Stuff Ltd v Hubbard - [2019] NZHC 1596

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND INVERCARGILL REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WAIHŌPAI ROHE

CRI-2019-425-000011

[2019] NZHC 1596

BETWEEN
STUFF LTD

Appellant

AND

LAUREL HUBBARD

First Respondent

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

Second Respondent

Hearing: 1 July 2019

Appearances:

M van Beynen for the Appellant

F Guy Kidd QC for the First Respondent S N McKenzie for the Second Respondent

Judgment:

9 July 2019

Reissued:

12 July 2019

JUDGMENT OF NATION J

Background

[1] At about 4.20 pm on 24 October 2018, Ms Hubbard was driving a motor vehicle on Littles Road in Queenstown. Upon travelling through a sharp left bend, she crossed the centre line. She tried to correct the manoeuvre, causing her vehicle to fishtail and eventually collide with an oncoming vehicle carrying the victims Gary and Suzette Wells. Mr and Mrs Wells, who were both in their 60’s, were tourists from Australia.

[2] The victims’ vehicle suffered extensive damage. Mr Wells, the driver, suffered a spinal injury. Mrs Wells suffered bruising to her chest. Mr Wells was hospitalised

STUFF LTD v HUBBARD [2019] NZHC 1596 [9 July 2019]

in the orthopaedic ward of the Dunedin Hospital for 12 days. On his return to Australia, on the advice of a neurosurgeon, he had to undergo major surgery to correct a significant injury to his spinal cord. It is apparent from Mr and Mrs Wells’ victim impact reports that the injuries have had a long term effect on them emotionally and have significantly curtailed their ability to enjoy the active lives they had been living in their retirement.

[3] Ms Hubbard pleaded guilty to charges of careless driving causing injury on 28 January 2019. In pleading guilty to the charge, Ms Hubbard offered to pay full reparation for the costs Mr and Mrs Wells had incurred which were not covered by insurance and $1,000 for emotional harm. In total, she paid the New Zealand equivalent of AUD12,774.01.

[4] On 4 February 2019, a Judge in the District Court discharged Ms Hubbard without conviction.

[5] The Judge noted Ms Hubbard was a first offender for this type of offence, had pleaded guilty relatively early, was willing to undertake restorative justice, was genuinely sorry for the injuries Mr Wells had suffered, and had recognised the emotional harm through the reparation payment she made. The Judge noted the Police accepted that, in terms of the degree of carelessness involved, this was low-level offending.

[6] As to the consequences, the Judge noted that, if Ms Hubbard was convicted and disqualified, she would not, as was normally mandatory, be able to apply for a limited licence with a passenger endorsement. She would not be able to be employed in her normal line of work as a driver. This would mean she would have to live off limited savings in a situation where she was already struggling to pay for overseas travel and competition costs associated with her sporting ambitions. The Judge considered there was an appreciable risk that a conviction would have…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2019] NZHC 1596
Decision Date: 9 July 2019

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Stuff Ltd, a New Zealand media company, appealed against suppression orders made in the District Court which limited the ability of the media to report on the proceedings against Laurel Hubbard, a weightlifter who had been charged with careless driving causing injury. Stuff argued the suppression orders were not justified and would not prevent the publication of comments which would cause distress to Ms Hubbard. Ms Hubbard cross-appealed to argue the suppression orders should be retained. The High Court found that the suppression orders were not justified and quashed them.

The Court found the District Court had erred in finding that publication of Ms Hubbard’s name would cause extreme hardship. The Court found the hardship Ms Hubbard would suffer from publication of her name was no different to the hardship she would suffer as a result of competing in weightlifting as a transgender athlete, which had already attracted considerable criticism and hostility. The Court found there was no evidence that publication would have a significant effect on Ms Hubbard’s ability to qualify for the Olympics. The Court found Ms Hubbard had demonstrated considerable courage and resilience in transitioning and in deciding to compete at an international level as a woman.

The Court found the District Court had also erred in the further suppression orders it had made. The Court found those suppression orders went beyond what was permitted by the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 and quashed them. The Court found there was no justification for suppression of the reasons for Ms Hubbard’s discharge without conviction and the oral submissions made by counsel and the Police. The Court found the suppression orders seriously restricted the media’s ability to report on what had been said in Court at a hearing which was open to the public. The Court found suppression of the media’s right to report on what had been said in Court and the reasons for the decisions reached would not be justified.

Orders