IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2018-404-1182
BETWEEN KRISTINE MARY STEWART
First Plaintiff
JOSEPH MATTHEW BROWN
Second PlaintiffAND
MILANO INTERNATIONAL 2007 LIMITED
First Defendant
EURO ASIA LABOUR BUILDING CONSTRUCTION NZ LIMITED
Second Defendant
Hearing: 24 August 2018 Counsel:
C Hollings for Plaintiffs
M Taylor for First Defendant
Judgment:
24 August 2018
JUDGMENT OF WHATA J
This judgment was delivered by me on 24 August 2018 at 5.00 pm, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date: ………………………….
Solicitors Andrew Seton Law Limited, Auckland
Maria Taylor, Auckland
STEWART v MILANO INTERNATIONAL 2007 LIMITED [2018] NZHC 2207 [24 August 2018]
[1] I have before me an application by the plaintiff for injunctive relief in relation to alleged trespass and/or nuisance in respect of a shared driveway used by the plaintiffs and the first defendant. The first defendant has reached agreement with the plaintiffs for interim injunctive relief. The second defendant has taken no part in the proceedings.
[2] Having considered the plaintiffs’ submissions and the evidence filed, together with the consent memorandum of the plaintiff and the first defendants, I am satisfied that the orders agreed between the plaintiffs and the first defendant should be granted and in respect of both the first and second defendants. Those orders are stated at [5].
[3] To elaborate, I am satisfied that the plaintiffs have a seriously arguable case that use of their driveway by construction vehicles attending to works on the first defendant’s property, and the occupation of the shared driveway by those vehicles, is a trespass. I am also satisfied that the balance of convenience favours interim injunctive relief – the consent of the first defendant to such orders, together with the absence of any opposition from the second defendant, being the best evidence of that.
[4] I am also satisfied the second defendant should be subject to the orders, given the plaintiffs’ evidence that the second defendant owns or controls some of the allegedly trespassing vehicles. Finally, the orders to be granted impose a lesser restriction on the first and second defendant’s vehicles (the requirement for non-use by heavy vehicles over the shared driveway has been deleted). I am therefore satisfied that it is unnecessary to serve the second defendants with the proposed orders.
[5]Accordingly, I make the following orders, namely:
[a]An injunction pending further order of the Court prohibiting the first defendant and the second defendant and any other agents or invitees of the first or second defendants from entering onto and/or parking on and/or dumping any material and/or bringing heavy vehicles onto and/or otherwise trespassing over the plaintiffs’ property, including the shared driveway marked (A), for any purpose (other than accessing
section 19A) and including for the purpose of accessing sections 21 and 21A; and
[b]An injunction pending further order of the Court prohibiting the first defendant and second defendant and any other agents or invitees of the first or…
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- Case
- [2018] NZHC 2207
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the plaintiffs had a seriously arguable case of trespass due to the use of their driveway by construction vehicles attending to works on the first defendant’s property. The balance of convenience was considered to favour interim injunctive relief, supported by the consent of the first defendant and the absence of opposition from the second defendant. Given the plaintiffs' evidence that the second defendant owned or controlled some of the trespassing vehicles, the court was satisfied that the second defendant should also be subject to the orders. The court concluded that the proposed orders imposed a lesser restriction on the defendants' vehicles, making it unnecessary to serve the second defendant with the proposed orders.
Consequently, the court granted the following orders: an injunction prohibiting the first and second defendants, and any agents or invitees, from entering or parking on the plaintiffs' property, including the shared driveway, for any purpose other than accessing specific sections, and from parking, dumping material, or obstructing the plaintiffs' rights to pass and repass over parts of the shared driveway. The court also noted that the parties had not agreed on costs and scheduled submissions on costs to be filed by the plaintiffs and the first defendant. The judge decided to refer the matter of costs to another judge due to a connection with the plaintiffs’ counsel, although it was not considered necessary to recuse himself from the case.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Ratio Decidendi