Rabson v Transparency International New Zealand Inc

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

CA156/2015
[2016] NZCA 26

BETWEEN

MALCOLM EDWARD RABSON AND RICHARD JOHN CRESER
Appellants

AND

TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL NEW ZEALAND INCORPORATED
Respondent

Court:

Wild, Miller and Cooper JJ

Counsel:

Appellant Mr Creser in person
D R Kalderimis and K E Yesberg for Respondent

Judgment:

(On the papers)

24 February 2016 at 2.30 pm

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

A        The application for recall is dismissed. 

BThe appellant Mr Creser is to pay the respondent’s costs in the sum of $500.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Wild J)

  1. By application filed on 17 December 2015 the appellants, or at least the appellant Mr Creser, requests this Court to recall the judgment it delivered on 12 November 2015.[1]

  2. The nub of the recall application is that this appeal was deemed abandoned on 26 June 2015, pursuant to r 43(1) of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005.[2]  There was therefore no extant appeal for this Court to strike out.

    [2]If Mr Creser’s argument is correct, the date on which the appeal would have been deemed abandoned was 30 June 2015, as the time for compliance with r 43 of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 was extended by Randerson J in Rabson v Transparency International New Zealand Inc [2015] NZCA 188.

  3. This very point was the basis for the application the appellant Mr Rabson made to the Supreme Court, seeking leave to appeal the judgment Mr Creser is now requesting this Court to recall. 

  4. In the judgment it delivered on 16 February 2016, the Supreme Court dismissed that application for leave to appeal.[3]  The Supreme Court detailed what had happened in this Court, importantly that Mr Rabson had made a timely r 43(2) application for an extension of time, which was addressed by Wild J in a minute dated 4 August 2015,[4] but not finally determined.  The Court then stated:[5]

    In those circumstances, it is at least open to question whether the effect of r 43(1) was that the appeal was to be treated as abandoned so as to obviate the need for, or appropriateness of, an order striking it out.

    [4]Rabson v Transparency International New Zealand Inc CA156/2015, 4 August 2015 (Minute and Direction of Wild J) at [7]–[8].

    [5]SC judgment, above n 3, at [3].

  5. That view that this appeal had not been deemed abandoned through the operation of r 43(1), or at least that that was arguably not the position, is binding on this Court.[6]  Rule 43(3) permits an application under r 43(2), for an extension of time, to be made at any time within three months after the appeal has been deemed abandoned pursuant to r 43(1).  The intention of r 43 is thus that the appeal is deemed abandoned (and thus is at an end) for all purposes except a timely r…

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Details
Case
[2016] NZCA 26
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Malcolm Edward Rabson and Richard John Creser sought to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, which had dismissed their appeal against Transparency International New Zealand Inc. The appellants argued that the appeal was erroneously deemed abandoned, and they requested the Court to recall the judgment. The core of the recall application hinged on whether the appeal was deemed abandoned on 26 June 2015, as per rule 43(1) of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005. The Court of Appeal had to determine if the appeal was properly deemed abandoned, or if there was a valid argument that it was not.

The Court examined the procedural history of the case, including the Supreme Court's dismissal of Mr Rabson's application for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal's judgment. The Supreme Court's decision provided that the appeal was not necessarily deemed abandoned, given that Mr Rabson had made a timely application for an extension of time under rule 43(2). This application had not been finally determined. The Court concluded that the appeal had not been deemed abandoned, and thus, the appeal was not properly struck out. The Court further found that the appellants' reliance on a previous Supreme Court decision, Rabson v Chapman, was misplaced, as that case did not involve a timely application for an extension of time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for recall, as the grounds for recall were not established. The Court noted that a new judicial decision had been delivered by the Supreme Court, but this did not support the appellants' position. Instead, it reinforced the conclusion that the appeal had not been deemed abandoned. Consequently, the appellants' request to recall the judgment was denied. The Court also ordered the appellant, Mr Creser, to pay the respondent's costs in the sum of $500.

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