Siemer v Attorney-General

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2012-404-7385 [2013] NZHC 1111

IN THE MATTER OF     an application under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 for declaratory relief

BETWEEN  VINCENT ROSS SIEMER Plaintiff

ANDATTORNEY-GENERAL Defendant

Hearing:         2 May 2013

Appearances: Plaintiff in Person

PJ Gunn for Defendant

Judgment:      16 May 2013

JUDGMENT OF TOOGOOD J

This judgment was delivered by me on 16 May 2013 at 9:15 am

Pursuant to Rule 11.5 High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

V Siemer, 27 Clansman Tce, Gulf Harbour:               vsiemer@hotmail.com

PJ Gunn, Crown Law, Wellington:  peter.gunn@crownlaw.govt.nz

SIEMER V ATTORNEY-GENERAL HC AK CIV-2012-404-7385 [16 May 2013]

Introduction

[1]      The Attorney-General, the defendant in this proceeding, has applied to strike out the claim by the plaintiff, Mr Siemer, for declarations related to alleged breaches of his rights under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“NZBORA”) by Judges of the Supreme Court.

Recusal application by plaintiff

[2]      At the beginning of the hearing, Mr Siemer requested that I disqualify myself from dealing with the application because I had demonstrated bias against him in the handling of cases in which he had appeared to date.   He asserted that I was the subject of seven active complaints by him to the Judicial Conduct Commissioner; that my rulings in cases in which he was involved were the subject of four current appeals to the Court of Appeal; and that he had included on a website managed by him “data” of my past which included “very questionable legal behaviour”.   He argued that an informed and impartial lay observer would not only conclude that I could not be impartial in respect of him in these proceedings, but that an observer would likely question my judgment to preside in such circumstances.

[3]      In support of these allegations and the proposition that I should recuse myself on the grounds of apprehended bias, Mr Siemer cited authorities suggesting that I had failed in my duty to assist him as an unrepresented litigant and that I had placed myself in a position where the natural tendency for me as a judge would be to “seek vengeance” against him for seeking my disqualification.

[4]      Mr Siemer  referred  to  the  judgment  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  Saxmere Company  Limited  v  Wool  Board  Disestablishment  Company  Ltd1   and  to  the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct as discussed in Orlov v New Zealand Law

Society.2      He  also  relied  on  statements  by  the  United  Nations  Human  Rights

1    Saxmere Company Limited v Wool Board Disestablishment Company Ltd [2009] NZSC 72, [2010] 1 NZLR 35 (SC).

2      Orlov v New Zealand Law Society [2013] 1 NZLR 390.

Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of India, the

International Commission of Jurists and others.

Recusal principles

[5]      In Saxmere, the Supreme Court confirmed the view of the New Zealand courts that the test for disqualification of a Judge on the grounds of apparent bias was whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably…

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Case
[2013] NZHC 1111
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Siemer v Attorney-General, the plaintiff, Mr Siemer, sought declarations related to alleged breaches of his rights under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 by Judges of the Supreme Court. The Attorney-General applied to strike out the claim, arguing that it was frivolous and vexatious, and that it had no reasonable arguable cause of action. The court considered the principles applicable to a strike-out application and the arguments presented by both parties. The court found that the decision of the Supreme Court in Attorney-General v Chapman provided a complete bar to the plaintiff's claim, as the principles upon which it was founded had equal application to claims for declaratory relief. The proceeding was considered a collateral attack on the Supreme Court's decisions, and the court held that the proceeding was an abuse of process. Consequently, the proceeding was struck out, and the defendant was awarded costs.

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