Rafiq v Meredith Connell - [2015] NZCA 145

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA634/2014
[2015] NZCA 145

BETWEEN	RAZDAN RAFIQ Applicant
AND	MEREDITH CONNELL Respondent

Court:

Randerson, White and Miller JJ

Counsel:

Applicant in person
B A Tompkins for Respondent

Judgment:

(On the papers)

4 May 2015 at 11.30 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

AThe application for special leave to appeal is dismissed.
BThe applicant must pay the respondent costs for a standard application on a band A basis and usual disbursements.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by White J)

Introduction

The applicant, Mr Rafiq, applies for special leave to appeal against a decision of Courtney J.[1] The Judge declined Mr Rafiq’s application for review of a decision of Associate Judge Bell.[2] The Associate Judge dealt with an application by the respondent, Meredith Connell, to strike out Mr Rafiq’s claim in defamation. The Associate Judge was satisfied that Meredith Connell had a complete defence to all aspects of the claim. He was also satisfied that the proceeding should be struck out as vexatious.
[1]Rafiq v Meredith Connell [2014] NZHC 2549 (Second High Court decision).
[2]Rafiq v Meredith Connell [2014] NZHC 1597 (First High Court decision).
Courtney J refused Mr Rafiq’s application for review of the Associate Judge’s strike out decision because no error was shown in the Judge’s reasoning or decision.
Courtney J also refused Mr Rafiq leave to appeal her decision to this Court on the ground that it raised no issue of law or fact capable of serious argument.[3]
[3]Second High Court decision, above n 1, at [25].
Mr Rafiq applies to this Court for special leave to appeal against both Courtney J’s refusal to review the decision granting the strike out and her decision refusing leave to appeal.
This Court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal against a decision refusing leave.[4]
[4]Simes v Tennant (2005) 17 PRNZ 684 (CA) at [39].
The only issue therefore is whether special leave should be granted to appeal against Courtney J’s decision refusing the application for review of Associate Judge Bell’s decision.

Background

Mr Rafiq in his statement of claim alleges that certain statements made by Meredith Connell in court during a prosecution against him and in the course of a civil proceeding brought by him against the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment were defamatory. The statements related to the vexatious and abusive nature of proceedings brought by him.
Mr Rafiq also claims that a similar statement published on a website was defamatory and an email sent by Meredith Connell to the police was defamatory.
Associate Judge Bell struck out the claim because he found that for each alleged defamatory statement Meredith Connell had a defence:
(a)In relation to the statements by Meredith Connell in court during the prosecution and in the course of the civil proceeding brought by Mr Rafiq against the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment there was a defence of absolute privilege under s 14(1) of the Defamation Act 1992.[5]
(b)In relation to the statement published…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Rafiq v Meredith Connell

Details

AGLC: Rafiq v Meredith Connell [2015] NZCA 145
Case: [2015] NZCA 145
Decision Date: 4 May 2015 at 11.30 am

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, Mr. Rafiq sought special leave to appeal against a decision of Courtney J that declined his application for review of a decision by Associate Judge Bell. The Associate Judge had granted a strike-out application by Meredith Connell against Mr. Rafiq’s defamation claim, finding that Connell had a complete defence to all aspects of the claim and that the proceeding should be struck out as vexatious. Courtney J refused Mr. Rafiq's application for review of the Associate Judge's decision and his subsequent application for leave to appeal, holding that no error was shown in the Associate Judge's reasoning or decision, and that the proposed appeal raised no issue of law or fact capable of serious argument.

The central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether special leave should be granted to appeal against Courtney J's decision to refuse the application for review of the Associate Judge's decision. The Court of Appeal found that the proposed appeal did not meet the criteria for granting leave to appeal, as it did not raise any arguable question of law or fact. The Court further found that the appeal was not of sufficient importance to outweigh the cost and delay it would generate. The Court upheld the Associate Judge's findings that Connell had a defence of absolute privilege in relation to statements made in court, a defence of qualified privilege in relation to the statement published online, and a defence of qualified privilege in relation to emails sent to the police. The Court also found that the Associate Judge did not err in considering Mr. Rafiq's history of vexatious litigation in concluding that the claim lacked merit.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeal dismissed the application for special leave to appeal and ordered Mr. Rafiq to pay Meredith Connell's costs for a standard application on a band A basis and usual disbursements.

Orders