Rolleston v The Queen

Case [2020] NZSC 113


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ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF PREVIOUSLY SUPPRESSED MINUTES ISSUED IN RELATION TO THIS MATTER UNTIL FURTHER ORDER OF THIS COURT.

 NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS, OCCUPATION OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF COMPLAINANT PROHIBITED BY S 203 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011. SEE

 NOTE: PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS, OCCUPATION OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF ANY COMPLAINANT UNDER THE AGE OF 18 YEARS WHO APPEARED AS A WITNESS OR NAMED WITNESS UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE PROHIBITED BY S 204 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011. SEE

 NOTE: PUBLICATION OF ANY MATERIAL, BROADCASTING OF ANY MATTER OR DISCLOSURE OF ANY INFORMATION THAT IDENTIFIES OR MAY LEAD TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF A JUROR OR FORMER JUROR PROHIBITED BY S 32B OF THE JURIES ACT 1981. SEE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI MANA NUI

 SC 17/2019
 [2020] NZSC 113
BETWEEN

BROOKE CHRISTIE ROLLESTON
Appellant

AND

THE QUEEN
Respondent

SC 18/2019

BETWEEN

BRANDON JAMES ROCHE
Appellant

AND

THE QUEEN
Respondent

Hearings:

20 June and 13 November 2019

Court:

Winkelmann CJ, Glazebrook, O’Regan, Ellen France and Williams JJ

Counsel:
(20 June 2019)


Counsel:
(13 November 2019)

E Huda and T D A Harre for Appellant in SC 17/2019
A J Bailey for Appellant in SC 18/2019
M J Lillico and K L Kensington for Respondent

E Huda for Appellant in SC 17/2019
A J Bailey for Appellant in SC 18/2019
M J Lillico and M H Cooke for Respondent

Judgments:

26 June and 19 November 2019

Reasons:

19 October 2020

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AOrder made directing an inquiry to be undertaken by an independent practitioner of the jury foreperson in the appellants’ trial on terms to be settled following receipt of a memorandum of counsel.

BThe application to cross-examine the foreperson is dismissed.

CThe appeals are dismissed.

DExisting suppression orders in respect of the minutes issued in relation to this matter remain in place but are varied to continue until further order of this Court.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

Para No.
Winkelmann CJ, O’Regan, Ellen France and Williams JJ [1]
Glazebrook J [72]

WINKELMANN CJ, O’REGAN, ELLEN FRANCE AND WILLIAMS JJ

(Given by Williams J)

Table of Contents

Para No.
Introduction [1]
Facts as found by the trial Judge in light of the verdicts [2]
Allegation of juror bias [7]
The Court of Appeal decisions [13]
  The inquiry [13]
  The substantive appeal [15]
The issues [17]
The power to order an inquiry [19]
Section 76 of the Evidence Act 2006 [21]
  Intrinsic evidence and the exclusionary rule: s 76(1) [22]
  Extrinsic evidence: s 76(2) [28]
Application for an inquiry [32]
  Submissions [32]
  The interests of justice [34]
  Other fair trial safeguards [35]
  The test [42]
  Application to this case [45]
The inquiry [49]
The substantive appeal [56]
  Application to cross-examine S [59]
  Does the evidence establish actual or apparent bias? [63]
Result [71]

Introduction

  1. Following a trial by jury in 2017, the appellants Brooke Rolleston and Brandon Roche were convicted of the rape…

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AGLC
Rolleston v The Queen [2020] NZSC 113
Case
[2020] NZSC 113
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Rolleston v The Queen, the court was required to determine the admissibility of evidence concerning the deliberations of a jury, as governed by Section 76 of the Evidence Act. The primary issue was whether the circumstances of the case were exceptional enough to permit evidence about the jury's internal deliberations, despite the general rule prohibiting such disclosures. This decision was necessary to weigh the public interest in protecting the confidentiality of jury deliberations against the interest in ensuring justice was served in the specific proceedings.

The court examined the statutory framework provided by Section 76, which prohibits evidence of jury deliberations unless exceptional circumstances warrant it. The court considered the principles established by precedent, which emphasize the importance of the secrecy of jury deliberations in maintaining public confidence in the justice system. The balance between protecting the confidentiality of the jury's discussions and ensuring that justice is achieved in the case was carefully weighed. The court scrutinised whether the potential benefits of allowing such evidence outweighed the detriment to the integrity of the jury system.

Ultimately, the court ruled that the circumstances did not reach the exceptional threshold required for the admission of evidence about jury deliberations. The court found that the potential prejudice to the jury system and the general public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of jury deliberations were too significant to justify an exception. Consequently, the evidence in question was deemed inadmissible. This decision reinforces the principle that the confidentiality of jury deliberations is a cornerstone of the justice system, and any evidence that might compromise this confidentiality is generally inadmissible unless exceptional circumstances are clearly established.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 76 of the Evidence Act addresses the admissibility of evidence about jurors and jury deliberations. In practical terms, it will therefore set the scope of most inquiries that a court considers the interests of justice may require. It would obviously not be in the interests of justice to order an inquiry that could only produce inadmissible evidence. The section provides as follows:76 Evidence of jury deliberations(1) A person must not give evidence about the deliberations of a jury.(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent the giving of evidence about matters that do not form part of the deliberations of a jury, including (without limitation)—(a) the competency or capacity of a juror; or(b) any conduct of, or knowledge gained by, a juror that is believed to disqualify that juror from holding that position.(3) Subsection (1) does not prevent a person from giving evidence about the deliberations of a jury if the Judge is satisfied that the particular circumstances are so exceptional that there is a sufficiently compelling reason to allow that evidence to be given.(4) In determining, under subsection (3), whether to allow evidence to be given in any proceedings, the Judge must weigh—(a) the public interest in protecting the confidentiality of jury deliberations generally:(b) the public interest in ensuring that justice is done in those proceedings. A distinctive feature of our system of trial by jury is that the jury must hold its deliberations in secret and must not give reasons for its verdict. Trial courts go to great lengths to ensure this veil of secrecy is not breached. A court official is appointed to provide for the needs of each jury once empanelled. Even though juries are no longer routinely sequestered, one of the important functions of that official is to ensure the jury is secure from outside influences that may distract them from complying with the duty to determine the defendant’s guilt according to law. Trial judges are careful to warn juries that they must not discuss the trial with anyone other than their fellow jurors and that they must not make inquiries of their own about the case. Section 76(1) adds a further and important safeguard.[20] It enacts what in the common law is known as the “secrecy rule”, the “rule of exclusion” or the “exclusionary rule”.[21] Evidence of internal deliberations of the jury (intrinsic evidence) is not admissible in any proceedings except where exceptional circumstances provide a compelling reason to admit it.[22] In deciding whether the circumstances are sufficiently exceptional, the court must undertake the balancing exercise described in subs (4). [20]See R v Pan 2001 SCC 42, [2001] 2 SCR 344 at [47]–[48].[21]See for example in New Zealand, R v Papadopoulos [1979] 1 NZLR 621 (CA) at 627; in Australia, Smith v State of Western Australia [2014] HCA 3, (2014) 250 CLR 473; in the United Kingdom, R v Mirza [2004] UKHL 2, [2004] 1 AC 1118 at [13] per Lord Steyn and [115] per Lord Hope; and in Canada, Pan, above n 20, at [38]. [22]Evidence Act, s 76(3).

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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