| IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA |
| CA671/2017 [2018] NZCA 324 |
| BETWEEN | RAYMOND JOSEPH TUKAKI |
| AND | THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA |
| Hearing: | 19 June 2018 |
Court: | Winkelmann, France and Wylie JJ |
Counsel: | C G Tuck and R D Butler for Appellant |
Judgment: | 27 August 2018 at 12 pm |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
AThe application for leave to appeal is granted.
BThe appeal is dismissed.
CNo order as to costs.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Winkelmann J)
The Commonwealth of Australia seeks Mr Tukaki’s surrender on six counts charging serious violent and sexual offending. He is alleged to have offended in 1998 and 1999 when living in the Northern Territory. Accordingly, any trial of these charges will take place in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory.
Mr Tukaki appeals, as of right, Moore J’s dismissal of his claim for judicial review of Judge Ingram’s refusal to refer Mr Tukaki’s case to the Minister under s 48 of the Extradition Act 1999.[1] He also appeals Moore J’s dismissal of an appeal against the same judgment of Judge Ingram in which the Judge found Mr Tukaki eligible for surrender, rejecting his claim that extradition would be unjust or oppressive because of the amount of time that had passed since the alleged offending and in light of his personal circumstances.
[1]Tukaki v District Court at Tauranga [2017] NZHC 843. As to the appeal right, see s 20 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016.
The right of appeal in respect of the finding that Mr Tukaki is eligible for surrender is limited to an appeal on a question of law only and requires the grant of leave. The Crown does not oppose the grant of leave. We are satisfied that Mr Tukaki’s appeal raises important questions of law, in the extradition context, rather than issues specific to the facts of his case.[2] Accordingly, we grant leave to appeal.
Factual background
[2]Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 303(2). See McAllister v R [2014] NZCA 175, [2014] 2 NZLR 764 at [36] for this Court’s discussion of the principles for granting leave for a further appeal on a question of law under the Criminal Procedure Act.
Mr Tukaki is 42 years of age and currently works as a self-employed contractor at Te Kaha in the Bay of Plenty. He is Māori. We gratefully adopt Moore J’s summary of the circumstances of the alleged offending:
[6] In July 1998 Mr Tukaki met the adult complainant (“Ms M”) when she was holidaying in New Zealand. They commenced an intimate relationship which was suspended when the complainant returned to her home in Darwin.
[7] The following month Mr Tukaki travelled to Darwin where he reconnected with Ms M. Their intimate relationship resumed resulting in Ms M becoming pregnant to Mr Tukaki, who at that time used the surname Reid. The two charges of assault and the charge of sexual intercourse…
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- Case
- [2018] NZCA 324
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Background
Background to the litigation
Mr Tukaki appealed, as of right, against the decision of Moore J, who dismissed his claim for judicial review of Judge Ingram's refusal to refer his case to the Minister under section 48 of the Extradition Act 1999. He also appealed Moore J's dismissal of his appeal against the same judgment in which the Judge found him eligible for surrender. The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and heard the case on 19 June 2018. Judgment was given on 27 August 2018, dismissing the appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was it an error for the Judge to find that the words "because of" in s 8(1)(c) require a causal relationship between the circumstances relied upon and the delay?
2. Did the Judge apply an incorrect standard for oppression, defining it as "oppressing, harsh or cruel", requiring that Mr Tukaki make out "unusual" circumstances, and ignoring the importance of human rights?
3. Should Mr Tukaki's case have been referred to the Minister under s 48(4)(a)(ii)?
Held
1. The court found it was not an error for the Judge to require a causal relationship between the circumstances relied upon and the delay under s 8(1)(c) of the Extradition Act 1999. However, the court clarified that the change in circumstances did not have to be caused by the delay, but rather could have occurred as a result of it.
2. The court held that the Judge applied the correct standard for oppression. The court found that the Judge did not improperly emphasise the principle of comity over the importance of Mr Tukaki's tikanga rights.
3. The court held that Mr Tukaki's case should not have been referred to the Minister under s 48(4)(a)(ii) of the Extradition Act 1999. The court found that Mr Tukaki did not establish any compelling or extraordinary circumstances that would make it oppressive to require his surrender.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court clarified that for a discretionary restriction on surrender under s 8(1)(c) of the Extradition Act 1999 to apply, there must be a causal relationship between the circumstances relied upon and the delay. However, the court explained that the change in circumstances did not have to be caused by the delay, but rather could have occurred as a result of it. The court found that Mr Tukaki's change in circumstances, such as establishing a new family in New Zealand and developing strong bonds within his whanau, were connected to the delay in the prosecution. However, the court held that these circumstances did not make it oppressive for Mr Tukaki to be extradited.
The court held that the Judge applied the correct standard for oppression. The court found that the Judge did not improperly emphasise the principle of comity over the importance of Mr Tukaki's tikanga rights. The court recognised that New Zealand's international obligations are relevant to the interpretation and application of the mandatory and discretionary restrictions under the Extradition Act 1999. However, the court found that Mr Tukaki's circumstances did not reach the threshold of oppression.
The court held that Mr Tukaki's case should not have been referred to the Minister under s 48(4)(a)(ii) of the Extradition Act 1999. The court found that Mr Tukaki did not establish any compelling or extraordinary circumstances that would make it oppressive to require his surrender. The court compared Mr Tukaki's case to the Canadian case of United States v Leonard, where the Court held that the Minister made errors in weighing the specific and particular problems faced by Aboriginal offenders when sentencing them. However, the court found that Mr Tukaki's case fell well short of the circumstances in Leonard, as he could not be tried in New Zealand for the alleged offending.
The binding legal principle established by this decision is that for a discretionary restriction on surrender under s 8(1)(c) of the Extradition Act 1999 to apply, there must be a causal relationship between the circumstances relied upon and the delay, but the change in circumstances does not have to be caused by the delay, but rather could have occurred as a result of it. Additionally, the court held that the Judge applied the correct standard for oppression, and Mr Tukaki's case did not reach the threshold of oppression. Finally, the court held that Mr Tukaki's case should not have been referred to the Minister under s 48(4)(a)(ii) of the Extradition Act 1999, as he did not establish any compelling or extraordinary circumstances that would make it oppressive to require his surrender.