Rafiq v Meredith Connell - [2014] NZHC 2292

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2014-404-002475 [2014] NZHC 2292

UNDER the Defamation Act 1992

IN THE MATTER

of a claim

BETWEEN

RAZDAN RAFIQ Plaintiff

AND

MEREDITH CONNELL Defendant

Hearing: (On the papers)

Judgment:

22 September 2014

JUDGMENT OF VENNING J

This judgment was delivered by me on 22 September 2014 at 11.45 am, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the
High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date……………

Solicitors: Meredith Connell, Auckland
Copy to: Plaintiff

RAFIQ v MEREDITH CONNELL [2014] NZHC 2292 [22 September 2014]

[1] This proceeding was referred to in the decision of this Court in [2014] NZHC

2291.

[2] As the Court said in that decision in relation to these proceedings:1

Mr Rafiq alleges that an indictment presented by the Crown Solicitor to the District Court in 2011 defames him in a variety of ways. He seeks a declaration, together with compensatory, aggravated and exemplary damages totalling $21 million. The claim is based on an allegation the reference to him in the indictment as “Razdan Kahn also known as Razdan Rafiq” and the term “indictment” are defamatory of him. Such claims trifle with the Court process. They are also entirely misconceived as a matter of law. What is said in the indictment is protected by absolute privilege: s 14(1) Defamation Act 1992.

The Registrar was correct to refer the proposed proceedings to a Judge. The pleading discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action. In addition the proceeding is frivolous and vexatious and a flagrant abuse of the process of the Court. The damages claimed are ridiculous. If the proceeding was accepted for filing, then served, inevitably it would be struck out on an application initiated by the defendant. That would be a waste of the Court’s limited resources and unfair to the defendants by unreasonably burdening them with costs for which there is no realistic prospect of recovery.

In the particular circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that it is appropriate for the Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to dismiss the proposed proceeding at this stage. Rule 15.1(4) confirms the Court’s inherent jurisdiction is retained.

[3] For those reasons and the further following reasons identified in the review decision it is proper to strike out these proceeding in the inherent jurisdiction of the Court:

[11] … [w]hile the documents may comply with the basic requirements of the High Court Rules in relation to form the Court retains an inherent jurisdiction pursuant to which it has a duty to strike out pleadings that are an abuse of process.

[12] As Lord Diplock said in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West
Midlands Police [1982] AC 529:2

My Lords, this is a case about abuse of the process of the High Court. It concerns the inherent power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Rafiq v Meredith Connell

Details

AGLC: Rafiq v Meredith Connell [2014] NZHC 2292
Case: [2014] NZHC 2292
Decision Date: 22 September 2014

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, the case of Rafiq v Meredith Connell involves a defamation claim brought by Razdan Rafiq against Meredith Connell. Rafiq alleges that an indictment presented by the Crown Solicitor to the District Court in 2011 defames him in various ways and seeks substantial damages. The defendant argues that the claim is without merit and an abuse of court process. The court was required to decide whether the claim had any reasonable arguable cause of action and whether the proceeding was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of court process. The court found that the claim was entirely misconceived as a matter of law because the content of the indictment is protected by absolute privilege under the Defamation Act 1992. Additionally, the court determined that the proceeding was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the court process based on Mr Rafiq's history of filing vexatious litigation and his statements indicating an intent to clog the workings of the court and harass defendants. The court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to strike out the proceeding to prevent an abuse of its processes.

The court based its decision on the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to prevent misuse of its procedures in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party or bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The court cited Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police, Reid v New Zealand Trotting Conference, and Chamberlains v Lai to support its decision. The court noted that Mr Rafiq's previous comments and conduct confirmed his intention to file vexatious proceedings, which would unreasonably burden the defendants and waste the court's limited resources. The court also considered Mr Rafiq's right to access justice under section 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 but emphasised that this right does not permit him to act in the way he seeks to act. The court concluded that striking out the proceeding was necessary to protect the integrity of the court's processes and the rights of genuine litigants.

Orders