Thompson v Diston
[2015] NZHC 2050
•28 August 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND PALMERSTON NORTH REGISTRY
CIV-2015-454-35 [2015] NZHC 2050
UNDER The Insolvency Act 2006 IN THE MATTER OF
a proposal by Guy Marshall Diston under
Part 5, Subpart 2BETWEEN
STEVEN JAMES TOMPSON AND KAREN MICHELLE TOMPSON Judgment Creditors
AND
GUY MARSHALL DISTON Judgment Debtor
Hearing: 22 July 2015 and 12 August 2015 Counsel:
D A Bleier for J Scutter, the trustee named in the proposal
Judgment:
28 August 2015
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE SMITH
[1] Mr Scutter applies for approval of a proposal made by Mr Diston to his creditors in April 2015.
[2] Mr Diston was a shareholder and director of a company called Waikanae Plastics Limited (Waikanae). The company failed, and on 6 May 2014 it was placed in liquidation. Mr Diston was left with a substantial number of debts, many of them resulting from personal guarantees of Waikanae’s liabilities which he had given. The debts far exceeded Mr Diston’s ability to pay, and in April 2015 he put a proposal to his creditors under subpart 2 of part 5 of the Insolvency Act 2006 (the Act).
[3] Mr Diston’s proposal was accepted by the required majority of his creditors at a creditors’ meeting held on 8 May 2015. Mr Scutter now makes the required
application for Court approval of the proposal, under s 333(1) of the Act.
STEVEN JAMES TOMPSON AND KAREN MICHELLE TOMPSON v GUY MARSHALL DISTON [2015] NZHC 2050 [28 August 2015]
[4] The application was first called in the list on 30 June 2015. No notices of opposition had been filed, but I indicated to Mr Bleier that I would wish to hear further submissions on two questions. Those questions were:
(a) whether unsecured creditors would in fact be better off under the proposal than they would be if Mr Diston were adjudicated bankrupt; and
(b)whether the proposed dividend to unsecured creditors, which appeared to be less than one cent in the dollar, was so low that the Court should regard it as unreasonable.
[5] I adjourned the application for hearing on 22 July 2015.
[6] Before the case was called on 22 July 2015, an affidavit was filed by Mr Tompson, one of the judgment creditors. Mr Tompson had voted against the proposal. Mr Tompson expressed certain concerns about the proposal, including an allegation that Mr Diston and/or his wife were then operating a business from their home in Waikanae which had not been disclosed to creditors. He stated that he considered that Mr Diston’s conduct ought to be investigated, and that there would be no investigation if the proposal were approved. Mr Tompson also contended that the equity in the home owned by Mr Diston and Mrs Diston at Elizabeth Street in Waikanae is such that a sale would yield more for creditors than the amounts they would receive under the proposal.
[7] Mr Tompson elected not to appear in support of his objection when the case was called on 22 July 2015, but I considered that his objection, to the extent that it did not raise hearsay matters (generally relating to Mr Diston’s conduct while he was a director of Waikanae) should be considered.
[8] Mr Bleier took the position that Mr Tompson’s objection should not be considered, because no notice of opposition had been filed. On that basis, no reply affidavit was filed by Mr Diston. I determined that I would consider Mr Tompson’s objection, but that the justice of the case required that Mr Diston be permitted to file
an affidavit in reply, particularly on the question of whether he and/or his wife have been operating a business from their home which was not disclosed to the creditors. I adjourned the application to 12 August 2015.
[9] Two further affidavits were then filed in support of the application for approval, one by Mr Diston and one by Mrs Diston. It is not necessary to refer in detail to their contents, beyond noting that Mrs Diston had incorporated a company in March 2014, to operate a business supplying a range of customised stationery products. At that time she was the sole shareholder, and Mr Diston had no authority to act on the company’s behalf. Her evidence is that Mr Diston took no active part in the company’s financial affairs, although he did assist his wife from time to time in the business while he was seeking full time employment. There was a period between July 2014 and early 2015 when Mr and Mrs Diston both obtained full time employment, but that changed in early 2015. By March 2015, Mr and Mrs Diston were both unemployed and without any income. At that stage Mrs Diston decided to re-establish the business selling customised stationery products. Mr Diston started to look for full time work.
[10] In June 2015 Mr Diston acquired one per cent of the shares in his wife’s company, apparently as part of an arrangement under which the company would get some direct sales work from a third party. But copies of financial statements produced by Mrs Diston show that the company’s trading activities have been very limited. Its operating profit in the period of approximately four months between
1 April 2015 and 23 July 2015 was sufficiently small as to be immaterial in the context of the application to approve Mr Diston’s proposal (even if he had been receiving the income, rather than his wife’s company). Likewise, the value of the one per cent share which Mr Diston now holds in his wife’s company would appear to be small enough that it is not material on the question of whether his proposal should or should not be approved.
[11] Mr Tompson did not press his objection on the “undisclosed business” point
any further, and did not appear at the resumed hearing on 12 August 2015.
The proposal and the statement of affairs
[12] Mr Diston’s statement of affairs disclosed total debts of $2,258,188, including a debt of $311,989 to the ANZ Bank, secured by a first mortgage over the family home at Elizabeth Street. The only assets were Mr Diston’s half share in the Elizabeth Street property (estimated value of property $370,000) and furniture and other personal property (estimated value approximately $28,000).
[13] Mr Diston stated that payments owing to the ANZ bank on the mortgage were up to date, and that the Bank did not require the property to be sold. There were no debts which would have priority under the Act over unsecured debts.
[14] The proposal was that Mr Diston would pay the sum of $20,000, to be distributed pro-rata among the unsecured creditors. That sum would be funded by Mrs Diston from her personal bank account, and would be paid to the trustee for distribution to the creditors. The proposal provided that the fees and expenses of the trustee would be met by members of Mr and Mrs Diston’s family.
The creditors’ meeting
[15] Under s 331(3) of the Act, a proposal put by an insolvent to his or her creditors is deemed to be approved by the creditors if the resolution putting the proposal to the meeting is accepted by a majority in number and three quarters in value of the creditors who–
(a) vote; and
(b)are personally present or are represented at the meeting, or have voted by postal vote.
[16] In this case, 14 creditors voted at the meeting, those creditors having completed claim forms and voting forms. Of those who voted, 11 were in favour of the proposal and three against. The 50 per cent of creditors voting threshold was accordingly met.
[17] The total value of the debts held by creditors voting in favour of the proposal was $996,849.19. The creditors voting against the proposal held debts totalling
$122,168.39. Those figures represent 89.08 per cent of creditors (by value) in favour of the proposal, and 10.92 per cent against. The resolution was therefore carried, and the proposal approved by the creditors.
[18] The secured creditor, the ANZ Bank, did not vote on the proposal.
[19] I note in passing that the proofs of debt filed by a number of the creditors who voted stated claim figures significantly lower than the figures which Mr Diston had set out in his statement of affairs. Proofs of debt submitted by unsecured creditors listed in Mr Diston’s statement of affairs who voted for the proposal at the creditors’ meeting totalled approximately $445,000 less than the corresponding figures for those creditors which Mr Diston had included in his statement of affairs. Mr Bleier explained this on the basis that many of the debts listed by Mr Diston in his statement of affairs were amounts owing by him under guarantees of Waikanae’s liability, and that Mr Diston had not (at the time of completing his proposal) had access to Waikanae’s files.
[20] It is not possible to be precise on the evidence which has been presented, but the figures appear to show that Mr Diston’s unsecured debts may be a little less than
$1.5 million, rather than the figure of $1,946,199 in his statement of affairs.
Applicable legal principles
[21] Section 333 of the Act relevantly provides:
333 Court must approve proposal
(1) After the proposal has been accepted by the creditors, the trustee must, as soon as practicable,—
(a) apply to the court for approval of the proposal; and
(b) send notice of the hearing of the application in the prescribed form to the insolvent and to each known creditor.
(2) The court must, before approving a proposal, hear any objection that is made by or on behalf of a creditor.
(3) The court may refuse to approve the proposal if it considers that—
(a) the provisions of this subpart have not been complied with;
or
(b) the terms of the proposal are not reasonable or are not calculated to benefit the general body of creditors; or
(c) for any reason it is not expedient that the proposal be approved.
(4) The court must not approve a proposal if it does not provide for the payment, before any other debts are paid, of—
(a) those debts that would have priority under this Act if the insolvent was adjudicated bankrupt; and
(b) the trustee’s fees and expenses that are properly incurred by
the trustee in respect of the proposal; and
(c) costs incurred by a person other than the insolvent in organising and conducting a meeting of creditors for the purpose of voting on a proposal.
(5) Subsection (4)(a) does not apply to the extent that a creditor waives the priority that the debt of that person would otherwise have had.
(6) When it approves the proposal, the court may correct any formal or accidental error or omission, but must not alter the substance of the proposal.
[22] In Re Bennetts’ Proposal, Hardie Boys J set out the general approach the
Court should take in the following terms:1
…Rather than it being for the proponents of a scheme to show that it ought to be approved, I think the Court should accept the view of the creditors, or the majority of them, and grant approval unless it is apparent that one of the grounds for refusing approval exists. The Court is clearly required to exercise its independent judgment, for considerations of wider public interest are relevant, and therefore even unanimity amongst the creditors will not be predeterminative of appeal. But unless it is clear that the creditors generally would fare better under a bankruptcy, approval ought normally to be given unless other special circumstances militate against it. Whilst a proposal ought not to be imposed upon dissentient creditors if that would be advantageous to them as members of the general body of creditors their dissent should not be upheld if to do so could be prejudicial to the general body of creditors.
1 Re Bennetts’ Proposal HC Christchurch B138/81; M306/81, 1 February 1982 at 9.
[23] That passage has been approved in the Court of Appeal on a number of occasions, including in Magsons Hardware Ltd v Bogiatto,2 Farmer v Rowley,3 and Herbert v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd & Ors.4
[24] In the first instance decision in Herbert, Associate Judge Doogue was asked to approve proposals by Mr and Mrs Herbert which would have provided creditors with a total sum of $10,000 to settle debts totalling $29 million. The dividend received by each creditor would have been about 0.016 cents in the dollar. The Associate Judge described the dividend as de minimis, and of no practical advantage to the creditors. He considered that this was not the kind of compromise with creditors that s 333 was designed to facilitate, and that it was unreasonable within the meaning of s 333(3)(b). The opposing creditors should not be constrained to accept
an amount of the kind offered.5
[25] His Honour acknowledged that the reasonableness or otherwise of the proposals was to be assessed from the perspective of the creditors,6 but concluded that whatever the motives of the creditors voting for the proposal may have been, they cannot have approached the matter by making a calculation that $10,000 was going to be of any practical advantage to them.7
[26] The Associate Judge concluded that “the palpable inadequacy of the amount that is offered to the creditors means that this is not a proposal that the Court ought to approve”.8
[27] An appeal from the decision of the Associate Judge filed by Mrs Herbert was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.9 Substantially for the reasons given by the Associate Judge, the Court rejected a submission that Associate Judge Doogue had
erred in finding that Mrs Herbert’s proposal was unreasonable.10 Assuming the
2 Magsons Hardware Ltd v Bogiatto [2011] NZCA 378.
3 Farmer v Rowley [1992] 2 NZLR 195 (CA).
4 Herbert v New Zealand Guardian Trust Ltd & Ors [2012] NZCA 442, [Herbert (CA)].
5 Herbert v Allied Nationwide Finance & Others HC Auckland CIV-2012-404-8294, 26
September 2010 at [15], [Herbert (HC)].
6 Citing Kelly v Structural Finance Ltd [2009] 2 NZLR 785 (HC) at [44].
7 Herbert (HC), above n 5, at [15].
8 At [26].
9 Herbert (CA), above n 4.
$10,000 would have been available to meet Mrs Herbert’s debts of $10.38 million alone, the Court calculated the return to creditors at about 0.096 cents in the dollar, an amount which the Court regarded as inadequate to the point of being derisory.11
The Court acknowledged that the views of the creditors will ordinarily carry substantial weight in deciding on the reasonableness of a proposal in commercial terms, but noted that the significance of that factor was undermined by two factors. First, the views of the creditors were not unanimous. Secondly, the views of secured creditors ought to carry less weight, as they had other means of recovery and were not reliant on the offer of $10,000 unless there were shortfalls after their securities
were realised.12
[28] The Court of Appeal stated that the proposal was not reasonable “because it offered little material return in comparison to what creditors could expect to recover if Mrs Herbert were bankrupted”.13
The issues to be determined
[29] There is no issue under s 333(3)(a) – the relevant provisions of the Act appear to have been complied with. The questions, then, are whether the proposal is not reasonable, or not calculated to benefit the general body of creditors (s 333(3)(b)), and whether there is any reason to conclude that it would not be expedient to approve the proposal (s 333(3)(c)).
Issue (1) – Is the proposal unreasonable or not calculated to benefit the general body of creditors?
[30] A substantial majority of the creditors accepted the proposal. There is nothing to suggest that those creditors had connections with Mr Diston, or any other reason to conclude that their views in support of the proposal should be given less weight. On the approach set out by Hardie Boys J in Re Bennetts’ Proposal, then, the starting point must be that the proposal should be approved unless it is clear that the creditors generally would fare better under a bankruptcy, or there are other
reasons for the Court to exercise its judgment against approval of the proposal.
11 At [33].
12 At [34].
Would the creditors generally fare better in a bankruptcy?
[31] The only significant asset is the dwelling at Elizabeth Street, owned jointly by Mr Diston and his wife. Mr Diston produced price indications obtained from three real estate agents operating in the Waikanae area, giving price indications for the property ranging between $370,000 and $400,000. The property has a rating valuation with the Kapiti District Council of $380,000. As noted above, there is one mortgage on the property, securing approximately $311,000.
[32] In an affidavit filed in support of the application, Mr Diston provided a table setting out various recovery scenarios if the property were sold, ranging from a “worst case” sale price of $360,000 to a “best case” sale price of $400,000 (as advised by real estate agents operating in the district). The table is set out in Appendix 1 to this judgment.
[33] The final creditor balance in each of the five scenarios is: $7,055.50,
$11,855.50, $16,655.50, $21,455.50, and $26,255.50. It will be seen that, in three of the five scenarios, creditors would receive less in a bankruptcy than the $20,000 which would be available to them if the proposal were approved. Mr Bleier then submits that if the proposal is not approved, there would probably be a forced sale by the mortgagee, or the property would be sold by the Official Assignee in circumstances which would be less than desirable for creditors.
[34] I accept that there is some force in that submission. I also accept Mr Bleier’s submission that, in a bankruptcy, Mr Diston would probably be permitted to keep his interest in the modest items of furniture which were disclosed in his statement of affairs.
[35] On the evidence produced, I conclude that creditors would probably be slightly better off (in terms of the amount immediately available to them) under the proposal than they would be if an order were made adjudicating Mr Diston bankrupt. But it would be marginal, and it is possible that they would be better off in a bankruptcy. In a bankruptcy, there would also be the possibility of Mr Diston making further contributions from any employment he may obtain.
Does the proposal unreasonably prefer ANZ Bank (the secured creditor) over unsecured creditors?
[36] Under the proposal, the Bank would continue to earn interest on its debt of approximately $312,000, and of course it would continue to hold first mortgage security in an amount which would appear to cover its debt.
[37] A similar issue arose in Herbert, where Mr and Mrs Herbert would have been permitted to continue to reside in a dwelling owned by their family trust if the Court approved the proposal, while mortgage payments totalling approximately $120,000 per annum continued to be paid to the secured creditor. The Court of Appeal described this as a “troubling aspect of the proposal”, in that it represented a clear preference in favour of the secured creditors. The Court was not told how these payments were to be funded, who would be making them, or for what reason. In the absence of evidence on these points, the Court of Appeal considered that the Judge in the Court below was right to conclude that the proposal was not in the interests of
the general body of creditors.14
[38] In this case, Mr Bleier acknowledges that the proposal does have an element of preference to the Bank with the ongoing interest payments. However, Mrs Diston is presently the sole breadwinner, and it is fairly clear that she will be the party to whom the Bank will look for payment, at least while Mr Diston remains unemployed. Mrs Diston presently has a modest income, and Mr Diston has given evidence that additional income is earned through hosting international exchange students. While there may be an element of preference to the Bank insofar as its ability to earn ongoing interest on the advance is concerned, I accept that the alternative would be adjudication in bankruptcy, and the immediate sale of the house. In that scenario the amounts presently being paid to the bank for interest would presumably have to be spent on renting another property. In those circumstances, I do not consider that any preference to the Bank in earning ongoing interest on the advance is enough, on its own, to render the proposal as a whole unreasonable, or
not in the interests of the general body of creditors.
14 Herbert (CA), above n 4, at [35].
Would the dividend to unsecured creditors be so small as to render the proposal unreasonable?
[39] This is the issue which arose in Herbert, and it is an issue which I have not found free from difficulty. At what point does the dividend offered to unsecured creditors by an insolvent become so small that it can be regarded as “inadequate” or “derisory”, and so render the proposal unreasonable? (While there were other factors in Herbert which weighed against the proposal, both the Associate Judge and the Court of Appeal appear to have accepted that the very small size of an offer to creditors can, in an appropriate case, be a stand-alone reason for rejecting a proposal on the ground that it is not reasonable). In what circumstances should the Court decide not to defer to the (apparent) views of the creditors in such a case, and exercise its independent judgment against the proposal?
[40] In this case, on the basis that unsecured debts may be approximately
$1.5 million, the dividend to unsecured creditors would appear to be a little more than one cent in the dollar. In Herbert, the dividend to Mrs Herbert’s creditors (which the Court of Appeal categorised as derisory) would have been roughly one tenth as much. Is the proposed dividend in this case of any more “tangible benefit” to the creditors than the dividend Mrs Herbert was offering to her creditors?
[41] Mr Bleier’s submission is that these are matters for the creditors, and (once the creditors have accepted the proposal) do not justify the refusal of the application for approval. He relies on the passage from the judgment of Hardie Boys J in Re Bennetts quoted above, and in particular the passage reading:15
…But unless it is clear that the creditors would generally fare better under a bankruptcy, approval ought normally be given unless other circumstances militate against it.
[42] Mr Bleier refers to the judgment of Associate Judge Gendall (as he then was) in Ullrich Aluminium Co v Blackmore, where the proposal which was approved by the Court was for the payment of $100,000 in satisfaction of debts totalling $26.9
million.16
15 Re Bennetts, above n 1, at 9.
16 Ullrich Aluminium Co v Blackmore [2012] NZHC 3287.
[43] The Associate Judge noted that, in the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, weight should be given to the commercial judgment of the vast majority of the voting creditors.17
[44] Mr Bleier acknowledges that in Blackmore the Associate Judge noted that a very small return to creditors would only be approved by the Courts in “rare and unusual circumstances”.18 However, the Associate Judge did approve the proposal in that case, and the return to creditors would have been even less than the dividend of approximately one cent in the dollar that would appear to be likely in this case. Mr Bleier also referred to Re Connett,19 and Re Marsh,20 where small returns to creditors were accepted by the Courts as falling within the bounds of “reasonableness” when all of the surrounding circumstances were considered. Mr Bleier submitted that the Court should only refuse to approve the proposal when the majority of the creditors have voted to accept it or have taken no steps to oppose it, in exceptional circumstances. In his submission, it is largely for the creditors to determine if they will be better off under the terms of the proposal – the creditors are
the people who will lose out if bankruptcy provides a worse outcome.
[45] I accept that proper weight has to be given to the views of the creditors in deciding what is or is not commercially reasonable. But I think it goes too far to say that the Court should always accept the view of the majority of creditors unless there are exceptional circumstances. In Herbert, the creditors had accepted Mrs Herbert’s proposal, but the Court of Appeal declined to approve it, pointing out that the creditors’ approval of the proposal was not unanimous. That is also the position here, and while there were other factors in Herbert which contributed to the Court’s decision to decline to endorse the view of the majority of the creditors, I think Herbert makes it clear that a lack of unanimity among the creditors is a factor the Court can take into account in the exercise of the independent judgment it is required
to bring to bear.
17 At [14].
18 At [42]-[43].
19 Re Connett, High Court Auckland 26 November 1999, B1374-IM99.
20 Re Marsh Ex Parte Commonwealth Bank of Australia, HC Auckland B1374-IM99, 26
November 1999.
[46] One of the three dissenting creditors in this case was the Bank of New Zealand, a significant commercial entity whose view was that the proposal should not be approved.
[47] I note also that Connett and March pre-date the decision of the Court of Appeal in Herbert, and that the decision in Herbert (although given several months before the Blackmore decision) does not appear to have been drawn to the Associate Judge’s attention in the latter case.
[48] Mr Bleier submitted that the result in Herbert was influenced by a number of additional factors, which went beyond the “derisory” size of the offer. I do not read either the decision of Associate Judge Doogue or the decision of the Court of Appeal that way – in each case the very small size of the offer was regarded as sufficient on its own to render the proposal unreasonable, quite apart from the other factors which pointed to the same result.
[49] A further factor in this case is that the real estate agent’s appraisals set out in Appendix 1 to this judgment which appeared to offer the possibility that creditors might fare better in a bankruptcy, were not provided to creditors, although the appraisals had been obtained prior to the creditors’ meeting. Mr Bleier advised that the appraisals were not provided to the creditors because none of them raised any issue with the equity in the property. Creditors presumably voted on the basis that the property was worth approximately $370,000 (its rateable value, and the figure put forward by Mr Diston in his statement of affairs), without knowing that three firms of real estate agents had put higher figures on the property, one as high as
$400,000.
[50] It seems to me that in those circumstances the creditors did not have before them all of the information which would have enabled them to value the chance that they would fare better commercially if Mr Diston were adjudicated bankrupt.
[51] As to whether the offer would provide any tangible benefit to unsecured creditors, I think the answer, certainly at the lowest end, is that it would not. The Bank of New Zealand would receive approximately $51 on its debt of $5,102.41 and
the other two creditors who voted against the proposal would respectively receive approximately $570 and $600 on their debts of $57,065 and $60,000. Applying Herbert, I would say that there would be no “practical advantage”, or “tangible benefit”, for the BNZ in receiving a dividend of $51, and that it would not be fair or reasonable for it to be constrained to accept that sum rather than taking its chances in a bankruptcy.
[52] In Blackmore, it was at least clear that the $100,000 offered to creditors, although only providing a dividend described by the Associate Judge as “paltry”, would be for more than they would receive than if Mr Blackmore were bankrupted. And creditors with debts of less than $10,000 in that case were to receive 25 cents in the dollar on their debts. (The Associate Judge described that as not an unusual provision, as “otherwise their entitlement would be insignificant with a pari passu distribution”). Neither of those factors is present here: it is by no means clear in this case that creditors would not fare better in a bankruptcy.
[53] Taking into account all of those factors, and considering also the element of preference the proposal confers on the ANZ Bank, I am not satisfied that this is one of the “relatively rare and unusual circumstances” where a proposal pitched at this sort of level should be accepted.21 In terms of s 333(3)(b) of the Act, I conclude that the terms of the proposal are not reasonable, and are not calculated to benefit the general body of creditors.
Issue (2) – Is there any reason to conclude that it would not be expedient to approve the proposal?
[54] It is not strictly necessary for me to address this issue, but in case the matter should go further, I record my view that I would not have found it inexpedient to approve the proposal. Mr and Mrs Diston have sufficiently answered Mr Tompson’s allegations that Mr Diston has been conducting a business which was not disclosed to creditors, and there is nothing to suggest that an investigation by the Official Assignee might yield additional assets. Nor is there evidence of dishonest trading or commercial recklessness on the part of Mr Diston, sufficient to raise an
issue as to whether the commercial community needs to be protected from entering
21 Borrowing from the language of Associate Judge Gendall in Blackmore, at [43].
into business dealings with him in the future. His indebtedness has arisen as a result of him giving personal guarantees of a company which failed, not a remarkable situation on its own, and the liquidators of Waikanae have not issued any proceedings against Mr Diston as a former director and shareholder.
[55] In summary, I see no public interest or other reason which would have made it inexpedient to approve the proposal.
Result
[56] The application for an order approving the proposal is refused. There will be no order for costs.
Associate Judge Smith
Solicitors:
WCM Legal, Wellington for the judgment debtors
Appendix One
Costs analysis for Diston
Worst case Rateable value
Real Estate
Agent #1
Real Estate
Agent #2
Real Estate
Agent #3
Sale price $360,000 $370,000 $380,000 $390,000 $400,000 Commission
(at 4%)
$14,400.00
$14,800.00
$15,200.00
$15,600.00
$16,000.00
Marketing/ auction costs
$3,500.00
$3,500.00
$3,500.00
$3,500.00
$3,500.00
Legal fees
$2,000.00
$2,000.00
$2,000.00
$2,000.00
$2,000.00
Total costs
$19,900.00
$20,300.00
$20,700.00
$21,100.00
$21,500.00
Total from sale
$340,100.00
$349,700.00
$359,300.00
$368,900.00
$378,500.00
Less mortgage debt
$311,989.00
$311,989.00
$311,989.00
$311,989.00
$311,989.00
Residual post sale
$28,111.00
$37,711.00
$47,311.00
$56,911.00
$66,511.00
Less
Mrs Diston share 50%
$14,055.50
$18,855.50
$23,655.50
$28,455.50
$33,255.50
Total creditors
to $14,055.50
$18,855.50
$23,655.50
$28,455.50
$33,255.50
OA/mortgagee
costs
$7,000.00 $7,000.00 $7,000.00 $7,000.00 $7,000.00 Final creditor balance
$7,055.50
$11,855.50
$16,655.50
$21,455.50
$26,255.50
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