Rabson v Chapman

Case [2016] NZSC 17


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 52/2014
[2016] NZSC 17
BETWEEN

MALCOLM EDWARD RABSON
Applicant

AND

WAYNE SEYMOUR CHAPMAN
Respondent

Court:

William Young, Glazebrook and Arnold JJ

Counsel:

Applicant in person
S A Barker for the Respondent

Judgment:

25 February 2016

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for recall is dismissed.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

  1. Mr Rabson applies for the recall of the Court’s judgment in Rabson v Chapman[1] dismissing his application for leave to appeal.

  2. Mr Rabson submits that the judgment was a nullity as the underlying appeal in the Court of Appeal had been deemed abandoned.  In particular he says that no award of costs should have been made by this Court.

  3. We do not accept that submission.  Mr Rabson filed the application for leave in this Court.  He did not withdraw it.  It therefore had to be determined.  The respondent filed submissions and was entitled to costs.

  4. The application for recall is dismissed.

Solicitors:
Buddle Findlay, Wellington for the Respondent


Details
AGLC
Rabson v Chapman [2016] NZSC 17
Case
[2016] NZSC 17
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Rabson v Chapman, the applicant, Malcolm Edward Rabson, sought the recall of a judgment from the Supreme Court of New Zealand, which had previously dismissed his application for leave to appeal. The respondent in this matter was Wayne Seymour Chapman. The Supreme Court, comprising Justices William Young, Glazebrook, and Arnold, was tasked with deciding whether the judgment was a nullity and whether any costs should have been awarded to the respondent.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the judgment dismissing Rabson’s application for leave to appeal was valid. Rabson argued that the underlying appeal in the Court of Appeal had been deemed abandoned, thus rendering the Supreme Court's judgment a nullity. Furthermore, he contended that no award of costs should have been made by the Supreme Court in this context. The respondent, Chapman, opposed the application for recall, asserting that the application was properly before the court and that he was entitled to his costs.

The Supreme Court held that the application for recall was not valid as Rabson had not withdrawn his application for leave to appeal. Consequently, the court was obliged to determine the application, and the respondent was entitled to his costs. The Court found that the judgment was not a nullity and dismissed Rabson's application for recall. As a result, the court maintained the original decision and upheld the award of costs to the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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