IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
CIV-2012-409-001605 [2012] NZHC 3594
BETWEEN SPINACH DESIGN LIMITED Applicant
ANDPROPERTY VENTURES LIMITED (IN RECEIVERSHIP AND LIQUIDATION) Respondent
Hearing: 12 November 2012 (Heard at Christchurch)
Appearances: KW Clay for Applicant
K P Sullivan for Respondent
Judgment: 21 December 2012
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE OSBORNE [as to setting aside a statutory demand]
[1] Property Ventures (the respondent company) was the central company of the property development ventures formerly controlled by David Henderson of Christchurch.
[2] An order was made putting Property Ventures into liquidation on 27 July
2010. Robert B Walker, a Wellington chartered accountant was appointed liquidator. The order was stayed pending an appeal by Property Ventures to the Court of Appeal. Property Ventures subsequently withdrew its appeal and the liquidation proceeded.
[3] A considerable number of “Henderson companies” joined Property Ventures
in liquidation. Mr Walker is the liquidator of a number of them.
[4] After some resistance from those involved with the documents of Property
Ventures and related companies, Mr Walker deposes that he was able to obtain
SPINACH DESIGN LIMITED V PROPERTY VENTURES LIMITED (IN RECEIVERSHIP AND LIQUIDATION) HC CHCH CIV-2012-409-001605 [21 December 2012]
relevant records including the general ledgers and some bank statements. He was then able to track a number of payments which he considered Property Ventures should recover.
[5] He caused Property Ventures (in receivership and in liquidation) to issue statutory demands in relation to particular payments.
[6] This case concerns one of those demands, being a demand served on Spinach
Design for $12,206.25.
[7] Spinach Design applies to set aside the demand. At the same time as hearing this application, I heard a parallel application by Gibbston Downs Wines Ltd in relation to which I am contemporaneously delivering a separate judgment (Gibbston Downs Wines Ltd v Property Ventures Ltd (in receivership and liquidation)).[1]
The approach to the setting aside jurisdiction
[8] The Court’s jurisdiction to set aside a statutory demand is contained in s 290
Companies Act 1993. I refer specifically to the basis upon which the Court may grant an application as contained in s 290(4) which provides:
290 Court may set aside statutory demand
…
(4) The Court may grant an application to set aside a statutory demand if it is satisfied that—
(a) There is a substantial dispute whether or not the debt is owing or is due; or
(b) The company appears to have a counterclaim, set-off, or cross-demand and the amount specified in the demand less the amount of the counterclaim, set-off, or cross-demand is less than the prescribed amount; or
(c) The demand ought to be set aside on other grounds.
[9] For the purposes of this hearing I adopt as a general approach to the exercise
of this jurisdiction these 5 principles –
The applicant must show that there is arguably a genuine and
substantial dispute as to the existence of the debt.
The…
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- Case
- [2012] NZHC 3594
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the statutory framework under the Companies Act 1993 and the principles for setting aside a statutory demand. The court found that the liquidator had the authority to issue the demand as it was made on behalf of Property Ventures, not the liquidator himself. The court further examined the documentary evidence and email exchanges indicating that the payment was intended to be held in the Spinach Design account for Property Ventures. The applicant failed to provide material short of proof to support a substantial dispute over the existence of the debt, as required under the Act. The applicant's assertion of being able to pay the sum was also unsupported and irrelevant in the context of setting aside a statutory demand.
The court dismissed the application to set aside the statutory demand. The court extended the date for payment of the demand to 15 January 2013, after which the respondent could apply for winding up of the applicant if the demand was not met. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi