IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE
CIV-2022-485-032
[2023] NZHC 553
UNDER the Prisoners’ and Victims’ Claims Act 2005 IN THE MATTER OF
an appeal from the Victims’ Special Claims Tribunal
BETWEEN
SAM TE HEI
Appellant
AND
IDA HAWKINS
Respondent
AND
ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Intervener
Hearing: On the papers Counsel:
A J Ellis for the Appellant
N M Pender for the Respondent Appearances excused for Attorney-General
Judgment:
17 March 2023
JUDGMENT OF PALMER J
Solicitors/Counsel
A J Ellis, Barrister, Kawakawa & Wellington N M Pender, Barrister, Wellington
Nat Dunning Law, Wellington Crown Law Office, Wellington
TE HEI v HAWKINS [2023] NZHC 553 [17 March 2023]
The judgment
[1] On 30 November 2022, I issued judgment in these appeals holding, in summary:1
[1] Mr Sam Te Hei was convicted of murdering Mrs Ida Hawkins’ daughter. After he was awarded compensation for breach of his rights in prison, the Victims’ Special Claims Tribunal (the Tribunal) awarded Mrs Hawkins
$15,000 compensation for emotional harm under the Prisoners’ and Victims’ Claims Act 2005 (the Act). Mr Te Hei appeals on five grounds. Mrs Hawkins cross-appeals the decision not to award her exemplary damages.
[2] Mrs Hawkins was a victim entitled to make a claim under the Act. She suffered loss for which she did not receive effective redress. And the procedural defects Mr Te Hei complains of, lack of a fair process, an error in one finding, and invalid appointment of the Tribunal, are not sustained. But the Act requires that Mrs Hawkins must have a claim disclosing a cause of action for which damages are payable under the general law. The Tribunal did not rigorously analyse the merits of her claim. The Acts it identified do not provide causes of action upon which Mrs Hawkins can sue at general law. Assault and battery are common law causes of action but lie at the suit of the person assaulted or battered, not a third party. A family member can pursue a cause of action that would have been available to a deceased under the Death by Accidents Compensation Act 1952 (DBAC Act), but only damages for pecuniary benefits are available. Accordingly, Mrs Hawkins is not entitled to damages for emotional harm on the basis found by the Tribunal. Neither is she entitled to exemplary damages, for similar reasons.
The application
[2]Mrs Hawkins applies for leave to appeal the judgment on two central questions:
(a)Whether a member of the immediate family of a person who dies as the consequence of an intentional tort has a cause of action against the wrongdoer under the DBAC Act, or otherwise under the general law, for which damages for emotional harm and/or bereavement are payable.
(b)Whether a member of the immediate family of a person who dies as the consequence of an intentional tort has a claim for exemplary damages against the wrongdoer under the DBAC Act, or otherwise under the general law
Continue reading Te Hei v Hawkins
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Te Hei v Hawkins [2023] NZHC 553
- Case
- [2023] NZHC 553
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that Mrs Hawkins was indeed a victim entitled to make a claim under the Act, and she did suffer a loss for which she did not receive effective redress. However, the court also determined that the Tribunal had not rigorously analysed the merits of Mrs Hawkins' claim. Specifically, the court held that the statutes identified by the Tribunal did not provide causes of action upon which Mrs Hawkins could sue at general law. The common law causes of action, such as assault and battery, lie at the suit of the person assaulted or battered, not a third party. Additionally, while a family member can pursue a cause of action under the Death by Accidents Compensation Act 1952, only damages for pecuniary benefits are available, not damages for emotional harm or bereavement. Consequently, the court ruled that Mrs Hawkins was not entitled to damages for emotional harm on the basis found by the Tribunal, nor was she entitled to exemplary damages.
The court further considered whether Mrs Hawkins should be granted leave to appeal the decision. It found that the proposed grounds of appeal raised questions of principle of public importance and were capable of serious argument. The questions involved the interpretation of the Death by Accidents Compensation Act and the common law concerning the rights of family members to claim for emotional harm and exemplary damages in cases of intentional tort. Given the precedential value of these issues, the court concluded that the appeal raised issues sufficiently important to warrant a second appeal. The court granted leave to appeal and outlined the procedural steps for the appeal to proceed, including the preparation of the case by Mrs Hawkins and the potential involvement of other interested parties as intervenors.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.