Tukaki v Commonwealth of Australia

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

 CA671/2017
 [2018] NZCA 324

BETWEEN

RAYMOND JOSEPH TUKAKI
Appellant

AND

THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

Hearing:

19 June 2018

Court:

Winkelmann, France and Wylie JJ

Counsel:

C G Tuck and R D Butler for Appellant
F R J Sinclair for Respondent

Judgment:

27 August 2018 at 12 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for leave to appeal is granted.

BThe appeal is dismissed.

CNo order as to costs.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Winkelmann J)

  1. The Commonwealth of Australia seeks Mr Tukaki’s surrender on six counts charging serious violent and sexual offending.  He is alleged to have offended in 1998 and 1999 when living in the Northern Territory.  Accordingly, any trial of these charges will take place in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory.

  2. Mr Tukaki appeals, as of right, Moore J’s dismissal of his claim for judicial review of Judge Ingram’s refusal to refer Mr Tukaki’s case to the Minister under s 48 of the Extradition Act 1999.[1]  He also appeals Moore J’s dismissal of an appeal against the same judgment of Judge Ingram in which the Judge found Mr Tukaki eligible for surrender, rejecting his claim that extradition would be unjust or oppressive because of the amount of time that had passed since the alleged offending and in light of his personal circumstances. 

    [1]Tukaki v District Court at Tauranga [2017] NZHC 843. As to the appeal right, see s 20 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016.

  3. The right of appeal in respect of the finding that Mr Tukaki is eligible for surrender is limited to an appeal on a question of law only and requires the grant of leave.  The Crown does not oppose the grant of leave.  We are satisfied that Mr Tukaki’s appeal raises important questions of law, in the extradition context, rather than issues specific to the facts of his case.[2]  Accordingly, we grant leave to appeal.

Factual background

[2]Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 303(2).  See McAllister v R [2014] NZCA 175, [2014] 2 NZLR 764 at [36] for this Court’s discussion of the principles for granting leave for a further appeal on a question of law under the Criminal Procedure Act.

  1. Mr Tukaki is 42 years of age and currently works as a self-employed contractor at Te Kaha in the Bay of Plenty.  He is Māori.  We gratefully adopt Moore J’s summary of the circumstances of the alleged offending:

    [6]       In July 1998 Mr Tukaki met the adult complainant (“Ms M”) when she was holidaying in New Zealand. They commenced an intimate relationship which was suspended when the complainant returned to her home in Darwin.

    [7]       The following month Mr Tukaki travelled to Darwin where he reconnected with Ms M.  Their intimate relationship resumed resulting in Ms M becoming pregnant to Mr Tukaki, who at that time used the surname Reid.  The two charges of assault and the charge of sexual intercourse…

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Details
Case
[2018] NZCA 324
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Court of Appeal of New Zealand heard an appeal from Raymond Joseph Tukaki, who sought to overturn a decision by Moore J that refused his claim for judicial review of a decision by Judge Ingram that Mr Tukaki was eligible for surrender to Australia and to dismiss an appeal against the same judgment. Tukaki sought to appeal the decision on the basis that it was unjust and oppressive to extradite him to Australia to face charges for offences committed against a woman and her infant child in 1998 and 1999. The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the District Court for consideration. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Court found that the delay in the proceedings did not have a causal relationship with Mr Tukaki’s changed personal circumstances and that the hardship he would experience if extradited did not reach the threshold of oppression. The Court also found that the District Court did not err in its consideration of Mr Tukaki’s case for referral to the Minister of Justice for determination of surrender.

Background

Background to the litigation

Raymond Joseph Tukaki is a Māori man who was living in Australia when he allegedly committed serious violent and sexual offences against an adult woman and her infant child between January 1999 and March 1999. Mr Tukaki returned to New Zealand in 2001 and has been living there since. In 2009, complaints were made to the Northern Territory Police about the alleged offences. Charges were laid in July 2013, and an extradition request was made in May 2016. Mr Tukaki is appealing against the decision of the District Court Judge, Ingram, who found him eligible for surrender and refused to refer his case to the Minister under section 48 of the Extradition Act 1999. Mr Tukaki argues that it would be unjust or oppressive to surrender him due to the amount of time that has passed since the alleged offending and his personal circumstances, including his connection to his whānau and living in accordance with tikanga.

Mr Tukaki appealed, as of right, against the decision of Moore J, who dismissed his claim for judicial review of Judge Ingram's refusal to refer his case to the Minister under section 48 of the Extradition Act 1999. He also appealed Moore J's dismissal of his appeal against the same judgment in which the Judge found him eligible for surrender. The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and heard the case on 19 June 2018. Judgment was given on 27 August 2018, dismissing the appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was it an error for the Judge to find that the words "because of" in s 8(1)(c) require a causal relationship between the circumstances relied upon and the delay?
2. Did the Judge apply an incorrect standard for oppression, defining it as "oppressing, harsh or cruel", requiring that Mr Tukaki make out "unusual" circumstances, and ignoring the importance of human rights?
3. Should Mr Tukaki's case have been referred to the Minister under s 48(4)(a)(ii)?

Held
1. The court found it was not an error for the Judge to require a causal relationship between the circumstances relied upon and the delay under s 8(1)(c) of the Extradition Act 1999. However, the court clarified that the change in circumstances did not have to be caused by the delay, but rather could have occurred as a result of it.
2. The court held that the Judge applied the correct standard for oppression. The court found that the Judge did not improperly emphasise the principle of comity over the importance of Mr Tukaki's tikanga rights.
3. The court held that Mr Tukaki's case should not have been referred to the Minister under s 48(4)(a)(ii) of the Extradition Act 1999. The court found that Mr Tukaki did not establish any compelling or extraordinary circumstances that would make it oppressive to require his surrender.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court clarified that for a discretionary restriction on surrender under s 8(1)(c) of the Extradition Act 1999 to apply, there must be a causal relationship between the circumstances relied upon and the delay. However, the court explained that the change in circumstances did not have to be caused by the delay, but rather could have occurred as a result of it. The court found that Mr Tukaki's change in circumstances, such as establishing a new family in New Zealand and developing strong bonds within his whanau, were connected to the delay in the prosecution. However, the court held that these circumstances did not make it oppressive for Mr Tukaki to be extradited.

The court held that the Judge applied the correct standard for oppression. The court found that the Judge did not improperly emphasise the principle of comity over the importance of Mr Tukaki's tikanga rights. The court recognised that New Zealand's international obligations are relevant to the interpretation and application of the mandatory and discretionary restrictions under the Extradition Act 1999. However, the court found that Mr Tukaki's circumstances did not reach the threshold of oppression.

The court held that Mr Tukaki's case should not have been referred to the Minister under s 48(4)(a)(ii) of the Extradition Act 1999. The court found that Mr Tukaki did not establish any compelling or extraordinary circumstances that would make it oppressive to require his surrender. The court compared Mr Tukaki's case to the Canadian case of United States v Leonard, where the Court held that the Minister made errors in weighing the specific and particular problems faced by Aboriginal offenders when sentencing them. However, the court found that Mr Tukaki's case fell well short of the circumstances in Leonard, as he could not be tried in New Zealand for the alleged offending.

The binding legal principle established by this decision is that for a discretionary restriction on surrender under s 8(1)(c) of the Extradition Act 1999 to apply, there must be a causal relationship between the circumstances relied upon and the delay, but the change in circumstances does not have to be caused by the delay, but rather could have occurred as a result of it. Additionally, the court held that the Judge applied the correct standard for oppression, and Mr Tukaki's case did not reach the threshold of oppression. Finally, the court held that Mr Tukaki's case should not have been referred to the Minister under s 48(4)(a)(ii) of the Extradition Act 1999, as he did not establish any compelling or extraordinary circumstances that would make it oppressive to require his surrender.