Rameka v Accident Compensation Corporation
[2015] NZHC 730
•16 April 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV 2014-485-11274 [2015] NZHC 730
UNDER the Accident Compensation Act 2001 IN THE MATTER
of an appeal on point of law pursuant to s 162
IN THE MATTER
of an application for special leave to appeal on point of law under s 162(3)
BETWEEN
WHAKARUA RAMEKA Appellant
AND
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION CORPORATION
Respondent
Hearing: 11 March 2015 Counsel:
C Hollingsworth and J Miller for Appellant
P McBride for RespondentJudgment:
16 April 2015
JUDGMENT OF BROWN J
[1] The appellant sustained significant spine and brain injuries as a result of a motor vehicle accident in November 2004 and is paraplegic. It is common ground that as a result of her injuries the appellant qualifies to receive “attendant care” provided by the respondent under s 81(1)(b) of the Accident Compensation Act 2001
(the Act).
RAMEKA v ACC [2015] NZHC 730 [16 April 2015]
[2] In relation to “attendant care”, cl 14 of pt 1 of sch 1 of the Act states:
14 Attendant care
In deciding whether to provide or contribute to the cost of attendant care, the Corporation must have regard to–
…
(d) the extent to which household family members or other family members might reasonably be expected to provide attendant care for the claimant after the claimant’s personal injury; and
(e) the extent to which attendant care is required to give household family members a break, from time to time, from providing attendant care for the claimant; and
(f) the need to avoid substantial disruption to the employment or other activities of household family members.
(emphasis added)
[3] Since her accident the appellant has lived with a friend, Mr Terry George, who provides the appellant’s on-going care as an employee of McIsaac Caregiving Agency Ltd.
[4] On 11 August 2011 the Corporation issued a decision providing for the extent of social rehabilitation assistance which would be provided to the appellant which included provision for 19.5 hours for attendant care level 1 and 1.5 hours for attendant care level 2 from 25 March 2012.
[5] The appellant applied for a review of the Corporation’s decision which was heard on 25 May 2012. The Corporation took the position that Mr George was a household family member. In accepting the Corporation’s contention and dismissing the review the reviewer stated:
There is no definition within the statutory scheme of what a “household family member” means. Having considered the evidence which is available, I reach the view that Mr George is more than simply a paid professional carer. I find his relationship with Ms Rameka is more akin to being a family member than a servant. I would have no difficulty in finding that what is considered to be a family member is not a matter easily capable of definition. New Zealand has a wide range of communities and social groups, and the make-up of those families differs greatly…
While I accept there is no sexual relationship, that is not required. It is manifest that to be a family member does not require that level of intimacy between “family members”.
When I consider the evidence in its totality, it is my impression that Mr George provides care to Ms Rameka, not as a paid carer but as a family member and companion. In that circumstance, I am not persuaded that it has been established that it is reasonable that a full eight hours per night of paid care is required, as assessed by Ms Smith.
[6] The appellant’s appeal to the District Court was heard by Judge P R Spiller on 21 June 2013. His judgment dated 25 July 2013 dismissing the appeal found no error in the reviewer’s finding that Mr George had provided care as a household family member:1
[44] I also find that it has not been shown that ACC’s treatment of Mr Terry George as a household family member, for the purposes of Ms Rameka’s assessment, is incorrect. In deciding whether to provide or contribute to the cost of home help, ACC must have regard to the extent to which other household family members might reasonably be expected to do domestic activities for the claimant after her personal injury (paragraph [35]). As at 11 August 2011, ACC had Ms Rameka’s own evidence that she and Mr George had a close personal relationship of long duration, which extended to sleeping in the same bed, and that Mr George was her “soul mate” “with a bond that very few people can break” (paragraphs [20], [22], [24] and [25]). I consider that there were sufficient grounds for ACC to regard Mr George as a household family member and to have regard to the extent to which he might reasonably be expected to do domestic activities for Ms Rameka. I note the finding of the reviewer that Mr George provided care to Ms Rameka as a family member (paragraph [30]), and I find that this decision has not been shown to be wrong (cf paragraph [39]).
[7] In a judgment dated 29 August 2014 Judge L G Powell granted the appellant leave to appeal to the High Court on the following question:2
Did the District Court make an error of law in determining that Mr George was a “household family member” for the purposes of cl 14(d) of Schedule 1 to the Accident Compensation Act 2001?
1 Rameka v Accident Compensation Corporation [2013] NZACC 219.
2 Rameka v Accident Compensation Corporation [2014] NZACC 204.
Application for special leave to appeal
[8] Judge Powell’s decision declined leave to appeal on a second issue which can be conveniently described by reference to the Judge’s own analysis:
[6] The second error alleged is whether the reviewer correctly exercised his discretion under s 145 of the Act, which Mr Miller characterised as being wider than the jurisdiction of the District Court with regard to discretionary decisions of the type in issue in the appeal before Judge Spiller.
…
[13] On the second issue, for the reasons identified by Mr McBride, I am not satisfied that any question of law arises. In my view the legislation is clear that appeals to the District Court are by way of rehearing. This means the District Court was required to consider the substantive issues afresh on the basis of the evidence presented at review and any other evidence subsequently admitted in the course of hearing the appeal. In addition the appeal was by definition made on the basis that there was a valid review decision as otherwise there could be no appeal. It would therefore seem that if there were issues taken with the way in which the reviewer had exercised the jurisdiction with regard to the review the appropriate course would have been to have sought judicial review to that effect.
[9] The appellant seeks special leave of the High Court in relation to a second question of law expressed in her written submissions in the following terms:
Whether the reviewer’s failure to use section 145 of the Act in setting aside the exercise of discretion by ACC should have been remedied in the District Court by the court directing the reviewer to comply with section 145, rather than the court advising that the matter go to Judicial Review.
[10] It is apparent that the primary focus of the appellant’s complaint is with the process which was adopted at the review hearing. That was made explicit in the submissions in the District Court in support of leave to appeal which stated:
The second question of law is the reviewer’s powers under s 145 of the Act which the reviewer did not exercise and instead wrongly restricted himself [to] the approach an appellate court takes in appeals from a discretionary decision.
That alleged error on the part of the reviewer is now sought to be challenged by an attack in this Court on the District Court judgment for a failure to address the reviewer’s alleged error.
[11] In resisting the application for special leave Mr McBride’s first point was that the proposed question of law is different from that which was the subject of the application for leave which was declined by Judge Powell. Mr McBride argues that it is not open to the High Court to entertain an application for special leave in relation to a different form of question. I do not consider that the form of the question sought to be pursued in this Court is fundamentally different from the question considered by Judge Powell. However even if that were so, I do not agree that the High Court is constrained by the course of events below in entertaining an application for special leave to appeal on a question of law.
[12] However I consider that Mr McBride finds more fertile ground in his primary argument, namely that the appellant’s complaint is with the process followed by the reviewer whereas an appeal under s 162 relates to errors of law in decisions of District Courts. He argues that the District Court decision does not disclose any error of law of the nature alleged for the reason that the issue of the reviewer’s process was not a live question before Judge Spiller.
[13] That submission finds support in the content of the submissions presented to the Judge which I requested counsel to provide. In the submissions as originally filed, there was extensive discussion about the comparative jurisdiction of a reviewer and the District Court.3
[14] Subsequently on 19 June 2013 a supplementary submission was filed which stated:
1.Further to paragraphs [35]–[54] of the Appellant’s written submissions on jurisdiction and the approach of the reviewer and the Court the Appellant makes the following further submissions.
2.The Appellant acknowledges that this Court may be bound by the finding of Clifford J in Wildbore v ACC 22/11/07, HC Wellington CIV-2007-485-496 in relation the approach of the District Court. Clifford J held that the reviewer is empowered by statute to put aside the ACC decision and make the decision a fresh, whereas the District Court is exercising an appellate function and is bound by the principles in May v May (1982) 1 NZFLR 165, 170.
3 At [35]–[54].
3.The Appellant submits that the approach of the reviewer and the Court in relation to discretionary decisions may be clarified by later cases.
[15] In the light of the appellant’s revised position it is understandable that Judge Spiller did not engage with the argument advanced in the original written submissions. Consequently his decision of 25 July 2013 does not address the issue of the correct approach to be adopted by a reviewer on a review of a discretionary decision of the Corporation. It follows that the Judge’s reasons do not involve an error of law of the nature suggested by the appellant.
[16] Consequently I uphold Mr McBride’s objection to the appellant’s invitation to this Court to entertain a further question of law. The application for special leave to appeal is declined accordingly.
Events prior to the Corporation’s decision of 11 August 2011
[17] The history of the appellant’s medical treatment and of the various assessments, decisions and reviews which have taken place is detailed in Judge Spiller’s decision. For the purposes of this appeal it is sufficient to refer to the course of events since the second half of 2010.
[18] On 12 August 2010 the Corporation issued a decision reducing the appellant’s
care package hours. On 4 October 2010 the Corporation revoked its decision of
12 August 2010 on the basis that, although Mr George was considered a natural support and therefore no sleepover allowance was awarded for him to sleep where he normally lives, there should still have been an allocation for the support time he provided during the night. The allowance for attendant care level 1 was increased from 20 to 23 hours.
[19] The appellant reviewed that decision on the basis that she should have been entitled to increased attendant care hours and home help and that the Corporation should provide adequate sleepover relief for Mr George. At the review hearing on
23 February 2011 the appellant gave evidence which was recorded in the review decision of 29 April 2011 in this manner:
Terry is her “soul mate”. She is not in a relationship with Terry. He does sleep in the same room as her and in the same bed. They are not in a sexual relationship, but he is committed to doing things for her. Her money is her money; Terry pays her board and they go halves in the food. Terry pays the
'phone and she pays the power. Terry has been wrongly classed as a partner in the Support Needs Assessment.
[20] The reviewer quashed the Corporation’s decision of 4 October 2010 and directed the Corporation to research the legal question of who is a “household family member” and then obtain affidavits from the appellant and Mr George about the nature of their relationship. In fact those steps occurred in reverse order.
[21] The appellant and Mr George both made statutory declarations dated
12 May 2011. The appellant’s declaration stated:
I have a carer named Terry George who lives in my house, pays board, Phone and Shares the costs of food weekly.
Before my injury I cared for his mother. I am now a T7-T8 paraplegic and
Terry cares for me.
At night Terry has to untangle my legs as they twist and bend. He has also to relax me as my body stiffens and I cannot sleep.
I swear that Terry George and myself DO Not have a sexual relationship, we are soul mates with a bond that very few people can break.
[22] Mr George’s declaration stated:
I am a carer for Whakarua Rameka and reside at 7 Suffolk Place Porirua which is her place of residence. I pay board, phone and we share the costs of food.
Whakarua was looking after my mother and then roles changed when she had her injury.
I look after Whakarua day and night.
At night her legs and back hurt her so much that I have to untangle and relax her legs so she is comfortable.
We have a bond that goes back many years and we are NOT a sexually intimate couple.
[23] A legal opinion from a senior solicitor in the Corporation which is referred to in the District Court judgment at [24] reviewed a number of statutory provisions including the definition of a “domestic relationship” in the Domestic Violence Act 1995 and the meaning of “a de facto relationship” in the Property (Relationships) Act 1976. As Judge Spiller noted, it concluded as follows:
It seems likely to me, that most people would consider that in the circumstances as described above that Ms Rameka and Mr George are in a relationship together of a de facto nature, and therefore that he is a “household family member”. I note in particular the fact that they have a close personal relationship, which extends to sleeping in the same bed, and the fact that Mr George is described as Ms Rameka’s soul mate. Further the relationship has been of long duration. This indicates to me that he is more than a simple flatmate, or lodger and that there is a connection there that goes beyond an independent shared-living arrangement. In my view it is no stretch to describe Mr George as being a household family member.
The parties’ arguments
[24] The phrase “household family member” is not defined in the Act. Indeed it was common ground that the phrase is not employed in any other New Zealand legislative instrument. Hence counsel’s submissions reviewed terminology having some degree of similarity in other legislation, while recognising that the meaning of such phrases was dependent on the text and purpose of the particular legislation.
Appellant’s submissions
[25] Ms Hollingsworth analysed the circumstances of the appellant and
Mr George viewed from the perspective of:
(a) “de facto relationship”, the definition of which in s 2D of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 includes the requirement that two persons “live together as a couple”; and
(b)“domestic relationship” as defined in s 4(1) of the Domestic Violence Act 1995, of which para (d) includes the requirement that one person “has a close personal relationship with the other person”.
[26] She submitted that while they had been friends a long time, friendship and cohabitation do not amount to either a “close personal relationship” or to a “de facto relationship”. She concluded:
70.Analysis of the above two Acts are helpful to an extent. The Accident Compensation legislation has as its purpose a specific focus on rehabilitation in s 3. It is submitted that the phrase of (sic) household family member should not be interpreted too broadly so as to include non-family members residing in the same dwelling. This would have a detrimental effect on claimants who require care and are at risk of further injury if that care is not provided or not paid for purely by dint of their living arrangement.
Respondent’s submissions
[27] Mr McBride’s submissions focused on the phrase “family member”, noting that it was clearly much wider than either the phrase “living together as a couple” or being in a de facto relationship, neither of which included parent, child or sibling. While he accepted that “family member” would be unlikely to capture a mere flatmate or house guest, he contended that it was plain that a sexual or blood relationship or a formalised legal relationship was not essential.
[28] Three statutory provisions were referred to in support of the proposition that the concept of “family” or “family member” covers a more diverse class of relationships:
(a) Families Commission Act 2003, s 10 of which deals with the diversity of New Zealand Families:
(2) In this section, family includes a group of people related by marriage, civil union, blood, or adoption, an extended family, 2 or more persons living together as a family, and a whanau or other culturally recognised family group.4
4 Also of note is s 10(3) which states:
(3) However, persons are not members of a family for the purposes of this section solely because they have as their common objective or one of their common objectives the achievement of some outcome of a community, domestic, professional, recreational, social, vocational, or other nature (for example, the commission of offences against any enactment, whether to obtain valuable consideration or not).
(b)Crimes Act 1961, s 131A of which defines in expansive terms a “dependent family member” for the purposes of s 131 (sexual conduct with dependent family member) as follows:
… one person is a dependent family member of another person–
(a) if the other person has power or authority over him or her, and is–
(i) his or her parent, step-parent, foster parent, guardian, uncle, or aunt; or
(ii) a parent, step-parent, or foster parent of a person described in subparagraph (i); or
(iii) a child of his or her parent or step-parent; or
(iv) the spouse or de facto partner of a person described in subparagraph (i) or subparagraph (ii) or subparagraph (iii); or
(b) if they are members of the same family, whanau, or other culturally recognised family group, and the other person–
(i) is not a person referred to in paragraph (a);
but
(ii) has a responsibility for, or significant role in, his or her care or upbringing; or
(c) if he or she is living with the other person as a member of the other person’s family, and the other person is not a person referred to in paragraph (a), but has–
(i) power or authority over him or her; and
(ii) a responsibility for, or significant role in, his or her care or upbringing.
(c) Domestic Violence Act 1995, s 2 of which defines “family member” as including a member of the person’s whanau or other culturally recognised family group.
[29] Mr McBride’s submissions concluded in this way:
46.Whether or not a person or persons have characteristics as a “family member” will inevitably be a question of fact and degree. Matters of culture, longevity of relationship, commitment, appearance, and other factors might necessarily be considered.
47.In the particular context, it is submitted that the phrase means someone living in the household, and who has some objective appearance of affinity with, and more than a mere transitory relationship with, one or more others in the household.
48.On the basis of the facts as found by the District Court, wherever any line might be drawn, it is submitted that the Appellant and Mr George were at relevant times clearly living as members of a family, in the same household.
Analysis
[30] The starting point in the consideration of the interpretation of “household family member” is the guidance of the Supreme Court in Commerce Commission v Fonterra Co-Operative Group Ltd:5
[22] It is necessary to bear in mind that s 5 of the Interpretation Act 1999 makes text and purpose the key drivers of statutory interpretation. The meaning of an enactment must be ascertained from its text and in the light of its purpose. Even if the meaning of the text may appear plain in isolation of purpose, that meaning should always be cross-checked against purpose in order to observe the dual requirements of s 5. In determining purpose the Court must obviously have regard to both the immediate and the general legislative context. Of relevance too may be the social, commercial or other objective of the enactment.
Attendant care
[31] Attendant care, along with child care and home help, is a key aspect of social rehabilitation which the respondent has a liability to provide.6 The purpose of social rehabilitation is to assist in restoring a claimant’s independence to the maximum
extent practicable.7 Attendant care is defined in cl 12 of sch 1 as follows:
5 Commerce Commission v Fonterra Co-Operative Group Ltd [2007] NZSC 36, [2007] 3
NZLR 767.
6 Section 81(1)(b) of the Act.
7 Section 79.
attendant care–
(a) means–
(i) personal care; and
(ii) assistance with cognitive tasks of daily living, such as communication, orientation, planning, and task completion; and
(iii) protection of the claimant from further injury in his or her ordinary environment; and
(b) includes training a person to provide attendant care, if the
Corporation agrees to fund the training; but
(c) does not include child care, domestic activities, or home maintenance.
[32] “Personal care” is defined to mean physical assistance to move around and to take care of basic personal needs such as bathing, dressing, feeding and toileting.
[33] Child care is separately addressed in cl 15. Similarly domestic activities (cleaning, laundry, meal preparation and associated shopping activities8) are covered by “home help” addressed in cl 17. Those provisions relating to child care and home help are of interest because they also contain references to both “household family members” and “other family members”. In particular cls 14(d) and (f)9 are echoed in cls 15(1)(d) and (e) and in cls 17(1)(e) and (f) respectively.
[34] There are four points of difference among the three clauses. First, cl 15(1)(c) (which has a counterpart in cl 17(1)(d)) refers to the extent to which child care was provided by other household family members before the claimant’s personal injury. Clause 17(1) contains two provisions which are not replicated in either cls 14 or 15, namely:
(c) the number of household family members and their need for home help;
(g) the impact of the claimant’s personal injury on the contribution of
other family members to domestic activities.
8 Defined in cl 12; see also the definition of “home help” in cl 17.
9 At [2] above.
[35] Finally cl 14(e) has no equivalent in the provisions relating to child care and home help. It states:
(e) the extent of which attendant care is required to give household family members a break, from time to time, from providing attendant care for the claimant.
Preliminary observations on construction
[36] It is plain from the use of the two phrases “household family members” and “other family members” that household family members are a subset of the larger group of family members. In that respect the terminology is similar to the usage “members of their families forming part of the household” in the Consular Privileges
and Immunities Act 1971.10 It is to be contrasted with the distinction drawn between
“family” and “household” in s 67 of the Animal Products Act 1999 concerning consumption of homekill.
[37] It follows that membership of what might be described as a claimant’s household does not of itself qualify a person as a family member of the claimant. That is to be contrasted with certain of the provisions cited in argument:
(a) the component of the definition of “domestic relationship” in s 4(1)(c) of the Domestic Violence Act 1995, namely a person who “ordinarily shares a household” with another person;
(b)certain factors in s 2D(2) of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 relating to whether two persons live together as a couple, namely:
(b) the nature and extent of common residence; and
(h) the performance of household duties.
10 Schedule 1 of that Act ratifies the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art 52 of which provides for the exemption from personal services and immunities.
Family members
[38] Certain persons referred to in the Act are plainly within the category of family members, namely:
(a) a spouse;11
(b) a partner;12
(c) a child of the claimant.13
[39] It is possible that “other dependant”14 could be categorised as a family member. However it is not necessary for the purposes of the present case to determine that question and I do not do so.
[40] Beyond the assistance provided by the Act, I consider that parents of a claimant plainly qualify as family members.15 Similarly it is my view that all those within the definition of “near relative” in s 2(1) of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 would qualify, namely:
(a) a grandparent, aunt, uncle, brother, or sister; and includes
(b) a brother or sister of the half-blood as well as the full-blood.
[41] It is possible that family member for the purposes of the Act could extend to include all those who would be encompassed by the definition of “family member” in the Domestic Violence Act 1995, namely:
family member, in relation to a person, means–
(a) any other person who is or has been related to the person by blood or by or through marriage, a civil union, or a de facto relationship, or by adoption:
11 Section 18(1).
12 Section 18A(1).
13 “Child” is broadly defined in s 6(1).
14 Section 6(1).
15 Parents may make claims under the Family Protection Act 1955, s 3(1)(e).
(b) any other person who is a member of the person’s whanau or other
culturally recognised family group:
[42] However a number of issues arise: for example, would nieces and nephews be included? What is the meaning of “related … through marriage”? Does it extend to brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law? Again, for the purposes of the present case, it is not necessary for me to determine whether the phrase in the Act is quite so extensive and I do not do so.
The present case
[43] Assuming, however, that “family members” embraced all the categories discussed above, in my view it does not go further and extend to a person who provides attendant care to a claimant (whether paid for the service of doing so or not) but who is not related to the claimant either by blood, marriage (or civil union or a de facto relationship) or adoption.
[44] Nor in my view does the fact that such a person forms a significant personal connection with the claimant, even within the ambit of the concept of a “close personal relationship”,16 have the consequence of transforming their relationship into one of being family members.
[45] It follows that, notwithstanding that the appellant and Mr George may have become soul mates,17 they are not members of the same family. Consequently, while their living arrangements are such that Mr George and the appellant are plainly members of the same household, Mr George does not have the status of being a
household family member.
16 At [25] above. It is not necessary for there to be a sexual relationship between the persons for a close personal relationship to subsist: s 4(4)(a) of the Domestic Violence Act 1995.
17 At [21] above.
Cross-checking against purpose
[46] With reference to rehabilitation, the statement of purpose in s 3 of the Act states:
The purpose of this Act is to enhance the public good and reinforce the social contract represented by the first accident compensation scheme by providing for a fair and sustainable scheme for managing personal injury that has, as its overriding goals, minimising both the overall incidence of injury in the community, and the impact of injury on the community (including economic, social, and personal costs), through–
…
(a) ensuring that, where injuries occur, the Corporation’s primary focus should be on rehabilitation with the goal of achieving an appropriate quality of life through the provision of entitlements that restores to the maximum practicable extent a claimant’s health, independence, and participation: …
[47] “Rehabilitation” is defined in s 6(1) to mean a process of active change and support with the goal of restoring, to the extent provided under s 70, a claimant’s health, independence and participation. Section 70 records a claimant’s and the respondent’s obligations in relation to rehabilitation:
A claimant who has suffered personal injury for which he or she has cover–
(a) is entitled to be provided by the Corporation with rehabilitation, to the extent provided by this Act, to assist in restoring the claimant’s health, independence, and participation to the maximum extent practicable; but
(b) is responsible for his or her own rehabilitation to the extent practicable having regard to the consequences of his or her personal injury.
[48] I consider that a claimant’s responsibility in s 70(b) extends to an entitlement to call for assistance from those who might fairly be seen as having some moral obligation to provide care for the claimant of a personal or domestic nature. The persons who could be viewed as having such an obligation would be first and foremost members of the claimant’s family, in particular those who share a residence with the claimant.
[49] In my view the fact and extent of that obligation to provide assistance is reflected in various parts of cls 14, 15 and 17, including in particular:
(a) in all three instances the amount of care is the extent to which it might
“reasonably be expected” to be provided;
(b)in all three instances the need to avoid substantial disruption to the employment or other activities of the household family members is recognised;
(c) in the case of attendant care, there is reference to the need for household family members to have a break from the provision of care;
(d)in the case of home help, the number of household family members and their need for home help is to be considered.
[50] In daily life it will not infrequently be the case that claimants will receive some assistance and care from supportive neighbours and close friends. However it seems to me that in cls 14, 15 and 17 Parliament chose to confine the recognition of a moral obligation for the provision of personal assistance to persons having a familial connection. Furthermore those clauses reflect an attempt to maintain a balance between the extent of such an obligation and the other commitments and obligations of family members.
Conclusion
[51] My conclusion as to the meaning of the phrase “household family member” from a consideration of the statutory language is supported by what I perceive to be the statutory purpose, namely that a claimant has a responsibility to secure his or her rehabilitation and that he or she is entitled to such support and assistance as can reasonably be expected from members of the claimant’s family, the extent being dependant on whether or not they reside with the claimant.
[52] However persons who provide such support and assistance, whether paid or not, and who have no familial connection with the claimant and are not the claimant’s spouse or partner, are not family members and hence do not qualify as household family members even though they are part of the claimant’s household.
[53] Consequently Mr George is not a household family member for the purposes of the provision of attendant care to the appellant. The question whether the District Court made an error of law in determining otherwise is answered in the affirmative. If costs cannot be agreed, memoranda as to costs should be filed by the appellant within 10 working days and by the respondent within 20 workings days of this
judgment.
Brown J
Solicitors:
John Miller Law, Wellington
McBride Davenport James, Wellington
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