| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND |
| SC 124/2010 [2011] NZSC 12 |
| BETWEEN SAXMERE COMPANY LIMITED |
| AND WOOL BOARD DISESTABLISHMENT COMPANY LIMITED |
| Court: Blanchard, Tipping and McGrath JJ |
| Counsel: D J Chisholm and T P Mullins for Applicant |
| Judgment: 9 March 2011 |
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs of $2,500 to the respondent.
REASONS
The nub of Saxmere’s case is that the Wool Board unlawfully refused to differentiate Saxon wool from Merino wool and, in particular, unlawfully declined to assist Saxon growers with promotion and development costs. The Board’s levies on Saxon wool were used to fund the marketing of Merino wool by Merino New Zealand Ltd (a joint venture of the Board and a society of Merino growers).
On 20 February 1998 the Board entered into a heads of agreement with the society. That agreement gave Merino New Zealand responsibility for marketing all wool up to 24 microns, which included Saxon wool. It also gave Merino New Zealand a share of the levies generated by Saxon wool. Although in the Courts below Saxmere alleged that some later decisions of the Board were also unlawful, its leave application impugns only the decision of 20 February 1998.
Saxmere’s complaint is that in making that decision the Board failed to comply with s 6(6) of the Wool Board Act 1997 which was, until repeal of that Act on 15 September 2003, in the following form:
(6)The Board must not determine that a function or element of a function is to be performed by a particular mechanism and entity (that is to say the Board, a partnership or joint venture, or some person other than the Board) unless it has –
(a) Considered other mechanisms and kinds of entity that might reasonably be expected to be able to perform the function or element efficiently and effectively; and
(b) Satisfied itself that the mechanism and entity are likely to be the most efficient and effective means of performing the function or element.
The High Court[1] concluded that the subsection had been complied with. The Wool Board had not done a comparative exercise but at that time Saxmere was not a reasonable alternative to Merino New Zealand even in relation to the marketing of Saxon wool only.
[1]Saxmere Company Ltd v The Wool Board Disestablishment Company Ltd HC Wellington CIV-485-2003-2724 per Miller J.
In the Court of Appeal[2], Hammond and Chambers JJ both found that the Board had failed to correctly apply s 6(6). They gave the subsection an interpretation favourable to Saxmere. On the other hand, Ellen France J gave the subsection a different interpretation. In its application for leave Saxmere says that it wishes to challenge her interpretation. However, what Ellen France J said in this connection is not amenable to appeal as it did not represent the view of the Court on the interpretation of the subsection. That interpretation has been…
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- Case
- [2011] NZSC 12
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in this case revolved around the interpretation and application of section 6(6) of the Wool Board Act 1997, which required the Board to consider other mechanisms and entities that could efficiently and effectively perform a function before determining that a particular mechanism and entity would be used. The Court of Appeal had interpreted the subsection in favour of Saxmere, but the majority found that the Board had met the requirements of the subsection. Additionally, the tentative nature of the Board's decision on 20 February 1998 meant that it did not have the effect of excluding Saxmere's proposals if they were to further develop them.
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in dismissing the application for leave to appeal was that there was no question of public or general importance, and that concurrent findings of fact had been made on the point. The Supreme Court also noted that any challenge to the decision of 20 February 1998 faced the difficulty that the decision was clearly tentative. The third proposed ground, whether a declaration should have been made because the Wool Board had breached section 6(6), was deemed moot. The Supreme Court was not persuaded that there was any good reason in the public interest for hearing the appeal.
The final order of the Supreme Court was to dismiss the application for leave to appeal with costs of $2,500 to the respondent.
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