Savvy Vineyards 4334 Limited v Weta Estate Limited

[2018] NZHC 1771

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2016-404-2735

[2018] NZHC 1771

BETWEEN

SAVVY VINEYARDS 4334 LIMITED

First Plaintiff

SAVVY VINEYARDS 3552 LIMITED
Second Plaintiff

AND

WETA ESTATE LIMITED

First Defendant

TIROSH ESTATE LIMITED

Second Defendant

Hearing:

On the papers

Counsel:

DPH Jones QC and CL Bryant for the Plaintiffs

R E Harrison QC and W D Woodd for the Defendants

Judgment:

17 July 2018

JUDGMENT OF  GORDON J

[As to costs]

This judgment was delivered by me on 17 July 2018 at 4 pm, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

Solicitors:           Hesketh Henry, Auckland

Boyle Mathieson, Auckland

Counsel:DPH Jones QC, Auckland R E Harrison QC, Auckland

SAVVY VINEYARDS 4334 LTD v WETA ESTATE LTD [2018] NZHC 1771 [17 July 2018]

Introduction

[1]    The first plaintiff had options to purchase grapes from two vineyards owned by the first defendant under two grape supply agreements, one for each vineyard. Similar agreements existed as between the second plaintiff and second defendant.

[2]    The defendants have refused to supply grapes to the plaintiffs, claiming that the plaintiffs failed to exercise their options to purchase grapes within the time specified in the grape supply agreements and those options had accordingly lapsed.

[3]    The plaintiffs brought proceedings which were split into two separate stages, namely liability and (if necessary) damages.

[4]    In my judgment on the liability stage,1 I found in favour of the plaintiffs on one of three causes of action.

[5]    On the second (successful) cause of action, I made a declaration that the plaintiffs were entitled to purchase the 2016 to 2018 harvests and are entitled to purchase subsequent harvests on the terms set out in the grape supply agreements.2 They are therefore entitled to pursue a damages claim for the defendants’ failure to supply grapes for the 2016, 2017 and 2018 harvests.

[6]    In their third (unsuccessful) cause of action, the plaintiffs sought the same relief as was sought in the second cause of action on an alternative legal basis, namely an implied contract and/or an estoppel.

[7]    In their first cause of action, which was also unsuccessful, the plaintiffs claimed for their lost opportunity to exercise the options to purchase grapes from the 2014 and subsequent harvests. The plaintiffs are therefore unable to pursue a damages claim for the 2014 and 2015 harvests.

[8]    I dismissed all of the defendants’ counterclaims. One was a joint counterclaim seeking declarations that the plaintiffs’ exercise of options for the 2016 and all

1      Savvy Vineyards 4334 Ltd v Weta Estate Ltd [2018] NZHC 989.

2 At [306].

subsequent harvests were invalid and ineffectual; and that the plaintiffs’ purchase options had permanently expired and lapsed. Second counterclaims were made separately by each defendant in relation to the second cause of action, seeking rectification of the grape supply agreements (these latter counterclaims were contingent on the Court accepting the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the relevant clauses in the grape supply agreements).

[9]I then reserved costs by way of the following direction:

[310] Costs are reserved. The Savvy companies have partially succeeded in their claims. I would hope that the parties can agree costs. In that case, they should file a joint memorandum within 20 working days of the date of this judgment. If agreement cannot be reached, the Savvy companies are to file their memorandum within 25 working days of the date of this judgment, and Weta and Tirosh within a further five working days. Memoranda should not exceed five pages.

[10]   The parties have been unable to agree on costs and separate memoranda have been filed.

The application

[11]   The plaintiffs seek costs on a 2B basis in the sum of $59,318 plus disbursements of $22,502.74, together totalling $81,820.74, as set out in the plaintiffs’ schedule which is attached to this judgment as Annexure A.

[12]The costs claimed include an amount for second counsel.

[13]   The claim also includes costs on the application by the first plaintiff for an interim injunction restraining the first defendant from selling its vineyards unless the terms of sale complied with a particular clause of the grape supply agreements. Shortly before the hearing, which was set down for 11 August 2017, the first defendant gave an undertaking in terms as sought in the application and costs were reserved pending the outcome of the liability trial. This claim is against the first defendant only.

[14]The claim for costs does not include any adjustment for partial success.

[15]   The plaintiffs also seek an allowance for the costs of preparing their memorandum in support of the application for costs.

The opposition

[16]   The defendants accept that they should pay costs on a 2B basis, but submit that an appropriate reduction should be made to take into account the two causes of action on which the plaintiffs did not succeed. They also say that even though the plaintiffs succeeded on the second cause of action, there were some legal arguments in relation to that cause of action on which the plaintiffs did not succeed. All of those matters led to a significant increase in the defendants’ costs.

[17]   The defendants accordingly submit that all of the items in the plaintiffs’ schedule of proposed 2B costs (except for the items relating to discovery, inspection and the first plaintiff’s interim injunction application) be reduced by 40 per cent.

[18]   In relation to the plaintiffs’ claim for discovery, inspection and the first plaintiff’s interim injunction application, the defendants submit they should be disallowed in their entirety.

[19]   In relation to disbursements, the defendants submit that the hearing fee should also be reduced by 40 per cent to take account of the increase in hearing time attributable to the two causes of action on which the plaintiffs did not succeed and the issues in the second cause of action on which the plaintiffs did not succeed.

[20]   The defendants also submit that the sums claimed based on the invoices of the plaintiffs’ witnesses, Gerard Grant and Dr David Jordan, should be disallowed.

[21]   The defendants further submit that if it is found that the defendants are entitled in some degree to a reduction in the level of costs claimed by the plaintiffs, then the plaintiffs’ request for costs on the cost submissions should be declined.

[22]   Finally, the defendants acknowledge that their rectification counterclaims under the second cause of action, which the defendants brought as an alternative challenge to the plaintiffs’ case as to the natural and ordinary meaning of certain

clauses in the grape supply agreements, contributed to the overall time and effort directed to that cause of action.

Issues

[23]The issues for determination are as follows:

(a)Should the Court award costs at this stage, namely after a liability hearing only, or should it reserve costs until after the second stage damages hearing;

(b)Should costs be awarded on a 2B basis;

(c)Should the Court certify second counsel;

(d)What reduction, if any, should the Court make to the items of costs claimed (except the items relating to discovery, inspection and the interim injunction application) and the disbursement for a hearing fee to take into account:

(i)That the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their first and third causes of action; and/or

(ii)That, while the plaintiffs were successful on the second cause of action, some of their legal arguments in support of that cause of action were not upheld;

(e)Should the following claims for costs be disallowed:

(i)Plaintiffs’ discovery;

(ii)Plaintiffs’ inspection of defendants’ documents; and

(iii)First plaintiff’s application for interim injunction against first defendant;

(f)Should the following claims for disbursements be disallowed:

(i)Amounts claimed for attendances by plaintiffs’ witnesses;

a.Gerard Grant;

b.Dr David Jordan;

(ii)First plaintiff’s claim for a filing fee for its interlocutory application for interim injunction; and

(g)Should the Court award costs on this costs application?

Decision

Should a decision on costs be deferred until after the second stage damages hearing?

[24]   A Court may choose to reserve costs until the outcome of a quantum hearing is known. But, there is no principle in favour of deferring costs.3

[25]   The defendants take no issue with costs being fixed at this point. They properly accept4 that the declaration of the plaintiffs’ entitlement to purchase future harvests constitutes meaningful relief (regardless of the level of any damages award).

[26]There is also the fact that the plaintiffs have incurred significant costs to date.

[27]   For all these reasons, I consider it is appropriate in this case to award costs on the liability hearing now.

Categorisation

[28]   The parties agree that costs should be on a 2B basis. I consider that is the appropriate categorisation.

3      Cousins & Associates v FM Custodians Ltd [2013] NZCA 99 at [17].

4      The acceptance is subject to the outcome of their appeal to the Court of Appeal against my decision.

Should second counsel be certified?

[29]   Certification of second counsel is at the discretion of the Court. I consider certification should be given for second counsel in this case. The defendants do not argue otherwise. This is now the ninth year of litigation between the parties, with a decision in prior proceedings arising out of the same contractual relationships between the parties having been appealed to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. The plaintiffs and defendants both instructed Queens Counsel, which reflected the value of the claim and the history of litigation between the parties.

Should the Court make any reduction in the costs claimed?

[30]   The starting point in any costs assessment is that all matters with regard to costs are at the discretion of the Court.5 This discretion is not unfettered and is to be guided by the general principles in rr 14.2 to 14.7 of the High Court Rules (the Rules). A fundamental general principle is that costs follow the event.6 The defendants do not submit that there should be a departure from this general principle and they accept that on a common sense approach the plaintiffs have succeeded overall.

[31]   The real issue is whether there should be a reduction in costs. Rule 14.7(d) of the Rules allows the Court to reduce costs otherwise payable where the party claiming costs has failed in relation to a cause of action or issue which significantly increased the costs of the party opposing costs.

[32]   Mr Jones QC for the plaintiffs submits that their failed arguments did not significantly increase the defendants’ costs at all. There was no discrete evidence called in support of the third cause of action which was essentially a series of legal arguments. The defendants addressed five pages to the third cause of action in their 57-page closing submissions.

[33]   Mr Jones also submits that the defendants did not discover any evidence or call any witnesses in opposition to the first cause of action.

5      High Court Rules, r 14.1(1).

6      Rule 14.2(1)(a).

[34]   Further, as to the first cause of action, in relation to time cross-examining the plaintiffs’ witnesses, Mr Jones submits that Mr Grant and Dr Jordan took less than an hour between them, while the cross-examination of Peter Vegar on matters relating to the first cause of action lasted just over one session.

[35]   Mr Jones does acknowledge that the defendants’ closing submissions on the first cause of action were lengthy. However, he says that the overall time taken up by the first cause of action, that is cross-examination together with closing submissions, was at the most less than a day.

[36]   Mr Jones contrasts this with the majority of pre-trial steps and hearing time being taken up by the defendants’ interpretation argument and failed rectification counterclaims both in relation to the second cause of action. Two of the defendants’ witnesses gave evidence on these issues and Mr Jones submits that most of the cross- examination of the plaintiffs’ witnesses was directed at these issues.

[37]   Mr Jones therefore submits that any deduction should be limited to $3,345, being one day of the trial.

[38]   Mr Harrison QC for the defendants submits, in relation to the unsuccessful first cause of action, that this significantly increased the defendants’ costs. He submits the evidence-in-chief of both Mr Grant and Dr Jordan was solely directed at this cause of action, and that more than half of Mr Vegar’s primary brief of evidence was similarly directed at the first cause of action.

[39]   Mr Harrison also submits that the entirety of the plaintiffs’ discovery, including the documents for which confidentiality was claimed, was solely directed at the first cause of action. He acknowledges that the defendants did not discover documents in opposition, but it was necessary to review the plaintiffs’ documents.

[40]   In relation to the unsuccessful third cause of action, Mr Harrison says that even accepting that the facts were already largely documented and not in dispute, the legal arguments nevertheless occupied six to seven pages of defendants’ counsel’s 53 pages of submissions.

[41]   In relation to the second cause of action, Mr Harrison submits that the plaintiffs succeeded based solely on the “natural and ordinary meaning” of the words in the agreements. However, he says the supporting arguments advanced by the plaintiffs were not upheld and therefore were unnecessary.

[42]   The test I must apply is whether the causes of actions or issues in respect of which the plaintiffs failed “significantly increased the costs of the party opposing costs”.7

[43]   It is difficult to be absolutely precise as to how much preparation and hearing time related to claims or issues in respect of which the plaintiffs failed.

[44]   Dealing with the first cause of action, the evidence of Mr Grant, Dr Jordan and the relevant part of Peter Vegar’s evidence, in total, took less than half a day. However, as properly acknowledged by Mr Jones, the defendants’ closing submissions were lengthy. In terms of hearing time on the first cause of action, including both cross- examination and closing submissions, this would have occupied perhaps up to a day.

[45]   In relation to the third cause of action, the extent of written submissions (six pages out of 57 pages) and hearing time devoted to those submissions was modest. There was no separate evidence called.

[46]   In relation to the second cause of action, the Court did not accept the plaintiffs’ supporting legal arguments, but their main argument was accepted and the plaintiffs succeeded overall on this cause of action.

[47]   On the other hand, the defendants’ unsuccessful rectification counterclaims contributed significantly to the overall time and effort directed at the second cause of action. Two of the defendants’ witnesses gave evidence in support of the rectification counterclaims and a significant part of the cross-examination of those two witnesses, as well cross-examination of the three witnesses for the plaintiffs, was directed at issues relating to the rectification counterclaims.

7      Rule 14.7(d).

[48]   In my view, the real focus of the Court’s consideration of a reduction is in relation to the first cause of action. The hearing in total, including closing submissions, occupied five days.

[49]   I consider the plaintiffs’ proposed deduction of $3,345, being one day of the trial, does not sufficiently allow for the increase in the defendants’ costs arising from the failed causes of action, the first cause of action in particular. While one day fairly represents the amount of hearing time, it does not take into account other attendances and costs over and above the hearing time. However, the one day of hearing time provides a useful benchmark. That one day represents 20 per cent of the five-day hearing.

[50]   I therefore propose to apply a 20 per cent reduction to the costs claimed, as well as to the disbursement for the hearing fee.

Should certain claims for costs be disallowed?

(a)Plaintiffs’ discovery

[51]The plaintiffs seek $5,575 as costs of discovery.

[52]   Both parties acknowledge that by agreement they were not required to include in their affidavits of documents those documents already disclosed in the previous proceedings. However, Mr Jones submits that the parties were nonetheless required to review all documents in their possession relevant to the statement of claim and counterclaims to identify whether discovery had in fact previously been given, and then prepare lists of documents accordingly. He says the documents relating to the second cause of action and counterclaims were extensive.

[53]   Mr Harrison, on the other hand, provides background context by noting that from early 2010 onwards the plaintiffs and defendants corresponded via their respective solicitors in relation to the on-going disputes arising out of the agreements relating to the vineyards. He says that the grape supply agreements and vineyard management agreements, and all contractual and other documents relevant to the dispute, were annexed to the parties’ affidavits filed in the 2010 injunction application

and in the common bundle for the substantive trial held in 2012. Any correspondence after that date was between the parties’ solicitors.

[54]   Therefore, Mr Harrison says that all documents conceivably relevant to the contractual interpretation issue in the second cause of action, and the defendants’ counterclaims for rectification in that same cause of action, were either already in evidence in the earlier proceedings and/or were documented in subsequent correspondence between solicitors. All these documents were therefore outside the scope of the discovery order.

[55]   Mr Harrison says that any review by the plaintiffs of documents in the plaintiffs’ possession would not have been for the purpose of determining whether discovery had previously been given, but rather for the purposes of preparation of the plaintiffs’ witnesses’ briefs and/or the common bundle, both of which are items of costs which have been separately claimed.

[56]   Therefore, Mr Harrison says that the entirety of the plaintiffs’ discovery related solely to the failed first cause of action and accordingly an allowance for preparation of the list of documents on discovery is not appropriate.

[57]   While I acknowledge the force of Mr Harrison’s argument, I consider that at least some review by the plaintiffs was required to ensure that, in fact, all documents relevant to the second cause of action had been discovered. However, I reduce the claimed amount of $5,575 by 70 per cent. The amount allowed is therefore $1,672.50.

(b)Plaintiffs’ inspection of defendants’ documents

[58]   The plaintiffs claim the sum of $3,345 for inspection of documents. Mr Jones submits that although documents relating to the second cause of action and counterclaims were not provided following an exchange of lists in the usual way, an inspection process was required and documents relating to the earlier proceeding were referenced in briefs of evidence or provided for the bundle.

[59]   I accept Mr Harrison’s submission that an allowance for inspection is not appropriate. Any inspection of documents by the plaintiffs relating to the plaintiffs’

own witness briefs would fall within the item 30 allowance which is already claimed. Any inspection by the plaintiffs of documents referred to in the briefs of defendants’ witnesses is part of the item 33 allowance, again already claimed. Any review of documents for the purpose of inclusion in the common bundle is covered under the item 31 allowance. Again, that is already claimed.

[60]The claim for $3,345 is disallowed.

(c)Costs on interim injunction application

[61]   The first plaintiff seeks a total of $4,906 made up of five individual costs claims as set out in the attached schedule, Annexure A.

[62]   Mr Harrison submits that solely in order to avoid wastage of costs and court time, the first defendant gave, on a without prejudice basis, an undertaking to comply with the terms of orders sought. He submits that Mr Vegar’s supporting affidavit demonstrated that the application had no prima facie merit. The stated basis for the application was a rumour that the first defendant may be selling its vineyards. Also, the first plaintiff, plainly insolvent Mr Harrison submits, offered nothing by way of security for its supporting undertaking as to damages.

[63]   However, the first defendant had declined to give Mr Vegar an assurance that it would comply with certain obligations under the grape supply agreements if the vineyards were sold. The first plaintiff therefore filed the application. While he deposed in his affidavit in reply that the first defendant had not initiated any step to market its vineyards, Mr Forlong (for the first defendant) nevertheless deposed that he had been approached by three potential purchasers. He further deposed that while the first defendant was not attempting to market its vineyards, it would look seriously at offers made at an appropriate level. It opposed the application as it wanted to be free to accept such offers if the right opportunity arose.

[64]   The fixture was vacated by consent when the first defendant gave an undertaking in terms sought in the application. I therefore consider the claim is properly made and I allow the sum of $4,906.

Whether certain claims for disbursements should be disallowed

(a)Gerard Grant

[65]   The plaintiffs claim $601 being the cost of Mr Grant’s flights to and from Auckland.

[66]   The plaintiffs submit that it was difficult to see from the questions addressed to Mr Grant in cross-examination that any purpose was served by requiring him to attend (the plaintiffs having invited the defendants to agree to his evidence). Nevertheless, Mr Grant’s evidence related solely to the unsuccessful first cause of action.

[67]I therefore disallow this claim.

(b)Dr Jordan

[68]   The plaintiffs claim $7,422.34 being the total of three invoices submitted by Dr Jordan as set out in the plaintiffs’ schedule, Annexure A.

[69]   Mr Jones submits that Dr Jordan’s attendance at the trial was necessary to rebut certain of Mr Forlong’s evidence for the defendants and to enable the Court to assess witness credibility for the rectification counterclaims.

[70]   However, the first of Dr Jordan’s invoices for $3,018.75 is dated 1 February 2018, which was prior to the service of the defendants’ briefs on the plaintiffs. In other words, it was not in response to any of Mr Forlong’s evidence.

[71]   The second and third invoices for $215.63 and $4,187.96 are dated after the provision of Mr Forlong’s brief of evidence. However, I accept the submission made by Mr Harrison that Dr Jordan’s evidence involved Dr Jordan giving evidence of what was said in a conversation with Mr Forlong, rather than Dr Jordan applying any particular expertise for which his hourly rate as an expert might be charged. I therefore disallow the claim for Dr Jordan’s invoices.

(c)Filing fee for interim injunction

[72]   Having allowed the claim for costs on the interim injunction, I also allow the filing fee of $500 (but with the necessary deduction for the GST component).

Should the Court award costs on this costs’ application?

[73]   Mr Jones submits that the Court should award costs on this costs application. He says that the plaintiffs provided their schedule annexed to this judgment and invited the defendants to agree costs. He submits that the position taken by the defendants at that time, that costs should lie where they fall, is not consistent with the Rules or previous judgments of this Court. Accordingly, the plaintiffs seek an allowance for costs of preparing the submission and suggest an allowance of $2,230 (one day).

[74]   Mr Harrison accepts that the plaintiffs did invite the defendants to agree costs and disbursements as set out in the plaintiffs’ schedule. He says that a response was sent on behalf of the defendants, taking the position that causes of actions and issues won and lost were approximately even. That was then followed by the service of the plaintiffs’ costs memorandum.

[75]   In my view, neither party’s position has been completely accepted by the Court. The Court of Appeal held, in Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd,8 that there was to be no order for costs made in respect of the costs application itself as neither side’s position had been completely upheld.9

[76]   In this case, I have determined that the defendants are entitled in some degree to a reduction in the level of costs claimed by the plaintiffs. The application for costs on costs submissions is declined.

8      Paper Reclaim Ltd v Aotearoa International Ltd [2007] NZCA 544.

9 At [62].

Result

[77]   The plaintiffs are entitled to costs of $37,731.60 as set out in Annexure B to this judgment and disbursements to be fixed by the Registry (to take into account the GST component) against the defendants jointly.

[78]   The first plaintiff is additionally entitled to costs of $4,906 (being the costs relating to the first plaintiff’s application for an interim injunction against the first defendant) against the first defendant.

[79]I make orders accordingly.

Gordon J

Annexure A

Item	Description	Daily Rate	Number of Days	Total
1	Commencement of proceedings by plaintiffs	$2,230.00	3	$6,690.00
2	Reply and defence to counterclaim	$2,230.00	2	$4,460.00
10	Preparation for case management conference	$2,230.00	0.4	$892.00
11	Filing memorandum for case management conference, 12 December 2017	$2,230.00	0.4	$892.00
Discovery and inspection
20	List of documents on discovery, 5 October 2017 and supplementary affidavit on 14 December 2017	$2,230.00	2.5	$5,575.00
21	Inspection of documents	$2,230.00	1.5	$3,345.00
Preliminary questions and hearing
11	Joint memorandum of counsel as to determination of separate preliminary questions and priority fixture, 15 August 2017	$2,230.00	0.4	$892.00
30	Plaintiffs’ preparation of briefs	$2,230.00	2.5	$5,575.00
31	Plaintiffs’ preparation of list of issues, authorities and common bundle	$2,230.00	2.5	$5,575.00
33	Preparation for hearing	$2,230.00	3	$6,690.00
26	Appearance at hearing of defended application for principal counsel	$2,230.00	4	$8,920.00
27	Second and subsequent counsel	$2,230.00	2	$4,460.00
29	Sealing order or judgment	$2,230.00	0.2	$446.00
First plaintiff’s application for interim injunction against first defendant (costs reserved, by minute dated 1 August 2017)
22	Filing interlocutory application dated 11 April 2017	$2,230.00	0.6	$1,338.00
11	Filing memorandum of counsel re application for interim injunction, 11 April 2017	$2,230.00	0.4	$892.00
11	Filing memorandum of counsel in reply to first defendant’s memorandum, 28 April 2017	$2,230.00	0.4	$892.00
11	Joint memorandum of counsel, 17 May 2017 (prepared by first plaintiff)	$2,230.00	0.4	$892.00
11	Joint memorandum of counsel as to vacation of 11 August fixture, 28 July 2017	$2,230.00	0.4	$892.00
Total costs	$59,318.00
Disbursements
31 October 2016	Filing fee – initiating the proceeding	$1,350.00
7 November 2016	Process server fee – service on Weta Estate Ltd	$138.00
10 November 2016	Process server fee – service on Tirosh Estate Ltd	$276.00
25 July 2017	Filing fee reply and defence to counterclaim	$110.00

25 July 2017	Courier fee – filing reply and defence to counterclaim	$5.36
20 December 2017	Courier fee – filing plaintiffs’ list of documents	$8.14
Preliminary hearing (12-14, 27 and 28 March)
8 September 2017	Setting down fee	$1,600.00
8 September 2017	Courier fee	$7.91
22 January 2018	Hearing fee	$8,000.00
5 March 2018	Courier fee – filing common bundle	$41.48
5 March 2018	Courier fee – collection of copied common bundles from Colour Copy & Print	$53.95
5 March 2018	Courier fee – forwarding additional folders for common bundle to Colour Copy & Print	$22.79
6 March 2018	Courier fee – service of common bundle on Dr Harrison QC	$25.75
6 March 2018	Courier fee – service of common bundle on Boyle Mathieson	$32.35
8 March 2018	Courier fee – service of additional folders for common bundle (Dr Harrison QC)	$51.93
8 March 2018	Courier fee – service of additional folders for common bundle (Boyle Mathieson)	$37.62
12 March 2018	Colour Copy & Print Ltd – copying common bundle	$2,218.12
External witnesses – invoices for attendances
1 February 2018	Vine to wine to market invoice (Dr Jordan at consultancy fee rate; evidence preparation)	$3,018.75
5 March 2018	Vine to wine to market invoice (Dr Jordan at consultancy fee rate; review defendant’s briefs)	$215.63
13 March 2018	Gerard Grant travel costs – flights to and from Auckland	$601.00
23 March 2018	Vine to wine market invoice (Dr Jordan; evidence preparation and attending Court)	$4,187.96
First plaintiff’s application for interim injunction against first defendant
11 April 2017	Filing fee for interlocutory application	$500.00
Total disbursements	$22,502.74
Grand total	$81,820.74

Annexure B

Item	Description	Daily Rate	Number of Days	Total
1	Commencement of proceedings by plaintiffs	$2,230.00	3	$6,690.00
2	Reply and defence to counterclaim	$2,230.00	2	$4,460.00
10	Preparation for case management conference	$2,230.00	0.4	$892.00
11	Filing memorandum for case management conference, 12 December 2017	$2,230.00	0.4	$892.00
Discovery and inspection
20	List of documents on discovery, 5 October 2017 and supplementary affidavit on 14 December 2017	$2,230.00	2.5	$1,672.50
Preliminary questions and hearing
11	Joint memorandum of counsel as to determination of separate preliminary questions and priority fixture, 15 August 2017	$2,230.00	0.4	$892.00
30	Plaintiffs’ preparation of briefs	$2,230.00	2.5	$5,575.00
31	Plaintiffs’ preparation of list of issues, authorities and common bundle	$2,230.00	2.5	$5,575.00
33	Preparation for hearing	$2,230.00	3	$6,690.00
26	Appearance at hearing of defended application for principal counsel	$2,230.00	4	$8,920.00
27	Second and subsequent counsel	$2,230.00	2	$4,460.00
29	Sealing order or judgment	$2,230.00	0.2	$446.00
Total costs for this proceeding	$47,164.50
Discounted by 20 per cent	$37,731.60
First plaintiff’s application for interim injunction against first defendant (costs reserved, by minute dated 1 August 2017)
22	Filing interlocutory application dated 11 April 2017	$2,230.00	0.6	$1,338.00
11	Filing memorandum of counsel re application for interim injunction, 11 April 2017	$2,230.00	0.4	$892.00
11	Filing memorandum of counsel in reply to first defendant’s memorandum, 28 April 2017	$2,230.00	0.4	$892.00
11	Joint memorandum of counsel, 17 May 2017 (prepared by first plaintiff)	$2,230.00	0.4	$892.00
11	Joint memorandum of counsel as to vacation of 11 August fixture, 28 July 2017	$2,230.00	0.4	$892.00
Total costs	$42,637.60