Takapuna Residence Development Limited v Dixon
[2023] NZHC 624
•27 March 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2022-404-001423
[2023] NZHC 624
BETWEEN TAKAPUNA RESIDENCE DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
First PlaintiffEDEN GP LIMITED
Second PlaintiffEDEN DEVELOPMENT LIMITED
Third PlaintiffAND
PETER ANDREW DIXON and MARGARET JOAN DIXON
Defendants
Hearing: 21 February 2023 Appearances:
A J Casey for the Plaintiffs
W McCartney for the Defendants
Judgment:
27 March 2023
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE GARDINER
This judgment was delivered by Associate Judge Gardiner
on 27 March 2023 at 4.00 pm, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar / Deputy Registrar – Date: ………………………………..
Solicitors:
Duncan King Law, Auckland Duthie White, Auckland
W McCartney, Auckland
A J Casey, Auckland
TAKAPUNA RESIDENCE DEVELOPMENT LTD v DIXON [2023] NZHC 624 [27 March 2023]
Introduction
[1] Takapuna Residence Development Ltd (Takapuna RD) seeks summary judgment against the Dixons for breach of a goods and services tax (GST) warranty on the sale and purchase of a property.
[2] In brief, Takapuna RD was the nominee of Eden GP Limited (formerly Eden Reits Limited) (Eden GP), who, on 28 October 2019 entered into an agreement with the Dixons to purchase a property. The Dixons represented that they were not GST registered under the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 (the Act) and would not be so at the time of settlement. Eden Development No. 1 LP (Eden LP) (the general partner of Eden GP) paid $550,000 in deposits before Takapuna RD was nominated as purchaser. Takapuna RD paid the remainder of the purchase price ($1,950,000) and settled the transaction. Takapuna RD and Eden LP subsequently applied to the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) for input tax credits in relation to the purchase. These applications were declined by the IRD as the Dixons were GST registered and consequently the transaction was zero-rated under s 11(1)(mb) of the Act.
[3] The Dixons accept that they are liable in damages to Takapuna RD for the input tax credit Takapuna RD would have received in respect of the $1,950,000 had they, as they warranted, not been GST registered. However, they submit that Takapuna RD is not entitled to recover the loss of input tax credit in respect of the deposit as Takapuna RD did not pay the deposit and consequently has not suffered any loss. The Dixons note that Takapuna RD was not yet incorporated at the time of the deposit and Eden LP has already (unsuccessfully) attempted to claim an input tax credit for the deposit.
[4] At issue is whether the Dixons’ defence, that because Takapuna RD is not entitled to claim the tax credit it has not suffered any loss, is reasonably arguable.
[5]There are three sub-issues:
(a)Who would have been entitled to the input tax credit in respect of the deposit? Takapuna RD as recipient of the goods, or Eden LP as the party who paid the deposit.
(b)If Takapuna RD is prima facie entitled to the credit, does the fact that Takapuna RD was not yet incorporated at the time of the deposit alter this conclusion?
(c)Does the fact that Eden LP previously applied for the input tax credit in relation to the deposit prevent Takapuna RD from seeking damages for this amount from the Dixons?
Legal principles
[6]Rule 12.2(1) of the High Court Rules 2016 provides:
The court may give judgment against a defendant if the plaintiff satisfies the court that the defendant has no defence to a cause of action in the statement of claim or to a particular part of any such cause of action.
[7] The relevant principles governing a summary judgment application are well established:1
The principles are well settled. The question on a summary judgment application is whether the defendant has no defence to the claim; that is, that there is no real question to be tried: Pemberton v Chappell [1987] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) at 3. The court must be left without any real doubt or uncertainty. The onus is on the plaintiff, but where its evidence is sufficient to show there is no defence, the defendant will have to respond if the application is to be defeated: MacLean v Stewart (1997) 11 PRNZ 66 (CA). The court will not normally resolve material conflicts of evidence or assess the credibility of deponents. But it need not accept uncritically evidence that is inherently lacking in credibility, as, for example, where the evidence is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent, or is inherently improbable: Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan [1980] AC 331 (PC) at
341. In the end the court’s assessment of the evidence is a matter of judgment. The court may take a robust and realistic approach where the facts warrant it: Bilbie Dymock Corp Ltd v Patel (1987) 1 PRNZ 84 (CA).
Factual background
[8] Takapuna RD is a wholly owned subsidiary of the third plaintiff, Eden LP. The second plaintiff, Eden GP is the general partner of Eden LP.
1 Krukziener v Hanover Finance Ltd [2008] NZCA 187, [2010] NZAR 307 at [26].
[9] On 28 October 2019, Eden GP entered into an agreement with the Dixons to purchase 45 Anzac Street in Takapuna (ASP). The ASP was recorded on the standard ADLS form, ninth edition. The purchase price was $2,500,000 inclusive of GST with a 10 per cent deposit.2
[10] The front page of the ASP recorded the purchaser as “Eden Reits Limited or nominee”. The front page also recorded that the Dixons were not registered under the Act and would not be so registered at settlement. Clause 15.1 of the ASP provided:
The vendor warrants that the statement on the front page regarding the vendor’s GST status in respect of the supply under this agreement is correct at the date of this agreement.
[11] Between 26 November 2019 and 24 November 2020, Eden LP paid deposits in four amounts totalling $550,000 under the ASP to the Dixons’ solicitors.
[12] On 19 April 2021, Eden GP’s solicitors notified the Dixons’ solicitors that Eden GP wished to nominate Takapuna RD to complete the purchase. Takapuna RD paid the balance of the purchase price ($1,950,000) and settled the purchase on 22 April 2021.
[13] Takapuna RD and Eden LP subsequently filed GST returns claiming GST input credits in relation to the purchase. The IRD contacted their accountants, advising that the Dixons were in fact GST registered, and the purchase should have been zero-rated for GST purposes. The IRD required Takapuna RD and Eden LP to make a voluntary disclosure adjusting the GST returns to exclude the input credits, which was done on 31 March 2022.
Procedural issues
[14] Takapuna RD was the sole plaintiff in the original statement of claim. At the first call of its interlocutory application for summary judgment, Gault J gave leave to Eden GP and Eden LP being joined as second and third plaintiffs respectively.3
2 As set out in the affidavit of Peter Dixon dated 13 October 2022, additional deposit amounts were agreed after the ASP was signed.
3 Takapuna Residence Development Ltd v Dixon CIV-2022-404-1423, 18 October 2022 (Minute of Gault J). While the minute does not record it, Ms Casey confirms that leave was given and that
[15] On 20 October 2022 an amended statement of claim was filed, naming Eden GP as second plaintiff and Eden LP as third plaintiff. Other than the amount of accounting costs sought being reduced to a GST exclusive amount, the amended statement of claim differs from the original statement of claim in that it details the relationship between Takapuna RD, Eden GP and Eden LP and the particulars of the deposits. It also includes details of Eden LP’s application for the GST input credit and provides more details as to why it was declined. In all material respects, the amended statement of claim resembles the original statement of claim.
[16] The Dixons raise two procedural objections. First, that the plaintiffs’ written submissions treat the application for summary judgment as an application by all three plaintiffs when only Takapuna RD has applied for summary judgment. Second, that there is no affidavit evidence verifying the allegations in the amended statement of claim on behalf of the second and third plaintiffs as required by r 12.4(5) of the High Court Rules 2016.
[17] Ms Casey explains that Eden GP and Eden LP were added as plaintiffs out of an abundance of caution, primarily in an (ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to avoid the need to proceed with a hearing by addressing the basis of the Dixons’ defence. She submits that it is not necessary for Eden GP and Eden LP to apply for summary judgment: Takapuna RD is able to apply for summary judgment of all the plaintiffs’ claims. She notes that the issue around there being no affidavit evidence verifying the allegations by the second and third plaintiffs was not raised by the Dixons before this time.
[18] For reasons that will become apparent, nothing turns on this procedural point. Had it been material I would have been prepared to treat the application for summary judgment as an application by all the plaintiffs for summary judgment in relation to the relief they collectively claim in the amended statement of claim.4 To require the plaintiffs to file an amended notice of application naming the second and third
therefore a timetable direction was made for the plaintiffs to file and serve an amended statement of claim.
4 High Court Rules 2016, r 1.5.
plaintiffs, when an amended statement of claim was filed doing so, would be wasteful and pointless.
[19] In terms of the concern that the there is no affidavit verifying the allegations in the amended statement of claim on behalf of the second and third plaintiffs, again nothing turns on this point. The essential allegations against the Dixons on which this judgment turns were in the original statement of claim and were verified.
[20] The Dixons also complain that Mr De Luo, director of Takapuna RD, was misleading in his affidavit by implying that Takapuna RD paid the deposits and claimed an input tax credit for the deposit portion of the purchase price, only providing the full picture in his evidence in reply.
[21] Mr De Luo could have been clearer in his first affidavit, but when he affirmed this affidavit Takapuna RD was the only plaintiff. It is clear from Mr De Luo’s affidavit that Eden GP entered into the agreement and Takapuna RD was nominated later. The plaintiffs say that they did not anticipate the basis of the defence until the notice of opposition was filed, at which point Mr De Luo provided a further affidavit that was explicit as to who paid the deposit and who claimed what with the IRD. I accept this explanation.
[22]I now turn to the substantive issues.
Who would have been entitled to the input tax credit in respect of the deposit?
[23] The Dixons maintain that they have a defence to the plaintiffs’ claim in relation to the GST payable on the deposit portion of the purchase price. They say that Takapuna RD has not suffered any loss because it did not pay the deposits, either to the Dixons or to Eden LP by way of reimbursement. Takapuna RD paid only the balance due on settlement, of $1,950,000 (and claimed a GST input credit only on that
$1,950,000, being $254,347.82). Consequently, Takapuna RD was not entitled to claim input tax credits on the deposits totalling $550,000, an amount of $71,739.13.
[24] The Dixons rely on the following parts of s 20(3) which they say mean that regardless of Takapuna RD’s invoicing status, it could claim input tax on the supply of land only to the extent of a payment that it had made:
20 Calculation of tax payable
…
(3) Subject to this section, in calculating the amount of tax payable in respect of each taxable period, there shall be deducted from the amount of output tax of a registered person attributable to the taxable period—
(a)in the case of a registered person who is required to account for tax payable on an invoice basis pursuant to section 19, the amount of the following:
(i)input tax in relation to the supply of goods and services (not being a supply of secondhand goods to which section 3A(1)(c) of the input tax definition applies), made to that registered person during that taxable period:
(ia) input tax in relation to the supply of secondhand goods to which section 3A(1)(c) of the input tax definition applies, to the extent that a payment in respect of that supply has been made during that taxable period:
…
(b)in the case of a registered person who is required to account for tax payable on a payments basis or a hybrid basis pursuant to section 19, the amount of the following:
(i)input tax in relation to the supply of goods and services made to that registered person, being a supply of goods and services which is deemed to take place pursuant to section 9(1) or section 9(3)(a) or section 9(3)(aa) or section 9(6), to the extent that a payment in respect of that supply has been made during the taxable period:
(ii)input tax paid pursuant to section 12 during that taxable period:
(emphasis added)
[25] The Dixons submit that based on these provisions, for a registered person to be able to claim input tax credits in relation to the supply of land, they need to have paid the tax on that supply. As Takapuna RD did not pay the deposits, it is not entitled to claim an input tax credit for the GST portion of the deposits under s 20(3). Therefore,
it did not suffer any loss because of the defendants’ breach of warranty, as it was not entitled to claim the input credits in the first place.
[26] I do not consider this aspect of the Dixons’ defence to be reasonably arguable, for the following reasons.
[27] GST liability is calculated as output tax minus any input tax.5 The Act defines input tax as “tax charged under section 8(1) on a supply of goods or services acquired by the person”.6 Acquire, for the purposes of input tax, means to “obtain legal rights in the nature of proprietary rights”.7 Accordingly, only the person who becomes the legal owner of the goods can claim the input tax credit.8 Here, it is undisputed that Takapuna RD acquired the legal ownership of the property.
[28] Thus, under the definition of input tax in s 3A(1), it is Takapuna RD who is entitled to the input tax credit for the deposit. This is supported by s 60B(6) which states that, where land is supplied by the vendor to a nominee of the purchaser, that sale is treated as a single supply to the nominee.9 The existence of the original purchaser whom entered into the contract for sale and purchase, is, for GST purposes, ignored. This applies even if the original purchaser paid some, or all of the purchase price.10 This conclusion makes sense. Input credits are only available to the extent that the goods are used for or made available for use in making taxable supplies.11 It is only Takapuna RD that will be using the property for this purpose, and it is Takapuna RD who will be required to account for GST output tax when the land is eventually sold. It makes economic sense that Takapuna RD is entitled to the input tax credit.
5 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 20(3).
6 Section 3A(1).
7 Case T35 (1997) 18 NZTC 8,235 at 8,240.
8 Case R11 (1994) 16 NZTC 6,062.
9 Goods and Services Tax Act, s 60B(6).
10 Although this is not expressly set out by the Act, in relation to other goods s 60B(2) clearly states that if the original purchaser pays the purchase price, the supply will be deemed to have been made to them. If, as in the present case, the purchaser and nominee both contribute to the purchase price, the supply will again be deemed to have been made to the original purchaser unless the parties otherwise agree (ss 60B(2)–(5)). For land, however, the rule applies regardless of which party has contributed to the purchase price.
11 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 20(3C).
[29] Although the Dixons submit that s 60B(6) cannot allow Takapuna RD to claim input tax on payments it did not make, this is actually precisely the situation that the wording of s 3A(1) permits. The definition in s 3A(1) does not limit the amount of input tax to the amount of consideration paid by the recipient of the goods. This is because the purpose of input tax is to ensure that GST is a tax on consumption, not turnover.12 Further, as noted by the IRD, supply of goods or services need not be made to the person who made the payment.13
[30] Therefore, both legally and in reality, Takapuna RD was the sole recipient of the supply of land. Takapuna RD is therefore entitled to the input tax credit for the deposit, even though it was Eden LP who paid it.
[31] The Dixons’ reliance on the requirement in s 20(3) that there has been a payment in respect of the supply during that taxable period is misplaced. This section is not concerned with eligibility for input tax credits, rather it is about how to calculate the input tax credit available. It simply requires that there has been ‘a payment’ in respect of the supply of secondhand goods during the taxable period in which the credit is claimed by the registered person.
[32] Case law also supports this conclusion. Of particular relevance is YL NZ Investment Ltd v Ling14 and Park Homes Ltd v Miah.15 The other cases cited by Takapuna RD support that a purchaser is entitled to damages for breach of warranty that a vendor is not GST registered,16 but they do not directly relate to the issue of nominee arrangements. As such, I will only discuss YL NZ Investment Ltd and Park Homes.
[33] In YL NZ Investment Ltd v Ling YL NZ Investment Ltd (YL) was the nominee under an agreement dated 21 December 2015 to purchase a property. Ms Ling warranted that she was not GST registered, when in fact she was liable to be.
12 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 (Inland Revenue Department, Public Information Bulletin 143, February 1986).
13 Inland Revenue Department, Interpretation Statement: GST: Time of Supply—Payments of Deposits, Including to a Stakeholder (IS 10/03, June 2010).
14 YL NZ Investment Ltd v Ling [2017] NZHC 1793.
15 Park Homes Ltd v Miah [2022] NZHC 1352.
16 Marr v Mills [2021] NZCA 505; Holdaway v Ellwood [2019] NZHC 792, [2019] NZAR 680;
Degan Farms (BOP) Ltd v Williams [2020] NZDC 1353.
Accordingly, the IRD zero-rated the transaction and YL was declined its input tax credit claim of $365,869.57.
[34] The original contract was between Ms Ling and WHC Holdings Ltd (WHC) and/or nominee. Between December 2015 to January 2016 WHC paid a deposit of
$500,000. YL was subsequently incorporated on 25 May 2016 and was nominated purchaser. Of particular relevance for the present case is the fact that both deposits were paid by WHC prior to YL’s incorporation.
[35] The Court was satisfied that the breach of warranty caused loss to YL. It did not obtain the credit it would have otherwise been entitled and was thus entitled to its monetary claims.17
[36]Ms Ling appealed to the Court of Appeal.18 The appeal was dismissed.
[37] Similarly, in Park Homes Ltd v Miah, Park Homes Ltd sought summary judgment against Mr Miah for breach of a warranty that he was not GST registered.
[38] On 13 November 2020 Mr Wong, the director of Park Homes, entered into an agreement for sale of a property with Mr Miah as vendor. The sale price was $6.5m including GST and a settlement date of 15 March 2021 was set.
[39] On 19 November 2020 Mr Wong paid the deposit of $632,250. On 27 January 2021, Mr Wong incorporated Park Homes and, on 9 March 2021, nominated Park Homes as the purchaser.
[40] Settlement took place on 16 March 2021 and Park Homes paid the rest of the purchase price. After settlement, Park Homes attempted to obtain a GST refund from the IRD for the GST component of the purchase price. This was declined as Mr Miah was registered for GST.
17 YL NZ Investment Ltd, above n 14, at [44].
18 Ling v YL NZ Investment Ltd [2018] NZCA 133, (2018) 20 NZCPR 830.
[41] The Court rejected Mr Miah’s argument that Park Homes, as nominee, had not suffered any loss.19 Park Homes was denied an input credit for the GST component of the purchase price. This loss arose from the breach of the warranty and summary judgment was granted.20
[42] In both Park Homes and YL NZ Investment Ltd the nominee was entitled to damages equal to the GST portion of the purchase price, even though the deposit was paid by the nominator. The cases are therefore consistent with the conclusions reached in the statutory analysis above.
[43] The Dixons submit that Park Homes and YL NZ Investment Ltd can be distinguished as there was no suggestion the deposit had not been repaid by the nominee to the original purchaser. Equally, however, there was no suggestion that it had. Had the issue been of importance for the determination of the issue, it is likely that this would have been raised by the High Court in either case or the Court of Appeal in YL NZ Investment Ltd. The focus of the enquiry for the purposes of s 3A(1) and the entitlement to input tax credits is who acquired the goods, not who paid for them.
[44] Prima facie, therefore, Takapuna RD, as sole recipient of the supply and acquirer of the land, is entitled to the input tax credit for the whole purchase price. I find that the Dixons defence to the contrary does not meet the threshold of reasonably arguable.
Whether Takapuna RD’s date of incorporation impacts this conclusion?
[45] The Dixons submit that Takapuna RD has not suffered any loss as it was not incorporated at the date the deposit was paid. This mirrors an argument raised by Ms Ling in YL NZ Investment.
[46] Ms Ling argued that YL was not entitled to sue for breach of warranty because they were the nominee of WHC (the contracting party). The Court held, however, that YL as nominee was entitled to enforce the provisions of the contract under ss 4 and
19 Park Homes Ltd, above n 15, at [38].
20 At [39]–[40].
8 of the Contracts (Privity) Act 1981. The Court said that this applies to YL even though it was not incorporated at the time of the agreement.21
[47]The Court stated: 22
If there had been no nomination WHC Holding Ltd would be able to recover damages for breach of warranty and those damages would be within the reasonable contemplation of the parties given the evidence purpose of cl 14.1. The fact that a nominee with rights under the Contracts (Privity) Act took title does not alter that. The damage suffered by that person is just as much within the contemplation of the parties as damages suffered by the original purchaser.
[48] Similar reasoning should be adopted here. Section 4 of the Contracts (Privity) Act is replicated in s 12 of the Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017. It states that the promisor is under an obligation to perform the promise to a nominee regardless of whether or not the nominee exists when the deed or contract is made. Thus, although Takapuna RD was not incorporated at the time of the deposit, Takapuna RD is entitled to recover damages for the Dixons’ breach of the warranty that they were not GST registered.
[49] Such a conclusion would be consistent with both YL NZ Investment Ltd and Park Homes. In both cases the deposits were paid by the nominator before the incorporation of the nominee. In both cases the nominee was entitled to damages reflecting the GST input credit they would have obtained but for the breach of the GST warranty.
Whether Eden LP’s unsuccessful application for the GST input credit prevents Takapuna RD from recovering damages?
[50] Alternatively, the Dixons submit that when Eden LP applied for the input credit Takapuna RD became disentitled to the input credit. Putting it another way, they submit that once Eden LP claimed input tax credits on the deposits, Takapuna RD could not claim the same input tax credit unless it first reimbursed Eden LP for the deposits, in which case Eden LP would have to pay output tax on what it received from Takapuna RD.
21 YL NZ Investment, above n 14, at [37].
22 At [41].
[51] Relatedly, they seek to distinguish YL NZ Investment Ltd and Park Homes because in those cases the nominee had attempted to obtain an input credit for the GST portion of the entire purchase price.
[52] I do not consider this aspect of the defence reasonably arguable either. First, Eden LP was unsuccessful in their claim so there is no issue of double recovery by both Eden LP and Takapuna RD.
[53] Second, even if the Dixons were not GST registered Eden LP would not have been entitled to the credit. Input tax credits are available to the party who has acquired the goods. This is Takapuna RD, not Eden LP. Additionally, no supply had been made to Eden LP. In accordance with s 60B(6), only one supply occurred—that from the Dixons to Takapuna RD.
[54] Third, Takapuna RD does not need to have claimed the credit for loss to be established. In Marr v Mills,23 the plaintiffs intended to use the credit they would have received as working capital to establish the business they intended to run on the property. They discovered that Ms Marr was not registered for GST before they themselves registered for GST and, therefore, before they had attempted to claim the input credit. The District Court and the High Court held that the Mills had suffered loss in that they were unable to claim the credit that they would have been entitled to had they registered for GST and claimed an input credit. The Court of Appeal declined leave to appeal these findings.
[55] Finally, it seems untenable that merely because Eden LP unsuccessfully applied for the credit that Takapuna RD is now not entitled to it. Such an approach would mean that in cases where one associated party erroneously applies for a credit, the party entitled to the credit loses the ability to apply for it. This cannot be correct.
23 Marr v Mills, above n 16.
Quantum
[56] There is disagreement on the rate of interest that should be applied to the amount the Dixons are required to pay Takapuna RD as compensation for the breach of the GST warranty.
[57] During the hearing the plaintiffs sought, and I gave, leave to amend their statement of claim to particularise their claim for interest. They claim interest as follows:
(a)on the GST credits pursuant to s 22 of the Interest on Money Claims Act 2016, late settlement interest under cl 14.1 of the ASP at the late settlement rate of 14 per cent, from the dates on which the GST credits were claimable until payment; and interest on the plaintiffs’ accounting costs pursuant to s 10 of the Interest on Money Claims Act, at the rate payable under the Act from the dates on which those costs were payable until payment; or
(b)on the GST credits and on the plaintiffs’ accounting costs pursuant to s 10 of the Interest on Money Claims Act, at the rate payable under the Act from the dates on which (respectively) those input credits were claimable and those costs were payable until payment.
[58] The amount under the first calculation is $80,339.75. Under the alternative calculation the amount payable is $11,184.50.
[59] In support of their claim to interest at the contractual late settlement rate, the plaintiffs submit that they have been deprived of the use of the GST credits since the dates on which they were claimable, and interest should therefore be payable from those dates. They argue that the Dixons should have to pay interest to the plaintiffs in respect of the GST credits at the same rate the plaintiffs would have been required to pay to the Dixons in the event they defaulted on a GST payment under the ASP, 24 of 14 per cent. 25
24 ASP, cl 14.1.
25 ASP, front page ‘interest rate for late settlement.’
[60] I am not persuaded by this submission. Contractual interest may be awarded under s 22 of the Interest on Money Claims Act if the contract provides for an award of interest, and such interest is in accordance with the rights and obligations of the parties specified in the contract.26 The ASP provides specifically for the circumstances in which late settlement interest is payable, including on sums to be repaid by the vendor to the purchaser after the purchaser cancels for the vendor’s default,27 or by the purchaser on any unpaid portion of the purchase price on cancellation by the vendor for the purchaser’s default.28 Or, as the plaintiffs emphasise, when the purchaser is late paying the vendor the GST payable on the GST date.29 The ASP does not specify that late settlement interest will be payable for a breach of the GST warranty by the vendor. That is not surprising, because the relief for breach of this warranty is an award of damages,30 rather an amount payable under the ASP.
Result
[61]I enter summary judgment for the first plaintiff, Takapuna RD:
(a)in the sum of $331,642.96; and
(b)interest pursuant to s 10 of the Interest and Money Claims Act 2016 as follows:
(i)GST on deposit amounts $71,739.12 from 15 January 2021 to 21 February 2023: $2,708.05
(ii)GST on balance of purchase $254,347.78 from 28 June 2021 to 21 February 2023: $8,317.27
(iii)Accounting fees of $1,764.10 due 20 November 2021 up to 21 February 2023: $50.11
26 Subsections 22(1) and 22(2).
27 ASP, cl 11.5(2).
28 Clause 11.4
29 Clause 14.1(3).
30 Marr v Mills, above n 16, at [16].
(iv)Accounting fees of $1,481.78 due 20 December 2021 up to 21 February 2023: $40.61
(v)Accounting fees of $3,143.59 due 20 May 2022 up to 21 February 2023: $66.35
[62] The plaintiffs signal an intention to seek indemnity or increased costs. They are invited to file submissions of not more than four pages within 10 working days, with the Dixons to file any submissions in response within a further 10 working days.
Associate Judge Gardiner
2
5
0