Stichting Lodestar v Austin, Nichols & Co. Inc

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA94/05
[2007] NZCA 61

BETWEENSTICHTING LODESTAR


Appellant

ANDAUSTIN, NICHOLS & CO. INC.


Respondent

Hearing:30 November 2006

Court:William Young  P, O'Regan and Robertson JJ

Counsel:B P Henry for Appellant


E C Gray and R C Watts for Respondent

Judgment:12 March 2007 at 12 noon

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        The appeal is allowed.

BThe appellant’s applications for registration of trade marks (Nos 617327 and 617328) are granted.

CThe appellant is awarded costs of $6,000 plus usual disbursements in this Court.

DThe costs award in the High Court (both in relation to the appeal in that Court and the hearing before the Assistant Commissioner of Trade Marks) is reversed.  The respondent must pay to the appellant costs of $2,850 in respect of the hearing before the Assistant Commissioner and $3,000 in respect of the appeal to the High Court.

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by O’Regan J)

Introduction

[1]       This appeal is a further round in the dispute between the appellant, which seeks to register the trade mark “WILD GEESE” and the respondent, the registered proprietor of the trade mark “WILD TURKEY”, which opposes registration.

[2]       The respondent markets bourbon and products containing bourbon under the Wild Turkey brand in New Zealand.  It is the registered proprietor of the trade mark WILD TURKEY in Class 33 for whisky, and the trade mark WILD TURKEY-KENTUCKY LEGION LABEL in Class 33 for wines, spirits and liqueurs.

[3]       The appellant does not market any product in New Zealand at present, but we are told that Wild Geese Irish Whisky is marketed in some countries overseas.  It seeks to register the trade mark WILD GEESE in Class 32(b) (certain non-alcoholic beverages) and in Class 33 (alcoholic beverages except beers).

[4]       The opposition to the registration of the Wild Geese trade marks is based on ss 16 and 17 of the Trade Marks Act 1953 (which applies in this case notwithstanding its repeal by the Trade Marks Act 2002, because of the operation of the transitional provisions in the 2002 Act). 

[5]       Under s 16, it is not lawful to register as a trade mark “any matter the use of which would be likely to deceive or cause confusion”. 

[6]       Under s 17(1), no trade mark shall be registered in respect of any goods if it is “identical with or similar to a trade mark belonging to a different proprietor and already on the register” in respect of the same or similar goods if the use of the trade mark for which registration is sought is likely to deceive or cause confusion.

[7]       Section 17(2) prohibits the registration of a trade mark in respect of any goods if the trade mark or an essential element is identical or similar to a trade mark which is well known in New Zealand in respect of the same or similar goods.

Commissioner’s decision

[8]       The issue facing the Assistant Commissioner of Trade Marks when she considered the appellant’s application for registration of…

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Details
Case
[2007] NZCA 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Stichting Lodestar v Austin, Nichols & Co. Inc. involved the appellant's application for the registration of the trade mark "WILD GEESE" against the opposition from the respondent, the registered proprietor of the trade mark "WILD TURKEY." The respondent markets bourbon and products containing bourbon under the Wild Turkey brand in New Zealand, while the appellant does not currently market any products in New Zealand but sells Wild Geese Irish Whisky overseas. The opposition to the registration of the Wild Geese trade marks was based on sections 16 and 17 of the Trade Marks Act 1953, which prohibit the registration of a trade mark that is likely to deceive or cause confusion.

The legal issues in the case were whether the appellant had discharged the onus of establishing that there was no likelihood of deception or confusion arising out of the use of its mark, and whether the High Court judge had properly exercised his appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the Assistant Commissioner's decision.

The Court of Appeal held that the High Court judge should have given proper weight to the Assistant Commissioner's decision and expertise in this area, and that the Assistant Commissioner's decision was not fairly characterised as wrong. The Court of Appeal gave greater weight to the differences between the words "Turkey" and "Geese" in spelling and phonetics, and concluded that the two marks were unlikely to be confused for one another if used for liquor products sold in New Zealand.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, granted the appellant's applications for registration of trade marks, and awarded costs to the appellant. The costs award in the High Court was reversed, and the respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs in relation to the hearing before the Assistant Commissioner and the appeal to the High Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

Stichting Lodestar, the appellant, sought to register the trade mark "WILD GEESE" in Class 32(b) for certain non-alcoholic beverages and in Class 33 for alcoholic beverages except beers. The respondent, Austin, Nichols & Co. Inc, the registered proprietor of the trade mark "WILD TURKEY" for whisky, opposed the registration of Stichting Lodestar's trade marks. The respondent markets bourbon and products containing bourbon under the Wild Turkey brand in New Zealand. Stichting Lodestar does not currently market any product in New Zealand but markets Wild Geese Irish Whisky in some countries overseas. The opposition to the registration of the Wild Geese trade marks was based on sections 16 and 17 of the Trade Marks Act 1953.

The matter first came before the Assistant Commissioner of Trade Marks, who found that Stichting Lodestar had discharged the onus of establishing that there was no likelihood of deception or confusion arising out of the use of its mark. The Assistant Commissioner ruled that the Wild Geese trade mark could proceed to registration. The respondent appealed to the High Court, which allowed the appeal and disallowed the registration of the Wild Geese trade mark. Stichting Lodestar then appealed to the Court of Appeal of New Zealand.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Court of Appeal should have given weight to the Assistant Commissioner's decision in determining the appeal.
2. Whether the Court of Appeal should have allowed the appeal and granted the registration of the Wild Geese trade mark.

Held
1. The Court of Appeal held that the Court of Appeal should have given weight to the Assistant Commissioner's decision in determining the appeal.
2. The Court of Appeal held that the Court of Appeal should have allowed the appeal and granted the registration of the Wild Geese trade mark.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court of Appeal began by outlining the context of the appeal, which involved a dispute between the appellant, Stichting Lodestar, and the respondent, Austin, Nichols & Co. Inc., over the registration of the trade mark "WILD GEESE." The Court noted that the respondent marketed bourbon and products containing bourbon under the Wild Turkey brand in New Zealand, while the appellant sought to register the trade mark WILD GEESE in Class 32 (certain non-alcoholic beverages) and in Class 33 (alcoholic beverages except beers). The opposition to the registration of the Wild Geese trade marks was based on sections 16 and 17 of the Trade Marks Act 1953.

The Court then discussed the Assistant Commissioner's decision, which found that the appellant had discharged the onus of establishing that there was no likelihood of deception or confusion arising out of the use of its mark. The Assistant Commissioner rejected the contention that confusion was likely because the two marks were conceptually similar and noted that the words "Turkey" and "Geese" were distinctive and dominant components of the marks. The Court of Appeal endorsed the Assistant Commissioner's approach and found that the Commissioner's conclusion, in relation to an issue calling for an evaluative assessment, appeared to be a conclusion which could not be fairly characterised as wrong.

The Court of Appeal then turned to the standard of appellate review, noting that the High Court should give some weight to the decision of the Commissioner in an area within the Commissioner's expertise. The Court found that Gendall J had failed to give any weight to the views of the Commissioner and disagreed with the High Court's conclusion that the two marks were likely to lead to confusion. The Court of Appeal held that the concept of the word "Wild" with a large game bird was not the controlling consideration in this case, and gave much greater weight to the stark difference between the words "Turkey" and "Geese", both in spelling and phonetically. The Court assessed that the two marks were unlikely to be confused for one another if used for liquor products sold in New Zealand in both bottled form in liquor outlets or as single drinks in bars.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, granted the registration of the Wild Geese trade mark, and reversed the cost orders made in the High Court. The Court of Appeal found that the High Court should have given weight to the Assistant Commissioner's decision and reached a different conclusion on the issue of likelihood of confusion. The Court of Appeal's decision was based on the principle that the standards applied by the law in different contexts vary a great deal in precision and that the vaguer the standard and the greater number of factors which the court has to weigh up in deciding whether or not the standards have been met, the more reluctant an appellate court will be to interfere with the trial judge's decision.