IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CIV-2017-409-662
[2019] NZHC 2899
BETWEEN CATHERINE FRANCES DEWES, ROBERT DENTON GREEN and DIANA
ROSEMARY SHAND (as trustees of the Dewes Green Family Trust)
PlaintiffsAND
IAG NEW ZEALAND LIMITED
First Defendant
AND
MAX CONTRACTS LIMITED
Second Defendant
AND
MAX EQ LIMITED
Third Defendant
AND
ORANGE H MANAGEMENT LIMITED
(formerly Hawkins Management Limited) (In Receivership and in Liquidation)
First Third Party
AND
ORANGE H GROUP LIMITED (formerly
Hawkins Management Limited) (In Receivership and in Liquidation) Second Third Party
AND
MAX CONTRACTS LIMITED
Third Third Party
AND
QBE INSURANCE (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED
Fourth Third Party
Hearing: 31 October 2019 (telephone conference) and on the papers Appearances:
C F Dewes for Plaintiffs
N S Gedye QC and O Collette-Moxon for First Defendant
R Smedley for Second and Third Defendants and Third Third PartyNo appearance for First Third Party and Second Third Party D McLellan QC and L R Green for Fourth Third Party
DEWES v IAG NEW ZEALAND LIMITED [2019] NZHC 2899 [7 November 2019]
Judgment: 7 November 2019
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESTER
This judgment was delivered by me on 7 November 2019 at 2.00pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar 7 November 2019
[1] The fourth third party, QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd (“QBE”) applies for leave to appeal my decision transferring this proceeding to the Canterbury Earthquakes Insurance Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). QBE has argued in the transfer application that the third party proceedings it faces should be recognised as a standalone proceeding. Once seen as a standalone proceeding, QBE’s submission is that the proceeding against it is not one eligible for transfer to the Tribunal pursuant to the terms of the Canterbury Earthquakes Insurance Tribunal Act 2019 (“the Act”).
[2] That ineligibility arises from the fact that the third party claim against QBE is not a claim between a policy holder and an insurer, that being one of the eligibility criteria under s 8 of the Act. The claim QBE faces is based on the Law Reform Act 1936.
[3] I took the view that in enacting the Act, Parliament did not intend to use the term “proceedings” in s 16 of the Act which governs transfer of proceedings to the Tribunal in the nuanced way adopted by QBE and that the jurisdiction to transfer in s 16 relates to an entire proceeding and does not permit a proceeding to be transferred in part.
Leave to appeal
[4] Leave is required by virtue of s 56(3) of the Senior Courts Act 2016. Counsel were agreed on the applicable principles and I adopt Mr McLennan QC’s, counsel for QBE’s, summary:
4.The provision was considered by Dobson J in A v Minister of Internal Affairs who identified the following (obiter) considerations:
(a)A high threshold exists for the granting of leave. An allegation of error of law or fact is generally insufficient. An application should raise an arguable error.
(b)Leave should only…
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- Case
- [2019] NZHC 2899
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Act permitted the transfer of third-party claims to the Tribunal and if the discretion to transfer should have been exercised in QBE's favour. The court considered the plain language of the Act and the purposes behind it, emphasizing that the Act aimed to provide fair, speedy, flexible, and cost-effective services for resolving insurance claims. The court found that the Act did not prohibit the transfer of third-party claims and that the decision regarding the role of third parties in the Tribunal should be made by the Tribunal itself, not the High Court. The court concluded that there was no reasonably arguable error of law or fact in the original decision and that the appeal did not warrant further delay or serve the interests of justice.
The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and costs were reserved. The decision underscored the importance of adhering to the statutory framework and the role of the Tribunal in determining the appropriate resolution of claims, including those involving third parties. The court highlighted that the decision to transfer a proceeding, including third-party claims, set a precedent that would need to be followed in future cases, thereby addressing a matter of general or public importance. However, the specific exercise of discretion in this case did not warrant an appeal, as it did not raise issues of significant public importance or justify further delay.