Reed v Waikato District Council - [2025] NZHC 3380

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA KIRIKIRIROA ROHE

CIV-2024-419-000346

[2025] NZHC 3380

UNDER the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 and Part 30 of the High Court Rules

IN THE MATTER

of an application for judicial review of decisions under the Resource Management Act 1991

BETWEEN

ANTHONY PRIVETT REED and REED

TRUSTEE 2018 LTD (as Trustees of the EAGLE TRUST)
Applicant/Counterclaim Defendant

AND

WAIKATO DISTRICT COUNCIL

First Respondent

OCEANIA HELICOPTERS PUKEKOHE LTD
Second Respondent/First Counterclaimant

RUBY & RATA LTD

Third Respondent/Second Counterclaimant

Hearing: 14 August 2025

Counsel:

D R Bigio KC and T M McGoldrick for Applicant K J Ridling for First Respondent

S J Ryan and S Thompson for Third Respondent

Judgment:

7 November 2025

JUDGMENT OF BREWER J

This judgment was delivered by me on 7 November 2025 at 12 noon pursuant to Rule 11.5 High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

REED v WAIKATO DISTRICT COUNCIL & ORS [2025] NZHC 3380 [7 November 2025]

Introduction

[1] The applicant has brought an application for judicial review against the respondents. The counterclaimants argue that the applicant has no right to seek judicial review. Justice Lang determined that the counterclaim should be adjudicated first.1

[2] Justice Lang’s decision provides an introduction to the bringing of the counterclaim:

[1] In this proceeding the applicants, the trustees of the Eagle Trust (the trustees), seek judicial review of decisions made by the Waikato District Council. The decisions related to an application for a land use consent by the second respondent, Oceania Helicopters Pukekohe Ltd (Oceania). Oceania sought consent to build a helicopter depot and commence a commercial helicopter operation on land owned by the third respondent, Ruby & Rata Ltd (Ruby). Ruby’s land adjoins a property owned by the Trust.

[2] The Council granted the consent on a non-notified basis. The trustees contend the Council erred in numerous respects in deciding that the application did not need to be notified and erred in granting it. It therefore seeks orders quashing both decisions.

[3] The Council, Oceania and Ruby oppose the application for judicial review. Oceania and Ruby have also filed a counterclaim against the trustees seeking to enforce an encumbrance that was registered over the land now owned by the trustees before they acquired it. Oceania and Ruby contend that the encumbrance requires the owners of the trustees’ land to support Oceania’s application for consent. They say the trustees acted in breach of the encumbrance by filing the application for judicial review. They maintain the trustees will continue to breach it if they pursue the application further. Oceania and Ruby seek declaratory relief as to the effect of the encumbrance, together with a permanent injunction prohibiting the trustees from taking further steps in the judicial review proceeding. In addition, they seek liquidated damages calculated in accordance with a formula prescribed by the encumbrance.

Background

The counterclaimants

[3] The first counterclaimant, Oceania, was incorporated in 2008 with Mr Richard Stening as sole director and as a shareholder with…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2025] NZHC 3380
Decision Date: 7 November 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Reed v Waikato District Council, the High Court of New Zealand considered an application for judicial review brought by Anthony Privett Reed and the Reed Trustee 2018 Ltd (the Trustees) against the Waikato District Council, Oceania Helicopters Pukekohe Ltd, and Ruby & Rata Ltd. The Trustees sought to challenge the Council’s decision to grant resource consent to Oceania for a helicopter depot and commercial helicopter operation on land owned by Ruby. The Trustees argued that the Council had erred in granting the consent without notification. In response, Oceania and Ruby filed a counterclaim, asserting that the Trustees had breached an encumbrance registered on the Trustees' land, which required them to support the helicopter operation and prohibited them from objecting to the resource consent application.

The central legal issues revolved around the interpretation of the encumbrance and whether the Trustees' application for judicial review constituted a breach of the encumbrance. The Trustees contended that their application for judicial review did not amount to an objection or opposition as defined in the encumbrance. Conversely, Oceania and Ruby argued that any attempt to interfere with the helicopter operation, including through judicial review, would breach the encumbrance. The Court held that the Trustees' application for judicial review constituted a breach of the encumbrance as it sought to prevent the implementation of the consented development. The Court also found that an injunction was not appropriate, and instead, it exercised its inherent jurisdiction to strike out the Trustees' application for judicial review.

Orders