R v T - [2022] NZHC 1038

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND ROTORUA REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA

TE ROTORUA-NUI-A-KAHUMATAMOMOE ROHE

CRI-2019-063-3764

[2022] NZHC 1038

THE QUEEN

v

T

Hearing: 13 May 2022

Appearances:

A Gordon for Crown S Gray for Defendant

Sentence:

13 May 2022

SENTENCING REMARKS OF LANG J

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Rotorua

R v T [2022] NZHC 1038 [13 May 2022]

[1] Ms T, you appear for sentence at the age of 28 years having pleaded guilty to charges of murder,1 injuring with intent to injure2 and ill-treating a child (x2).3

[2] The charge of murder carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, whilst the other charges carry maximum sentences of five and ten years imprisonment respectively.

Background

[3] You entered your guilty plea based on an agreed summary of facts. This discloses that the charges relate to events that ultimately led to the death of your daughter, Comfort-Jay, who was just 18 months of age at the time of her death.

[4] The charges other than that of murder were laid as a result of a series of events that occurred from at least January 2018 until Comfort-Jay’s death on 24 July 2018. During this period you ill-treated and physically abused Comfort-Jay in numerous different ways. You assaulted her by slapping and hitting her head, face and body. You would grab her with excessive force and scratch her with your fingers. You failed to change her dirty nappies and failed to keep her clean and warm. You also failed to provide her with enough food to ensure she was well nourished. In addition, you would keep her confined to her cot and a couch for extended periods. You would punish her if she endeavoured to leave these areas.

[5] This ill treatment occurred on a regular basis. At one stage she was seen by others to have two black eyes. Following her death she underwent a post-mortem examination. This revealed extensive soft tissue bruising to almost every part of her body. She also had extensive scratch marks all over her body, particularly on her neck and chest.

[6] Comfort-Jay was also found to have suffered from extreme nappy rash. This was so severe that large parts of her skin were peeling off parts of her buttocks. She also had deep-crusted fissure in the area where her nappy would sit. In addition, she

1      Crimes Act 1961, s 167(b).
2      Section 189(2).
3      Section 195(1).

had a large, and undoubtedly painful, ulcer under her chin. This was most likely caused by her dribbling and you failing to clean her up.

[7] At the time of her death Comfort-Jay weighed just eight kilograms and was plainly malnourished. Her weight placed her in the second percentile for her age and can only be explained by the fact that you did not feed her properly. In addition, as I have said, you would confine her to a cot for long periods and then to a small corner of a couch. If she endeavoured…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v T

Details

AGLC: R v T [2022] NZHC 1038
Case: [2022] NZHC 1038
Decision Date: 13 May 2022

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, Ms T was sentenced for charges of murder, injuring with intent, and child abuse, which resulted in the death of her 18-month-old daughter, Comfort-Jay. The court considered the systematic abuse and neglect leading to Comfort-Jay’s death, including physical assaults, malnutrition, and failure to seek medical attention. The charge of murder, under the Crimes Act 1961, required the court to impose a life sentence unless manifestly unjust, while the other charges carried maximum penalties of five and ten years respectively. The court had to determine the appropriate minimum term of imprisonment before parole eligibility, guided by the Sentencing Act 2002, which mandates a minimum of 17 years unless manifestly unjust.

The legal issues centred on determining the minimum term for parole eligibility, taking into account aggravating and mitigating factors. Aggravating factors included the vulnerability of the victim, the cruelty and callousness displayed, and the significant breach of trust. Mitigating factors considered were the defendant's disadvantaged upbringing, remorse, and expressed determination to rehabilitate. The court assessed whether a 17-year minimum term would be manifestly unjust, given the nature and circumstances of the offending.

In its reasoning, the court acknowledged the severe physical abuse and neglect endured by Comfort-Jay, noting the defendant's breach of trust and the failure to seek medical help. The court recognised the defendant's disadvantaged background and personal hardships but emphasised that these factors explained rather than excused the offending. The court concluded that the nature of the crime warranted a minimum term of 17 years, finding it was not manifestly unjust to impose such a term. The court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment on the murder charge with a 17-year minimum term before parole eligibility and three years for each of the other charges, to be served concurrently.

The final orders of the court were that the defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment with a 17-year minimum term before parole eligibility on the murder charge and three years for each of the other charges, to be served concurrently. The defendant's name was to be anonymised for a further 20 working days due to an ongoing appeal against a name suppression order.

Orders