim to the RPO for reconsideration on terms as Ms Jerebine confirmed from the bar. That provides V with the opportunity to advance her fourth claim to the statutory decision maker, for its reconsideration on the entirety of the information submitted to the RPO, together with any further relevant information which she provides promptly. The application will be assessed afresh pursuant to s 140.
[49] I am not persuaded it is necessary or appropriate to make any further specific direction as to the basis upon which reconsideration is to occur. As set out above, appropriate application of the assessment in s 140(3) of the Act will ensure compliance with New Zealand’s obligations under the relevant international instruments. Further, decisions of the Court of Appeal and of this Court provide clear guidance on application of the elements set out in s 140(3):
(a)“Manifestly unfounded” denotes a high standard, something which is self-evident from the particulars on which the claim relies and is unfounded or untenable.17 The standard is such that an officer must be sure that a claim will fail.
16 BD (India) v Refugee and Protection Officer [2016] NZHC 1762 at [31]-[33].
17 WK v Refugee and Protection Officer, above n 12 at [56] citing AO (Afghanistan) [2015] NZIPT 800797 at [31].
(b)The circumstances in which a clearly abusive claim may arise are not exhaustive, and could include a claim lodged to prolong the legal process. 18 That would include appeal or deportation proceedings.
(c)To determine whether a claim is repetitive, for the purposes of s 140(3), a comparison of the first claim (or claims) with the subsequent claim to see whether it is essentially the same claim is required.19
[50] Self-evidently, also, the Court’s decision in this matter will be drawn to the attention of the RSU, including the nature of V’s concerns as to the aspects which her requested further directions essentially advocate for, in support of the reconsideration. I am satisfied the concerns will thus be squarely before the decision-maker, however, ultimately as the scheme in the Act prescribes, it is a matter for the RPO to re-consider the fourth application in compliance with the terms of s 140 and I do not consider any further gloss on the way in which the RPO goes about that is necessary.
[51] I agree, as Ms Jerebine submits, there is no basis to grant the further relief V maintained as her primary preference, that this Court undertake a comprehensive review and determine her application for refugee status.
[52] V’s application in this regard misapprehends the fundamental function of judicial review, which is to provide an expeditious review of statutory (or other public) powers exercised by decision makers. While that entails the exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction to rule on the legality of public acts,20 it is not the High Court’s role on judicial review to intervene in the merits of a decision, particularly one that involves the exercise of a discretion made within the correct statutory framework.21
[53]In the present context, the Court’s observations in WK are apposite:22
18 WK v Refugee and Protection Officer [2018] NZHC 514 at [57], upheld by the Court of Appeal in
WK v Refugee and Protection Officer above n 12.
19 AR v Refugee and Protection Officer [2016] NZHC 2916 at [50].
20 V v Family Court at Manukau [2021] NZHC 2326 at [9].
21 Deliu v Auckland District Court [2024] NZCA 39 at [39].
22 WK v Refugee and Protection Officer, above n 12 at [65].
Orthodox principles apply to an application for judicial review of a decision by either the Tribunal or the RPO. The refugee context does not change the approach. The High Court’s function is to correct jurisdictional, procedural, and other errors of law. The Court should be mindful of the refugee context and ensure high standards of fairness were followed by the decision-maker, but the same rules and principles are to apply.
… Because of the nature of judicial review, which is to assess the lawfulness of the decision-making process rather than the merits of the decision, the task of the reviewing court is to assess whether a decision was reasonably available to the maker on the basis of the evidence before them.
[54] As is often noted, the purpose of judicial review is not to provide substantive relief, by substituting the Court’s view for that of the decision maker. In the rare cases this has occurred the court has been satisfied the decision maker could not determine the matter in any other way23 or the urgency of the situation required substantive determination.24 Plainly this is not warranted in this case. Further, it is inconsistent with the code within the Act and in particular Parts 5 and 7 which prescribe the consideration and determination of applications by the statutory decision makers, the RPO at first instance and the Tribunal on appeal.
[55] In her written submissions V also sought, although it had not been pleaded, a declaration that the “policy of automatically rejecting future application [is] unlawful as … contrary to international law and New Zealand’s obligations”. Again, I am satisfied there is no proper basis for any such declaration. Although the Court is granting the application for judicial review, I record that nothing on the evidence before me supports the suggestion that the claim at hand, far less any future claims brought by V, have been or will be ‘automatically’ rejected, or that there is any such policy in existence.
Result
[56]V’s application for judicial review is granted.
23 See, for example, Fiordland Venison Ltd v Minister of Agriculture & Fisheries [1978] 2 NZLR 341 (CA) and Jolly v Central Otago District Council [2020] NZHC 2808.
24 The court provided a substantive remedy in Dunne v CanWest TVworks Ltd [2005] NZAR 577 (HC), given the urgency of the situation.
[57]There are orders:
(a)setting aside the decision of the RPO dated 27 June 2024; and
(b)directing the RPO to reconsider the applicant’s fourth claim. Such reconsideration is to include the review of the documents submitted on 27 October 2023 and 28 October 2023, and 18 May 2024, and any other relevant material V wishes to promptly submit.
[58] I direct V, within two weeks of the date of issue of this judgment, to notify the RPO whether she wishes the RPO to reconsider her fourth claim for review. Such notification is to be in writing by email to counsel, Ms Jerebine.
[59] For the avoidance of doubt, I record the undertaking of counsel for the respondent that the respondent agrees not to deport V until delivery of the decision on the reconsideration of the fourth claim, which supersedes the letter of the delegated decision maker on behalf of the Associate Minister of Immigration of 26 March 2024 to V.
[60] I decline to make any direction for provision of legal assistance to translate documents on V’s behalf, absent jurisdiction to do so.
Costs
[61] For the reasons set out in counsel for the respondent’s written submissions, I am satisfied the RPO offered prompt and appropriate settlement of this proceeding following counsel’s receipt and review of V’s submissions and affidavit evidence. V was late in filing her affidavit evidence, some 344 pages, and declined, as she was entitled to, counsel’s offer of assistance in preparation of the evidence offered.
[62] In those circumstances I accept it is appropriate costs should lie where they fall.
………………………………………
Preston J
Solicitors:
S J Jerebine, Barrister, Auckland Crown Law, Wellington
Copy to: Applicant
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