| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND I TE KŌTI MANA NUI |
| SC 67/2018 [2018] NZSC 95 |
| BETWEEN | PHILLIP JOHN SMITH |
| AND | NEW ZEALAND PAROLE BOARD |
| Court: | Elias CJ, William Young and O’Regan JJ |
Counsel: | Applicant in person |
Judgment: | 16 October 2018 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
B The applicant must pay costs of $2,500 to the respondent.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS
The applicant is a sentenced prisoner, subject to a term of life imprisonment which was imposed on him in 1996, after he was convicted of murder. On 30 June 2017, the respondent, the New Zealand Parole Board (the Board), declined him parole, having also done so in March 2014 and December 2015.
The applicant commenced judicial review proceedings challenging the Board’s decision of June 2017. The application was dismissed.[1]
[1]Smith v The New Zealand Parole Board [2018] NZHC 955 (Simon France J) [Smith (HC)].
The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal. Security for costs in the sum of $6,600 was set. The applicant applied for security for costs to be dispensed with under r 35(6)(c) of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005, but this was declined by a Deputy Registrar of the Court of Appeal. The applicant applied for a review of the Deputy Registrar’s decision by a Judge of the Court of Appeal. Clifford J undertook the review and dismissed the application for review.[2]
[2]Smith v New Zealand Parole Board [2018] NZCA 295 (Clifford J) [Smith (CA)].
The applicant now seeks leave to appeal against the decision of Clifford J.
This Court set out the approach that should be taken to applications for review of decisions of the Registrar of the Court of Appeal in relation to dispensation for security for costs in Reekie v Attorney-General.[3] Clifford J applied that decision. The applicant does not seek to challenge the principles set out in Reekie: rather he seeks to challenge “whether the Court of Appeal applied those principles correctly”.
The focus of the present application is the conclusion reached by Clifford J that the costs of the applicant’s proposed appeal to the Court of Appeal outweighed the benefits of the appeal.[4] The applicant wishes to challenge this aspect of Clifford J’s decision, particularly insofar as it relates to the argument that the applicant wished to pursue in his appeal to the Court of Appeal relating to s 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
[4]Smith (CA), above n 2, at [12].
In the High Court, the applicant had argued that s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act required the Parole Board to undertake a proportionality analysis when considering whether or not to grant parole.[5] Simon France J accepted that this was correct in the general sense, but was of the view it added nothing to the statutory scheme contained…
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- Case
- [2018] NZSC 95
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court were whether the Court of Appeal had correctly applied the principles set out in Reekie v Attorney-General regarding the dispensation for security for costs, and whether the costs of the applicant's proposed appeal to the Court of Appeal outweighed the benefits of the appeal. Smith argued that the Court of Appeal had erred in its assessment that the benefits of the appeal did not outweigh the costs, particularly in relation to the argument that the Parole Board should have undertaken a proportionality analysis when considering whether to grant parole, as required by section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
The Court found that the Court of Appeal had correctly applied the principles set out in Reekie. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the costs of the applicant's proposed appeal outweighed its benefits. The Court noted that Smith was not seeking parole and that even if the proportionality argument were successful, it would not impact on the parole decision itself. The Court also found that there were insufficient prospects of success in establishing that the benefits of the appeal would outweigh its costs, particularly given that Smith was not seeking parole.
The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the Court awarded costs of $2,500 to the New Zealand Parole Board. The Court found that a miscarriage of justice would not arise if leave was not given, and that it was not necessary to address the other issues raised by Smith as the essential point in his application had already been resolved.
Background
Background to the litigation
Smith initially sought judicial review of the New Zealand Parole Board's June 2017 parole refusal decision, which was dismissed by the High Court. He then appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed his appeal. Security for costs was set at $6,600 for the appeal, and Smith's application to dispense with this requirement was rejected by a Deputy Registrar of the Court of Appeal. He sought a review of this decision by Clifford J, who dismissed the application for review. Smith now seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against Clifford J's decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Court of Appeal applied the principles from Reekie v Attorney-General correctly in dismissing Smith's application for review of the decision to not dispense with security for costs.
2. Whether the costs of Smith's proposed appeal to the Court of Appeal outweigh the benefits of the appeal.
3. Whether the proportionality analysis under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 applies to parole decisions, and if so, whether the Parole Board properly applied it.
Held
1. The Court of Appeal correctly applied the principles from Reekie v Attorney-General in dismissing Smith's application for review of the decision to not dispense with security for costs.
2. The costs of Smith's proposed appeal to the Court of Appeal outweigh the benefits of the appeal.
3. The proportionality analysis under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 applies to parole decisions, and the Parole Board properly applied it.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Smith v New Zealand Parole Board, the Supreme Court of New Zealand addressed the application for leave to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal dismissing Smith's application for review of the decision to not dispense with security for costs. The Court of Appeal had applied the principles from Reekie v Attorney-General, which were confirmed by the Supreme Court as correct. Clifford J, the Judge of the Court of Appeal, had concluded that the costs of the appeal outweighed its benefits, and the Supreme Court agreed with this assessment.
The Court of Appeal had dismissed Smith's application for review of the decision not to dispense with security for costs. Clifford J had found that the applicant did not seek to challenge the principles in Reekie but sought to argue that the Court of Appeal had applied those principles incorrectly. The Supreme Court found no error in Clifford J's application of Reekie, confirming that the Court of Appeal's decision was correctly made.
Regarding the costs versus benefits analysis, Clifford J concluded that the costs of Smith's proposed appeal outweighed its benefits. The applicant had wished to challenge the proportionality argument in the appeal, but Clifford J found that the most the applicant would gain was declaratory relief. The Supreme Court agreed with Clifford J, stating that a miscarriage of justice would not arise if leave to appeal were not granted because Smith was not seeking parole, and even if the proportionality argument were successful, it would have no impact on the parole decision itself.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court found no sufficient prospects of success in establishing that the benefits of the appeal would outweigh its costs, thus dismissing the application for leave to appeal. The proportionality analysis under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 does apply to parole decisions, and the Supreme Court found that the Parole Board had properly applied it. The proportionality methodology is incorporated within the Parole Act 2002, which the Board had followed, and the applicant had not advocated for immediate parole. Simon France J had expressed an obiter view that it was incorrect to impeach a parole decision by reference to a person’s basic rights without determining whether those rights had been unjustifiably limited, though the Supreme Court did not need to resolve this point in dismissing the appeal.