R v Roest
[2012] NZHC 1086
•18 May 2012
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CRI-2008-004-029179 [2012] NZHC 1086
THE QUEEN
v
CORNELIS ROBERT ROEST PETER DAVID STEIGRAD
Hearing: 18 May 2012
Appearances: B Dickey for Crown
P Dacre and R Butler for Mr Roest
B Keene QC and M E Cole for Mr Steigrad
Judgment: 18 May 2012
Charges: Cornelis RoestFalse statements x6
False statement to trustee x2
Distributing offer documents containing false statement x10
Peter Steigrad
Distributing offer documents containing false statements x6
Plea: Not Guilty
Sentenced: 18 May 2012
SENTENCING NOTES OF VENNING J
Solicitors: Crown Solicitor, Auckland
Lowndes Jordan, Auckland
Copy to: B Keene QC, Auckland,
M E Cole, Auckland, P E Dacre, Auckland
R Butler, Auckland
J F Anderson, Auckland
R V ROEST & STEIGRAD HC AK CRI-2008-004-029179 [18 May 2012]
[1] Cornelis Robert Roest and Peter David Steigrad, you are for sentence this morning following your conviction on a number of counts arising from the failure of Bridgecorp Limited and Bridgecorp Investments Limited (BIL). In your case Mr Roest, you have been convicted and are for sentence on six counts under the Crimes Act of making false statements, two counts under the Companies Act of making false statements in directors’ certificates to the trustee and 10 counts under the Securities Act of distributing offer documents containing false statements.
[2] The maximum penalty for the offending under the Crimes Act is 10 years’ imprisonment and five years for the offending under the Companies and Securities Act charges.
[3] Mr Steigrad, in your case you are for sentence on six counts under the Securities Act. I note that following trial you were found not guilty on four other counts.
[4] Three other directors, Messrs Davidson, Urwin and Petricevic, have already been sentenced and dealt with by the Court. Messrs Davidson and Urwin pleaded guilty. Mr Petricevic was convicted following trial.
[5] Although it will be well known to you, I do need to briefly refer to the background.
[6] Bridgecorp was incorporated on 30 April 2001. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Bridgecorp Holdings Limited (BHL) which is registered in Australia. It is in liquidation. Bridgecorp’s principal activity was the sourcing of funding and lending in relation to property financing transactions. It primarily funded that activity through investments from the public by issuing secured debentures to members of the public and through issuing redeemable preference shares to BIL.
[7] BIL was itself incorporated in April 2002 as a vehicle to raise further funds for New Zealand subsidiaries of BHL. It issued capital notes to the public and invested the proceeds from those activities into redeemable preference shares issued by Bridgecorp. BIL’s performance was entirely dependent on Bridgecorp.
[8] In order to raise money from investors Bridgecorp and BIL issued prospectuses and investment statements from time to time and registered them with the Registrar of Companies. The companies were required to appoint a custodian for the debenture holders, Covenant Trustee Company Limited.
[9] The Bridgecorp and BIL prospectuses were distributed from 21 December
2006 until 29 June 2007 when the Securities Commission suspended their distribution. During the same period Bridgecorp and BIL distributed investment statements. The offer documents contained a number of untrue statements as at
21 December 2006, and subsequent to that date a number of other statements became untrue.
[10] Importantly from 7 February 2007 on Bridgecorp and BIL began to regularly miss payments of interest and principal due to investors. On 30 March 2007
Bridgecorp and BIL registered prospectus extension certificates with the Registrar of Companies. The certificates were signed Mr Petricevic and Mr Davidson on behalf of all other directors, including both of you. The certificates extended the time period during which the securities could be allotted for a further nine months.
[11] During the period the relevant offer documents were before the public, 991 investors invested in excess of $25 million of new money and 3,461 existing investors re-invested almost $86 million with Bridgecorp. During the same period
67 investors invested just under $2.4 million of new money and existing investors re- invested over $5.2 million with BIL. In summary $91 million of re-invested funds and $28 million of new money was invested during the currency of the false statements. In your case Mr Steigrad, Mr Keene QC has calculated approximately
$48 million was invested with Bridgecorp in the period to which your convictions relate.
[12] Bridgecorp was placed into receivership on 2 July 2007. On that day it had approximately $459 million secured debenture stock outstanding to approximately
14,500 debenture holders. It is likely those investors will recover less than 10 cents in the dollar.
[13] BIL was placed in liquidation on 6 July. At that date BIL had approximately
$28.8 million of capital notes outstanding and 30 million redeemable preference shares. It is unlikely the capital note holders of BIL will recover anything of the amounts due to them.
[14] In sentencing you both I am required to take into account the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act. The purposes that are particularly relevant in this
case are:
to denounce your offending and deter others from committing the same or
similar offending;
to hold you accountable to members of the community for your actions and
omissions;
to provide for the interests of the victims of your offending; and
to promote in you a sense of responsibility for and an acknowledgement of the harm your actions have done to the victims of your offending. I have to say Mr Roest, that in your case the pre-sentence report suggests that you just do not appreciate the effect your offending has had on those people who
placed their trust in Bridgecorp.
[15] In relation to the harm on the numerous victims of your offending, at Mr Petricevic’s sentencing I read two victim impact reports at that time. I propose to refer to just one of those again today. It relates to an investor aged 79 and his wife. He and his wife had worked all their lives until their retirement. Before investing in Bridgecorp they had previously only invested with banks. They started investing with Bridgecorp in June 2006 and after considering the prospectus in this case and taking advice, doing everything they should, they then took what they thought was a slight risk to achieve a better interest return and invested up to $250,000 in Bridgecorp. They have lost it all. The impact of the financial loss on them has been devastating, both to them at their age and stage of life, and to their family. They have been unable to help their children as they hoped they might be able to do. They
have little savings left and minimal interest payments to support or supplement their pension. The lifestyle that they had worked all their lives to achieve and had looked forward to enjoying in retirment has been lost. There is not a day that they have woken up and not thought about that. They say it is the most depressing period of their lives.
[16] The point is, as this Court has observed before, the losses caused and sustained by the victims by the failure of finance companies such as Bridgecorp are not just financial in nature. There are often enormous emotional and psychological costs caused to people, particularly those who have lost much of their savings. A number of victims will also inevitably suffer from medical conditions brought on by the stress of what has happened.
[17] In terms of the principles of sentencing, there are some which assume particular importance in this case, and they are:
the need for the sentence the Court imposes to reflect the gravity of the
offending, including the degree of your individual culpability;
the requirement to take into account the seriousness of the type of offending in comparison with other offences as indicated by the maximum penalties
prescribed by Parliament for the offending;
the need for consistency in sentencing. In this case there are two aspects, the first is the need for similar sentences to be imposed on people who commit like offences. The second is the need to consider the sentences imposed on your co-offenders to reflect the varying degrees of culpability. That is a matter to which I shall return. The most relevant sentences in your case Mr Roest, are that of Mr Petricevic and Mr Steigrad, the sentences imposed on Mr Davidson and Mr Urwin, but I do take into account other sentences as
well;
theneed to respond adequately to the effect of the offending on the victims that I have referred to;
the need for a proportionate response on behalf of the community; and
the need to impose the least restrictive outcome in the circumstances.
[18] I propose to sentence you first Mr Roest.
[19] For you the Crown argued that a starting point of eight years could apply for the totality of your offending given the criminal nature of it, but accept in light of the sentence imposed on Mr Petricevic a starting point of seven and a half years is appropriate. The Crown argued that a reduction for mitigating factors of less than the 12 months applied to Mr Petricevic would be justified in your case.
[20] Mr Dacre submits there are material differences between your position and that of Mr Petricevic. He submits those differences should be reflected in the ultimate sentence imposed.
[21] Mr Roest, like Mr Petricevic, you were an executive director of Bridgecorp. You were its finance director from 17 July 2006, but before that date you had been with Bridgecorp in a number of roles since 1996.
[22] As the finance director of Bridgecorp you were heavily involved in the day to day operation of the business and had responsibility for all financial information including cash flows that were prepared, and a variety of other detailed financial information about the company. You were also a member of various committees within Bridgecorp and attended board meetings on a monthly basis, regular meetings of the executive committee, meetings of the ALCO committee, the credit committee and the audit committee. Your office at Bridgecorp was beside Mr Petricevic’s and the two of you regularly discussed Bridgecorp’s business and position.
[23] You knew from 7 February on that Bridgecorp and BIL had missed principal and interest repayments due to investors on a number of occasions. In finding the charges under the Crimes Act proved the Court found you knew the statement in the offer documents that Bridgecorp had never missed interest and principal repayments was false, and that you intended to induce people to invest in Bridgecorp and BIL
despite that. In finding the Companies Act charges proved the Court found that you furnished statements to the trustee that were false in a misleading particular, namely that they failed to disclose Bridgecorp and BIL had missed those interest and principal repayments.
[24] In finding the Securities Act charges proved the Court found that the offer documents included a number of untrue statements, particularly:
that Barcroft Holdings was not a related party;
that no relevant adverse circumstances had arisen between 30 June 2006 and
21 December 2006;
in relation to the issue of liquidity risk; and
that after 7 February the interest and principal payments had not been missed.
[25] The Court also found there were false statements made in the extension certificate which was registered in order to prolong and extend the effective life of the offer documents and receive further investments from the public.
[26] The Court rejected the defences raised to the Securities Act counts that the statements were immaterial or that you had reasonable grounds to believe and did, up to the distribution of the documents, believe them to be true.
[27] The evidence also established that you were heavily involved with Mr Urwin in the establishment of the Barcroft transaction and through your ability to appoint trustees to the Pacific Trust, you had influence over Barcroft. Mr Dawson directly raised the issue of Barcroft as a related party with you. The lending to the entities underlying the Barcroft transaction and the effect of the Barcroft transaction itself was one of the principal reasons for the failure of Bridgecorp. Your knowledge of that transaction, apart from Mr Urwin, was far more extensive than any of the other directors.
[28] In summary, the Court found you knew of defaults from 7 February 2007 onwards, and that you concurred in making and leaving false statements before the public. You were found to have acted dishonestly and with intent to deceive the investing public from 7 February 2007 on.
[29] I have considered the authorities counsel have referred to in terms of the Crimes Act offending, which I take as the lead offending. I have been most assisted by the cases of R v Farquhar1 and R v Thompson.2 Both cases were decided under earlier similar provisions of the Crimes Act. Of course I have also taken into account the sentence imposed on Mr Petricevic.
[30] I accept that you did not set out to cause any of the investors harm, but you did deliberately make false statements with the intention of inducing people to invest in Bridgecorp when you knew the company was in serious financial trouble. It had even ceased new lending which was its principal activity. The new money was effectively used to keep the company going and to meet repayments of investors who wished to withdraw their monies.
[31] Mr Dacre said that when you were appointed as finance director in July 2006, the existing directors must have been aware of the difficulties facing Bridgecorp, and those difficulties or concerns were not disclosed to you. He suggested they obviously had their own motives when choosing to appoint you as a director. He suggested, indeed submitted, that Mr Petricevic’s knowledge of the company, his power within it and experience was to be contrasted with yours.
[32] I am not persuaded that your role in relation to the offending within Bridgecorp was materially different to that of Mr Petricevic’s, so that you can be considered any less culpable than him. While you may not have been a director for as long, at all relevant times you were finance director and were, as I have said, heavily involved in the day to day operation of the business. You belonged to a
number of internal committees and had responsibility for financial information.
1 R v Farquhar CA455/94, 5 October 1995.
2 R v Thompson HC Christchurch T113/95, 8 March 1996; R v Thompson CA75/96, 14 August
1996.
[33] Mr Dacre also noted that Mr Petricevic and his interests held in excess of 40 per cent of the companies’ shares while you held in contrast a relatively modest shareholding. The Crown suggests that you were aware a likely consequence of disclosure to the trustee would have been the trustee putting Bridgecorp into receivership or investor funds drying up, and suggested that was a motive for your acting in the way you did.
[34] While I acknowledge your shareholding was significantly less than Mr Petricevic’s interests it was not insignificant, but I accept as I did for Mr Petricevic, that this was not a factor that formed any focus or was a major issue at trial.
[35] Mr Roest, after considering your counsel’s submissions and the relevant authorities, I see no reason to take a different starting point in your case than that I took for Mr Petricevic. The appropriate starting point on a totality basis to reflect your culpability and overall offending, taking the Crimes Act offences as the lead offences, is a sentence of seven and a half years’ imprisonment. I then turn to your personal factors.
[36] There are no personal aggravating factors.
[37] The pre-sentence report is a brief one. At the age of 55 you appear before the Court for sentencing on criminal offending for the first time. You told the probation officer you regretted any investor lost money but added “We were doing everything we could to make sure money was repaid”.
[38] I have read the letter your wife has written to the Court. I accept that you have been a caring and supportive father. I also acknowledge the personal issues disclosed in relation to you and your family in that letter. In relation to your personal issues, there is no evidence of any link between them and your offending so as to engage s 9(2)(e) of the Sentencing Act.
[39] Mr Roest, I can take into account that at the age of 55 you have no previous relevant criminal offending, I can apply a reduction of 10 per cent as appropriate for
that. There can be no further reduction for remorse or your statements that you thought you were doing everything to make sure the money was repaid. You do not accept the verdicts and still apparently regard yourself as innocent. You have no insight into your offending. You do not, and are unable to, accept responsibility for the harm that you have caused that I have been discussing.
[40] There can be no credit for remorse in those circumstances.
[41] There is no prospect of reparation. You are bankrupt and have no assets.
[42] In the absence of any other mitigating factors an end sentence of six years nine months would be the result. However, I note Mr Petricevic received an end sentence of six years six months. I note Mr Dacre refers to your indifferent health and that you have found prison difficult. I also take account, in terms of parity, of your situation and that of Mr Petricevic and I do not consider that you should receive ultimately a longer sentence than Mr Petricevic.
[43] Mr Roest please stand.
[44] Mr Roest on the offending under the Crimes Act you are sentenced to six years’ six months’ imprisonment. In relation to the offending under the Companies Act you are sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. On the Securities Act offences you are sentenced to imprisonment of four and a half years. These sentences are concurrent.
[45] The effective sentence is six and a half years’ imprisonment. [46] Stand down.
[47] Mr Steigrad, I turn to your position. You were one of three non-executive directors of Bridgecorp and BIL together with Mr Davidson and Mr Urwin.
[48] You were described in the prospectus as an experienced company director, an international businessman and an immediate past chairman of Young and Rubicam Asia Pacific and Dentsu Young and Rubicam. You, together with the other non-
executive directors, met Messrs Petricevic and Roest at monthly board meetings. In addition you sat on the audit committee. You were not, however, a member of the executive or any other working management committee. The information you received was generally limited to the information in the audit and board packs. Through the audit committee you also received monthly internal audit progress reports from the internal auditor.
[49] In the reasons for verdict the Court accepted you had an honest belief the statements in the offer documents were true at the time they were distributed. On the counts relating to the period between 21 December 2006 and 7 February 2007 the Court also found your belief was a reasonably held one. The Court also accepted that between 7 February and 30 March 2007 you remained unaware that interest and principal payments had been missed on a number of dates. That fact was never directly reported either by Messrs Petricevic or Roest, who knew of it, or by management who were aware of it. Despite that, towards the end of February and certainly by 30 March you were in possession of a number of significant items of information and had notice of several factors that should have put you on inquiry as to the truthfulness of the statements in the various offer documents.
[50] Apart from the general background of the issues facing Bridgecorp, that you would have been aware arose during 2006, there was further significant information as to the cash flow and day to day cash management placed before the board on 22
March 2007. Then, there also was the information of the predicted negative cash balance Mr Roest circulated to you and the other non-executive directors two days before the quarterly interest run was due on 31 March. I note that you accept now you should have made further inquiries. Even the most basic inquiries at that time would have, or should have, revealed payments of interest and principal had been missed which I accept would have led you to take appropriate action.
[51] After 30 March and until suspension of the prospectus the position worsened for Bridgecorp, and to that extent you and your position as director. Among the board papers for the 19 April meeting was the general manager’s summarised report, which disclosed there was a higher than normal level of inquiries as a result of
interest payments having been made on subsequent business days. By this time you were yourself concerned about Bridgecorp’s liquidity position.
[52] In relation to the Barcroft issue, I accept your knowledge and understanding of it was significantly less than Mr Petricevic and even more so, significantly less than that of Messrs Roest and Urwin. I accept that you were unaware, at least until trial, that Messrs Urwin, Roest and Petricevic had roles as appointers of the trustees of the Pacific Trust until the evidence was given.
[53] In your case the Crown submit a starting point for sentence of between three years and three years three months’ imprisonment is appropriate. It submits that at its worst your offending bordered on wilful blindness, but the Crown accepts a discount may be appropriate to reflect mitigating factors personal to you.
[54] Mr Keene submits your offending was more in the nature of material misjudgment and seeks a starting point of six months’ home detention. He submits a final sentence of 200 hours community work and $350,000 reparation would be appropriate.
[55] Mr Steigrad it is necessary for the Court to determine the level of seriousness of your offending and the particular degree of your culpability given the six counts on which you were found guilty. In the case of R v Moses3 Heath J identified a spectrum of offending under s 58 of the Securities Act starting at dishonesty and intention to mislead, next reckless or gross negligence and then carrying on down to innocent misrepresentation arising out of a greater or lesser degree of carelessness.
[56] I accept, of course, you did not act dishonestly and did not intentionally intend to mislead any investor. You were not motivated by self interest nor subject to any possible conflict of duty. I take into account the fact that your offending was shorter in duration than that of the other directors in this case, but it still extended over a number of months. I also note that the Court of Appeal in Moses made the point that it is not appropriate to draw bright lines between the types of offending on
the continuum and that the categories shade into one another.
3 R v Moses HC Auckland CRI-2009-004-1388, 2 September 2011.
[57] I accept there is force in relation to that in the Crown submission that given the information you had, and particularly with reference perhaps to the email of
29 March, your failure to act in response to that was either bordering on considerable negligent, or if you failed to consider it at all, would equally be bordering on gross negligence.
[58] However, Mr Steigrad, in my judgment your culpability rests on your failure to perform the statutory duties and functions cast on you as a director. You had a duty to form your own opinion on the accuracy, or otherwise, of the prospectus statements through the course of the prospectuses being before the public. While I have considered all of the authorities counsel have referred to, I consider the most helpful analysis of starting points in your case to be a comparison with Mr Davidson’s sentencing and the Nathans’ directors sentencing in Moses & Ors. In taking a starting point for Mr Davidson of three years three months Andrews J recorded Mr Davidson’s guilty pleas were entered on the basis that at the time the statements were made he genuinely and honestly believed they were true, but accepted his belief was not reasonable in light of what he knew or ought to have known. Like you Mr Steigrad, it was accepted Mr Davidson did not act dishonestly or intend any wrongdoing. I note Mr Keene properly makes the point that Mr Davidson’s offending spanned a longer period than yours, and I accept your culpability sits slightly below that of him for that reason.
[59] In Nathans, I note Mr Young, a non-executive director, was considered the least culpable. He became a director at a later stage. Heath J took a start point of two years nine months’ imprisonment for his offending. Mr Keene submits it is significant that in that case there was no finding of reasonable grounds for the directors’ honest belief at any stage, unlike your case. While that fact is relevant in assessing the duration of the offending, it does not, in my judgment, lead to a reduction in culpability for the periods during which the Court has held that you did fail in your obligations as a director.
[60] For the sake of completeness I refer to the sentencing of Mr Urwin. Mr Urwin pleaded guilty and was sentenced on the basis of an agreed summary of facts. However, on the basis of the evidence that I heard during the trial Mr Urwin
was substantially involved in devising and executing the Barcroft transaction, and given the significance of that transaction to the failure of Bridgecorp I consider his overall responsibility and culpability to be greater than yours.
[61] Despite Mr Keene’s submission, I am not able to accept that a starting point for your sentence of anything less than imprisonment would be appropriate. I am of course aware of the Lombard case and the sentences imposed in that case. The untrue statements were effectively a misstatement in relation to liquidity. The misstatements in the Bridgecorp case are more stark and significant. I note that in sentencing the Lombard directors, Dobson J referred in passing to the substantially greater culpability of the Nathans’ and Bridgecorp directors.
[62] In my judgment anything less than a starting point of imprisonment would not properly reflect the purposes and principles that I have previously referred to. I take as a start point for the sentence a term of three years’ imprisonment.
[63] I then turn to your personal circumstances. There are no aggravating personal circumstances. In your case there are a number of positive factors the Court can take into account by way of mitigation.
[64] At the age of 66 you appear for the first time for sentence on criminal offending. Quite apart from that record I accept you have been a positive contributor to the community you have lived in by way of community charity work and other work. For example, you were a former director and fundraising chairman of the Child Accident Prevention Foundation of Australia. You are also a founding co- chairman of the Indigenous Community Volunteers, a non-profit organisation working with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities to improve their quality of life, health and social and economic wellbeing. You are also a member of the New South Wales Marine Rescue as a volunteer. The Court has received a significant number of letters of support that attest to your good character and work in the community.
[65] I do not accept the Crown submission your good character should be seen as nothing more than neutral. There is no evidence people invested in Bridgecorp as a
result of your good character. You did not have a major profile in New Zealand. To take account of your previous clear record and your positive contribution to society, a reduction of approximately 15 per cent is appropriate. I am then also able to, in your case, take into account remorse. I accept you are genuinely remorseful, as the Supreme Court discussed the concept in R v Hessell.4 The letter you have written to the Court discloses real empathy for the victims of the Bridgecorp collapse and contrition for your own failures. Importantly, I note that both you and your counsel have said you accept the factual findings and the verdicts, and accept you should
have done more to intervene. You have expressed and shown a tangible acknowledgement of your role in the Bridgecorp failure.
[66] I also note the steps you have taken, and continue to take, to achieve a settlement of the civil proceedings.
[67] There is then the issue of the reparation. Mr Keene has confirmed you have arranged to borrow $350,000 which could be shortly available to investors. The Crown submits the Court should be careful not to discount unduly for character and reparation because someone in your position may be in a better position than others to rely on those factors. However, reparation is in my judgment tangible evidence of your remorse and the consequences of your offending, and can reduce an otherwise appropriate sentencing response. The Court is directed to take into account offers of amends such as that. Ultimately it remains the task of the sentencing Judge to determine the value of the reparation offered in the context of the case and the extent to which it requires an adjustment to components of the overall sentence.
[68] I consider your remorse and reparation combine to enable the Court to make a further reduction of approximately five months off the starting point. Finally, I take into account you and your family’s personal circumstances. Again the Court has been provided with significant amount of information in relation to that. I accept that given you live overseas the imposition of a sentence requiring you to remain in New Zealand for the purposes of the sentence would be more harsh on you, and particularly your family than it would be for a New Zealand citizen.
[69] The end result is that after taking account of all of those positive factors in your favour I consider an overall reduction of one-third from the start point to be appropriate, which would lead to a sentence of imprisonment of two years. I am then required, given that I have arrived at a sentence in that range, to consider whether a sentence short of imprisonment could be appropriate in this case and sufficient to respond to the sentencing goals of denunciation, deterrence, accountability and response to victims needs.
[70] Despite Mr Keene’s submissions I am unable to accept that a sentence of community work on its own would be adequate to meet those sentencing goals in the context of the Bridgecorp failure and this case. The Bridgecorp offending as a whole, as well as your degree of culpability, is in my judgment of a more serious nature than that of the directors in Lombard which enabled Dobson J to impose sentences of community work and reparation.
[71] However, nor do I accept the Crown submission that home detention is out of the question. The sentence of home detention is the second most restrictive sentence next to imprisonment. It was intended by Parliament as a real alternative. It is not a soft option. In R v Iosefa5 the Court of Appeal expressed the view the sentence carries with it a considerable measure of deterrence and denunciation. Nor do I accept the Crown submission that imposing a sentence less than imprisonment would create disparity with the sentences imposed on Mr Davidson and Mr Urwin in particular. At the end of the day the Court has to determine the culpability of the particular offending and offender before it. In concluding a sentence of home
detention was not appropriate for Mr Urwin, Andrews J made particular reference to his substantial involvement and personal interest in Bridgecorp and the Barcroft transaction.
[72] In my view, on the information and evidence the Court heard, you are the least culpable of the five directors of Bridgecorp. You have demonstrated genuine remorse and acceptance for your wrongdoing and accept the verdicts. In those circumstances and taking account of your personal situation as much as I can, I
consider in your case imprisonment is not necessary to respond to the relevant sentencing goals. A combination of sentences short of imprisonment will suffice.
[73] In fixing the length of home detention I also take into account the considerations under ss 7 and 8 of the Sentencing Act, and as much as I am able to I take into account your personal circumstances and the circumstances of your family obligations.
[74] Mr Steigrad please stand.
[75] On the six counts under the Securities Act you are sentenced to nine months’ home detention, together with 200 hours community work which can be completed during the course of the home detention. In addition you are to pay reparation in the sum of $350,000. That sum is to be paid to the Registrar of the High Court by 1
June 2012.
[76] The sentence of home detention is to be served at the address that is referred to in the pre-sentence report. The sentence of home detention will apply as from
10am on Monday, 21 May 2012.
[77] You are to stay in New Zealand. The formal sentence will commence at
10am on Monday, 21 May 2012. You will not be subject to any restriction within
New Zealand between now and then.
[78] The standard conditions applying to a home detention sentence will apply, but otherwise there are no special conditions necessary and no post-sentence conditions are to apply.
……………………………..
Venning J
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