Secretary for Education v Yates
[2004] NZCA 329
•21 December 2004
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
CA116/03
BETWEENSECRETARY FOR EDUCATION
First AppellantANDBOARD OF TRUSTEES OF HILL PARK PRIMARY SCHOOL
Second Appellant
ANDMIHIMAMAO YATES, JUDITH RAWHITI, WENDY RANKIN
First RespondentsANDNEW ZEALAND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTE
Second Respondent
Hearing:10 August 2004
Court:McGrath, Glazebrook and William Young JJ
Counsel:C R Gwyn and R B Chan for Appellants
P Cranney and A Connor for Respondents
Judgment:21 December 2004
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The appeal is allowed. The decision of the Employment Tribunal is restored. The appellants are entitled to costs of $6,000 together with disbursements (including travelling and accommodation expenses of counsel if any) to be agreed and, in default of agreement, to be fixed by the Registrar.
REASONS
McGrath J [1]
Glazebrook J (dissenting) [24]
William Young J [51]
McGRATH J
[1] This appeal raises a question concerning the correct interpretation of the Primary Teachers’ (including Deputy and Assistant Principals and Other Unit Holders) Collective Employment Contract 1998-2001. Those who were parties to the contract or bound by its terms include the appellants (who are the Secretary of Education and the board of trustees of a primary school) and the respondents (who are teachers at the school and the New Zealand Educational Institute). The contract set out terms of remuneration of primary teachers. Those covered were categorised into three groups, with different tiered salary scales according to their qualifications.
[2] The respondent teachers each held the qualification of Diploma in Teaching and were members of the group who had that qualification. They enrolled for a three year Bachelor of Education degree course at Massey University which credited them with points towards that degree, amounting to two thirds of the total requirement, on account of holding the Diploma. They claimed that this credit qualified them to be members of a different group under the contract, with entitlement to a higher salary. The Secretary of Education disputed the interpretation of the contract on which the teachers’ contention was based. The respondents then sought a compliance order against the appellants in the Employment Tribunal.
[3] The Employment Relations Authority member who exercised the power of the Employment Tribunal, Mr Kenneth Johnston, upheld the position of the Secretary of Education. His decision was reversed on appeal to the Employment Court in a judgment delivered on 20 May 2003 by Chief Judge Goddard. The Secretary for Education and the board of trustees have appealed to this Court against the Employment Court’s decision.
[4] The issue of principle arising in the appeal is whether s 135 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 precludes the Court from hearing an appeal against the Employment Court’s decision in this matter. Section 135 which is identical in effect to s 214 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 provides:
135. Appeals to Court of Appeal on question of law–
(1) Where any party to any proceedings under this Act is dissatisfied with any decision of the Court (other than a decision on the construction of any individual employment contract or collective employment contract) as being erroneous in point of law, that party may appeal to the Court of Appeal against the decision; and section 66 of the Judicature Act 1908 shall apply to any such appeal.
(2) Every such appeal shall be made by giving notice of appeal within 28 days after the date of the issue of the decision to which the appeal relates.
(3) In its determination of any appeal, the Court of Appeal may confirm, modify, or reverse the decision appealed against or any part of that decision.
(4) Notice of appeal shall not operate as a stay of proceedings in respect of the decision to which the appeal relates unless the Court or the Court of Appeal so orders.
(5) The determination of the Court of Appeal on any appeal under this section shall be final and conclusive.
[5] The purpose of the predecessors of s 135 of the 1991 Act was to reserve to the Arbitration Court, and its successors, the exclusive right to interpret awards, applying its specialist knowledge and expertise without being restrained by technical legal principle: Combined Unions v NZMC Ltd [1983] ACJ 233 at 239; Foodtown Supermarkets Ltd v NZ Shop Employees IAW [1984] ACJ 1043 at 1048 per Somers J (CA).
[6] Until 1991 the statutory context was different. Awards were viewed as extensions of the legislation until the 1987 Act. Even after its passage, the statutory underpinning of awards meant that the principles of statutory interpretation governed their interpretation, sometimes with modifications arising from their consensual nature: J Hughes, Labour Law in New Zealand (1990) 6082. Industrial agreements were seen as akin to contracts, but nonetheless interpreted applying principles of statutory interpretation.
[7] Nonetheless, the provision enacted in 1977 as s 62A of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 has served as the model for confining the scope of appeals to this Court in all subsequent legislation. It was substantially repeated in the 1987, 1991 and 2000 Acts.
[8] The provisions prior to 1991 gave rise in this Court to a deferential approach to decisions of the Arbitration Court that interpreted industrial agreements. For instance this Court’s attitude to the application of s 62A of the Industrial Relations Act 1973, was explained in the judgment delivered by Sir Thaddeus McCarthy for the Court in Winstone Clay Products Ltd v Cartledge (Inspector of Awards) [1984] ACJ 1035. The Court there said:
It is a fairly commonplace statement that it would be most dangerous to overlook the special nature of the Arbitration Court. It is not to be assumed that propositions of law, however prestigious and well established in the High Court or the Court of Appeal, will apply with the same clear force in the Arbitration Court. That is a specialist Court, designed for a specific field. In the matters directed by the statute to come before it, it has exclusive jurisdiction, and, when exercising it, it must take into account other considerations besides legal issues. It is concerned primarily with fairness. Thus it has been more than once said in this Court that legal technicalities or analogy of rules will not always be helpful in achieving the objects of a Court which has been given what Cooke J has characterised as “unusual powers”.
[9] The Employment Contracts Act 1991 brought a fundamental change to the statutory characterisation of the nature of employment. The shift is summarised by Keith J in his separate judgment in Canterbury Spinners Ltd v Vaughan [2003] 1 NZLR 176 at [10]:
Four years later that emphasis on the resolution of disputes of interest by contract was taken further by the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (the 1991 Act), as indeed appears from its short title alone: it no longer referred to “conciliation and arbitration” but simply to contract. No longer was there an Arbitration Court or commission with the power, even with the consent of the parties (as under the 1987 Act), to write the rules of the employment relationship for the parties. No longer was it possible, as it was for Salmond J in New Zealand Waterside Workers’ Federation Industrial Association of Workers v Frazer [1924] NZLR 689 at p709, to refer to an industrial award as judicial in form but legislative in substance and effect. From 1991 a contract negotiated between the parties was the means for fixing and changing the terms of the employment relationship. And the Employment Relations Act 2000 (the 2000 Act), although introducing some major changes of policy, especially in the direction of collective agreements negotiated by unions which were deliberately not mentioned in the 1991 Act, maintained the centrality of the employment agreement.
[10] The different statutory context led this Court to take a different approach to the application of what had become s 135 of the 1991 Act. Air New Zealand Ltd v Johnston [1992] 1 NZLR 159 was decided under the Industrial Relations Act 1973, but the judgment of the majority made some observations concerning the new legislation. Cooke P observed, obiter, at 165-166:
Subject to appeal on questions of law to this Court – which will extend to general principles and general implied terms in contracts of employment, as distinct from the construction of individual contracts…these matters now fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Employment Court, on appeal from employment tribunals or permitted direct reference.
[11] This dictum was later adopted by a Full Court of this Court in Attorney-General v NZ Post-Primary Teachers Association [1992] 2 NZLR 209 in a judgment delivered by Gault J who said of s 135 of the 1991 Act, at 215:
…appeals on questions of law will extend to general principles and general implied terms in contracts of employment, as distinct from the construction of individual contracts…
[12] This approach was next applied in TISCO v Communication & Energy Workers Union [1993] 2 ERNZ 779 where Cooke P described s 135(1) as “a provision which might be called a relic of times when it was thought that the terms of industrial awards might be construed over-legalistically by the ordinary Courts.” He went on at 781 to say:
It is clear that the limitation on appeal rights does not extend to questions of principle going beyond the particular terms of a contract (citing the Air New Zealand Ltd and the NZPPTA cases).
[13] The TISCO case concerned the scope of an implied term, a question which the Court held to be outside of the construction of the express contractual terms and which because of that was seen to raise a general point of principle. On the other hand the Court accepted that it could not review a decision of the Employment Court to the effect that to carry on the business of restoring electronic trade practice of monetary award was an “electronic trade practice for monetary reward” under the contract.
[14] There was further clarification of the scope of this Court’s appellate powers under s 135 in Sears v Attorney-General [1995] 2 ERNZ 121 in which an unsuccessful appellant sought leave to appeal to the Privy Council on an employment issues. Part of the appellant’s proposed argument was that this Court should not have addressed the terms of the appellant’s employment contract in the substantive appeal, as it was contrary to s 135 to do so. Richardson J said for the Court at 125:
It is well-settled that this Court is not precluded from examining questions of principle going beyond a particular term of a contract and that where the Employment Court errs in principle in how it goes about interpreting the contract, that is an error of law for appropriate consideration by this Court under s 135 (Air NZ v Johnston [1992] 1 ERNZ 700; A-G v NZ Post Primary Teachers Assn [1992] 1 ERNZ 1163; and TISCO Ltd v Communication & Energy Workers Union [1993] 2 ERNZ 779). The same position applies where, as here, crucial questions concern the construction and application of legislation. That is reinforced by the recognition in s 104(1)(i) and s 105(1) that questions of statutory construction may arise in the course of proceedings in the Employment Court.
[15] In this dictum there was a shift of emphasis to the simple proposition that the Court could intervene on appeal under s 135 when there was an error of principle in the Employment Court’s interpretation of the contract. The case had concerned whether Government Superannuation Fund legislation permitted deductions from the appellant’s salary pursuant to an employment contract, in order to meet the cost of Government contributions to the GSF Fund. The effect of the Court’s decision refusing the leave application was that the interpretation of the statutory provisions had raised a question of principle concerning the interpretation of Mr Sears’ contract which was not excluded from appellate scrutiny by this Court under s 135 and was not open to appeal. A similar approach was taken by the Court in Walker Corporation v O’Sullivan [1966] 2 ERNZ 513 and later a majority of four Judges used the same language as was used in Sears to state the test in the Full Court’s decision in Principal of the Auckland College of Education v Hagg [1997] 2 NZLR 537.
[16] By way of contrast, this Court also clarified the circumstances where there will be no error of principle in the Employment Court’s interpretation of a contract. This Court said in a judgment delivered by Richardson P in Wellington College of Education v Scott [1999] 1 ERNZ 98 at 101:
There is, of course, a distinction between erring as a matter of law in the approach to the interpretation of the relevant provision of the employment contract, which is amenable to appeal under s 135, and simply erring in the ultimate construction, which is excluded under the section (A-G v Grant [1998] 3 ERNZ 259 (CA)). And in the application of that construction to the facts of the case an absence of any factual support for the factual conclusion will be an error of law. But we cannot discern any error of approach on the Judge’s part and there was ample evidence before the Employment Court to support his factual conclusion.
[17] The Employment Court’s decision in that case, in this Court’s view, turned entirely on the construction of the contract and raised no issue of contractual principle with the consequence that s 135 precluded appellate review. The Court’s earlier judgment in Attorney-General v Grant [1998] 3 ERNZ 259 is also in point. Richardson P said for the Court at 267:
The standard interpretation approach was for the Judge to consider the meaning of the words used in their context and having regard to their matrix. In that regard he had drawn attention to the only statutory provisions providing for and limiting the power of transfer of employees of a department to positions in the same department or other departments. Against that statutory and factual background he interpreted the phrase, “placement to a suitable position…in a new structure or agency established as part of the restructuring” as meaning an agency of the Crown. We cannot discern any error of law in that interpretation approach. Whether or not as a matter of construction we would have reached the same conclusion is not within our jurisdiction on appeal under s 135.
[18] Given that s 135 of the 1991 Act was largely the same as the equivalent provision in the 1973 Act, which had been inserted in 1977, the change in this Court’s approach to decisions of the Employment Court under the 1991 Act was marked. The reason for it lies in the substantially different statutory context in the 1991 Act. Section 135 had to be applied to a statutory scheme in which rights and obligations arose under employment contracts. This Court quickly concluded that the general principles of interpretation of a contract applied equally to employment contracts as to any other kind: TNT Worldwide Express (NZ) Limited v Cunningham [1993] 3 NZLR 681 especially per Cooke P at 686-687. It was in this context that s 135 was interpreted in the manner indicated, that is as retaining the primacy of the role of the Employment Court in relation to construction of contracts but subject to the supervisory appellate function of this Court in relation to the law of contractual interpretation. On this reading of the statutory provision matters of contractual principle became the responsibility of this Court.
[19] The enactment of the Employment Relations Act 2000 saw the substantial repetition of s 135 in s 214 of that Act. The major difference is that leave is now required to bring an appeal against a question of law but the language expressing constraints on this Court’s appellate powers remains substantially the same. I read that as an affirmation of this Court’s approach to appellate review of interpretation of employment agreements under the 1990 Act.
[20] Accordingly under the 2000 Act, as under the 1991 Act, if the Employment Court reads the terms of an employment agreement in a manner that was not open to it this Court may intervene on the basis that a wrong principle has been applied, which may include that what the Employment Court has done does not in law amount to an orthodox interpretation of the contract. The latter conclusion will not lightly be reached but is an aspect of appellate supervision of the interpretation of agreements in the Employment Court jurisdiction under the 2000 Act.
[21] On the other hand if the Employment Court adopts an interpretation which reflects its view on an orthodox approach to contractual interpretation this Court must observe the statutory constraint and not intervene, even if it doubts the correctness of the outcome. Deference by this Court to the expertise and experience of the Employment Court remains a requirement of our employment legislation (to this extent).
[22] In this context the modern role of provisions such as ss 135 and 214 of the 2000 Act is to ensure that the Employment Court applies a principled approach to interpretation of employment contracts, protecting litigants to that extent by allowing a right of appeal, now under the 2000 Act with leave. But where an interpretation favoured by the Employment Court is the result of an orthodox application of the principles of contractual interpretation this Court is bound to respect that primacy.
[23] For reasons that are more fully developed in the judgment of William Young J, I have concluded that the Chief Judge did not apply orthodox principles of contractual interpretation in reaching his construction of this contract. In particular, in the passage William Young J cites at [86] the Chief Judge wrongly imported a principle that an express power of qualified recognition was necessary to allow the Secretary to recognise a qualification for particular purposes only. In the context of the first sentence of the cited passage the error in introducing the word “express” does not appear to be a mere slip which can be dismissed as being without consequence. Because of the error, and the absence of any discussion of the point in the Employment Court judgment, it cannot in my view be assumed that the Chief Judge’s approach was based on acceptance of the Tribunal’s construction of the relevant clauses of the contract. The error leads directly to the conclusion that limited recognition was beyond the Secretary’s contractual powers. The protective purpose of s 135, identified in [22], requires appellate intervention. The error of interpretation must be classified as one of principle with the result that the appeal must be allowed and this Court’s interpretation of the relevant provisions, as set out in [79] of William Young J’s judgment, substituted.
GLAZEBROOK J
Introduction
[24] The first respondents in this case (called the Teachers in these reasons) enrolled in newly introduced three year Bachelor of Education degrees from Massey University for the 1999 academic year. Upon enrolling, they were immediately entitled to the credit of 200 points because they held Diplomas in Teaching. They then had to complete only 100 points to receive the degree and had, therefore, achieved two-thirds of the degree merely by enrolling.
[25] At the relevant time, the Teachers’ terms and conditions of employment were governed by the Primary Teachers’ (including Deputy and Assistant Principals and other Unit Holders) Collective Employment Contract 1 February 1998 to 30 April 2001 (the 1998 CEC). The relevant terms of that CEC are set out at [55] – [56] below. In brief, under cl 5.3.1 of the 1998 CEC, teachers were entitled to be paid according to the qualifications they had. A Diploma in Teaching put the teacher in Group Q1, a Higher Diploma of Teaching or two-thirds of a university degree in Group Q2 and a Bachelors degree or better or an Advanced Diploma of Teaching in Group Q3.
[26] Clause 5.10 set out the procedure for recognising qualifications for the purposes of cl 5.3.1. In accordance with that procedure, by circular of 19 May 1999, the Secretary for Education notified the decision that the new three year education degrees would be recognised for Group Q3 status but that completion of two-thirds of such degrees, by the cross crediting of an existing Diploma of Teaching, would not entitle teachers to Group Q2 status.
[27] The Teachers claimed that they were entitled to be Group Q2 status because they had completed two-thirds of their degrees. They applied for a compliance order pursuant to s 55 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991. The Employment Tribunal held that, because the recognition of the new three year degrees had been qualified, they were not entitled to Q2 status. On appeal to the Employment Court, Chief Judge Goddard held that they were so entitled. The appellants appeal against that decision.
[28] A preliminary point arises as to whether an appeal to this Court lies. This depends on whether or not the Employment Court decision is a decision on the construction of the 1998 CEC. If it is, then the Court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal - see s 135 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991. That is the issue addressed in these reasons.
Section 135
[29] In his reasons McGrath J has set out the history of s 135 of the Employment Contracts Act and the approach of this Court to that section and its predecessors. I agree with his analysis. If there are errors of principle in an Employment Court decision, as against errors of interpretation, then an appeal to this Court will lie.
[30] I sound a note of caution. It is important that this Court resist the temptation of turning errors of interpretation into errors of principle merely because it sees the result reached as wrong. After all, even if there is less obvious justification for the restriction on appeals now than when the question was the interpretation of awards, Parliament has kept the provision and, indeed, it has been carried over the into Employment Relations Act 2000 – see s 214. I would also say that any error of principle must be operative in the sense that it must have been causative of the error made before an appeal will lie.
The Employment Tribunal’s decision
[31] Part of the Employment Tribunal’s decision is set out in full at [73] below. It is worth, however, summarising the Tribunal’s decision here for ease of reference and so I can draw attention to certain aspects of that decision.
[32] The Employment Tribunal set out a summary of the evidence and the contentions of the parties. It also analysed the provisions of the CEC. Its conclusion on the interpretation of the CEC (as set out at para 7.1 of its decision) was that, notwithstanding the apparent underlying intention of the provisions of the CEC, the plain words of cls 5.3.1 and 5.10.1 of the CEC entitle any teacher who has acquired two-thirds of a recognised university degree – by whatever means – to be recognised as having Q2 status. The Tribunal said (at para 7.2) that it was not persuaded that the factual background against which the CEC was settled assisted greatly in its interpretation. Nor was it a case in which the interpretation of the CEC contended for by the Teachers was so manifestly absurd that it could not have been the mutual intention of the parties.
[33] The Tribunal went on, in para 7.3, to say that the real issue in the case came down to a point that had not been canvassed by counsel in argument - the terms in which the Secretary for Education recognised the vocational degrees for the purposes of cl 5.10.1 of the CEC. The Tribunal considered the circular of 19 May 1999 and concluded (at para 7.6) that it amounted to qualified recognition of the degree only and thus recognition for Q3 and not for the purposes of Q2 status. It expressed the view (at para 7.7) that, to the extent that the Ministry was entitled under cl 5.10.1 to recognise qualifications for the purposes of the operation of the CEC generally, then the Ministry could also give qualified recognition. That, it said, is what had happened in this case.
[34] At para 7.8, the Tribunal said that it had not ignored the Teachers’ submission that the contention of the Secretary for Education and the Board was that a qualification should be read into the CEC that was not expressly included. The Tribunal said that that was not a complete analysis of the position:
The qualification which is not included in Clause 5.3.1 of the 1988 CEC was achieved by the terms of the Ministry’s qualified recognition of the category of qualifications in question in the circular of 19 May 1999.
[35] This could be read as a suggestion that the Ministry had some power outside the CEC to give qualified recognition in this manner. At para 7.9 the Tribunal expressed the following conclusion:
Thus my conclusion is that whilst there is nothing in the CEC itself (clause 5.3.1, 5.10.1 or elsewhere) which would stand in the way of the first applicants seeking Q2 status, the degrees which they hold two thirds (or more) of have not been recognised in terms which enable them to do so.
[36] This could be read as a conclusion that the CEC gave the Teachers Q2 status but that the circular (ie something outside the contract) took that status away. I suspect that, given the earlier comment at para 7.7, the Tribunal’s finding was in fact that cl 5.10 allowed that qualified recognition but the later paragraphs could certainly be seen as having obscured that point.
Grounds of appeal to the Employment Court
[37] The Notice of Appeal to the Employment Court filed on 26 July 2002 on behalf of the Teachers said that they appealed against that part of the Employment Tribunal’s decision contained in paras 7.3 to 7.10 of the decision on the following ground:
Having correctly determined the contractual interpretation issue in the Appellants’ favour, that is by holding that the plain words of the contract entitle any teacher who had acquired two-thirds of a recognised university degree by whatever means to be recognised as having Q2 status, the Tribunal then erred by introducing and relying upon the concept of qualified recognition which was contrary both to the facts and to the terms of the contract.
[38] This means that the appeal was argued for the Teachers on the basis that the conclusion of the Tribunal at para 7.1 was correct – that is that cl 5.3.1 and 5.10.1 entitled the Teachers to Q2 status, even though they had automatically achieved two‑thirds of the degree immediately upon enrolment.
The Employment Court decision
[39] The relevant parts of the Employment Court’s decision are set out at [75] below.
Proper interpretation of the 1998 CEC
[40] I agree with William Young J that, on the proper interpretation of the 1998 CEC, the Teachers would not be entitled to Q2 group status. My reasons are similar to William Young J’s. In my view, cl 5.3.1 does not come into operation until the qualifications have been recognised in accordance with the procedure set out in cl 5.10. I consider that two-thirds of a university degree is a separate qualification from the university degree itself. It thus needs separate recognition. Under the circular of 19 May 1999 the three-year education degrees were recognised as qualifications for Group Q3. Two-thirds of those degrees were not, however, recognised as a separate qualification for Q2 purposes. The Teachers were thus not entitled to Group Q2 status.
[41] I also agree with William Young J that the qualifications chart in force at the time the 1998 CEC was entered into and which is referred to in cl 5.10.1 (a) of that contract reinforces that as the correct interpretation. To be fair to the Chief Judge, however, I doubt that it was pointed out to him that the chart recognised the Bachelor of Building Science for the purpose of group Q3 but that two-thirds of that degree was not recognised for Q2 purposes. That was only pointed out to us late in the hearing in response to a question on the chart.
[42] Also in fairness to the Chief Judge I point out that, if the Chief Judge recorded the arguments put to him accurately, the argument for the Secretary of Education and the Board of Trustees does not appear to have rested on cl 5.10. This appears to have been the case also before the Tribunal. The argument for the Secretary and the Board appears to have been that the contract must be interpreted as a whole against its factual matrix. The submission was that this meant that the proper interpretation of the contract was that a teacher, in order to qualify for Q2 status, must have completed papers equivalent to two-thirds of a degree in addition to the qualifications recognised for the purposes of group Q1 status. Any other interpretation would lead, it was said, to unfairness and absurdity.
Was there an error of principle in the Employment Court’s approach?
[43] In his reasons, William Young J criticises the judgment of the Employment Court on the basis that it did not apply orthodox legal principles in the interpretation of the CEC. This appears to be based on a view that the Chief Judge did not construe the contract at all – see [87] and [99] below. This criticism would have been valid (and may have amounted to an error of principle in the Employment Court decision) if the judgment could be read in isolation. It cannot. It must be read in light of both the Tribunal’s decision and the grounds of appeal.
[44] What appears to have happened is that the Chief Judge accepted the Tribunal’s interpretation of cls 5.3.1 and 5.10 as set out in para 7.1 of its decision, referred to at [33] above. Although I take a different view of the contract, that appears to me to have been a possible interpretation if cl 5.3.1 is regarded as the dominant provision.
[45] The appeal was predicated on the basis that that part of the Tribunal’s decision were correct. Indeed, as indicated at [42], the Tribunal’s conclusion in para 7.1 appears not to have been challenged directly by the Secretary and the Board. It was said on their behalf that the interpretation contended for led to an absurdity and that it was not the proper interpretation if the contract as a whole was looked at. Both of these arguments were dealt with by the Chief Judge in the Employment Court judgment, albeit in a relatively brief manner. It must be remembered, however, that there had been a full discussion of these issues in the Tribunal’s decision. There was no need in an appellate judgment to duplicate the reasoning of the Tribunal.
[46] Both McGrath J and William Young J have relied particularly on the following comment of the Chief Judge in holding that he made an error of principle in interpreting the contract:
As the Secretary’s power is contractual by nature, an express provision is needed to allow the Secretary to grant qualified recognition.
[47] In my view this comment is quite understandable when the Tribunal’s decision is looked at. As indicated above at [35] and [36], one interpretation of the Tribunal’s decision was that the Ministry had power outside of the contract to recognise the degrees conditionally. It is not surprising in that context that the Chief Judge considered it necessary to emphasise the contractual nature of the power.
[48] It must also be remembered that the Chief Judge had accepted the Tribunal’s interpretation of cls 5.3.1 and 5.10 as meaning that recognition of a degree automatically meant recognition of two-thirds of a degree. If that had been the correct interpretation of those clauses then the Judge would have been quite right to refuse to imply a term into the CEC allowing qualified recognition. Such a term could not in my view have met the test for implying terms into contracts set down by the Privy Council in BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266, 283. Indeed, it could have been seen as contradicting the express terms of the contract. Although the Chief Judge did not express his conclusion in quite that manner this Court should not in my view be too quick to assume an error of principle from infelicity of expression.
[49] The other matter noted particularly by William Young J is the Chief Judge’s reliance on the provisions of the subsequent CEC. It is not necessary to embark on a discussion of whether or not subsequent conduct can be relied on to interpret the terms of a contract. His view of the subsequent CEC appears to me to be used by the Chief Judge merely to confirm an interpretation he has already come to. As such, even if it is not legitimate to rely on subsequent conduct of this kind, it cannot be an operative error in the sense set out in [31] above.
Conclusion
[50] The question was one of interpretation of the 1998 CEC. I am unable to discern an error of principle in the Chief Judge’s approach and, therefore, I would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
WILLIAM YOUNG J
Table of Contents
Para No
INTRODUCTION [51] The background The relevant terms of the CEC [53] The education background [59] The “qualified” recognition of the new degrees [63] The individual cases [65] Subsequent events [68] THE DISPUTE [69] THE DECISION OF THE EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL [72] THE APPEAL TO THE EMPLOYMENT COURT [74] INTERPRETATION OF THE 1998 CEC [76] SECTION 135 OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT 1991 [81] WHERE I DIFFER FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHIEF JUDGE General [84] Express provision required to allow qualified recognition [86] The provisions of the CEC contemplate a progression
through the salary groups
[88] Bizarre consequences [90] The new CEC [92] Individual respondents not to be penalised [94] DOES THE APPEAL CHALLENGE A “DECISION ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF ANY … COLLECTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT”? [96] RESULT [101] Appendix: 1988 Primary, Area School, Secondary Teachers Qualification Charts Introduction
[51] This is an appeal from a judgment of Chief Judge Goddard delivered in the Employment Court on 20 May 2003 in which he found that Ms MihimamaoYates, Ms Judith Rawhiti and Ms Wendy Rankin (“the individual respondents”) were entitled to have cross-credits towards a three year education degree offered by Massey University taken into account for remuneration purposes.
[52] The Secretary for Education and the Board of Trustees of Hill Park Primary School (“the appellants”) now challenge that decision in this Court.
The background
The relevant terms of the CEC
[53] The case arises out of the Primary Teachers’ (including Deputy and Assistant Principals and other Unit Holders) Collective Employment Contract which was operative between 1 February 1998 and 30 April 2001. I will refer to this as “the 1998 CEC”.
[54] Clause 5 of the 1998 CEC provided for remuneration. The detail of the remuneration arrangements as a whole is reasonably complicated. But only one aspect of those arrangements is relevant to this case. This relates to the categorisation by qualification of teachers. The scheme of the clause is that there are three relevant qualification groups and the remuneration entitlements of any particular employee are in part referable to the qualification group of which he or she is a member.
[55] Clause 5.3.1 provided:
An employee who has completed a course of teacher training and has no service credits shall, on appointment to a base scale position, be paid at the first step of the relevant qualification group as follows:
Group Q1 – with a Diploma of Teaching;
Group Q2– with a Higher Diploma of Teaching or 2/3 of a university degree;
Group Q3– with a Bachelors degree or better, or Advanced Diploma of Teaching.
Those teachers with a 4 or 5 year degree shall on appointment be paid at the first step of that degree level.
Those teachers with previous teaching or other recognised service, and/or previous relevant experience, shall be paid at the appropriate service step of the relevant qualification group.
[56] Clause 5.10 provided
5.10.1(a) The qualifications chart sets out recognised qualifications for the purposes of determining entry points into the salary scale. The full qualifications chart shall be set out annually in the Education Gazette.
(b)The basic qualification for primary teaching is the NZ Diploma of Teaching.
(c)Teachers are assessed on the highest qualification held.
(d)Qualifications obtained overseas are assessed in relation to the nearest equivalent NZ qualification.
(e)Teachers who possess two or more qualifications rated Q3, eg, BA and BSc from different subject areas requiring a minimum of 4 years fulltime study are to be placed in group Q3, and would enter the scale at Step 6.
5.10.2The qualification chart will be reviewed and any additional qualifications added each year by the Secretary for Education following consultation with the NZEI as follows:
(a)The Secretary for Education will advise the NZEI at least one month prior to the annual review of the qualifications chart of the new qualification(s) to be considered for inclusion in the chart and the qualification group proposed for each new qualification under consideration;
(b)The NZEI will within one month of receiving this information advise the Secretary for Education of any qualification(s) they wish to see included and the qualification group proposed;
(c)The parties will then meet to discuss the proposals and endeavour to reach an agreement on the proposals;
(d)In the event that agreement is not reached, the Secretary for Education may amend the qualifications chart, as he/she deems appropriate, having regard to the consultation process;
(e)Any changes to the qualifications chart will be notified in the Education Gazette;
(f)The Secretary for Education shall not delete any qualifications from the qualifications chart without the agreement of the NZEI.
[57] The qualifications chart is attached as an appendix. The effect of the chart was that, generally, the same degrees were to be recognised for the purposes of the Q2 and Q3 and groups but this was not always the case. In the “technological” subject area, Victoria University’s Bachelor of Building Science degree was recognised for the purposes of group Q3 but two-thirds of that degree was not recognised for the purposes of group Q2.
[58] It should be noted that provisions similar to cl 5.3.1 have appeared in earlier CECs and that a qualifications chart (up-dated from time to time) had been in effect for many years prior to 1998.
The education background
[59] Up until the mid-1990s the basic primary teaching qualification was a two year diploma of teaching. Education degrees required four years of study.
[60] In the latter part of the 1990s various institutions introduced three year degree courses in teaching; this with a view to replacing eventually the Diploma of Teaching. The Ministry of Education took the view that those who obtained such degrees would be recognised for the purposes of group Q3 and the various education providers were notified accordingly.
[61] This decision on the part of the Ministry did not require contractual implementation until 2000; this because the first cohort of those to complete the new year three year courses would not be qualified until 2000.
[62] Some of the institutions offering the new three year degrees were prepared to cross-credit existing Diplomas of Teaching to the extent of two-thirds of the new degrees. This produced a conundrum for the Ministry. While it was prepared to recognise completed degrees for the purposes of group Q3, it was unwilling to allow those with only Diplomas of Teaching to gain automatic group Q2 status simply by enrolling for such a degree and cross-crediting their existing diplomas.
The “qualified” recognition of the new degrees
[63] In the Education Circular of 19 May 1999, the Secretary for Education notified his decision that three year pre-entry teacher education degrees would be recognised for qualification group Q3 but that completion of two-thirds of such degrees by the cross crediting of an existing Diploma of Teaching would not entitle teachers to group Q2 status.
[64] This decision has not been implemented formally in quite the way contemplated by the 1998 CEC. In particular, no amended qualifications chart has been published in the Education Gazette and if such a chart exists, it was not produced in this Court. The parties have been content to treat the contractual provisions as to amendment of the chart (which may have happened for all I know) and publication in the Education Gazette as directory. I am prepared to do the same.
The individual cases
[65] The three individual respondents had all qualified as teachers in the late 1970s holding, in each case, a Diploma of Teaching. So each was a member of group Q1.
[66] In late 1998 they all enrolled for the three year education degree offered by Massey University. On enrolling, each was credited with 200 of the 300 points required.
[67] Each of the respondents has been a bona fide student at Massey University and has sat and passed further papers. But the case which they have advanced does not turn on this. On their argument, their entitlement to group Q2 status crystallised as soon as they were credited with 200 points and would not have been lost if they had subsequently taken no steps towards completing the balance of the degree.
Subsequent events
[68] The CEC which replaced the 1998 CEC made specific provision for the situation now in issue by providing that the three year degrees are not recognised for the purposes of group Q2.
The dispute
[69] The primary issue between the parties is whether it was open to the Secretary to approve the Massey degree for the purposes of group Q3 but not to recognise cross-credits representing two-thirds of that degree for the purposes of group Q2.
[70] The individual respondents who are supported by the New Zealand Educational Institute, say that the word “degree” in cl 5.3.1 means any degree on the qualifications chart and any other degree subsequently recognised pursuant to cl 5.10. On this basis, they became entitled to group Q2 status once the three year degrees were approved for the purposes of group Q3.
[71] The appellants, on the other hand, maintain that the Secretary for Education was entitled to add the Massey degree to the qualifications recognised for group Q3 but not to add cross-credits representing two-thirds of such a degree to the qualifications recognised for the purposes of group Q2.
The decision of the Employment Tribunal
[72] The case started in the Employment Tribunal. In issue was an application for a compliance order under s 55 of the Employment Contracts Act. This was treated as involving, in substance, “a declaration as to the proper interpretation” of cl 5.3.1 of the 1998 CEC.
[73] In its decision of 28 June 2002 the Tribunal concluded:
7.3Having said all of that, in my view, the real issue in this case comes down to a point that was not canvassed by counsel in argument, namely, the terms in which the second respondent recognised the three year pre-service vocational degrees for the purposes of Clause 5.10.1 of the 1998 CEC.
7.4The evidence was – and I didn’t understand this to be controversial – that the recognition of these was published in the Ministry’s Circular of 19 May 1999.
7.5This circular commenced with some introductory material explaining that it was intended to supplement the qualifications chart referred to in the CEC. It then went on to deal with various sectors and in relation to the primary sector paragraph 4 said:
“Teachers who enrol in the programme of studies for the recently introduced three year, pre-entry teacher education degrees such as the Bachelor of Education (teaching) or the Bachelor of Teaching, and whose Diploma of Teaching counts as credit towards that degree, will not be entitled to a Q2 level when they have completed two-thirds of the degree. However, on completion of the degree their salary will be funded in salary group Q3.”
7.6Whilst the applicants would wish to categorise this announcement as the recognition of the three year pre-service vocational degrees pursuant to Clause 5.10.1 for all purposes, it appears to me to amount rather to a qualified recognition. Paragraph 4 is saying, at one and the same time, that the Ministry will recognise these “recently introduced … degrees” but where a teacher who currently holds a Diploma of Teaching obtains, on the basis of that Diploma of Teaching, a credit of some sort towards the conferment of the degree, the Ministry will not recognise the attainment of two-thirds of the degree as a basis for that teacher to move from Q1 and Q2 status.
7.7In my view, to the extent that the Ministry was entitled under Clause 5.10.1 to recognise qualifications for the purposes of the operation of the CEC generally (and I quite appreciate that this was not the exclusive prerogative of the Ministry), it seems to me that the Ministry might also give qualified recognition. That is precisely what has happened in this case.
7.8I have not ignored, and appreciate the force of, Mr Cranney’s point that the contentions made on behalf of the respondent’s in this case are that a qualification should be read into the 1998 CEC by implication that was expressly included in the current instrument. However, that does not appear to me to be a complete analysis of the position. The qualification which is not included in Clause 5.3.1 of the 1998 CEC was achieved by the terms of the Ministry’s qualified recognition of the category of qualifications in question in the circular of 19 May 1999.
7.9Thus my conclusion is that whilst there is nothing in the CEC itself (clause 5.3.1, 5.10.1 or elsewhere) which would stand in the way of the first applicants seeking Q2 status, the degrees which they hold two thirds (or more) of have not been recognised in terms which enable them to do so.
7.10For the reasons I have attempted to articulate, I am not prepared to make any of the orders sought by the applicants in this case, and their claim for a compliance order and related claims is dismissed.
The appeal to the Employment Court
[74] The present respondents then appealed successfully to the Employment Court.
[75] The key reasoning of Chief Judge Goddard appears in the following passage of his judgment:
23. It is appropriate that this appeal be allowed and the respondents be ordered to comply with the provisions of the 1998 CEC.
24. In coming to this decision there has been no need to look beyond the contractual terms and language. The 1998 CEC is silent as to whether or not the Secretary for Education can place a qualification on the recognition of a university degree. As the Secretary’s power is contractual by nature, an express provision is needed to allow the Secretary to grant qualified recognition. In the 1998 CEC the parties had not agreed that qualified recognition could be granted; in fact, it appears they had not contemplated it. Therefore the Secretary for Education was acting outside his contractual powers when he granted that limited recognition.
25. Further, the provisions of the contract, when read as a whole, contemplate a progression through the salary groups. The appellants’ argument has sought to preserve that progression, while the respondents’ argument negates it.
26. It is true that there is a bizarre consequence arising from the recognition of the Massey bachelor of education degree. If this is to be described as unfairness or absurdity, there is similar unfairness and absurdity whether or not the degree is given full or qualified recognition. As the degree incorporates the diploma of teaching, a teacher will be paid twice for this even when the degree is only recognised for attaining group Q3 status. Therefore, to argue that the teacher should not be paid twice indicates that the degree should not have been recognised in the first place, but does not add weight to the argument that the degree should not be recognised for the purposes of group Q2 status.
27. In addition, it must be noted that it is up to each university to regulate its own procedure, including the recognition of qualifications already held by the student. It is common for a university to grant a number of credits when a student has passed courses, whether at the same or another university. This must be one of the considerations the Secretary for Education takes into account when deciding whether to recognise a degree at all.
28. Finally, the substantive changes between clause 5.3.1 in the 1998 CEC and the subsequent CEC entered into by the parties, which explicitly states that recognition will not be given to these types of degrees for Q2 purposes, indicates that the 1998 CEC is inadequate to prevent full recognition.
29. This is a case where the contractual clauses have failed to keep up to date with changes in practice. The appellants should not be penalised for that failure.
Interpretation of the 1998 CEC
[76] The parties agreed that, in the context of the 1998 CEC as a whole (and particularly cl 5.10), cl 5.3.1 must be read as applying only to degrees recognised in terms of the then current qualifications chart or subsequently recognised under cl 5.10. On this basis, the underlying issue comes down to a very simple question. For the purposes of cl 5.3.1 is a “bachelors degree or better” recognised for the purposes of group Q3 necessarily also a “university degree” for the purposes of the group Q2 qualification “2/3 of university degree”.
[77] The answer to this question is straight-forward. On its true interpretation the contract permits degrees to be recognised for the purposes of group Q3 which are not recognised for the purposes of group Q2:
(a)In the qualifications chart in force at the time the 1998 CEC was entered into, the degree of Bachelor of Building Science was recognised for the purposes of group Q3 but two-thirds of such a degree was not recognised for the purposes of group Q2. Since it is reasonable to assume that cl 5.3 and the qualifications chart should be construed so as to be consistent, it follows that a full degree could be recognised for the purposes of group Q3 despite two‑thirds of the same degree not being recognised for the purposes of group Q2.
(b)Such an approach is also consistent with the terms of cl 5.10.2. This permits decisions to be made as to proposed new qualifications and “the qualification group proposed for each new qualification”. This suggests that a new qualification may be recognised for the purposes of one group but not another and thus for group Q3 but not group Q2.
(c)Such an approach also fits in with the manner in which changes are to be effected (ie by amendment of the qualifications chart). In the present case the amended qualifications chart would have the new three year degrees in the Q3 row but not in the Q2 row.
[78] In [77] I recorded that the parties were agreed that cl 5.3.1 must be read as applying only to degrees recognised in terms of the qualifications chart then current or subsequently recognised under cl 5.10. I am content to decide the case on that basis but think that a better approach is to regard cl 5.3.1 as providing merely an incomplete description (or paraphrase) of the various qualification groups with the operative provisions being found in cl 5.10 and the qualifications chart.
[79] Either way, however, the result is the same. On the true interpretation of the 1998 CEC, two-thirds of a three year degree obtained by cross-crediting a Diploma of Teaching does not count for the purposes of group Q2.
[80] My conclusion as to the true interpretation of the 1998 CEC (which is shared by McGrath and Glazebrook JJ) might be thought to be an end of the case. In fact, however, it merely sets the scene for what is the main issue in the case which is whether it is open to this Court to interfere with the decision of the Chief Judge given s 135 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991
Section 135 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991
[81] Section 135(1) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was in these terms:
Where any party to any proceedings under this Act is dissatisfied with any decision of the Court (other than a decision on the construction of any individual employment contract or collective employment contract) as being erroneous in point of law, that party may appeal to the Court of Appeal against the decision; and section 66 of the Judicature Act 1908 shall apply to any such appeal.
(Emphasis added)
[82] On the face of it, the present case might be thought to involve the construction of a collective employment contract. If so, the decision of Chief Judge Goddard is not subject to appeal. However, this Court has construed the exception to s 135 of the Employment Contracts Act and its precursors reasonably narrowly, see for instance Attorney-General v New Zealand Post-Primary Teachers Association [1992] 2 NZLR 209 and Walker Corporation Ltd v O’Sullivan [1996] 2 ERNZ 513.
[83] On this basis, the question whether the appeal challenges a “decision on the construction of any … collective employment agreement” requires careful and nuanced assessment.
Where I differ from the judgment of the Chief Judge
General
[84] Given s 135(1) of the Employment Contracts Act it is important to identify why the Chief Judge reached a conclusion which differs so radically from the one I prefer.
[85] The most helpful way of doing this is to examine, one by one, the key reasons which he gave for his conclusion.
Express provision required to allow qualified recognition
[86] The first, and no doubt the most important, of the reasons given by the Chief Judge was in these terms:
24. … The 1998 CEC is silent as to whether or not the Secretary for Education can place a qualification on the recognition of a university degree. As the Secretary’s power is contractual by nature, an express provision is needed to allow the Secretary to grant qualified recognition. In the 1998 CEC the parties had not agreed that qualified recognition could be granted; in fact, it appears that they had not contemplated it. Therefore the Secretary for Education was acting outside his contractual powers when granted that limited recognition.
(Emphasis added)
[87] The passage which I have emphasised is a non-sequitur. As I have endeavoured to point out, the issue involves a comparatively simple question of construction. If the issue of construction is resolved in the way that I prefer, it follows that cl 5.10 does permit recognition of a new qualification for the purposes of group Q3 but not group Q2. The approach taken by the Chief Judge meant that he did not identify the true issue of construction raised by the case and thus did not seek to resolve that issue by interpretation (using orthodox techniques) of the 1998 CEC. Indeed, in a real sense, he did not set out to construe the 1998 CEC at all.
The provisions of the CEC contemplate a progression through the salary groups
[88] The next of the reasons was expressed in this way:
25. Further, the provisions of the contract, when read as a whole, contemplate a progression through the salary groups. The appellants’ argument has sought to preserve that progression, while the respondents’ argument negates it.
[89] This is perhaps not the most obvious way of looking at the practical implications of the two arguments. The “progression” which the Chief Judge identified looks pretty artificial given that it was to be achieved by the re-labelling of an existing qualification, which, prior to re-labelling, only warranted group Q1 entitlements.
Bizarre consequences
[90] The Chief Judge then went on:
26. It is true that there is a bizarre consequence arising from the recognition of the Massey bachelor of education degree. If this is to be described as unfairness or absurdity there is similar unfairness and absurdity whether or not the degree is given full or qualified recognition. As the degree incorporates the diploma of teaching, a teacher will be paid twice for this even when the degree is only recognised for attaining group Q3 status. Therefore, to argue that the teacher should not be paid twice indicates that the degree should not have been recognised in the first place, but does not add weight to the argument that the degree should not be recognised for the purposes of group Q2 status.
27. In addition, it must be noted that it is up to each university to regulate its own procedure, including the recognition of qualifications already held by the student. It is common for a university to grant a number of credits when a student has passed courses, whether at the same or another university. This must be one of the considerations the Secretary for Education takes into account when deciding whether to recognise a degree at all.
[91] This reasoning is not particularly convincing. There is a logic to recognising the three year degrees for group Q3 but not cross-credited elements of the same degrees for the purposes of group Q2; this because the final degree is something additional to the previous qualifications of the employee.
The new CEC
[92] The next of the reasons was expressed in this way:
28. Finally, the substantive changes between clause 5.3.1 in the 1998 CEC and the subsequent CEC entered into by the parties, which explicitly states that recognition will not be given to these types of degrees for Q2 purposes, indicates that the 1998 CEC is inadequate to prevent full recognition.
[93] This also is a non-sequitur. The provisions of the subsequent CEC (which are more in keeping with the appellants’ contentions as to the meaning of the 1998 CEC than those of the respondents) simply cannot, either as a matter of logic or orthodox interpretative technique, be deployed in support of the conclusion that the 1998 CEC should be interpreted in the manner contended for by the respondents.
Individual respondents not to be penalised
[94] The key passage in the reasons of the Chief Judge concluded in this way:
29. This is a case where the contractual clauses have failed to keep up to date with changes in practice. The appellants [being the individual respondents in this Court] should not be penalised for that failure.
[95] This may be more in the nature of a comment than a reason. It certainly does not logically support the conclusion. There is, after all, no question of the individual respondents being “penalised”. All that was in issue is whether the repackaging of their existing group Q1 qualifications as two-thirds of a Massey degree entitled them to the benefits of group Q2 status.
Does the appeal challenge a “decision on the construction of any … collective employment agreement”?
[96] This brings me to the ultimate question in the case.
[97] This Court is required to recognise and comply with the limitation on the appellate jurisdiction provided by the exception to s 135. But the Court is also required to recognise that the parties to Employment Court litigation are entitled to the application of orthodox legal principles. This is plainly so as to the implication of terms (as indicated by the NZ Post-Primary Teachers Association case). But it also applies more generally. If satisfied that if the Employment Court “errs in principle in how it goes about interpreting a contract”, this Court has jurisdiction to interfere, see for instance the Walker Corporation case at 514. I am of the view that the Court is also entitled to interfere where the substance of the complaint is that the Employment Court did not construe the contact in question.
[98] I am alert to the need to avoid reasoning along the lines that the Employment Court must have erred in law as to the interpretative techniques used given that the result in that Court differs so markedly from my preferred interpretation. On the other hand, if persuaded that in substance the appellants are not challenging a decision on the construction of the 1998 CEC but rather some other (although associated) legal error, the Court is required to allow the appeal.
[99] I accept that there is at least one aspect of the Chief Judge’s reasoning which might be thought to be referable to an attempt at orthodox interpretation of the 1998 CEC. I am referring here to [25] of his judgment in which he referred to the scheme of the CEC as a whole. But the overall impact of the reasons given is that he did not set out to construe the 1998 CEC in an orthodox way. Rather he assumed, on an a priori basis, that the express contractual provision was required to permit qualified recognition. On the basis of this assumption there was no need to construe the contract as a whole. Glazebrook J has provided a very reasonable explanation as to why the Chief Judge may have taken this approach; this based on the way the case was dealt with by the Employment Tribunal and argued on appeal. But whatever the reason, the result arrived at was not driven by the application of orthodox construction techniques.
[100] For those reasons I am satisfied that the essence of the appeal is not, in substance, a challenge to a “decision on the construction of any … collective employment agreement” but rather a complaint that the Chief Judge did not construe the 1998 CEC.
Result
[101] The appeal is allowed. The decision of the Employment Tribunal is restored. The appellants are entitled to costs of $6,000 together with disbursements (including travelling and accommodation expenses of counsel if any) to be agreed and, in default of agreement, to be fixed by the Registrar.
Solicitors:
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Appellants
Oakley Moran, Wellington for RespondentsAPPENDIX
Appendix 1988 Primary, Area School, Secondary Teachers Qualification Charts
Primary School Teachers: Qualification Groups for Salaries (New Zealand Qualifications)
This chart is for the Primary Service
Qual-
fications
GroupArts Science Agricultural Science Home Economics Commercial Music Art Physical Education Technological Teaching Theological Q3
Step 2M.A.
Dip.Town Planning (AK)
B.A.Hons.
M.Phil.
Dip.Arts (Otago)
M.Ed.
B.Ed.Hons.
M.A.(Applied)
Recr.Admin.
M.Soc.Sc.
B.Soc.Work (Massey)
B.Ed.Studies (VUW)
B.Soc.Sc.Hons (Waikato)M.Sc.
B.Sc.Hons.
Dip.Sci. (Otago)
B.Tech.
(Massey)
B.Min.Tech. Hons. (Otago)
Dip.Sc. (Massey)
Dip.O.R.S. (VUW)
B.V.Sc. (Massey)
B.Pharm. (Otago)
Dip.Stats. (AK)
Dip.Comp.Maths. (AK)
Dip.Math.Ed. (AK)M.Ag.Sc.
B.Ag.Sc.Hons.
B.Ag.Sc.
B.Com.(Ag)
Hon.(Lincoln)
B.Agr.Sc.
B.Hort.Sc.
M.For.Sc.
B.For.Sc. Hons.
B.For.Sc.
Dip.Nat.Res. (Lincoln)
Dip.Agr.Sc. (Lincoln)
Dip.Hort.Sc. (Lincoln)M.H.Sc
B.H.Sc.
MCASM.Com.
LL.M
B.C.A.Hons
B.M.S.Hons.B.M.S.4 year University degree Hons in Commerce, Law, Economics
Dip.Arts in Com. (Otago)
M.P.P. (VUW)
M.M.S. Hons (Waikato)
M.M.S. (Waikato)Mus.D.
M.Mus.
B.Mus.Hons
B.Mus. (Perf)M.F.A. (AK)
B.F.A. (AK)
Dip.F.A.Hons.
Dip.Ind.Des.4yr (Wellington Poly)
Dip.Vis.Com.
Hons.4 yr (Wellington Poly)B.Ph.Ed. (Otago)
M.E.
B.E.
B.Arch.M.Theology (Otago)
B.D. (Otago) post bachelors degreeQ3
Step 1B.A.
B.Ed.
B.Soc.Sc.
B.Soc.Sc. (Waikato)B.Sc.
Dip.Pharm. (CIT)
B.Sc.(Tech) (Waikato)
B.Min.Tech. (Otago)
B.H.B.(AK)B.Ag.
B.Agr.
B.Com..(Ag) (Lincoln)
B.Hort.Dip.H.Sc.
Home Economics Teachers Advanced Dip exam
BCASB.Com.
B.B.S. (Massey)
B.C.A
A.C.A.
LL.B.
A.C.I.S.exam (1980 syllabus)
N.D.B.E.B.Mus
Dip.Mus
Dip Mus.
(Wellington Poly)
F T C L (Music)Dip F.A.
Dip.Tex.Des. 3 yr (Wellington Poly)
Dip.F.A. 3 yr (Otago Poly)
Dip.Vis.Com. 3 yr (Wellington Poly)
Cert.Vis.Com 3 yr (Wellington Poly)
Dip.Graph. Des. 3 yr (AK.T.I) with effect from 26.5.80
Dip.Vis.Com. 3 yr (ChCh Poly)Dip.Ph.Ed.
(Otago)B.B.Sc. (VUW)
NZ Cert. in Building Engineering Quantity Surveying Draughting (all subjects)
Adv.Tech. T.C.
Higher Tech.
T.C. plus Adv.
Trade Cert.
ANCTEdAdvanced Dip. of Teaching B.Theology (Otago)
Q2 2/3 or equivalent percent of degree
Dip.Soc.Work (VUW)
Dip.Ed. (Waikato)
F.T.C.L. (Speech)
Dip.Speech Board (NZ)
NZ Cert in Town Planning2/3 or equivalent percent of degree
NZ.Cert.Sc.
C.O.P.Med.Lab. Tech.
NZ Cert.Computer Tech.
NZ Cert.Statistics2/3 or equivalent percent of degree Nat.Dip.Hort. (NZRIH)
Dip.P and R (Lincoln)2/3 or equivalent percent of degree
Dip.H.Sc.
Home Economics Teachers Diploma exam2/3 or equivalent percent of degree or A.C.A.
NZ Cert.Com.
NZ Cert.Data Processing
A.I.B.(NZ)2/3 or equivalent percent of degree or University Diploma
L.R.S.M.
L.T.C.L.
L.Mus.T.C.L.
G.M.T.D.
Exec.Mus. 2 year (Wellington Poly)2/3 or equivalent percent of degree
Dip.F.A. 2nd prof.
Cert.Graph. Des.
2 yr (ChCh Poly)
Cert.Graph. Des.
2 yr (AK.T.I.) with effect from 26.5.802/3 Dip.Ph.Ed. (Otago) 5 units of degree plus A.H.P.E.R. Adv.Tr.Cert. Higher Tech.T.C.
Adv.Tech.T.C
Approved Passes
Craftsman
Reg. In
Plumbing
Gasfitting
Plumbing and GasfittingDip.T. or recognised components with effect from 1.9.80
Higher Diploma of Teaching2/3 or equivalent percent of degree B.Theology (Otago) Q1 Trained Teachers Cert. Diploma of Teaching NOTE: The basic qualification for primary teaching is the New Zealand Trained Teachers’ Certificate. For the purpose of employment as a teacher, a Certificate of Competence will be regarded as equivalent to a New Zealand Trained Teachers’ Certificate. Teachers are assessed on the highest qualification held. Qualifications obtained overseas are assessed in relation to the nearest equivalent New Zealand qualifications. Teachers who possess two or more qualifications rated in Group Q3, Step 1, eg B.A. and B.Sc. from different subject areas requiring a minimum of 4 years’ full-time study, are to be placed in Group Q3, Step 2, with effect from 28 January 1983. Advanced Trade Certificates are recognised in approved Trades (see Education Gazette, 1 September 1987).
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1
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