NATALIA SUPRA AND AUCKLAND DISTRICT COURT AUCKLAND DISPUTES TRIBUNAL McLEAN LAW LIMITED
[2025] NZHC 1384
•29 May 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2023-404-2977
[2025] NZHC 1384
UNDER ss 8 and 16 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 and ss 5 and 30 of the High Court Rules 2016 IN THE MATTER
of a Judicial Review of District Court and Disputes Tribunal decisions
BETWEEN
NATALIA SUPRA
Applicant
AND
AUCKLAND DISTRICT COURT
First Respondent
AUCKLAND DISPUTES TRIBUNAL
Second RespondentMcLEAN LAW LIMITED
Third Respondent
Hearing: 27 November 2024 Appearances:
Applicant in person
No appearance by or for the First and Second Respondents – abiding the decision of the Court
C J Cartwright for the Third Respondent
Judgment:
29 May 2025
JUDGMENT OF GAULT J
This judgment was delivered by me on 29 May 2025 at 4:00 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
……………………………………
SUPRA v AUCKLAND DISTRICT COURT [2025] NZHC 1384 [29 May 2025]
[1] In this application for judicial review, Ms Supra challenges the decision of Judge P Sinclair in the Auckland District Court dated 2 September 2022 to transfer a proceeding filed by McLean Law Ltd (the third respondent) against Ms Supra to the Disputes Tribunal.1 Ms Supra also challenges the substantive decision of the Disputes Tribunal dated 2 May 2023 that she is liable to pay McLean Law’s outstanding invoice balance of $10,110.71 plus contractual interest, up to a total of
$11,868.03.2
[2] Ms Supra contends that both decision-makers committed procedural errors and/or acted out without jurisdiction in reaching their decisions.
[3] The first and second respondents abide the decision of the Court. McLean Law supported the decisions under review.
Factual background
[4] In 2021, Ms Supra was self-represented in Family Court proceedings [REDACTED]. She sought to engage Mr McLean of McLean Law to prepare for and attend a Family Court two-day hearing.
[5] On 14 April 2021, Mr McLean sent Ms Supra an initial letter attaching his firm’s terms of engagement. The letter said the fee would be based on a number of factors including the time spent, urgency and the result obtained, and shall be fair and reasonable. The letter included a fee estimate, setting out hourly rates and options depending on the length of hearing (attend a one-and-a-half-day hearing – $10,000.00; attend a three-day hearing – $20,000.00). The letter also said the firm required an upfront payment into its trust account of $7,500.00 and would not start work until it received this payment. The terms of engagement also said that the firm needed a signed copy of the terms of engagement and the money sought to be engaged.
[6] Ms Supra signed the letter of engagement but did not pay the retainer of $7,500. She says that preparation and hearing attendance were no longer required.
1 McLean Law Ltd v Supra DC Auckland CIV-2021-004-1215, 2 September 2022, minute of Judge Sinclair.
2 Disputes Tribunal, District Court Waitakere, CIV-2022-090-001406, 2 May 2023, Referee Perfect.
[7] Ms Supra says that on 15 April 2021, Mr McLean called her and they agreed that if she paid a retainer of $1,000, he would personally represent her at an upcoming 15-minute Court conference. Ms Supra paid the $1,000.
[8] On 15 April 2021, Mr McLean emailed Ms Supra requesting a further $4,000 on the basis that the $1,000 was just going to be helping out behind the scenes – it would cost more to do the hearing, and the payment was security for his fees. Ms Supra says she did not agree to this. She did not pay the further retainer.
[9] However, on 17 April 2021, Ms Supra transferred a further $2,000. She says this was because Mr McLean suggested if she paid another $2,000, he would communicate with the opposite party for temporary child contact arrangements and assist with an affidavit. Ms Supra agreed and paid $2,000. She said that Mr McLean arranged some contacts and assisted with an affidavit as agreed.
[10] Ms Supra says that despite this, Mr McLean directed his staff to start correcting draft submissions and the chronology of proceedings they had in her file, without her knowledge or instruction.
[11] On 27 April 2021, Ms Supra received an invoice for $6,040.35 for preparation of submissions.
[12] On 14 May 2021, she received another invoice from Mr McLean for $6,474.16 for preparation of submissions for the hearing which had been scheduled for 2 to 4 August 2021.
[13]On 16 June 2021, McLean Law issued its final invoice. The total invoiced was
$13,110.71.
[14] Ms Supra did not pay the invoices for correcting submissions and chronology. She did not consider there was an agreement for this service. She only paid the retainers totalling $3,000.
District Court proceeding
[15] On 19 July 2021, McLean Law commenced civil proceedings in the Auckland District Court for breach of contract. On 11 August 2021, Ms Supra filed a statement of defence denying there was a legally enforceable contract for hearing preparation.
[16] On 9 December 2021, Judge M B Sharp directed the matter be set down for a one-day short trial and made timetable directions.
[17] Following an adjournment while Ms Supra’s New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) complaint was resolved,3 on 17 August 2022 McLean Law filed a memorandum of counsel seeking transfer of the proceeding to the Disputes Tribunal.
District Court transfer decision
[18] On 2 September 2022, Judge Sinclair made an order transferring the proceeding to the Disputes Tribunal. Her minute stated:
I refer to the memorandum of counsel for the plaintiff dated 17 August 2022 to which no reply has been received from the defendant.
An order is now made under S37 of the Disputes Tribunal Act 1988 transferring the proceeding to the Disputes Tribunal.
Disputes Tribunal decision
[19] Ms Supra said the Disputes Tribunal hearing occurred over a short telephone conversation and that no submissions were provided.
[20] On 2 May 2023, the Tribunal ordered Ms Supra to pay $11,868.03 to McLean Law on or before 30 May 2023. The Tribunal’s reasons stated that Ms Supra had engaged McLean Law and signed the terms of engagement. The Tribunal did not accept Ms Supra’s argument that the contract did not come into force because she did not pay the upfront payment of $7,500. The Tribunal found that Ms Supra did not vary her instructions that Mr McLean do the hearing. McLean Law provided its legal
3 The complaint was on separate grounds and NZLS decided to take no further action.
services with reasonable care and skill and at a reasonable price. The Tribunal found that Ms Supra was liable to pay the outstanding invoice balance of $10,110.71 plus contractual interest provided for in the terms of engagement up to the limit of the amount originally claimed in the Tribunal, being $11,868.03.
Judicial review grounds
[21] Ms Supra commenced this judicial review proceeding on 11 December 2023. She understood and emphasised that this is an application for judicial review, not an appeal.
[22] Ms Supra’s amended statement of claim dated 23 July 2024 challenges the District Court’s transfer decision on the following grounds:
(a)ex parte (without notice) consideration contravened the process prescribed in the District Court Rules 2014 (the DCR);
(b)breach of natural justice and right to be heard; and
(c)contravened the Disputes Tribunal Act 1988 (the Act).
[23] Her amended statement of claim challenges the Disputes Tribunal decision on the following grounds:
(a)contravened the Act;
(b)the Tribunal made its own hearing agenda; and
(c)breach of natural justice.
Evidence objection
[24] At the outset of the hearing, Ms Supra objected, on a number of grounds, to exhibit C of Mr McLean’s affidavit dated 3 April 2024 filed in the judicial review proceeding – McLean Law’s response to the NZLS complaint dated 21 March 2022, and its attachments. Mr Cartwright, for McLean Law, accepted that I could put to one
side the attachments to the response. In relation to the response letter itself, I said that I would decide whether to admit it in the decision. In the event, nothing turns on it.
Transfer decision
[25] Ms Supra disputed that she was served with the memorandum of counsel dated 17 August 2022 seeking transfer. Her affidavit in support of the judicial review application said that she did not receive the memorandum and was unaware McLean Law was seeking transfer, otherwise she would have opposed it. She also referred to a separate application filed by Mr McLean against her seeking a Harmful Digital Communication Order and said that she had received 205 letters from him asking for payment. She submitted that, if she did receive the memorandum, she may have overlooked it as she was overwhelmed by his correspondence.
[26] Ms Supra also submitted that, on receipt of the memorandum seeking transfer, the District Court Judge was required to follow the legal process prescribed by Part 7, Subpart 2 of the DCR (Interlocutory applications and orders). She referred to r 7.36 (making of interlocutory orders), which provides that an interlocutory order may be made on the interlocutory application of a party or on a Judge’s own initiative. Rule 7.36(3) requires that before making an order on the Judge’s own initiative, the Judge must give the parties an opportunity to be heard. Ms Supra also referred to the rules requiring that interlocutory applications must be in the correct form, accompanied by an affidavit, filed and served.
[27] Ms Supra submitted that the Judge should have required a proper application with an affidavit to be served and given her an opportunity to respond. She submitted the transfer order was interlocutory and was not made of the Court’s own motion, whereas Mr Cartwright submitted the order was of the Court’s own motion and was not interlocutory. Ms Supra also submitted the transfer order was ex parte in breach of natural justice.
[28] Whether or not Ms Supra overlooked the memorandum of counsel dated 17 August 2022 or overlooked responding to it, she did not dispute it was sent to her that day. Nor did she do so following the transfer decision in September 2022, nor otherwise seek to appeal that decision at any time before the Tribunal hearing (even
after the Tribunal’s substantive decision, she only commenced this proceeding when faced with bankruptcy proceedings). It is incorrect to characterise the memorandum of counsel as seeking transfer ex parte. The District Court Judge was correct to record that there had been no response to the memorandum, and the validity of the Judge’s decision to transfer is not dependent on the reason that Ms Supra did not respond.
[29] Further, I do not accept that the transfer was on the Court’s own motion without giving Ms Supra an opportunity to be heard. Although the memorandum of counsel for McLean Law was not a formal interlocutory application, it expressly sought transfer to the Disputes Tribunal. There was no response and it was open to the Judge to deal with the request based on the memorandum without requiring a formal interlocutory application.
[30] Ms Supra also submitted that the Disputes Tribunal has no jurisdiction in this matter. She submitted this was acknowledged in the memorandum seeking transfer where McLean Law said:
This matter initially could not be heard in the Dispute tribunal as the debt was not in dispute. The defendant’s complaint to the NZLS shows that this matter is, in fact, disputed which therefore satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of section 11 of the Disputes Tribunal Act 1988.
[31] Section 37(1) of the Act makes it clear that transfer by the District Court to the Tribunal requires that the proceedings be within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal:
37 Transfer of proceedings from District Court, etc
(1) Where proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal have been commenced in the District Court before a claim in respect of the same issues between the same parties has been lodged in the Tribunal, or transferred to the Tribunal under this section, a District Court Judge or Registrar may, on the application of either party or of that Judge’s or that Registrar’s own motion, order that the proceedings be transferred to the Tribunal.
[32]Section 10 of the Act relevantly states:
10 Jurisdiction of Tribunal
(1)Subject to this section and to section 11, the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction in respect of—
(a)a claim founded on contract or quasi-contract…
[33] Section 11(1) of the Act relevantly provides that a claim for a debt or liquidated demand is not within the jurisdiction conferred by s 10(1)(a) unless the applicant satisfies a Registrar, before the claim is lodged in the Tribunal, that the claim, or a part of the claim, is in dispute.
[34] Ms Supra submitted that the Judge would not have known whether the claim was founded on contract. She submitted this involved complicated questions of law regarding contracts, letters of engagement, and retainers and their legality and enforceability. However, McLean Law’s claim was clearly a claim founded on contract. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal depends on there being a claim founded on contract, not proof of the enforceable contract. I also reject Ms Supra’s submission that the claim was not in dispute, since she only disputed the legal enforceability of the contract and not the sum of the claimed debt. Disputing the existence of an enforceable contract for the relevant services is a dispute for the purposes of s 11. Jurisdiction is not affected by Ms Supra’s submission that McLean Law’s reference to the NZLS complaint in the memorandum (to assert a dispute) was not supported by evidence. It was clear from Ms Supra’s notice of defence filed in the District Court dated 11 August 2021 that she disputed the claim.
[35] Therefore, the dispute was within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under the Act. It was within the Judge’s discretion, and consistent with the purpose of the Act, to transfer the proceeding to the Tribunal. Accordingly, Ms Supra’s application for judicial review of the District Court’s transfer decision does not succeed.
Tribunal decision
[36] Ms Supra also challenges the Tribunal’s substantive decision on the same jurisdiction grounds. For the same reasons, these arguments do not succeed.
The dispute was within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under the Act. Ms Supra is effectively attempting to challenge the Tribunal’s substantive decision that there was a binding contract for the services provided.
[37] Ms Supra also submitted that the Tribunal made up its own agenda for determination of the dispute – by articulating the issues for determination in the reasons for the decision as follows:
The issues to be determined are:
·What was the scope of work [McLean Law] was engaged for by Ms. Supra and did this change after the Terms of Engagement were signed by her?
·Did [McLean Law] provide its legal services to Ms Supra with reasonable care and skill?
·Is Ms Supra liable to make further payment to [McLean Law] and is contractual interest due?
[38] This articulation of the issues discloses no error of law and is also an attempt to challenge the Tribunal’s substantive decision.
[39] Ms Supra also submitted there was a breach of natural justice. Insofar as this ground was based on her jurisdiction argument, there was no such breach for the reasons already given in relation to jurisdiction. Insofar as Ms Supra submitted that she had no opportunity to defend the allegations of breach of contract, I do not accept that the summary of the issues to be determined in the Tribunal’s reasons gave rise to any natural justice issue. If anything, the Tribunal’s list of issues went further than it needed to address the one issue that Ms Supra says she disputed, namely whether there was an enforceable contract for the services provided (articulated by the Tribunal as the first issue in the bullet points). If there was no issue about the reasonableness of the fee, no natural justice issue could arise in relation to it. Also, the Tribunal needed to determine the quantum of the claim including interest and decided (to Ms Supra’s advantage) to limit the interest to the amount originally claimed. In any event, the evidence does not indicate that Ms Supra was denied an opportunity to address her defence to the claim in the Tribunal. The Tribunal process is intended to be quick and inexpensive. It was not required to timetable written submissions.
[40] Accordingly, Ms Supra’s application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision does not succeed.
Result
[41]The application for judicial review is dismissed.
[42] McLean Law is entitled to costs. I urge the parties to take a reasonable and proportionate approach to costs. The costs principles applicable under the High Court Rules 2016 are settled. They provide guidance to the parties to assist in the quantification of costs in a cost-effective way. If costs cannot be agreed, memoranda (not exceeding three pages) may be filed within 20 working days, and I will determine costs on the papers.
Gault J
Parties / Solicitors:
The Applicant
Crown Law (for First and Second Respondents), Wellington
Mr C McLean and Mr C J Cartwright, McLean Law Ltd, Auckland
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