Supra v Auckland District Court

[2025] NZHC 2487

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2023-404-2977

[2025] NZHC 2487

UNDER

s 16 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 and pts 5 and 30 of the High Court Rules 2016

IN THE MATTER

of a Judicial Review of District Court and Disputes Tribunal decisions

BETWEEN

NATALIA SUPRA

Applicant

AND

AUCKLAND DISTRICT COURT

First Respondent

AUCKLAND DISPUTES TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

McLEAN LAW LIMITED

Third Respondent

Hearing:

On the papers

Appearances:

Applicant in person

C J Cartwright for the Third Respondent

Judgment:

29 August 2025

JUDGMENT OF GAULT J

(Costs)

This judgment was delivered by me on 29 August 2025 at 3:00 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

……………………………………

SUPRA v AUCKLAND DISTRICT COURT [2025] NZHC 2487 [29 August 2025]

[1]                  My judgment of 29 May 2025 dismissed this application for judicial review and indicated that the third respondent was entitled to costs.1 I urged the parties to take a reasonable and proportionate approach to costs.2 I directed that if costs could not be agreed, memoranda (not exceeding three pages) may be filed within 20 working days and I would determine costs on the papers.

[2]The parties filed costs memoranda. There is no indication they conferred.

[3]                  The third respondent seeks 2B scale costs according to a costs schedule, totalling $18,881 (despite noting that increased costs were arguably warranted).3

[4]                  Ms Supra made multiple alternative arguments to dispute costs. Her costs submissions well exceeded the directed page limit. I could have directed her to file a more succinct submission, but it is more efficient just to address the merits.

[5]                  First,  Ms  Supra  submitted  that  the  costs  schedule  presented  by  the  third respondent was exaggerated and inappropriate. She asked the Court to evaluate the claim to guarantee a fair assessment of the work executed. That misunderstands the nature of the scale in the High Court Rules 2016 (Rules), which contains rates and steps designed to deliver to the successful party approximately two-thirds of the daily rate considered reasonable once the proceeding has been placed in its appropriate category for complexity or significance and then in the appropriate band for time.4 This avoids the need for the Court to undertake an assessment of the fairness of the actual cost of the work done by the successful party, at least unless a departure from scale is warranted under the Rules providing for indemnity, increased or reduced costs.

1      Supra v Auckland District Court [2025] NZHC 1384 at [42].

2      I noted the costs principles applicable under the High Court Rules 2016 are settled. They provide guidance to the parties to assist I the quantification of costs in a cost effective way.

3      It is therefore unnecessary to address the third respondent’s submission that the proceedings were simply an attempt to avoid payment and stall parallel bankruptcy proceedings.

4      High Court Rules 2016, r 14.2(c)-(e).

[6]                  Secondly, Ms Supra submitted that the third respondent had necessitated additional conferences, preparation and memoranda due to the lack of any substantial opposition in its statement of defence. Ms Supra’s submission in effect seeks reduced costs on the basis the third respondent’s conduct unnecessarily contributed to the additional conferences. I do not accept that is the case. I deal with Ms Supra’s further submissions seeking reduced costs separately below.

[7]                  Thirdly, Ms Supra submitted the proceeding should be categorised as 1A for costs purposes. However, Lang J had already categorised this proceeding  as category 2 for costs purposes and I decline to change that categorisation after the event. Band B applies where a normal amount of time is considered reasonable. Band A applies where a comparatively small amount  of time is considered reasonable.     I consider that 2A costs are appropriate for the applicable steps claimed except that 2B costs are appropriate in respect of preparation  for and  attendance  at  the hearing. On that basis, the allocated days reduce from 7.9 to 5.3, and total scale costs would be

$12,667.

[8]                  Fourthly, Ms Supra submitted costs should be reduced under r 14.7 on the basis that the time needed would be significantly less than the time allocated for Band A; the property or interests involved have an exceptionally low value; and/or the issues at stake are of minimal significance.5

[9]                  Ms Supra has not made out a basis for reducing costs below the scale bands.  I have already addressed the appropriate Band, which is a combination of 2A and 2B. The time needed would not have been significantly less than the time allocated for Band A. The debt involved was modest ($11,868.03) but this was Ms Supra’s proceeding seeking judicial review of a decision upholding the debt claim. Costs  also should not be reduced on  the basis the issues were of minimal significance.  The third respondent was required to address Ms Supra’s various arguments challenging the District Court and Disputes Tribunal decisions by way of judicial review rather than appeal.

5      Rule 14.7(a), (b) and (c).

[10]              Fifthly, Ms Supra submitted the Court may exercise its discretion in light of her financial situation and inability to pay a costs order. She filed an affidavit seeking that costs lie where they fall or  alternatively  be reduced  to  a minimal  amount.  Her affidavit indicates she is a student and single mother. I accept her financial situation as stated, which she says has been severely affected due to 14 years of Family Court proceedings. However, there is no further information about costs in the Family  Court  proceedings.  She  also  refers  to  attempting  to  settle  with  the  third respondent but there is no evidence of a settlement offer on a without prejudice except as to costs basis. I do not consider that Ms Supra’s financial position makes this is an appropriate case to reduce the scale costs beyond the combination of  Bands 2A and 2B referred to above.

[11]              Sixthly, Ms Supra submitted that the Court has overriding discretion as to costs where a losing party has brought a test case to clarify the law on a particular point, and therefore costs should lie where they fall. Leaving aside the inconsistency between this submission and the submission that the issues at stake were of minimal significance, I do not consider this case was in the nature of a test case warranting reduced costs. The relevant limb of r 14.7 refers to a proceeding concerning a matter of public interest and the party opposing costs acted reasonably in the conduct of the proceeding.6 This was not such a case.

[12]              Finally, Ms Supra submitted that the $500 per day rate for litigants in person should apply as Mr McLean was a litigant in person in the Disputes Tribunal and appearance by his employee in this proceeding did not involve a solicitor-client relationship. However, it was the firm of McLean Law that Ms Supra engaged and that succeeded in its claim in the Disputes Tribunal. I have no reason to doubt that counsel in this proceeding, Mr Cartwright, had a solicitor-client relationship with the third respondent (McLean Law).

[13]For these reasons, I conclude that McLean Law is entitled to scale costs of

$12,667.

6      Rule 14.7(e).

Result

[14]Ms Supra is to pay McLean Law scale costs of $12,667.

Gault J

Parties / Solicitors:

The Applicant

Mr C McLean and Mr C J Cartwright, McLean Law Ltd, Auckland Copy to:

Crown Law (for First and Second Respondents), Wellington