Rafiq v Meredith Connell - [2014] NZHC 2293

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2014-404-002476 [2014] NZHC 2293

UNDER the High Court Rules

IN THE MATTER

of a claim

BETWEEN

RAZDAN RAFIQ Plaintiff

AND

MEREDITH CONNELL Defendant

Hearing: (On the papers)

Judgment:

22 September 2014

JUDGMENT OF VENNING J

This judgment was delivered by me on 22 September 2014 at 11.45 am, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the
High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date……………

Solicitors: Meredith Connell, Auckland
Copy to: Plaintiff

RAFIQ v MEREDITH CONNELL [2014] NZHC 2293 [22 September 2014]

[1] This proceeding was referred to in the decision of this Court in [2014] NZHC

2291.

[2] As the Court said in that decision in relation to these proceedings:1

Mr Rafiq again purports to sue in defamation on the basis of the same indictment in the District Court. He repeats the allegation that the “also known as” reference is defamatory and also alleges the content of the charge is defamatory. He seeks compensatory, aggravated and exemplary damages totalling $17 million.

For the reasons given above the claim discloses no reasonably arguable claim, is frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process.

[3] To clarify, there is a defence to the claim of absolute privilege: s 14(1) Defamation Act 1992.

[4] For those reasons and the further following reasons identified in the review decision it is proper to strike out these proceeding in the inherent jurisdiction of the Court:

[11] … [w]hile the documents may comply with the basic requirements of the High Court Rules in relation to form the Court retains an inherent jurisdiction pursuant to which it has a duty to strike out pleadings that are an abuse of process.

[12] As Lord Diplock said in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West
Midlands Police [1982] AC 529:2

My Lords, this is a case about abuse of the process of the High Court. It concerns the inherent power which any court of justice must possess to prevent misuse of its procedure in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it, or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people. The circumstances in which abuse of process can arise are very varied; … It would, in my view, be most unwise if this House were to use this occasion to say anything that might be taken as limiting to fixed categories the kinds of circumstances in which the court has a duty (I disavow the word discretion) to exercise this salutary power.

[13] Lord Diplock’s comments were cited with approval by the Richardson J in the Court of Appeal in Reid v New Zealand Trotting Conference as follows:3

1       Re Rafiq [2014] NZHC 2291, at [19]–[20].
2       Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529, [1981] 3 All ER 727 at
729.
3       Reid v New…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Rafiq v Meredith Connell

Details

AGLC: Rafiq v Meredith Connell [2014] NZHC 2293
Case: [2014] NZHC 2293
Decision Date: 22 September 2014

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Rafiq v Meredith Connell, the plaintiff, Razdan Rafiq, sought to sue the defendant, Meredith Connell, for defamation, claiming that a reference to him in a court indictment and the content of the charge were defamatory. Rafiq sought substantial damages of $17 million. The court was required to determine whether the plaintiff's claim was reasonably arguable, and whether it constituted an abuse of process. The court found that the claim disclosed no reasonably arguable case, was frivolous and vexatious, and constituted an abuse of process. The court noted that there was a defence of absolute privilege under the Defamation Act 1992, and that the proceedings were an abuse of the court's process. The court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to strike out the proceedings, preventing the abuse of its processes. The court confirmed that the proceedings were an abuse of the process of the court and were manifestly unfair to the defendants, and would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court found that the plaintiff's previous comments and emails confirmed his intention to file vexatious proceedings in an attempt to clog the workings of the court and harass the defendants. The court noted that the plaintiff's right to access justice under section 27 did not permit him to act in the way he sought to act, and that the resources of the court were limited, affecting the rights of genuine litigants. The court held that the proceedings were struck out, preventing the abuse of the court's processes. The court did not make any orders for costs.

Orders