James v District Court at Whanganui

[2023] NZCA 181

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

 CA493/2022
 [2023] NZCA 181

BETWEEN	JAMES Appellant
AND	DISTRICT COURT AT WHANGANUI Respondent

Court:	Courtney and Mallon JJ
Judgment: (On the papers)	18 May 2023 at 10.30 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The appeal is struck out.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Courtney J)

Introduction

1. The appellant, who goes only by the name James, brought judicial review proceedings in the High Court in February 2022 in which he sought an injunction against the Whanganui District Court.  The terms of the injunction were directed towards halting or challenging proceedings brought against James in District Court.  It is not possible to discern the subject matter of the District Court proceedings with any certainty from the documents James has filed.

2. Churchman J struck out the judicial review proceeding as an abuse of process.[1] James filed an appeal against Churchman J’s decision.  In a minute, Miller J directed that the Court consider striking the appeal out as an abuse of process under r 44A of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 (the Rules).[2]  He directed that James be given the requisite notice under r 44A(2) and, on the expiry of the time for submissions, the Registrar refer the appeal to a panel for decision on the papers.  This is the issue now before us.

   [1]James v District Court at Whanganui [2022] NZHC 2309 [High Court judgment]

   [2]James v District Court at Whanganui CA493/2022, 14 March 2022.

3. Rule 44A relevantly provides:

   (1)In addition to any express power in these rules to strike out an appeal, the court may, on an interlocutory application or on its own initiative, make an order striking out or staying an appeal in whole or in part if—

   …

   (c)the appeal is frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.

1. In Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd, this Court explained that:[3]

   … a “frivolous” pleading is one which trifles with the court’s processes, while a vexatious one contains an element of impropriety.  … [One that is] “otherwise an abuse of the process of the court” … extends beyond the other grounds and captures all other instances of misuse of the court’s processes, such as a [proceeding] that has been brought with an improper motive or are an attempt to obtain a collateral benefit.

The High Court decision

[3]Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd [2013] NZCA 53, [2013] 2 NZLR 679 at [89] (footnote omitted). This case was concerned with r 15.1 of the High Court Rules 2016 but the explanation is of general application.

1. As noted, Churchman J struck out James’ proceeding under r 15.1(1) of the High Court Rules 2016.[4]  Rule 15.1(1) permits the court to strike out a pleading that:

   (a)discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action, defence, or case appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or

   (b)       is likely to cause prejudice or delay; or

   (c)       is frivolous or vexatious; or

   (d)       is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.

   [4]James’ proceeding was initially referred to Churchman J for consideration as whether it should be struck out under r 5.35B of the High Court Rules 2016. However, the Judge was not satisfied that r 5.35B could be invoked because it required that the proceeding by referred to a judge as soon as practicable after being filed and that had not happened: High Court judgment, above n 1, at [3].

2. In his pleading, James sought to distinguish between “the Man James” and “the Legal Fiction Person JAMES JONES” and asserted that District Court required the former’s written consent to “conduct any business” with the latter and that consent had been withdrawn.

3. It appeared to Churchman J that the form and wording of James’ statement of claim was consistent with that typically advanced by the “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument Litigants” who adhere to the “Sovereign Citizen movement”.[5]  Essentially, these arguments proceed on the premise that an individual has both a natural persona and a separate legal or “corporate” persona and that the natural person cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of the state without their consent.  The Court has previously held that this position is untenable.[6]  Almost always, it will be viewed as an abuse of process by a litigant.[7]  Churchman J concluded that there was no legal basis for James’ claim against the Whanganui District Court and that the proceeding was an abuse of process.[8]

Consideration of the appeal under r 44A(1) of the Rules

[5]At [8]–[11], citing Warahi v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2022] NZCA 105 at [9]; Meads v Meads [2012] ABQB 571, 543 AR 215; and Niwa v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2019] NZHC 853, [2019] NZAR 1104.

[6]Warahi v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, above n 6, at [11].

[7]Niwa v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 6, at [16].

[8]High Court judgment, above n 1, at [14]–[15].

1. It appears from James’ submissions that he believes he requires (and has been granted) leave to appeal.  However, under s 56(1)(a) and (4) of the Senior Courts Act 2016 James has a right to appeal the High Court decision and does not require leave.  Nevertheless, the fact that James has a right to bring an appeal does not preclude that appeal being struck out under r 44A(1) of the Rules if the Court is satisfied that it is an abuse of the Court’s process.  

2. Otherwise, James’ submissions in response to Miller J’s minute can be summarised as being that his appeal is not an abuse of the process of the Court because his view of the law is right — that is, the District Court acted unlawfully, the High Court has failed to acknowledge his application for a “Void Order of Court”, and James now has a “fundamental Right of a hearing” in this Court.

3. The grounds of appeal, although expressed in a convoluted manner and although denying the concepts of “Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Argument” and “sovereign citizen”, nevertheless rest on the argument regarding the “separation” between natural and legal persons and the rejection of Acts of Parliament unless consent has been given.  They can be summarised as being that the District Court has no jurisdiction over James without him giving his consent, which he has not done, and that Churchman J erred in rejecting this argument.

4. The arguments that James relies on are properly characterised as “sovereign citizen” type arguments.  They cannot succeed.  Apart from the sovereign citizen arguments, there is no genuinely identifiable legal or factual error asserted.  We are satisfied that the appeal cannot succeed.  We consider that it is properly viewed as both vexatious and an abuse of the Court’s process.

Result

1. The appeal is struck out.

Solicitors: