R v Wakefield

Case [2019] NZHC 1629


ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAMES, ADDRESSES, OCCUPATIONS OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF CONNECTED

PERSONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 202 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 2011.

See

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CRI-2018-085-1440

[2019] NZHC 1629

THE QUEEN

v

WILLIAM MARTIN WAKEFIELD

Hearing: 12 July 2019

Counsel:

S C Carter and R M Kós for Crown S J Gill for defendant

Sentence:

12 July 2019


SENTENCING NOTES OF DOBSON J


[1]    Mr Wakefield, I now have to sentence you for the murder of your stepson, Lincoln. Lincoln died a year and a month ago today on 12 June 2018, a little short of five months old. You began a relationship with Lincoln’s mother after you knew that she was pregnant and you set up house together on the basis that you would share the care of the child when it was born.

[2]    After a period of maternity leave, Lincoln’s mother went back to work four days a week, leaving you in sole charge while she was at work. You were able to work

R v WAKEFIELD [2019] NZHC 1629 [12 July 2019]

from home and also spent substantial periods on computer screens as a “gamer”. You tried to deal fondly with Lincoln, but his physical appearance reminded you of his biological father, and increasingly you resented that. In a lengthy recorded interview with a Police officer on the day Lincoln died, you changed your story as to how he had been hurt, eventually acknowledging that you had wanted to hurt him. On two separate occasions on 11 June 2018, you shook Lincoln a number of times. He became unresponsive, was hospitalised and operated on for internal injuries within his brain. He died early the next day. In pleading guilty to the manslaughter of Lincoln, you accepted that your shaking on 11 June 2018 was at least a substantial cause of his death.

[3]    You denied that your killing of Lincoln was murder and put the Crown to the proof of the elements of that charge. Those elements required the Crown to prove that you did the act which caused Lincoln’s death, which you did accept, as well as establishing that you appreciated that there was a real risk that inflicting the type of injury you did on him was likely to cause his death, and that you proceeded to inflict that type of injury being reckless as to whether it would kill him or not.

[4]    The jury accepted that the Crown had made out that form of murderous intent. Their verdict was consistent with acknowledgements you gave in your Police interview that you did appreciate shaking a baby could cause its death, and that you did want to harm Lincoln when you shook him on that day. Those provided a proper basis for the jury to infer that you took the risk that you would kill him, knowing of that risk and being reckless as to whether death ensued.

[5]…

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R v Wakefield [2019] NZHC 1629
Case
[2019] NZHC 1629
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

The defendant, William Martin Wakefield, was convicted of the murder of his stepson, Lincoln, who died as a result of internal injuries to the brain caused by violent shaking. The case was heard in the High Court of New Zealand, Wellington Registry. Wakefield pleaded guilty to manslaughter but denied murder, which required the Crown to prove that Wakefield appreciated the risk of killing Lincoln by shaking him and proceeded to do so recklessly. The jury accepted the Crown's case on this point, and Wakefield was convicted of murder. The primary legal issue was determining the appropriate minimum period of imprisonment (MPI) for the murder conviction, given the mandatory life imprisonment sentence and the statutory presumption under Section 104 of the Sentencing Act 2002 that an MPI of 17 years applies where the victim is particularly vulnerable. The Crown argued for 17 years, while the defence argued for 13 years, contending that 17 years would be manifestly unjust. The judge considered the extreme vulnerability of the victim, the breach of trust, and the defendant's immediate and genuine remorse. After a detailed analysis, the judge concluded that while the case was very serious, the difference between 17 years and the calculated MPI of 14 years and nine months would be manifestly unjust. Therefore, the judge imposed an MPI of 14 years and nine months, alongside a concurrent three-year sentence for wounding with reckless disregard.

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