Tippen v Spark

[2025] NZHC 1425

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE

CIV-2024-409-594

[2025] NZHC 1425

BETWEEN

SIMON MARK TIPPEN and LISA JANE TIPPEN
Plaintiffs

AND

MICHELE KELLY SPARK

Defendant

Hearing:	26 May 2025
Appearances:	M S Henderson and M R Gibson for Plaintiffs R J H Scott for Defendant
Judgment:	3 June 2025

JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAULSEN

This judgment was delivered by me on 3 June 2025 at 4.00 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

TIPPEN v SPARK [2025] NZHC 1425 [3 June 2025]

[1]    Mrs Spark agreed to purchase at auction Mr and Mrs Tippens’ property at Waikuku Beach. She was at the time suffering mental health issues, but this was not known by Mr and Mrs Tippen or their real estate agent. The parties entered into a written agreement for the sale on a standard REI-ADLS form. Mrs Spark failed to settle. Following the expiry of a settlement notice Mr and Mrs Tippen cancelled the agreement.

[2]    Mr and Mrs Tippen seek summary judgment for damages. Mrs Spark accepts the agreement cannot be avoided due to her illness and has admitted liability. However, she disputes the quantum of Mr and Mrs Tippens’ claim in one respect.

[3]    The issue is whether Mr and Mrs Tippen are entitled to the loss on the resale of the property measured against either the contract price or the property’s market value on the date of the auction. The issue arises because Mrs Spark contends the market value was significantly lower than the contract price and that she paid too much for the property because her judgement was impaired.  In other respects,  Mr and  Mrs Tippens’ losses are accepted.

Background

[4]    In December 2023 Mr and Mrs Tippen engaged Harcourts Real Estate Agency Four Seasons Realty 2017 Ltd to market their Waikuku Beach property for sale by auction.

[5]Mrs Spark and her husband viewed the property on 14 January 2024.

[6]The property was put up for auction on 31 January 2024.

[7]    Mrs Spark attended the auction with her son. There was competitive bidding for the property between Mrs Spark and another person. The property was sold to Mrs Spark for $606,000. The other bidder placed a final bid of $599,000 before withdrawing from the contest.

[8]    Mrs Spark signed an agreement for sale and purchase of the property after the auction and paid $10,600 towards the deposit of $60,060 that day, promising to pay the balance shortly thereafter.

[9]    The agreement was in the REI-ADLS Particulars and Conditions of Sale of Real Estate by Auction 6th edition 2022 (2) form. The relevant terms were:

(a)a contract price of $606,000 inclusive of GST (if any);

(b)the settlement date was 16 February 2024;

(c)the interest rate for late settlement was 16 per cent per annum;

(d)Mrs Spark was required to pay a deposit of 10 per cent of the purchase price immediately upon completion of the auction;

(e)on the settlement date the balance of the purchase price, interest and other monies, if any, were to be paid by Mrs Spark in cleared funds or otherwise satisfied as provided in the agreement; and

(f)if the sale was not settled on the settlement date Mr and Mrs Tippen could serve Mrs Spark with a settlement notice, who was to then settle on or before the 12th working day after the date of service, time being of the essence.

[10]Most relevantly, cl 12.4 provided:

12.4If the purchaser does not comply with the terms of the settlement notice served by the vendor then, subject to clause 12.1(3):

(1)Without prejudice to any other rights or remedies available to the vendor at law or in equity, the vendor may:

(a)sue the purchaser for specific performance; or

(b)cancel this agreement by notice and pursue either or both of the following remedies, namely:

(i)forfeit and retain for the vendor’s own benefit the deposit paid by the purchaser, but not

exceeding in all 10% of the purchase price; and/or

(ii)sue the purchaser for damages.

(2)Where the vendor is entitled to cancel this agreement, the entry by the vendor into a conditional or unconditional agreement for the resale of the property or any part thereof shall take effect as a cancellation of this agreement by the vendor if this agreement has not previously been cancelled and such resale shall be deemed to have occurred after cancellation.

(3)The   damages   claimable   by    the    vendor    under   clause 12.4(1)(b)(ii) shall include all damages claimable at common law or in equity and shall also include (but shall not be limited to) any loss incurred by the vendor on any bona fide resale contracted within one year from the date by which the purchaser should have settled in compliance with the settlement notice. The amount of that loss may include:

(a)interest on the unpaid portion of the purchase price at the interest rate for late settlement from the settlement date to the settlement of such resale; and

(b)all costs and expenses reasonably incurred in any resale or attempted resale; and

(c)all outgoings (other than interest) on or maintenance expenses in respect of the property from the settlement date to the settlement of such resale.

(4)Any surplus money arising from a resale shall be retained by the vendor.

[11]   The night of the auction Mrs Spark asked her parents for the balance of the deposit which they would not provide.

[12]   She sought legal advice the next day and her lawyer approached the real estate agent and advised that Mrs Spark had health issues and requested they contact the underbidder to see if he was still prepared to purchase the property; the underbidder was not willing to do so except at a substantial discount on what he had bid at the auction.

[13]For present purposes it is not disputed that Mrs Spark:

(a)had recently been in respite care;

(b)had been diagnosed with a mental disorder;

(c)was receiving treatment for that disorder; and

(d)was in a phase where her judgement was impaired.

[14]   There is, however, no suggestion that Mr and Mrs Tippen or the real estate agent were, or could have been, aware of Mrs Spark’s health issues at the time of the auction.

[15]   Mrs Spark defaulted on the settlement date and Mr and Mrs Tippen served a settlement notice on her pursuant to the agreement. When she failed to settle in accordance with the notice Mr and Mrs Tippen cancelled the agreement on 7 March 2024.

[16]   Mr and Mrs Tippen then undertook extensive remarketing of the property for sale, which included two more unsuccessful auctions. They also maintained the property. It was eventually sold on 12 February 2025 (that is, within 12 months of the date Mrs Spark was required to settle under the settlement notice) for $485,000. Settlement of that sale occurred on 21 February 2025.

[17]   Mr and Mrs Tippen have claimed losses in accordance with the schedule attached. The only amount in dispute is item 1.1

[18]   Mrs Spark has engaged a registered valuer whose evidence is that the market value of the property at 4 March 2024 (around the date of cancellation) was $430,000 and as at 25 January 2025 (around the date of resale) was $440,000.

Summary judgment principles

[19]Rule 12.2(1) of the High Court Rules 2016 provides:

1      An issue was also raised concerning a small amount claimed for obtaining a registered valuation under item 2, which Mrs Spark says to be treated as a disbursement in the proceeding. Mr and Mrs Tippen take no issue with treating it in that way.

12.2 Judgment when there is no defence or when no cause of action can succeed

(1)The court may give judgment against a defendant if the plaintiff  satisfies the court that the defendant has no defence to a cause of action in the statement of claim or to a particular part of any such cause of action

...

[20]   There is no dispute as to the principles that apply to summary judgment applications and it is not necessary for me to set those out in full. For present purposes it is enough to note that Mr and Mrs Tippen must show that Mrs Spark has no arguable defence to their claim and that the Court must be left without any real doubt or uncertainty on that matter.2

Mrs Spark’s submissions

[21]   Mrs Spark does not challenge the steps that Mr and Mrs Tippen took to resell the property, nor does she suggest that the resale price was inadequate. She does not seek relief under ss 43 to 45 of the Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 either.

[22]   Ms Scott acknowledges that the usual measure of damages in contract is intended to put the innocent party in the position they would have been had the contract been performed. However, she submits that this principle does not need to be applied in every case and should not be applied here, where its application would produce an unjust result.

[23]   She refers to dicta in two decisions to support her submission. First, she refers to Stirling v Poulgrain, which concerned a claim for breach of a lawyer’s contract of retainer, and a brief extract from the judgment of Cooke J where he said:3

Various circumstances are recognised as justifying a departure in favour of the defendant from the full rigour of that principle. In particular a plaintiff must normally show that the damages are of a kind within the reasonable contemplation of the parties; and there is no reason why that requirement should not apply to this case.

2      Mount Grey Downs Ltd v Pinot Properties Ltd [2018] NZHC 3094 at [12].

3      Stirling v Poulgrain [1980] 2 NZLR 402 (CA) at 419.

[24]   The second case was Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd which concerned whether Marlborough District Council owed a duty of care in supplying a land information memorandum and whether the Council’s negligence caused Altimarloch financial loss.4 In the course of his judgment, and when discussing the measure of damages for breach of contract, Tipping J said:

[156] It is as well to remember at the outset that what damages are appropriate is a question of fact. There are no absolute rules in this area, albeit the courts have established prima facie approaches in certain types of case to give general guidance and a measure of predictability. The key purpose when assessing damages is to reflect the extent of the loss actually and reasonably suffered by the plaintiff. The reference to reasonableness has echoes of mitigation. A plaintiff cannot claim damages which could have been avoided or reduced by the taking of reasonable steps.

[25]   Ms Scott argues from these authorities that it is open to the Court to assess Mr and Mrs Tippens’ loss on resale not against the contract price but the property’s market value at the time of the auction. She acknowledges that she has not found any case where the Court has taken that approach.

[26]   Responding to Mr and Mrs Tippens’ case that the losses claimed reflect an orthodox application of cl 12.4(3) of the agreement, Ms Scott argues that Mrs Spark is not asking the Court to depart from the terms of the agreement because that clause does not explicitly say that the vendor can recover the difference between the contract price and the resale price, merely that they can recover loss incurred on a bona fide resale.

[27]   She further submits that the authorities establish that the Court has a discretion in the application of cl 12.4(3), including in relation to the date at which damages will be calculated. In support of that submission she refers to Sullivan v Darkin which was primarily concerned with the duty of a vendor to take reasonable steps to mitigate loss on resale.5 Ms Scott’s submission appears to be based on what Somers J said as follows:6

4      Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11, [2012] 2 NZLR 726.

5      Sullivan v Darkin [1986] 1 NZLR 214 (CA).

6      At 220.

In an action for damages the question is how much worse off the vendor is by the diminution in the value of the land or the loss of the purchase money as a result of the purchaser’s default; ... That is to say the normal measure of damages is the contract price less the market price of the land at the date of the breach, usually that fixed for completion, plus expenses incurred in preparing to complete less anything received from the purchaser under the agreement. But if fixing damages at that date would result in injustice the Court may fix another date appropriate to provide proper compensation to the innocent party: ... Thus if a decree for specific performance has been granted and it proves impossible to carry the decree into execution the innocent party may apply to the Court to put an end to the contract and award damages for its breach; in such a case damages will be assessed at the date the contract is finally abandoned: ...

[28]   Ms Scott also referred to Mana v Fleming, which is relied upon by Mr and Mrs Tippen.7 There, the Court of Appeal held a defaulting purchaser was obliged by the terms of the equivalent to cl 12.4(3) to pay interest on the full amount of the contract price up to the date of resale. The purchaser objected to the claim on the ground that it allowed the vendor to make a handsome windfall. The Court of Appeal rejected the purchaser’s argument saying:

[64] With respect to Mr Akel, this submission depends for its success on resorting to a subjective view of what is fair and reasonable, rather than relying on the relevant contractual terms. The intention of the parties is to be derived from their agreement. And the express limitation on a right of recovery of contractual interest to a period of one year answers his foreseeability argument.

[29]   Ms Scott distinguishes Mana v Fleming on the basis that there the defaulting purchaser was asking the Court to award something different from what was provided for in the contract which, she submits, is not what Mrs Spark is asking the Court to do here.

[30]   Ms Scott argues that it would be unjust to assess Mr and Mrs Tippens’ loss against the contract price for several reasons. First, it appears the price she agreed to pay was substantially above market value, but Ms Scott accepts that would not be sufficient. Here, she says, there is the added feature that Mrs Spark was mentally unwell at the time of the auction. She submits the Court would not adopt the approach she is advancing to protect a merely careless purchaser, but the circumstances of this case are sufficiently uncommon that there can be no suggestion a finding in

7      Mana v Fleming [2007] NZCA 324, (2007) 8 NZCPR 469.

Mrs Spark’s favour would open the floodgates to the same argument being advanced in other cases.

[31]   Ms Scott also addresses the fact that notwithstanding Mrs Spark’s contention the property was worth $430,000 at the time of the auction, there was another bidder willing to pay $599,000. She submits that this does not alter anything as it is to be assumed the underbidder would not have offered that amount but for Mrs Spark’s involvement. It is said  that Mrs Spark effectively ruined the auction and Mr and  Mrs Tippen are entitled to be compensated for what that cost them, but not based on the bid of a mentally unwell person.

My analysis

[32]   The aim of an award of damages for breach of contract is to compensate the innocent party for his or her loss as if the contract had been performed. This principle is explained by the authors of Remedies in Contract & Tort in these terms, which I adopt:8

The traditional statement of the aim of awarding damages for breach of contract is that compensation should be assessed so as to give [the claimant] the equivalent in money of the value he would have enjoyed if [the defendant] had performed the promise according to its terms. Since the function of exchange is to realise a surplus, the central concept of ‘loss’ following a breach of contract is [the claimant’s] failure to obtain the future expected surplus. The purpose is not to restore [the claimant] to the position he was in before the contract was made, but to give him the monetary equivalent of the future improvement in his position which [the defendant] had undertaken to produce, in return for some price paid or promised by [the claimant].

[33]   At common law, the normal measure of damages for breach by failure of a purchaser of land to complete is the contract price less the market price at the contractual time fixed for completion.9 In Laird v Pim, Parke B said:10

The measure of damages ... is the injury sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the defendants not having performed their contract. The question is, how much worse is the plaintiff by the diminution in the value of the land, or the loss of the purchase-money, in consequence of the non-performance of the contract?

8      Donald Harris, David Campbell and Roger Halson Remedies in Contract & Tort (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005) at 74.

9      James Edelman McGregor on Damages (22nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2024) at [28-037].

10     Laird v Pim (1841) 7 M & W 474 at 478.

[34]   Importantly, at common law market value at the date of the contract is not relevant. Authority for this is York Glass Co, Ltd v Jubb where the defendant entered into a contract to purchase the plaintiff’s glassworks and business as a going concern.11 At the date of the contract the defendant was suffering from mental illness and was shortly afterwards removed to an asylum. The purchase was not completed and an action for damages made. In respect to the measure of loss, Warrington LJ said that the general principle in relation to damages was:12

.... quite sufficiently stated in WILLIAMS ON VENDORS AND PURCHASERS (3rd Edn) at p 1022 and 1023. ...

If the purchaser [breaks] the contract as, amongst other things, by failure to pay the price before the vendor has parted with his estate in the land, the vendor cannot recover the whole price as damages, but is limited to the loss which he has actually sustained, that is to say, the difference, if any, between the price agreed to be paid and the value of the land as remaining on his hands at the date of the breach.

I can only add to that what is clearly the law, that he would be entitled to recover any further incidental expenses to which he had been put by being compelled to retain the land in his own possession instead of conveying it to the purchaser. Some attempt was made before us to modify that rule in this case by substituting as the first element of comparisons, not the price which the purchaser had agreed to pay, but some sum which might properly be regarded as the true value of the property at the time the contract was made. In my opinion that contention is perfectly hopeless. If the contract is binding upon the defendant in every respect as if he had been a sane man as by law it is binding, then the contract price is the sum, the payment only of which can fulfil the terms of that contract; no other sum can be, and it must therefore he the proper element of comparison with the view of ascertaining what has been the vendor’s loss by reason of the breach. The breach is the non-payment of the purchase price, in this case 54,600 pounds and no other sum can be a proper standard of comparison.

[35]   Mr and Mrs Tippens’ position is that cl 12.4(3) of the agreement is a remedy fixing mechanism. It applies in circumstances where the vendor has cancelled the contract following the issue of a settlement notice and a resale is obtained within one year from the date on which the defaulting purchaser should have settled in compliance with the notice. I agree with that submission.

[36]   Mr Henderson relied upon s 34 of the Contract and Commercial Law Act, which provides:

11     York Glass Co, Ltd v Jubb [1925] All ER Rep 285, (1925) 134 LT 36

12     At 294.

34 Remedy provided in contract

If a contract expressly provides for a remedy for misrepresentation, repudiation, or breach of contract, or makes express provision for any of the other matters to which sections 35 to 49 relate, those sections have effect subject to that provision.

[37]   Mr Henderson took me to the leading text Sale of Land, which refers to the REI-ADLS form as modifying the general law measure of damages following a resale, following a failure to comply with a valid settlement notice.13

[38]   He also took me to Mana v Fleming, to which I earlier referred.14 There the agreement between the parties contained cl 9.4(3), which was effectively in identical terms to cl 12. 4(3) that applies in this case. The Court said in respect to it as follows:

[55]      Clause 9.4(3), when read in conjunction with cls 3.9(1) and (2), constitutes the parties’ agreement on the nature and extent of a purchaser’s liability for the financial consequences of breaching the agreement for sale and purchase, and meets some of the problems discussed in earlier authorities. It is designed as a stand-alone code in substitution for statutory rights: s 5 Contractual Remedies Act 1979. Its purpose is to provide the vendor with a range of remedies following cancellation for a purchaser’s breach and to identify how damages are to be assessed following a resale: Hoskins v Rule [1952] NZLR 827 at 832 (HC) (discussing an earlier and narrower version of the damages provision).

[56]      To that extent, cl 9.4(3) overcomes issues about foreseeability and remoteness of loss, and whether or not interest is recoverable as a head of special damage. Its wording recognises a modern commercial reality. The vendor of a residential property may suffer a significant capital loss while deprived of its funds by a purchaser’s default for an extended period when the market moves. The purchaser’s default may force the vendor into a static or holding position while the market for a substitute property in which it intends to buy, or a related area of investment opportunity, moves upwards.

[39]   There are other cases supporting Mr and Mrs Tippens’ position. Sullivan v Darkin is an example.15 There, the clause in the agreement was cl 8.4 of the then standard form. The case was primarily concerned with the obligation to mitigate loss, but in respect of cl 8.4 Somers J said:16

… it is clear that cl 8.4 confers an advantage on the vendors. It provides a simple and convenient way of compensating them for the loss of the sale arising from the purchaser’s default. But that compensation is not measured

13     D W McMorland Sale of Land (4th ed, Cathcart Trust, Auckland, 2022) at [12.57].

14     Mana v Fleming, above n 7.

15     Sullivan v Darkin, above n 5.

16     At 221.

in the same way as damages are measured at common law, a point noted by FB Adams J in Hoskins v Rule ... It is the deficiency on resale not the difference between sale price and market value. The amount recoverable is called damages. In reality it is the balance of the purchase price under the contract together with consequential losses.

[40]In the same case, Davison CJ said:17

And where the parties have by the terms of their contract specified how the resale is to be made and the losses which may be recovered, then it is not for this Court to impose upon that contract obligations that the parties have not themselves seen fit to express.

[41]   Mr Henderson also referred to Lion Residences Ltd v Robert Bell Consultants Ltd which was a claim for summary judgment following cancellation and resale of a commercial property.18 One of the arguments the defendant advanced was that the contract price was excessive and well above the market. The resale price achieved was $6.6 million as against an original sale  price  of  $7.85 million.  Associate  Judge Gardiner did not accept there was evidence to support the assertion that the price was in fact above market value. However, referring to the equivalent of cl 12.4(3) in this case, the Associate Judge said “Here, the contract specifies the damages payable in the event of default, and the Court is simply being asked to enforce the contract”.19

[42]   Underlying Mrs Spark’s case is the submission that cl 12.4(3) does not specifically refer to the vendor’s loss on resale as including the difference between the contract price and the resale price. There is nothing in that submission in my view. Clause 12.4(3) refers to “all damages claimable at common law or in equity” which, as I have set out above, include the loss on resale measured against the contract price. Mrs Spark’s contention also overlooks that the clause provides that the vendor may recover as damages interest on the unpaid portion of the contract price to the date of settlement of the resale, emphasising that the vendor’s loss is measured against the contract price.

17     At 218.

18     Lion Residences Ltd v Robert Bell Consultants Ltd [2021] NZHC 1760.

19 At [51].

[43]   Consistent with this, in Edlin Holdings Ltd v Carlisle Hardie Boys J considered what was cl 8.4 of the standard form REI-ADLS agreement before him and said the word “loss”:20

... refers not merely to resale at a lower price, but to the situation where on a final accounting, after allowing for all proper deductions, the vendor is in a worse position than if the transaction had been completed. In this situation, where there is a profit on resale, that must be set off against the loss ...

[44]   It follows that I do not accept Ms Scott’s submission that Mana v Fleming can be distinguished on the basis that Mrs Spark is not asking the Court to adopt an approach to the assessment of damages different from that provided for in the agreement.21

[45]   The extracts that Ms Scott referred to from Stirling v Poulgrain and Marlborough District  Council  v  Altimarloch  Joint  Venture  Ltd  do  not  assist  Mrs Spark.22 When the extracts are read in their context, they reinforce the importance of assessing damages with regard to long-standing basic principles. They are not authority that damages may be assessed according to a subjective assessment of what is just in all the circumstances.

[46]   I also do not accept Ms Scott’s submission that the Court has a discretion to adopt market value at the date of the agreement rather that the contract price as the basis for comparison in assessing damages. There are authorities where the Court has been prepared to assess damages as at a date other than the date of the breach but that is not what is contended for in this case.23

[47]   Had I been in agreement with Ms Scott as to the law, Mrs Spark’s defence would still face the insurmountable hurdle that there was another bidder prepared to pay substantially the same amount for the property on the day of the auction. It is difficult to see in those circumstances how it can be maintained that the contract price

20     Edlin Holdings Ltd v Carlisle [1986] 1 NZLR 198 (HC) at 200.

21     Mana v Fleming, above n 7.

22     Stirling v Poulgrain, above n 3; and Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd, above n 4.

23     See for instance the discussion of authorities in Blackwater Properties Ltd v Crawford Group Ltd

[2024] NZHC 149 at [34]-[43].

did not reflect market value on that day. It has been recognised in other contexts that the market value of a property is what a purchaser is prepared to pay for it on the day.24

[48]   While I have a great deal of sympathy for Mrs Spark for the situation she now finds found herself in, I do not think there is any valid basis in law to challenge Mr and Mrs Tippens’ claim.

Result

[49]   Mr and Mrs Tippen have satisfied me that Mrs Spark has no defence to their claim and that they are entitled to summary judgment.

[50]   There shall be judgment in terms of the relief sought in the amended statement of claim except only that the amount in paragraph B is $23,380.72 (deducting the registered valuer’s costs).

[51]   The plaintiffs are entitled to costs on a category 2B basis and reasonable disbursements. If there is any disagreement on costs or disbursements then memoranda may be filed within 21 days and I will determine the matter on the papers.

O G Paulsen Associate Judge

Solicitors:

Corcoran French, Christchurch Helmores Lawyers, Rangiora

24     See, for example, Mitchell v Trustees Executors Ltd [2011] NZCA 519, (2011) 12 NZCPR 659 at [68].

No	Relief	Amount ($)	Agreement Clause and/or Legislation
1	Difference between the sale price to the defendant of $606,000 and the resale price of $485,000 (less the deposit paid, forfeited and retained of $10,600)	110,400.00	12.4(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and 12.4(3)
2	Costs of resale of: a.     Real estate agent’s commission; and b.     Legal conveyancing costs. Costs of the staging, agent’s marketing for sale, and the valuing of, the property after 16 February 2024 to the date of its resale. Such costs are: c.     17 April 2024 auction costs d.     Promotion of the property and staging for the auction on 29 January 2025 e.     Registered valuer’s costs	9,000.00 2,450.38 3,960.75 2,840.35 1,150.00	12.4(3)(b) and (c)
3	Holding costs (16 February 2024 to 21 February 2025) of: a.     Law maintenance b.     Genesis Energy electricity a.     Waimakariri District Council and ECAN rates b.     AMI insurance	299.00 302.89 3,214.96 1,312.39	12.4(3)(c)
4	Interest at 16% per annum from 16 February 2024: a.     On $595,400 ($606,000 unpaid purchase price less the deposit paid) until 12 February 2025 when the new purchaser paid the resale deposit b.     On $546,900 (being the above amount less the resale deposit) from 12 February 2025 until the resale settlement on 21 February 2025	$94,481.00 $2,157.63	1.5 and 12.4(3)(a) and section 22 Interest on Money Claims Act 2016
5	Interest on: a.     The above loss on resale from 21 February 2025 to the date of payment b.     The above wasted resale and holding costs from 22 February 2025 until the date of payment c.     The above penalty interest from 22 February 2025 until the date of payment	To be awarded To be awarded To be awarded	Section 10 Interest on Money Claims Act 2016