Stevens v Police
[2025] NZHC 3016
•14 October 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CRI-2025-409-200
[2025] NZHC 3016
BETWEEN ASHLEY STEPHEN STEVENS
Appellant
AND
NEW ZEALAND POLICE
Respondent
Hearing: 9 October 2025 Appearances:
K J Basire for Appellant
B W D Alexander for Respondent
Judgment:
14 October 2025
JUDGMENT OF DUNNINGHAM J
This judgment was delivered by me on 14 October 2025 at 11 am, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date……………
STEVENS v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2025] NZHC 3016 [14 October 2025]
Introduction
[1] Ashley Stevens pleaded guilty to three charges of driving while disqualified (third or subsequent),1 two charges of failing to stop for red/blue flashing lights,2 two charges of breach of release conditions,3 and one charge of dangerous driving,4 possession of methamphetamine,5 possession of utensils,6 resisting police,7 and wilful damage.8 On 8 July 2025 he was sentenced by Judge Couch to 30 months’ imprisonment.9
[2] Mr Stevens appeals this sentence on the grounds the Judge erred in adopting a starting point of three years on the driving charges, the end sentence was manifestly excessive and should have been two years or less and substituted to home detention. Mr Stevens submits the Judge erred in imposing a finite disqualification period of 30 months and submits it should have been 18 months. He also seeks an extension of time for filing the appeal as the notice of appeal was filed 10 days late.
Facts
[3] The facts of the offending were set out in the District Court and are not in dispute:
[1] …The starting point is that, in September 2020, you were made subject to an alcohol interlock order under s 65AC of the Land Transport Act 1998. You never obtained an alcohol interlock licence, so you remained disqualified indefinitely.
[2] The next relevant event is that, on 31 May 2023, you were released from prison on conditions. They included a special condition that you were not to possess or consume controlled drugs.
1 Land Transport Act 1998, s 32(1)(a) and (4); maximum penalty two years’ imprisonment and
$6000 fine.
2 Sections 52A(1)(a)(ii), (3) and (6) and 114(2); maximum penalty $10,000 fine.
3 Sentencing Act 2002, s 96(1); maximum penalty one year’s imprisonment or $2000 fine.
4 Land Transport Act, s 35(1)(b); maximum penalty three months’ imprisonment or $4500 fine.
5 Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, s 7(1)(a) and (2); maximum penalty six months’ imprisonment or
$1000 fine.
6 Section 13(1)(a) and (3); maximum penalty one year’s imprisonment or $500 fine.
7 Summary Offences Act 1981, s 23(a); maximum penalty three months’ imprisonment or $2000 fine.
8 Section 11(1)(a); maximum penalty three months’ imprisonment or $2000 fine.
9 Police v Stevens [2025] NZDC 16232.
[3] From the outset, you repeatedly failed to report as required by your release conditions. That has led to one charge of breach of release conditions.
[4] On the evening of 19 January 2024, you were driving a motor vehicle on a road in Rangiora. You were stopped by police. You had a small amount of methamphetamine and a methamphetamine pipe in your pocket. That has led to charges of driving whilst disqualified (third or subsequent), possession of a Class A drug, and possession of utensils for consumption of methamphetamine. It has also led to a second charge of breach of release conditions.
[5] Late in the evening of 1 March 2024, you and a woman with whom you were in a relationship were having an argument on the footpath on a street in Rangiora. She was in a motor vehicle. You climbed onto the bonnet of the vehicle and stomped on the windscreen, breaking it. A week later, on the afternoon of 8 March, you and she were again arguing in public while she was in the same motor vehicle. This time, you used a skateboard to hit the vehicle, causing a dent in the bodywork. So that has led to a representative charge of wilful damage, covering those two incidents.
[6] Late in the evening of 2 February 2025, you were riding a power cycle on a street in Rangiora. It had no lights. You were signalled by police to stop, using red and blue lights and a siren. You did not stop. Instead, you rode onto the footpath in an effort to evade police. That has led to charges of failing to stop and driving whilst disqualified (third or subsequent).
[7] A few weeks later, on the evening of 20 February, you were yet again driving a motor vehicle on a street in Rangiora. You were seen by police, who followed you. You accelerated away, and your speed was measured at 123 kilometres per hour in a 50 kilometres per hour area. This was a built up area with lots of houses and footpaths. Police activated their red and blue lights and siren. You did not stop. Instead, you led police on a pursuit at an increasing speed, which eventually police discontinued for safety reasons. You were going so fast and driving so badly that they would have been at risk had they tried to keep following you.
[8] Less than 30 minutes later, the police located the vehicle that you were driving, parked on the street. You were told that you were under arrest, but you refused to co-operate. You tried to [w]alk away. When you were then stopped by police, you resisted being handcuffed. That has led to charges of dangerous driving, driving whilst disqualified (third or subsequent), failing to stop while exceeding the speed limit, and resisting police.
District Court decision
[4] On the three charges of driving while disqualified, dangerous driving, and two of failing to stop, the Judge considered totality on these charges and adopted a starting a point of three years’ imprisonment. A further three months was adopted for the breach of release conditions charges, two months for the drugs charges and
one month for the wilful damage. The combined starting point was 42 months’ imprisonment. Considering totality and the overlap between the drugs charges and the second breach of release conditions, a two-month deduction was given, and an adjusted starting point of 40 months’ imprisonment was reached. This was uplifted by 10 per cent for being subject to sentence or bail conditions at the time, but no uplift was applied for criminal history. Following a 22 per cent deduction for guilty pleas, the end sentence imposed was 30 months’ imprisonment.
[5] The Judge further imposed a cumulative disqualification of twelve months, a conviction and discharge on the first charge of failing to stop, a notice to the vehicle owner under s 129B of the Sentencing Act 2002, and accepted an oral application under s 100B of the Land Transport Act 1998 which has the effect of cancelling the alcohol interlock order made in 2020, and re-sentencing under s 65AI of the Land Transport Act, to an indefinite disqualification, noting Mr Stevens would not be eligible to seek removal of the disqualification from a minimum of two and a half years.
Principles on appeal
[6] Appeals against sentence are allowed as of right by s 244 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 and must be determined in accordance with s 250. An appeal against sentence may be allowed by this Court only if it is satisfied that there has been an error in the imposition of the sentence and that a different sentence should be imposed.10 As the Court of Appeal observed in Tutakangahau v R, with reference to the lower court’s decision, a “court will not intervene where the sentence is within the range that can properly be justified by accepted sentencing principles”.11 It is appropriate for this Court to intervene and substitute its own views only if the sentence being appealed is “manifestly excessive” and not justified by the relevant sentencing principles.12
10 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, ss 250(2) and 250(3).
11 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [36].
12 Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].
Submissions
Appellant’s submissions
[7] Ms Basire, for the appellant, submits the starting point of three years on the driving charges was too high. While there is no guideline case for driving while disqualified, Ms Basire submits it could not be said that any of the offences were the worst of its kind. Relying on Apiata v Police,13 Howe v Police,14 Whitley v Police 15 and Norris v Police,16 she submits the driving while disqualified charges should have attracted no more than two years’ imprisonment, particularly given he was only on his 12th to 14th charges, far less than in Apiata or Howe. She submits the uplift for dangerous driving should have been no more than one month, consistent with Howe. Ultimately, she submits the starting point of three years for the driving charges was manifestly excessive.
[8] While Ms Basire acknowledges an uplift for the other offending was required, she submits consideration must be given to the fact the drug offending, wilful damage and breach of release conditions would not, by themselves, have warranted a term of imprisonment, and the possession of methamphetamine reflects a longstanding issue with addiction. As such, uplifts for these charges should not exceed three months. Further, Ms Basire submits the uplift for offending on bail or while subject to release conditions should have been limited to two months.
[9] Accounting for the maximum on the ranges provided by Ms Basire, she submits the adjusted starting point should have been no more than 27 to 29 months. Following the accepted deduction of 22 per cent for guilty pleas, she seeks an end sentence of two years or less and seeks substitution of this sentence to home detention.
[10] Ms Basire submits the disqualification period of two years for driving while disqualified and cumulative six months for the aggravated failing to stop charge were too high and submits 18 months is a more appropriate sentence.
13 Apiata v Police [2016] NZHC 3119.
14 Howe v Police [2021] NZHC 2087.
15 Whitley v Police [2016] NZHC 1025.
16 Norris v Police [2024] NZHC 1992.
Respondent’s submissions
[11] Mr Alexander, for the respondent, submits the starting point, adjustments, end sentence, and disqualification were all appropriately within range and are not manifestly excessive.
[12] Mr Alexander submits that, similar to Hepburn,17 Mr Stevens was charged and cautioned for each of his offences of driving while disqualification, and then went on to reoffend, which elevates his culpability. He seeks to distinguish the authorities relied on by the appellant, submitting that Apiata can be distinguished as there were no further aggravating features of the driving, in Norris the “offences occurred within a short period of time as part of a methamphetamine-fuelled spate”18 and in Howe the primary focus on appeal was on whether the end sentence should have been non-custodial, not whether the starting point was appropriate. Instead, he relies on Pakau v Police19 and Barwell v Police20 and submits Mr Stevens’ offending falls between Pakau and Barwell and as such the starting point of three years for the driving offending was within range.
[13] Mr Alexander submits the effective uplift for the remaining charges of two breach of release conditions, wilful damage and drug offences, resulting in an uplift of four months was generous to the appellant with reference to the case law cited in Whiu v Police.21
[14] Given the disqualification for aggravated failing to stop offending must be cumulative on concurrent offending, Mr Alexander submits the minimum mandatory disqualification period was 18 months, and that given the additional offending, a starting point higher than the minimum was warranted. He acknowledges the period of 30 months was stern, but submits it was necessary to address the appellant’s repeated failure to comply with disqualification periods, and that the indefinite disqualification and mandatory assessment provisions do little to minimise the public
17 Hepburn v Police [2023] NZHC 475.
18 Norris v Police, above n 16, at [39].
19 Pakau v Police [2024] NZHC 1884.
20 Barwell v Police [2019] NZHC 2071.
21 Whiu v Police [2020] NZHC 298.
safety risk arising from driving while disqualified, dangerous driving and failing to stop.
Application for an extension of time
[15] An extension of time to bring this appeal is sought by the appellant and not opposed by the respondent. I am satisfied there were sufficient reasons given to explain the delay in bringing this appeal, namely that the District Court decision was not received by the appellant until after the date the appeal should have been filed, and it then took time for counsel to review it. Furthermore, the respondent does not oppose the extension as it is not prejudiced by the short delay. Accordingly, I grant the application for extension of time for filing this appeal.
Analysis
Starting points
[16] In the District Court, the prosecutor submitted a starting point of 18 months on the most aggravated charge, being Mr Stevens’ 13th charge of driving while suspended, would be appropriate, as it was aggravated by the offender’s speed, poor driving and failing to stop for police. Taking into account the earlier charges of driving while disqualified, the prosecutor submitted a starting point for the three charges of two years’ imprisonment was appropriate.
[17] In making this submission, the prosecutor then relied on Peterson v Police,22 Opetaia v Police,23 and Hepburn which tended to suggest an appropriate starting point for a single charge of driving while disqualified (third or subsequent), being the offender’s fifth through eighth offences, was 10 months’ imprisonment, while Williams suggested an offender’s 12th through 15th offence would be around 16 to 20 months’ imprisonment.24
[18] The defence acknowledged a starting point within the vicinity of two years was available. The Judge, without referring to case law, departed from the starting points
22 Peterson v Police HC Hamilton CRI-2009-419-11, 20 February 2009.
23 Opetaia v Police [2015] NZHC 2532.
24 Williams v Police [2015] NZHC 1118.
sought by both counsel and imposed a starting point 50 per cent higher, of three years’ imprisonment.
[19] To decide whether the starting point was within range, I turn to the case law referred to on appeal:
(a)In Apiata, the appellant was sentenced on four charges of driving while disqualified or suspended, being the appellant’s 20th to 23rd driving while disqualified/suspended charges, and the starting point of 36 months was overturned on appeal and substituted for 30 months.25 This was made up of a starting point of 12 months on the fourth charge and cumulative sentences of six months on the other three charges.
(b)In Whitley, the defendant was appearing on three charges of driving while disqualified, being his ninth to 11th charges and the starting point on these charges was 18 months’ imprisonment.26
(c)In Howe, the defendant was appearing on three charges of driving while disqualified, being his 19th to 21st charges, and one charge each of unlawfully getting into a motor vehicle, possessing two methamphetamine pipes, possessing methamphetamine, receiving and dangerous driving, and these, with a two-month uplift for his non-driving prior convictions, led to an overall starting point of 26 months’ imprisonment.27 Specifically on the driving while disqualified charges, a starting point of 18 months was adopted on the most serious charge with an uplift of four months for the other two charges, leading to a starting point of 22 months.
(d)In Norris, the appellant was sentenced on four charges of driving while disqualified (seventh to 10th), two of failing to stop for red/blue flashing lights (third or subsequent), two of breach of parole conditions, and one each of dangerous driving, failure to answer bail, and
25 Apiata v Police, above n 13.
26 Whitley v Police, above n 15.
27 Howe v Police, above n 14.
unlawfully getting into a motor vehicle.28 On appeal, this Court adopted a starting point of 10 months for the first offence of driving while disqualified and uplifted by nine months to reflect the other three offences, bringing the total to 19 months for the four driving while disqualified charges. When accounting for all charges, this Court found the combined starting point of 58 months to be plainly excessive and held the total starting point should be one of 30 months’ imprisonment.
(e)In Pakau, the appellant was sentenced on four charges of driving while disqualified (15th to 18th), two of failing to stop, and one of failing to answer bail and found a global starting point between 34 and 37 months to be appropriate.29 The driving on some of the driving while disqualified charges had a number of aggravating factors including speeding, crossing the centre-line several times and driving over road cones.
(f)In Barwell, the appellant was sentenced on four charges of driving while disqualified (14th to 17th convictions), operating a vehicle without evidence of a vehicle inspection, dangerous driving and failing to stop, and this Court found a starting point between 36 to 42 months to be appropriate.30 Again, there were a number of aggravating features of the driving.
[20] In light of the cases referred to at sentencing and those raised on appeal, and the fact that Mr Stevens was charged with his 12th, 13th and 14th charges of driving while disqualified/suspended, I accept that the three-year starting point is outside the available range. The two cases relied on by the respondent involved four rather than three charges of driving while disqualified and more prior offences of that type as well as greater aggravating features. A higher starting point was clearly warranted in both those cases.
28 Norris v Police, above n 16.
29 Pakau v Police, above n 19.
30 Barwell v Police, above n 20.
[21] In calculating an appropriate sentence, and applying the methodology applied in Apiata and Howe, I adopt a starting point on the 12th charge of 14 months, uplifted by four months for each of the other two charges, leading to a starting point of 22 months on the driving while suspended charges. As in Howe, I then uplift this by a further two months for the dangerous driving and second failing to stop charges, reaching a total starting point for the driving offences of two years.
Starting point for other charges and totality
[22] The total of the starting points adopted in relation to the breach of release conditions charges, drugs charges and wilful damage was an additional six months. However, taking account of totality and the overlap between these charges, a two-month deduction was given, meaning the only four months was added to the starting point for the driving charges. While Ms Basire submits this uplift should not have exceeded three months, I am satisfied the four-month uplift is clearly within range. I also note that Ms Basire’s submission that the possession of methamphetamine reflects addiction issues is not a matter appropriately dealt with in setting the starting point.
[23] Standing back and assessing totality (and taking account of the totality adjustment of two months adopted in the District Court), I consider the adjusted starting point of 28 months appropriately reflects the gravity of this offending.
Personal aggravating features
[24] In the District Court, the adjusted starting point was uplifted by 10 per cent for Mr Stevens being subject to sentence or on bail conditions when he offended, but no uplift was applied for his criminal history. On the sentence adopted in the District Court, this resulted in an uplift of four months. However, on the current sentence a 10 per cent uplift would result in an uplift of three months. Again, I reject Ms Basire’s submission that the uplift should have been limited to two months. It is common practice to have uplifts for offending while subject to sentence, bail or release conditions expressed as a percentage, and I consider a 10 per cent uplift to be within the available range.
Home detention
[25] From an adjusted starting point of 28 months’ imprisonment, with an uplift of 10 percent for being subject to sentence or bail conditions, and a deduction of 22 per cent for his guilty pleas, the end sentence is 24 months’ imprisonment (rounded down).
[26] Ms Basire advises that the appellant has already served eight months in custody. That means, should the sentence not be substituted; he would be released in four months.31 Alternatively, if home detention is substituted, he would only have four months of his sentence left to serve. The pre-sentence report provided to the District Court included a summary of an assessment for an electronically monitored sentence. Both the address and the occupants were deemed suitable at that time.
[27] Ms Basire emphasised that the person who has offered a home detention address is pro-social and prepared to support Mr Stevens both with employment and to, in due course, obtain an appropriate driver licence.
[28] In deciding whether to substitute a sentence of home detention, I accept the Court must impose the least restrictive outcome that is appropriate in the circumstances.32 Here, Mr Stevens is currently serving his third period of imprisonment, each of which was imposed for a range of offending which included driving while disqualified. His driving offending has increased in both frequency and in aggravating factors, including speeding and failing to stop. It is evident that he is a danger on the roads. While Mr Stevens has no recorded breaches of home detention, he has convictions for breach of community work, two breaches of post detention conditions and two breaches of court release conditions.
[29] Considering Mr Stevens’ disregard for previous warnings, his repeated offending by driving while disqualified, and his history of breaching sentences and conditions, I do not consider home detention to be the least restrictive sentence that is appropriate in the circumstances, and I decline to commute his sentence to home
31 Parole Act 2002, s 86.
32 Sentencing Act 2002, s 8(1)(g).
detention. While I appreciate he needs support to break the cycle of offending, I see no reason why that support cannot be offered on his release to assist him with his rehabilitation reintegration.
Disqualification periods
[30] The principles guiding the imposition of disqualification periods are summarised in Leaupepe v Police.33 The sentencing Judge has a discretion over the length of disqualification periods, but in exercising that discretion regard should be had to the following considerations:34
[10] …
(a)long periods of disqualification typically leave little hope for offenders; and
(b)it is incumbent on the Courts to keep dangerous drivers off the road for as long as reasonably possible.
[11] The task of the sentencing Judge, and an appellate Court on review, is to effect an appropriate balance between those considerations. The fixing of that balance depends upon the circumstances of the particular case.
[31] The appellant was sentenced to an alcohol interlock sentence. However, following confirmation he did not have a vehicle to fit a device, the court cancelled this sentence and the appellant was indefinitely disqualified, meaning he must attend an assessment centre and will not regain his licence until the Director of Land Transport removes the disqualification.
[32] Disqualification in the realm of three to four years is usually reserved for cases where offenders are driving under the influence of alcohol, causing the death of another.35 I acknowledge the appellant is clearly in a cycle of driving while disqualified. However, I accept Ms Basire’s submission that the imposition of a two-and-a-half-year disqualification will likely leave little hope for him and could tempt further driving while disqualified charges. This runs counter to the balance of
33 Leaupepe v Police [2015] NZHC 1766.
34 At [10], citing Hitchens v R CA380/03, 25 March 2004 at [10].
35 See Howard v R [2017] NZHC 2986 at [28]; McMillan v Police [2014] NZHC 150 and Gacitua v R [2013] NZCA 234.
the considerations set out in Leaupepe. I am satisfied that a total disqualification period of 18 months before he is eligible to attend an assessment centre and regain his licence is appropriate. This is the same disqualification period as was imposed in Pakau. While this is the minimum period of disqualification available, it is punitive in its own right along with the prison sentence he is serving. However, it leaves hope for Mr Stevens to be able to lawfully drive within a period that is not overwhelming, while the indefinite nature of the disqualification retains the additional safeguards of keeping the offender off the road until he is assessed as safe.
Result
[33] The appeal is allowed. I quash the sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment and impose a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment. That sentence is made up as follows:
(a)On the charges of driving while disqualified (third or subsequent), on the first and second occasions, on each charge Mr Stevens is sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment, to be served concurrently.
(b)On the third charge of driving while disqualified, Mr Stevens is sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment, to be served cumulatively on the other driving while disqualified charges.
(c)On the charges of breach of release conditions and possession of utensils, Mr Stevens is sentenced to two months’ imprisonment on each charge. They will also be served concurrently, but cumulatively on the sentences for driving while disqualified.
(d)On each other charge except the charges of failing to stop, Mr Stevens is sentenced to one month’s imprisonment. Those will be served concurrently with all other charges.
[34] On the charge of dangerous driving, Mr Stevens is disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for six months from 8 July 2025. On the second failing to stop charge, Mr Stevens is disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence
for six months from 8 July 2026. The Land Transport Act requires that be cumulative.36
[35] The two-year disqualification period imposed on the driving while disqualified charges is also quashed and replaced with a 12-month disqualification period, in addition to the existing indefinite disqualification, and to be served concurrently with the period of disqualification imposed in the District Court on the charge of dangerous driving, and cumulatively on the second charge of failing to stop, to make a total disqualification period of 18 months.
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Christchurch
Copy to:
K Basire, Barrister, Christchurch
36 Land Transport Act, s 52A(6).
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