Rougeux v Police - [2014] NZHC 979

ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF THE JUDGMENT AND ANY PART OF THE PROCEEDINGS (INCLUDING THE RESULT) IN NEWS MEDIA OR ON THE INTERNET OR OTHER PUBLICLY AVAILABLE DATABASE UNTIL FINAL DISPOSITION OF TRIAL [RETRIAL]. PUBLICATION IN LAW REPORT OR LAW DIGEST PERMITTED.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND INVERCARGILL REGISTRY

CRI 2014-425-11 [2014] NZHC 979

BETWEEN
REBECCA LEIGH ROUGEUX

Appellant

AND

NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

Hearing: 8 May 2014

Appearances:

K L McHugh for Appellant
E Higbee for Respondent

Judgment:

12 May 2014

RESERVED JUDGMENT OF MANDER J

Introduction

[1] The appellant appeals the decision of Judge Garland declining to grant a final order suppressing her name after conviction on one charge of theft by a person in a special relationship. The grounds of the appeal are that the Judge erred in his assessment that the appellant’s son would not suffer extreme hardship and was wrong not to grant final name suppression.

Factual background

[2] The appellant was the manager of a family owned retail business. As a result of concerns that money was being stolen from the premises, CCTV cameras were installed. On the same day as the installation the appellant was observed removing
an unknown amount of money from the till.

ROUGEUX v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2014] NZHC 979 [12 May 2014]

[3] When subsequently spoken to by her employer, the appellant admitted taking

$115 in cash and a block of cheese, and having taken further sums of $100 and $120 earlier in the year. It was on the basis of those admissions that the appellant entered her guilty plea and was subsequently sentenced to community work. The money the appellant admitted taking was repaid by her. She resigned her position with the business.

District Court decision

[4] Application for final name suppression was primarily based on the ground that publication of the appellant’s name would cause her 12 year old son to suffer extreme hardship. A further suggestion that her current employer would be affected should her name be published while argued before Judge Garland, was not pursued on appeal.

[5] Letters from a school counsellor, members of the appellant’s family, friends and her current employer were submitted in support of the application. The Police indicated that they did not oppose final name suppression. The victim however did, believing that in order to properly hold the appellant accountable the appellant’s name should be available for publication.

[6] Judge Garland referred to the overriding principle of open justice which is only to be displaced if one of the grounds set out in the relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 are made out. His Honour noted that good reasons for publication included the avoidance of possible suspicion falling on others and the promotion of denunciation and personal deterrence.

[7] His Honour rightly observed that extreme hardship is a high threshold and that a compelling reason or very special circumstance is needed in order for the statutory criteria to be established. The District Court described the test for…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2014] NZHC 979
Decision Date: 12 May 2014

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Rougeux v Police, the appellant, Rebecca Leigh Rougeux, sought an appeal against the decision of Judge Garland, who declined to grant a final order suppressing her name after she was convicted on one charge of theft by a person in a special relationship. The appellant's grounds for appeal were that the Judge erred in his assessment that her son would not suffer extreme hardship and was wrong not to grant final name suppression. The central issue in this case was whether the statutory threshold for extreme hardship had been met, which would have displaced the principle of open justice and allowed for the suppression of the appellant's name.

The court's reasoning focused on the statutory test for extreme hardship as outlined in the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. The court found that the threshold for extreme hardship is high and requires a very high level of hardship to be demonstrated. The court acknowledged that publication of the appellant's name would cause distress and embarrassment to her 12-year-old son and may lead to further teasing and bullying. However, the court was not satisfied that the hardship experienced by the son was of a sufficiently extreme nature to meet the statutory criteria. The court concluded that the District Court's decision to refuse name suppression was correct, and the appeal was dismissed.

The final orders of the court confirmed the District Court decision and dismissed the appeal, upholding the principle of open justice and refusing the appellant's request for final name suppression. The court emphasised the importance of the statutory threshold for extreme hardship and the need to balance the privacy interests of the appellant and her son against the public interest in open reporting.

Orders