Sleight v Beckia Holdings Limited
[2020] NZHC 571
•20 March 2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CIV-2017-409-818
[2020] NZHC 571
UNDER THE Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 and Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 BETWEEN
JOAN MARGARET FRASER SLEIGHT AND ALAN LEITHEAD SLEIGHT
Plaintiffs
AND
BECKIA HOLDINGS LIMITED (in
liquidation) (formerly FR 2012 Limited) First Defendant
AND
ORANGE H MANAGEMENT LIMITED
(in receivership and liquidation) (formerly Hawkins Management Limited)
Second Defendant
AND
IAG NEW ZEALAND LIMITED
Third Defendant
AND
QBE INSURANCE (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED
Fourth Defendant
Hearing: 16 March 2020 Appearances:
M J Borcoski for Plaintiffs
No appearance for First Defendant No appearance for Second Defendant
N S Gedye QC and O V Collette-Moxon for Third Defendant D H McLellan QC for Fourth Defendant
Judgment:
20 March 2020
Reissued:
20 March 2020
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESTER
This judgment was delivered by me on 20 March 2020 at 9.30am
pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar / 20 March 2020
SLEIGHT v BECKIA HOLDINGS LIMITED (in liq) & ORS [2020] NZHC 571 [20 March 2020]
[1] The plaintiff by memorandum, dated 26 February 2020, applied to transfer this proceeding to the Canterbury Earthquakes Insurance Tribunal (“the Tribunal”).1 The third defendant, IAG New Zealand Ltd (“IAG”), opposes the transfer. The fourth defendant, QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd (“QBE”), will abide the decision of the Court. The first and second defendants, being in liquidation, took no part.
[2] Whata J in a Minute of 6 March 2020 set down the opposed application for an in-person hearing. Opposed applications to transfer have been dealt with by in-person hearings or by telephone conference after the submissions have been filed.
Jurisdiction
[3] Section 8(1) of the Canterbury Earthquakes Insurance Tribunal Act 2019 (“the Act”) provides:
(1)This Act applies to disputes between policyholders and insurers about insurance claims for physical loss or damage arising from the Canterbury earthquakes to a residential building or residential property.
[4] Section 16 of the Act provides for a transfer of proceedings from a court to the Tribunal as follows:
16 Claim brought by transfer of proceedings from court
(1)If a person who is a policyholder or an insured person (or both) is a plaintiff in court proceedings relating to an insurance claim in dispute, a Judge may, on the application of that person or on the Judge’s own motion, order that the proceedings be transferred to the tribunal.
(2)An order to transfer proceedings may be made under subsection (1) only if—
(a)the proceedings meet the eligibility criteria for a claim under section 9 (however, the proceedings may also include additional parties to those referred to in section 8, but may not include a class action—see clause 6(2) of Schedule 2); and
1 2019 Practice Note: Canterbury Earthquakes Insurance Tribunal Act 2019 Arrangements for transfer of proceedings HCPN 2019/2 (civ) at cl 2, provides that an application to transfer a proceeding to the Canterbury Earthquake Tribunal may be made by memorandum.
(b)the other party or parties to the proceedings have been given a reasonable opportunity to comment; and
(c)the Judge making the order believes that the transfer is in the interests of justice.
(3)If a person who is a policyholder or an insured person (or both) is a defendant in court proceedings relating to an insurance claim in dispute, a Judge may, on the application of that person, order that the proceedings be transferred to the tribunal.
(4)An order to transfer proceedings may be made under subsection (3) only if—
(a)the proceedings meet the eligibility criteria for a claim under section 9 (however, the proceedings may also include additional parties to those referred to in section 8, but may not include a class action—see clause 6(2) of Schedule 2); and
(b)the other party or parties to the proceedings agree to the transfer; and
(c)the Judge making the order believes that the transfer is in the interests of justice.
(5)If court proceedings are transferred to the tribunal, a plaintiff in the proceedings becomes a claimant before the tribunal.
(6)If proceedings are transferred, the tribunal may have regard to any notes of evidence transmitted to it by the court, and it is not necessary for that evidence to be given again unless the tribunal requires it.
(7)Sections 12 to 15 do not apply to a claim that is transferred under this section from a court to the tribunal.
(8)For the purpose of this section, Judge means a District Court Judge or a High Court Judge.
Jurisdiction
[5] In his Minute, Whata J said he had concerns about the jurisdiction to transfer this proceeding to the Tribunal. His Honour referred to s 8 applying to disputes between policyholders and insurers about insurance claims. He said:2
… Whether that was intended to apply to cases involving claims in tort against third parties and/or inter party secondary claims based on contractual arrangements with those third parties is unclear to me.
2 Sleight v Beckia Holdings Ltd HC Christchurch CIV-2017-409-818, 6 March 2020 at [2].
[6] The issue of whether there is jurisdiction to transfer an earthquake proceeding that involves a third party claim was addressed by me in Dewes v IAG New Zealand Ltd.3 I held that a proceeding involving non-parties could be transferred to the Tribunal. I did not read s 16(1) of the Act as creating a jurisdiction to transfer part of a proceeding only.4 QBE applied for leave to appeal which I declined.5 QBE did not apply to the Court of Appeal for special leave.
[7] Against that background, IAG did not here submit there was no jurisdiction to transfer the proceeding to the Tribunal. QBE submitted there was an additional factor in this case which was not present in Dewes, namely here the plaintiff has brought a claim directly against QBE. QBE said the significance of that factor was that it complicated the legal issues to be addressed rather than it being a jurisdictional barrier to transfer. I will deal with complexity issues further below.
Timeline to fixture allocation
(1) 1 August 2019: Judgment Busby v IAG NZ Ltd,6 released – judgment on first opposed application to Tribunal dealing with features of Tribunal hearings and its attributes. (2)
6 August 2019:
Kitchin v AA Insurance Ltd,7 – second judgment on opposed transfer. Again, canvassing features of Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
(3)
23 August 2019:
This proceeding set down for 10-day fixture commencing 23 March 2020.
(4)
3 October 2019:
Judgment Fraser v Tower Insurance Ltd,8 released, confirming this Court’s continued ability to deal with costs in relation to proceedings transferred to the Tribunal.
(5)
14 November 2019:
Minute issued in this proceeding in relation to setting down and available dates.
3 Dewes v IAG New Zealand Ltd [2019] NZHC 2270.
4 At [19].
5 Dewes v IAG New Zealand Ltd [2019] NZHC 2899.
6 Busby v IAG NZ Ltd [2019] NZHC 1852.
7 Kitchin v AA Insurance Ltd [2019] NZHC 1902.
8 Fraser v Tower Insurance Ltd [2019] NZHC 2768.
(6) 2 December 2019: Counsel file joint memorandum confirming
counsels’ preference for a 13-day hearing commencing 2 June 2020.
(7)
9 December 2019:
Minute issued by Gendall J confirming fixture date of 2 June 2019.
(8)
26 February 2020:
Application for transfer filed.
[8] The fixture was allocated as a priority fixture. The parties have previously attended an unsuccessful mediation.
[9] I have included the dates of some of the decisions relating to the Act to put in context the reasons given by plaintiffs for seeking a transfer to the Tribunal.
Summary of proceeding
[10] The plaintiffs own a property in Christchurch. It was insured with IAG and was damaged in the Canterbury Earthquakes. IAG appointed the second defendant, (Orange Management Ltd (in rec and liq) previously known as Hawkins Management Ltd) (“Hawkins”) to be, in effect, a project manager of the repairs. A building company (the first defendant) was engaged to carry out the work. The plaintiffs say they were required by IAG to sign a contract with the building company which they did. It is alleged that the building company did not carry out the remedial works in a proper and tradesmen like manner.
[11] The plaintiffs’ first cause of action against IAG relies on the policy. IAG says it has met its obligations under the insurance policy by paying for the repairs carried out by the building company engaged by the plaintiffs. This proceeding will be the first to determine whether IAG remains liable under its policy if there are defective repairs.
[12] In addition, the plaintiffs bring a claim against IAG in tort and/or under the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993. These are also novel claims in the sense that they have not previously been before the Courts.
[13] There is a cause of action against IAG which seeks a declaration under s 3 of the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908, that exclusion clause defined in the statement of claim, are voided as unconscionable. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgments Act. Whether s 8 of the Act is wide enough to allow the Tribunal to make such a declaration was not addressed by counsel and the answer is not clear cut.
[14] The plaintiffs have also brought claims directly against Hawkins (for whom QBE is insurer) in negligence and under the Consumer Guarantees Act. Again, these claims have not been previously tested in Court. Claims under the Declaratory Judgments Act are also brought against Hawkins in relation to limitation of liability and exclusion clauses.
[15] That the plaintiffs have brought a claim directly against QBE under s 9 of the Law Reform Act 1936 gives rise to involved contribution arguments between IAG and QBE under s 17(1)(c) of the Law Reform Act and/or in equity.
[16] The contractual relationships between Hawkins and IAG, and between the plaintiffs and the building company, are also relevant to the claims that IAG and Hawkins owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs in addition to the duties under their respective contracts.
Interests of justice
[17]Plaintiffs’ counsel raises the following points said to favour transfer:
(i)the economic disparity between the parties;
(ii)the informal and flexible procedures in the Tribunal;
(iii)notwithstanding that there is a fixture on 2 June 2020, the plaintiffs submit transfer will not cause substantial delay and the flexible processes in the Tribunal may reduce the required hearing time; and
(iv)this Court has released judgments confirming the Tribunal’s ability to deal with complex legal issues and that this Court has a continued ability to deal with costs.
[18]Ms Borcoski for the plaintiffs in the application said:
The plaintiffs previously approached the Tribunal about a transfer in early July 2019. At that point in time the Tribunal was in its early stages and there had been no decisions from the High Court about transfers to the Tribunal, in particular about the issue of costs for steps taken in the High Court and the ability to transfer cases with some level of complexity. As a result of these uncertainties and because this proceeding was well advanced, the Tribunal indicated at that time that the proceeding may not be suitable for transfer.
[19] Ms Borcoski submitted there have been cases in this Court about the nature of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, its ability to deal with complex matters, and in relation to costs. What is not addressed by Ms Borcoski is why, against these cases (referred to in the timeline at [7] above), the plaintiff confirmed the fixture in this Court at the start of December 2019. The cases referred to by Ms Borcoski all pre-date that confirmation. Ms Borcoski was involved in an opposed transfer to the Tribunal in which the judgment was released in September 2019 so would have been familiar with the authorities.9
[20] In her oral submissions, Ms Borcoski sought to highlight why her clients had brought the transfer application. She emphasised the flexibility and informality of the Tribunal. She noted that the plaintiffs are elderly and considered that they would find proceedings in the Tribunal less stressful than in this Court. She also mentioned the possibility that if the matter was to proceed in the Tribunal the plaintiffs might at times be able to use alternative representation, including by family members. Ms Borcoski did not say that if this application was dismissed, her instructions would come to an end.
[21] Ms Borcoski suggested that in terms of the plaintiffs’ initial approach to the Tribunal in July 2019 they may have “jumped the gun” and if the Tribunal had existed when they commenced the proceeding they would have brought the case in the
9 Pinot Properties Ltd v Vero Insurance New Zealand Ltd [2019] NZHC 2244.
Tribunal. Again, Ms Borcoski did not identify the factor that prompted the application to transfer relatively soon after the June hearing date was confirmed.
[22] As to IAG’s position that this case was a test case on a number of issues, Ms Borcoski said the plaintiffs had never agreed to the case having that status. She said it was unjust for the plaintiffs to bear the burden of the case being a test case given their age and vulnerability.
[23] There was some implicit criticism of IAG by Ms Borcoski in that she suggested other cases said to involve not dissimilar issues had been transferred to the Tribunal either by consent or at least without opposition. She submitted this case was no more complex than other cases that had gone to the Tribunal. I do not consider this to be a relevant factor. If consenting to transfer was to be held against an insurer in subsequent applications insurers would have a perverse incentive to decline every application in case consenting somehow obliged them to consent in the future.
[24] Ms Borcoski accepted that some delay was inevitable if transfer was ordered but she considered the delay would not be substantial. From her clients’ point of view, the benefits of transfer outweighed a short delay. The fact is the extent of the delay is unknown.
[25] Ms Borcoski advised her clients were going to seek urgency as contemplated by sch 2 cl 7 of the Act. She also submitted the fact that a proceeding had a hearing date set, even one that was relatively close, was not of itself a barrier to transfer.10
[26] Further, Ms Borcoski submitted that in considering the interests of justice, that being the test as to whether transfer should occur,11 that only the interests of the parties were to be considered.
10 Birchs Road Ltd v Earthquake Commission [2019] NZHC 2439.
11 Canterbury Earthquake Insurance Tribunal Act 2019, s 16(2)(c).
IAG’s opposition
[27] Counsel for IAG, Mr Gedye QC, accepted that complexity of itself was not a ground for declining transfer but submitted the circumstances of this case meant the proceeding had been taken well away from a “standard” earthquake claim.
[28]Section 28 of the Act provides:
28 Transfer of claim to court
(1)The tribunal may order that a claim be transferred to the District Court or the High Court at any time before the tribunal makes an assessment of liability if, in the tribunal’s view, it is more appropriate for a court to decide the claim for any or all of the following reasons:
(a)the claim presents undue complexity:
(b)the claim is a novel claim:
(c)the subject matter of the claim is related to the subject matter of proceedings that are already before the court.
(2)Before making an order under subsection (1), the tribunal must give the parties a reasonable opportunity to comment.
(3)If the total amount at issue is within the jurisdiction of the District Court stated in section 74 of the District Court Act 2016, the claim must be transferred to the District Court.
(4)Any other claim must be transferred to the High Court.
[29] Mr Gedye submitted the more novel and complex a case was, and the more interdependent the issues and claims were, particularly in a multi-party claim, the more likely it was s 28 may come into play in the Tribunal. He submitted this Court in considering transfer may recognise complexity as a factor that may lead to a transfer being not in the interests of justice, in effect anticipating the type of assessment the Tribunal might itself make under s 28 of the Act.
[30] In that regard, Mr Gedye referred to Evans v IAG New Zealand Ltd which involved the Tribunal referring a question for the opinion of this Court under s 53 of the Act.12 The question referred by the Tribunal is similar to one of the issues that arises in this case. Thus, it was submitted that Evans was some indication that issues
12 Evans v IAG New Zealand Ltd HC Christchurch CIV-2019-409-705, 30 January 2020.
of the type raised in this case may well result in further s 53 requests for an opinion or potentially the proceeding being sent back to this Court under s 28.
[31] Mr Gedye referred to cases where other counsel and/or the Tribunal were awaiting the outcome of this proceeding. In one matter counsel for IAG and QBE confirmed to the Tribunal this proceeding was to proceed in June 2020 and that it contained many issues common to the proceeding being dealt with in the Tribunal. Decisions were made in respect of the future of that Tribunal proceeding on the basis that the June hearing date had been confirmed.13
[32] The real concern in relation to the possibility of a s 53 request for an opinion should this proceeding be transferred is how susceptible the issues in this case are to separate determination. If it turns out that a question referred to this Court is in fact not susceptible to a standalone opinion, then the issue would have to be referred back to the Tribunal potentially for factual findings to be made before the question could be answered. That raises the possibility of further delay and cost.
[33] I accept Mr Gedye’s submission that complexity is a factor to be considered if it has a direct impact on how quickly and how the proceeding might be resolved in the Tribunal.
[34]Section 3 of the Act provides:
3 Purpose
The purpose of this Act is to provide fair, speedy, flexible, and cost- effective services for resolving disputes about insurance claims for physical loss or damage to residential buildings, property, and land arising from the Canterbury earthquakes.
[35] If the quickest way of determining this proceeding is to retain the June fixture in this Court, and if the nature of the claim creates a risk that dealing with the various issues in the Tribunal may be lengthy, these factors would support the claim remaining in this Court.
13 Dewes v IAG New Zealand Ltd CEIT CEI-2019-0037, 29 November 2019. The Minute referred to in the Tribunal was dated 29 November 2019, that being the date of execution of the joint memorandum filed in this Court on 2 December 2019 in this proceeding.
IAG’s offer on costs
[36] IAG recognising that party-party costs in the Tribunal are only awarded in limited circumstances, offered to pay 100 per cent of the plaintiffs’ scheduling and hearing fees in the High Court and to not seek scale party-party costs and disbursements (including expert fees) from the plaintiffs for steps taken after 27 February 2020 until the conclusion of the High Court trial, if the plaintiffs agree to the same on a reciprocal basis.14 That offer was not accepted by the plaintiffs as for them to do so would be to surrender one of the arguments in favour of transfer.
[37] Mr Gedye confirmed that if the application to transfer was dismissed, the offer would remain open for acceptance by the plaintiffs for five working days from the release of the decision to allow the plaintiffs to take up the offer.
Discussion – interests of justice
[38]Briefs in this case have been exchanged.
[39] In Busby v IAG New Zealand Ltd, I said that determining whether a transfer is in the interests of justice involves an examination of whether the transfer will meet the purpose of the Act, as set out in s 3, and whether there were any other factors that arise in the particular case.15
[40] There have been delays in this case in the past. In her submissions for the hearing, Ms Borcoski said “[t]he unavailability of senior counsel for QBE which meant that, despite the plaintiffs’ objections, a number of available hearing dates could not be used.”
[41] The point raised by Ms Borcoski, if anything, is in my view a reason for declining transfer. Allocating the 2 June 2020 date was a result of the Court affording the proceeding priority. Finding dates that suited all counsel, in particular senior counsel for IAG and QBE, presented difficulties. Transferring the proceeding to the Tribunal will not guarantee the availability of senior counsel for IAG and QBE will be
14 See Canterbury Earthquakes Insurance Tribunal Act, s 47.
15 Busby v IAG New Zealand Ltd, above n 6.
any better, albeit it may be that the hearing style adopted by the Tribunal may result in a number of shorter evidentiary hearings which may make co-ordinating counsel easier.
[42] Whether the Tribunal could adopt the process of a number of separate evidentiary hearings focused on individual issues, given the inter-relationship of the issues, is unclear. The legal issues presented by the novel issues in this case mean a substantial period of hearing time will be required to deal with legal submissions in the Tribunal.
[43] In respect of whether the interests of other parties can be considered when considering the interests of justice, Mr Gedye relied on a case from the Weathertight Homes Tribunal Body Corporate 204464 v Waitakere City Council.16 In that case, this Court said in relation to an application brought by a defendant to transfer a leaky building proceeding from the High Court to the Weathertight Homes Tribunal:17
It may be that in determining what is in the best interests of justice, a particular factor will turn out to be decisive. But that should not foreclose a careful review of all relevant circumstances. Whether or not a transfer is in the best interests of justice must require an evaluation of its implications for the parties and any other affected interest. Each case will turn on its own facts and circumstances …
[44]And further, relevantly as follows:18
While effective to expedite the inexpensive and speedy processing of claims, the Tribunal’s processes lack many of the procedural safeguards that are available as of right to litigants in this Court. The Evidence Act 2006 does not apply to proceedings in the Tribunal …
[45]In declining the defendant’s applications for transfer it was said:19
A transfer would require that they [i.e. the plaintiffs opposing transfer] … face the risks associated with having their claim heard in a jurisdiction which is yet to be tested by complex representative claims.
16 Body Corporate 204464 v Waitakere City Council [2011] BCL 49.
17 At [9].
18 At [24].
19 At [31].
[46] While this is not a representative claim, I accept IAG’s submission that it does involve extensive and complex test case issues. I agree with Mr Gedye that whether the issues are called “novel”, “pivotal” or otherwise is not the point. The fact is this proceeding raises a number of issues that have not been before a New Zealand Court before.
[47] The purposes of the Act refer to the resolution of insurance claims and is not targeted at the resolution of a particular homeowner’s claim and so I consider it consistent.
[48] Other litigants have structured their proceedings in part on the basis that this claim was going to be heard in June 2020. Other litigants will be assisted by rulings in this Court on the novel issues in this case. Those factors coupled with any acceptance of Mr Gedye’s submission that the interests of justice are wide enough to include the interests of other affected interests, I am satisfied the loss rulings by this Court on issues of general interest is a factor that stands against transfer to the Tribunal.
[49] The Tribunal under s 53 of the Act, has referred the issue of insurer liability for defective repairs under a policy to this Court in Evans.20 In Dewes,21 the Tribunal focused that hearing on confirming damage and defects while awaiting the outcome of this case. Those actions are indicators that the Tribunal wants a ruling from this Court on at least one of the issues raised in this hearing. There is no reason to expect that the Tribunal will be prepared to rule on the issue of policy liability for defective repairs given its approach to date. Further, use of the s 53 process to obtain opinions from this Court, on such questions, is not a clear-cut process where there may be factual disputes.
[50] Again, every case falls to be considered on its own facts. The factor at the end of the day that weighs most heavily with me is the loss of a date certain against the accepted and uncertain delay that will occur if there is transfer to the Tribunal
20 Evans v IAG New Zealand Ltd, above n 12.
21 Dewes v IAG New Zealand Ltd, above n 3.
involving in all likelihood the further difficulties in co-ordinating counsel for further hearing dates.
[51] I do not for a moment overlook what Ms Borcoski has said about the stress of a High Court fixture on her elderly clients. Mr Gedye undertook that his client would seek to make the fixture as stress-free as possible and that any cross-examination would take place in that spirit. I accept that assurance and expect counsel for QBE to adopt the same approach. The stress of the scheduled fixture is to be balanced against the on-going stresses and frustrations of a new set of delays and uncertainties in the Tribunal.
[52] Ms Borcoski emphasised the flexibility of procedures in the Tribunal. However, given the significant number of novel and complex legal issues in this case, it is inevitable that a substantial part of the hearing in the Tribunal would involve the presentation of legal argument in much the same was as it will occur in this Court.
[53] I do not place any weight on the suggestion that the plaintiffs may adopt alternative representation in the Tribunal. Again, Ms Borcoski did not say that she would not be representing the plaintiffs if the matter remained in this Court. Accordingly, the circumstances are different from Birchs Rd Ltd, where the plaintiff company wanted to have its proceeding transferred to the Tribunal in order for its director to represent it, which would not be possible in the High Court.22 Birches Rd Ltd has a similarity with the present proceeding in that it had a hearing scheduled for 21 October 2019 and the application for transfer was dealt with in the preceding month – the hearing was on 23 September 2019 and the judgment was released 26 September 2019. The tenor of Dunningham J’s decision is that, but for the insurer taking a neutral stance on transfer at the telephone conference, neither consenting nor opposing the application, that the application may well have been dismissed.
[54] On balance, I do not believe that transfer to the Tribunal is in the interests of justice. I do not accept Ms Borcoski’s submission that her clients have been dragged into the complex issues between the defendants. The reality is that once direct claims
22 Birchs Rd Ltd v Earthquake Commission, above n 10.
were brought by the plaintiffs against the two insurer defendants, that involved legal issues along with it being likely contribution issues would arise.
[55] Ms Borcoski submitted that her clients have made their own assessment of the situation and that they considered the benefits, especially the flexibility of the hearing, outweighed the delay. While I do not dispute that, the view taken by the plaintiffs is not the test.
[56] Having committed to a priority fixture in the memorandum filed on 2 December 2019, the plaintiffs change of heart remains unexplained. The reasons put forward for the change must have been known to plaintiffs’ counsel by the time the memorandum was filed. As I said to Ms Borcoski, I find it hard to reconcile the plaintiffs willingness to lose the 2 June 2020 hearing date with counsel saying that they will apply for urgency in the Tribunal. In my view, Ms Borcoski’s submissions placed too much weight on the flexibility of the Tribunal’s procedures when fundamentally the core issues in this proceeding are legal issues which will have to be confronted through in-depth legal submissions. The benefits of flexibility are intangible but carry the certainty of delay and the loss of a firm fixture.
[57] Ultimately, IAG’s offer in respect of costs will protect the plaintiffs from party-party costs if acceptable. Albeit that QBE has not made the same commitment but given in substance (if not in form) it opposed the application, I would suggest it is appropriate it make a similar offer.
[58] The application to transfer this proceeding to the Canterbury Earthquakes Tribunal is dismissed.
Associate Judge Lester
Solicitors:
Saunders Robinson Brown, Christchurch DLA Piper, Wellington
Hazelton Law, Wellington
Copy to counsel:
Nathan Gedye QC, Auckland
O V Collette-Moxon, Barrister, Auckland
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