Reid v District Court at Tauranga
[2025] NZHC 1092
•8 May 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND TAURANGA REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TAURANGA MOANA ROHE
CIV-2025-470-67
[2025] NZHC 1092
BETWEEN DHRUVA DES REID JASON ALEXANDER REID BHADRA REID
BIANCA REID
ApplicantsAND
DISTRICT COURT AT TAURANGA
Respondent
Hearing: On the papers Judgment:
8 May 2025
JUDGMENT OF BECROFT J
This judgment was delivered by me on 9 May 2025 at 3pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
……………………………………
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Tauranga
Copy to:
Reid whanau
REID & ORS v DISTRICT COURT AT TAURANGA [2025] NZHC 1092 [8 May 2025]
The issue
[1] This matter has been referred to me by the Registrar of the High Court at Tauranga.
[2] The Registrar recently received for filing what purports to be an application for judicial review filed by the four applicants.
[3] Under r 5.35A of the High Court Rules 2016, the Registrar believes, on the face of the proceeding tendered for filing, that it is plainly an abuse of the process of the Court. The Registrar, as soon as was practicable, has referred it to a Judge for a decision under s 5.35B, to consider whether the purported proceeding is plainly an abuse of process of the Court. If so, one of the options is to strike the proceeding out.
How the issue arose
[4] The four applicants, who are defendants in the District Court, each separately face a variety of charges under the Resource Management Act 1991 and the Building Act 2004. Generally, the charges relate to the use of rural zoned land for more than one residential dwelling, and also to contravening abatement notices et cetera.
[5] There are a total of 25 charges specified in the Crown Charge Notice, roughly equally divided between the four applicants. They have all pleaded not guilty.
[6] There is a pre-trial hearing set down for 12 May 2025. A two-week trial is to begin on 26 May 2025.
[7] In November 2024, the applicants filed and served a memorandum headed “Request for the prosecution to disclose certain facts”. I understand that the memorandum listed eight matters, mainly consisting of reference to specific statutory provisions. It included statements that the applicants required the prosecution to produce statute law to show that each cited provision did not apply to the applicants before those proceedings could go to trial.
[8] Judge Kirkpatrick sought submissions. He delivered a reserved judgment about the issues, dated 12 November 2024. In that judgment, he treated the memorandum as an application to dismiss the charges under s 147 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (the Act).
[9] The Judge dealt carefully with, and rejected, all the eight points raised by the applicants.
[10] I do not need to go into them all. In my view, none of them could succeed. The submissions included and ranged from whether the prosecutor could establish that each of the defendants were “a person” in terms of s 13 of the Legislation Act 2019; that Genesis 1, verse 26, supports their caretakership (kaitiakitanga) of the property they live in; that the filing of the charges in these proceedings required the consent of the Attorney-General or some other official; and that they are entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities as set out in light of certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011.
[11] The applicants filed voluminous documentation in this Court which purports to be an application for judicial review of the decision not to dismiss the charges under s 147 of the Criminal Procedure Act together with a statement of claim and a memorandum.
[12] As I understand it, the applicants also challenge the authority of Judge Reid to issue Case Management Minutes in this matter dated 25, 26 and 27 March 2025.
The law
[13] The law is well out in McGechan on Procedure in the commentary to r 5.35A and B.1 There is no need for me to set out the law or the commentary in detail. Suffice to say, I am happy to adopt the following two-limbed test for strike out purposes frequently adopted in cases such as Mathiesen v Slevin.2 The Court should consider:
1 Jessica Gorman and others McGechan on Procedure (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR5.35A]–[HR5.35B].
2 Mathiesen v Slevin [2018] NZHC 1032, (2018) 25 PRNZ 116 at [6].
(a)Whether it would be manifestly unfair to the respondents that they be required to respond; and
(b)Whether right thinking people would regard this Court as exercising very poor control of its processes if it were to allow the applicants’ document to be regarded as a proper document.
Discussion
[14] There are three reasons why I consider the proceedings to be an abuse of process justifying strike out.
[15] First, what has been filed is prolix, very difficult to understand, and unfocussed. In my view, the statement of claim could be properly categorised as legally incomprehensible.
[16] Also, the statement of claim does not appear to include a prayer for relief nor set out the particular relief required. I assume that it seeks to have the District Court Judge’s decision quashed.
[17] There are other technical deficiencies in terms of the documentation. There is no cover sheet on the notice of proceeding; it lacks the prescribed content of a notice of proceeding; the cover sheets are different and are flawed in one way or another. I need not go on. However, I accept these are relatively minor matters.
[18] On this ground alone, I am of the view that it would be inappropriate to accept the statement of claim on the basis that it is so unfocussed, so entirely lacking in precision, and is so very difficult to understand. It would be virtually impossible to respond to, other than with blanket denials.
[19] Second, and much more importantly, the applicants’ statement of claim largely echoes the submissions put to Judge Kirkpatrick summarised above at [10]. These arguments are characteristic of “pseudo-law” and “sovereign citizen” type arguments.
The Senior Courts have consistently struck out similar claims.3 The claim as presently framed is legally untenable and is clearly an abuse of the Court’s process.
[20] If I can be more specific: while the applicants’ submissions are replete with statutory references and legalese, upon even a cursory examination they are entirely without substance. They are the legal equivalent of the well-known children’s story of the “Emperor’s New Clothes”. While they contain a patina of legal phraseology, which may appear to cloak the application with substance and authority, there is actually nothing there.
[21] The applicants assert that this “review required by the Senior Court is not a matter of routine, these matters can no longer be vainly dismissed as non-sensical gibberish, it is now a time and an opportunity to treat this as a matter of morality and law.” With the very greatest of respect to the applicants and their submissions, their own use of the word “gibberish” is an appropriate a description of what they have filed as any. One example suffices, being part of a long allegation the Statement of Claim that the King, in the form of the Crown Prosecutor for Tauranga, cannot bring charges against the applicants and conduct the prosecution:
The Constitution refers to ‘The Sovereign in right of New Zealand’ being the head of State of New Zealand. THE SOVEREIGN IN RIGHT OF NEW ZEALAND is a legal entity registered on the London Stock Exchange identified by the LEI Code 549300237GPHG2AI7C34.
Legal entity form Q4BE and previously known as Her Majesty in Right of New Zealand, but currently without a known registration authority available. The entity has a general category of ‘RESIDENT GOVERNMENT ENTITY,’ a sub category of CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, and its jurisdiction of formation is listed as NZ. Its Headquarters is listed C/O THE TREASURY, PO BOX 3724, 6140, WELLINGTON NZ- WGN NZ New Zealand. (refer to
supporting documents in bundle)
THE SOVEREIGN IN RIGHT OF NEW ZEALAND LEI Code
549300237GPHG2AI7C34 is associated with two trading companies listed also on the London Stock Exchange.
3 See James v District Court Whanganui [2023] NZCA 181, Miller v South Wairarapa District Council [2024] NZHC 2024, Larsen v New Zealand Police Company [2022] NZHC 2374, and Niwa v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2019] NZHC 853, [2019] NZAR 1104.
Firstly, “THE SOVEREIGN IN RIGHT OF NEW ZEALAND ACTING BY AND THROUGH THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
TRADE” company number OE020656 and “THE QUEEN'S EXCELLENT MAJESTY IN RIGHT OF NEW ZEALAND” company number OE021881.
(refer to supporting documents in bundle)
[22] No doubt the applicants hold their views about the law and its enforcement genuinely and firmly. The Court respects their right to do so. However, their views, reflected in their statement of claim, are totally outside well established interpretations of New Zealand law. They are unarguable and legally untenable. If the Court were to accept these documents for filing in their current form, it would reduce the Court processes to something approaching farce.
[23] Third and finally, there has been significant delay in the applicants taking any action in respect of Judge Kirkpatrick’s decision. This application comes more than five months after his decision and less than a month before a scheduled two-week jury trial.
[24] The application has been left until just about the last minute and endangers the conduct of the scheduled jury trial. It is hard not to conclude other than this was the intention of the applicants. Filing an application designed to delay the trial and to thwart due process in the jury trial jurisdiction is an abuse of process.
[25] I accept that it is a rare step to strike out a proceeding. Courts should strive to ensure that unrepresented applicants are treated with care and dignity and that every argument that could be raised on their behalf is properly considered.
[26] Even having gone through that exercise, I simply do not accept it would be appropriate to accept these documents, which in my view are plainly an abuse of the Court’s processes.
[27] Having reached that conclusion I add that the approach taken by the Courts, even to a properly filed judicial review application of a s 147 decision, would be cautious. While judicial review is an available avenue, it seems (as with the judicial review of decisions under the former s 347 of the Crimes Act 1961—the then
equivalent of s 147), this power must be used sparingly.4 Also, the relevant commentary5 emphasises that available appeal rights will reinforce judicial reluctance to undertake such judicial reviews. Relief by way of such review is discretionary. Delay in seeking judicial review is also relevant to the exercise of that discretion.6:
[28] Ordinarily, the conventional approach would be to exercise a right of appeal under s 296 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. This requires the applicants to seek leave to appeal on a properly formulated question of law. They have chosen not to do that, and indeed now they may well be out of time. I add that it is next to certain that leave would not have been granted, as no tenable point of law to examine on appeal could be formulated. This would have been a proper check on unrestrained resort to appeal. A judicial review proceeding in these circumstances is cumbersome and will take further time. It would clearly have been preferable to use the statutory appeal mechanism for what is a criminal matter, rather than to rely on the more “clunky” approach of a judicial review. That is not one of my reasons for striking out this “claim”, but it provides important context.
Conclusion
[29] When all these three factors are considered, cumulatively, I am of the view that what the applicants seek to do in this case is plainly an abuse of process. Right thinking people would regard the Court as exercising very poor control of its processes if it were to allow the applicants’ application to be regarded as a proper document.
[30] I am fortified in my view by the fact that, in these circumstances, all the points raised by the applicants could be dealt with again if they chose to appeal any conviction—which would be a more appropriate method of ventilating their continuing concerns.
[31]In the circumstances, I strike out the proceedings.
4 Auckland District Court v Attorney-General [1993] 2 NZLR 129 (CA) at 136.
5 Mathew Downs (ed) Adams on Criminal Law (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [CPA147.15].
6 Attorney-General v District Court at Nelson HC Nelson CIV-2008-442-364, 13 February 2009 at [48].
[32] Under r 5.35B of the High Court Rules, I make clear that the applicants have a right to appeal against this decision. A copy of my decision should be made available to them as soon as possible.
Becroft J
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